Results for 'Do The Right Thing'

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  1. “You and me, same!”: Political Envy in Do The Right Thing.Logan Canada-Johnson & Sara Protasi - forthcoming - Film and Philosophy.
    In this paper we argue that political envy is central to unraveling the racial dynamics in Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing. Building upon Sara Protasi’s taxonomy of envy and, in particular, from her analysis of some DTRT scenes, we conduct a more thorough interrogation of how political emotions, most notably envy, shape race relations in the film. We start by summarizing Protasi’s account of envy and then review two alternative accounts of political emotions. After elucidating what envy (...)
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  2. Do the Right Thing.Elinor Mason - 2017 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7. pp. 117-135.
    Subjective rightness (or ‘ought’ or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and (...)
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  3. Doing the right things–trivalence in deontic action logic.Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz - 2012 - Trivalent Logics and Their Applications.
    Trivalence is quite natural for deontic action logic, where actions are treated as good, neutral or bad.We present the ideas of trivalent deontic logic after J. Kalinowski and its realisation in a 3-valued logic of M. Fisher and two systems designed by the authors of the paper: a 4-valued logic inspired by N. Belnap’s logic of truth and information and a 3-valued logic based on nondeterministic matrices. Moreover, we combine Kalinowski’s idea of trivalence with deontic action logic based on boolean (...)
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  4. At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2707-2730.
    I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important in moral evaluation. In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important, does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views (...)
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  5. “The right thing to do?” Transformation in South African sport.Brian Penrose - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):377-392.
    In this paper I attempt to unpack the current public debate on racial transformation in South African sport, particularly with regard to the demographic make-up of its national cricket and rugby sides. I ask whether the alleged moral imperative to undertake such transformation is, in fact, a moral imperative at all. I discuss five possible such imperatives: the need to compensate non-white South Africans for the injustices in sport’s racist history, the imperative to return the make-up of our national sides (...)
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  6. When doing the wrong thing is right.David Kirsh, Richard Caballero & Shannon Cuykendall - 2012 - Proceedings of the 34th Annual Cognitive Science Society.
    We designed an experiment to explore the learning effectiveness of three different ways of practicing dance movements. To our surprise we found that partial modeling, called marking in the dance world, is a better method than practicing the complete phrase, called practicing full-out; and both marking and full-out are better methods than practicing by repeated mental simulation. We suggest that marking is a form of practicing a dance phrase aspect-by-aspect. Our results also suggest that prior work on learning by observation (...)
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  7. Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
    Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden (...)
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  8. The Right Balance.Martijn Boot - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):13-32.
    The focus of this essay is on conflicts of values and rival options in public decision-making, ethics and justice that seem to require us to balance the values or options against each other. The aim is to investigate implications of the so-called fourth value relation between competing valuable options for the possibility to weigh and balance them. The fourth value relation applies to many alternatives that represent important but conflicting or incompletely compatible human values. In this essay I will try (...)
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  9. Is the right prior to the good?Julian Fink - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's (...)
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  10. The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - 2020 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):215-233.
    If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent (...)
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  11. The Limits of the Rights to Free Thought and Expression.Barrett Emerick - 2021 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 31 (2):133-152.
    It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any philosophical question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. In this paper I object to those claims and argue that no (...)
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  12.  88
    The Role of Affect in Moral Grasp and Understanding.Logan Wigglesworth - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    What is the role of affect in moral epistemology? Sentimentalists assert that moral knowledge is rooted in knowledge of specific situational moral truths, which affect is a necessary means for attaining. Rationalists claim moral knowledge is rooted in moral principles, knowledge of which is acquired a priori through reason alone; affect is unnecessary. Note that in this way of framing the debate, the issue concerns solely moral knowledge. Recent epistemology, however, has also highlighted the importance of understanding as an epistemic (...)
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  13. Neoptolemus and Huck Finn Reconsidered. Alleged Inverse akrasia and the Case for Moral Incapacity.Matilde Liberti - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry.
    Cases of akratic behavior are generally seen as paradigmatic depictions of the knowledge-action gap (Darnell et al 2019): we know what we should do, we judge that we should do it, yet we often fail to act according to our knowledge. In recent decades attention has been given to a particular instance of akratic behavior, which is that of “inverse akrasia”, where the agent possesses faulty moral knowledge but fails to act accordingly, thus ending up doing the right (...). In particular, two literary examples are considered as exemplifying this kind of akratic situation: Huckleberry Finn (Arpaly & Schroeder 1999, Arpaly 2000, Hursthouse 1999, Kleist 2009, Holton manuscript) and Neoptolemus as understood by Aristotle (NE; Arpaly & Schroeder 1999). In this paper I will argue that those of Neoptolemus and Huck Finn are not cases of inverse akrasia (Holton manuscript) but are much better explained as instances of what Williams (1993) called “moral incapacity”. In particular, the reason why they fail to act according to their original judgments is due to a lack of motivation to act accordingly, which is grounded in their moral self-identities (Blasi 1984; Vigani 2016). The paper will unfold as follows: I will, first, argue that neither Neoptolemus nor Huck Finn show akratic behavior; thus, they cannot be legitimately labeled as “inverse akratics” (par 1.); then, I will argue that they act the way they do notwithstanding their faulty judgments because they are effectively motivated to do so. Such motivation originates in their moral self-identities and is experienced through the threat of self-betrayal (par 2); finally, I will argue that when an agent is motivated to act in a way that is integral with her moral self-identity, acting otherwise is experienced as something one cannot ultimately do; that is, as a moral incapacity (par 3). This “cannot” is neither a metaphor for an “I shouldn’t”, nor an instance of what has been recently labeled a “moral impossibility” (Caprioglio Panizza 2020, 2021), since it does not arise from the normative force of deontic judgments, and it is neither physically nor psychologically impossible for the agent to act otherwise. (shrink)
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  14. A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the (...)
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  15. You Do an Empirical Experiment and You Get an Empirical Result. What Can Any Anthropologist Tell Me That Could Change That?Charles Whitehead - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (10-11):7-41.
    Do you think the quotation in my title is reasonable or unreasonable? I find it unreasonable, but I know that many will not. Two people can react to the same idea, opinion, or data in opposite ways, and the reasons for this are often ideological. Ideology always has a political origin — in this case perhaps reflecting turf wars, career promotion, self-legitimation, the privileged status of science in post-industrial societies, and the need to say the right things in order (...)
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  16. Declare the Independence of Confucianism from the State.Chenyang Li - 2019 - Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 32:7-16.
    Since antiquity, Confucians have sought to work with the state in order to implement their philosophy through state sponsorship. And yet, whenever Confucians have sought state sponsorship, naturally the government has adopted Confucian philosophy selectively to serve its own purposes and thus compromised the integrity of Confucianism. Throughout Chinese history, countless Confucian officials attempted to help rulers to do the right thing. They often failed when their advice went against the fundamental interest of rulers. On reflection, this outcome (...)
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  17. Responsibility: distinguishing virtue from capacity.Nicole Vincent - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):111-26.
    Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008:462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such (...)
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  18. Emotional Attachment and Its Limits: Mengzi, Gaozi and the Guodian Discussions.Karyn L. Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (1):132-151.
    Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements (...)
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  19. Sisyphus and Climate Change: Educating in the Context of Tragedies of the Commons.Susan T. Gardner - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (1):4.
    The tragedy of the commons is a primary contributing factor in ensuring that humanity makes no serious inroads in averting climate change. As a recent Canadian politician pointed out, we could shut down the Canadian economy tomorrow, and it would make no measurable difference in global greenhouse gas emissions. When coordinated effort is required, it would seem that doing the “right thing” alone is irrational: it will harm oneself with no positive consequences as a result. Such is the (...)
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  20. The Priority of Preferences in the Evolution of Minds.David Spurrett - manuscript
    More philosophical effort is spent articulating evolutionary rationales for the development of belief-like capacities than for precursors of desires or preferences. Nobody, though, seriously expects naturally evolved minds to be disinterested epistemologists. We agree that world-representing states won’t pay their way without supporting capacities that prioritise from an organism’s available repertoire of activities in light of stored (and occurrent) information. Some concede that desire-like states would be one way of solving this problem. Taking preferences as my starting point instead of (...)
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  21. Notas sobre a definição de virtude moral em Aristóteles (EN 1106b 36- 1107a 2).Lucas Angioni - 2009 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.
    This paper discusses some issues concerning the definition of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics 1106b 36- 1107a 2. It is reasonable to expect from a definition the complete enumeration of the relevant features of its definiendum, but the definition of moral virtue seems to fail in doing this task. One might be tempted to infer that this definition is intended by Aristotle as a mere preliminary account that should be replaced by a more precise one. The context of the argument (...)
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  22. “Some Third Thing”: Nietzsche's Words and the Principle of Charity.Tom Stern - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (2):287-302.
    The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about how we read and write about Nietzsche and, related to this, other figures in the history of philosophy. The principle of charity can appear to be a way to bridge two dif-ferent interpretative goals: getting the meaning of the text right and offering the best philosophy. I argue that the principle of charity is multiply ambiguous along three different dimensions, which I call “unit,” “mode,” and “strength”: consequently, it (...)
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  23. De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
    Abstract It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto . If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a (...)
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  24. Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press.
    This paper defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. First, I argue that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent (...)
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  25. The tortured patient: a medical dilemma.Chiara Lepora & Joseph Millum - 2011 - Hastings Center Report 41 (3):38-47.
    Torture is unethical and usually counterproductive. It is prohibited by international and national laws. Yet it persists: according to Amnesty International, torture is widespread in more than a third of countries. Physicians and other medical professionals are frequently asked to assist with torture. -/- Medical complicity in torture, like other forms of involvement, is prohibited both by international law and by codes of professional ethics. However, when the victims of torture are also patients in need of treatment, doctors can find (...)
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  26. Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - St. Paul, USA: Paragon House.
    "Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for advancing beyond (...)
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  27. Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.
    It’s one thing to do the right thing. It’s another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right Making Features View and the Rightness Itself (...)
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  28. Moral worth and skillful action.David Horst - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):657-675.
    Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, (...)
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  29. Moral Advice and Joint Agency.Eric Wiland - 2018 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.
    There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral (...)
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  30. Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights.Francesco Stellin Sturino - 2023 - Social Theory and Practice 49 (1):161-187.
    Deepfake technology can be used to produce videos of real individuals, saying and doing things that they never in fact said or did, that appear highly authentic. Having accepted the premise that Deepfake content can constitute a legitimate form of expression, it is not immediately clear where the rights of content producers and distributors end, and where the rights of individuals whose likenesses are used in this content begin. This paper explores the question of whether it can be plausibly argued (...)
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  31. Kratzer Semantics: Criticisms and Suggestions.Michael Beebe - manuscript
    Abstract -/- Kratzer’s semantics for the deontic modals ought, must, etc., is criticized and improvements are suggested. Specifically, a solution is offered for the strong/weak, must/ought contrast, based on connecting must to right and ought to good as their respective ordering norms. A formal treatment of the semantics of must is proposed. For the semantics of ought it is argued that good enough should replace best in the formula giving truth conditions. A semantics for supposed to slightly different from (...)
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  32. Moral Education in the Classroom: A Lived Experiment.Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung & Rebecca DeYoung - 2020 - Expositions: An Interdisciplinary Study in the Humanities 1 (14).
    What would a course on ethics look like if it took into account Alasdair MacIntyre’s concerns about actually teaching students ethical practices? How could professors induct students into practices that prompt both reflection on their cultural formation and self-knowledge of the ways they have been formed by it? According to MacIntyre, such elements are prerequisites for an adequate moral education. His criticism of what he terms “Morality” includes the claim that most courses don’t even try to teach the right (...)
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  33. Aporia and the Implications for the Intuitive Knowledge of Children | Blog of the APA.Maria daVenza Tillmanns - 2018 - Blog of the APA.
    The compass we use to navigate life needs to be cultivated from an early age. My sense is that the arts, including Plato’s dialogues cultivate our navigational sense. It does not tell us rationally what is good or what is bad. It is not that simple. Remember, the stars we sail by, are not fixed, either. So we need to develop a sense for what may be right or not in any particular situation. We may have a general sense, (...)
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  34. Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy.Robert J. Hartman - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):353-359.
    The received view of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person’s ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to (...)
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  35. The Strength of Truth-Theories.Richard Heck - manuscript
    This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? It turns out that, in a wide range of cases, we can get some nice answers to this question, but only if we work in a framework that is somewhat different from those usually employed in discussions of (...)
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  36. The Transmission of Cumulative Cultural Knowledge — Towards a Social Epistemology of Non-Testimonial Cultural Learning.Müller Basil - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    Cumulative cultural knowledge [CCK], the knowledge we acquire via social learning and has been refined by previous generations, is of central importance to our species’ flourishing. Considering its importance, we should expect that our best epistemological theories can account for how this happens. Perhaps surprisingly, CCK and how we acquire it via cultural learning has only received little attention from social epistemologists. Here, I focus on how we should epistemically evaluate how agents acquire CCK. After sampling some reasons why extant (...)
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  37. Measuring Complexity: Things That Go Wrong and How to Get It Right—Version 2.Vincent Vesterby - manuscript
    Seven problems that occur in attempts to measure complexity are pointed out as they occur in four proposed measurement techniques. Each example method is an improvement over the previous examples. It turns out, however, that none are up to the challenge of complexity. Apparently, there is no currently available method that truly gets the measure of complexity. There are two reasons. First, the most natural approach, quantitative analysis, is rendered inadequate by the very nature of complexity. Second, the intrinsic magnitude (...)
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  38. The meaning of life and the measure of civilizations.Barry Smith - 2002 - In The History of Liberalism in Europe. Paris: CREA/CREPHE.
    In what respects is Western civilization superior or inferior to its rivals? In raising this question we are addressing a particularly strong form of the problem of relativism. For in order to compare civilizations one with another we would need to be in possession of a framework that is neutral and objective, a framework based on principles of evaluation which would be acceptable, in principle, to all human beings. Morality will surely provide one axis of such a framework (and we (...)
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  39. When you think it's bad it's worse than you think: Psychological bias and the ethics of negative character assessments.Hagop Sarkissian - 2015 - In Brian Bruya (ed.), The Philosophical Challenge from China. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 3-21.
    We often find ourselves thinking of others as boring, nauseating, dim, dodgy, clumsy, or otherwise irritating or unpleasant. What’s the right thing to do when we have such thoughts? Some philosophers argue we ought to be civil and conceal them, lest others pick up on them and feel disrespected. Drawing on experimental psychology and classical Confucianism, I argue otherwise, suggesting that we ought to (literally) doubt such appraisals and be wary of their veracity.
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  40. Epistemic Norms, the False Belief Requirement, and Love.J. Spencer Atkins - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (3):289-309.
    Many authors have argued that epistemic rationality sometimes comes into conflict with our relationships. Although Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller argue that friendships sometimes require bad epistemic agency, their proposals do not go far enough. I argue here for a more radical claim—romantic love sometimes requires we form beliefs that are false. Lovers stand in a special position with one another; they owe things to one another that they do not owe to others. Such demands hold for beliefs as well. (...)
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  41. (1 other version)What is at stake in taking responsibility? Lessons from third-party property insurance.Nicole A. Vincent - 2001 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 20 (1):75-94.
    Third-party property insurance (TPPI) protects insured drivers who accidentally damage an expensive car from the threat of financial ruin. Perhaps more importantly though, TPPI also protects the victims whose losses might otherwise go uncompensated. Ought responsible drivers therefore take out TPPI? This paper begins by enumerating some reasons for why a rational person might believe that they have a moral obligation to take out TPPI. It will be argued that if what is at stake in taking responsibility is the ability (...)
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  42. Radiation and Rational Deliberation.Martijn Boot - 2015 - Ars Vivendi Journal 7:3-18.
    There is uncertainty and disagreement about the question which preventive actions are rationally justified with regard to moderately elevated levels of nuclear radiation. This may have at least four causes: ignorance, insufficient information, inconclusiveness and indeterminability. After the nuclear disaster with the Fukushima nuclear power plant the advice, given by some authorities, to leave Tokyo was largely based on the former two factors: ignorance and insufficient information. By contrast, the uncertainty and disagreement amongst experts about the size of the area (...)
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  43.  49
    A Human Right to Relationships?Stephanie Collins - 2022 - In Kimberley Brownlee, Adam Neal & David Jenkins (eds.), Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter asks whether there is a human right to close personal relationships. It begins by providing a prima facie argument in favour of such a right: humans’ interests in close personal relationships are important, universal, and fundamental. It then explains that there are problems with the distribution, demandingness, and motivation of the correlative duties. The result is that each individual bears a human right only to ‘intimacy consideration’, not to close personal relationships themselves. The chapter then (...)
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  44. Inter-Relationship between Business Ethics and Corporate Governance Among Indian Companies.Dr Ramakrishnan Ramachandran - 2007 - Https://Papers.Ssrn.Com/Sol3/Papers.Cfm?Abstract_Id=1751657.
    Every organization, as they grow has many stakeholders like shareholders, employees, customers, vendors, community, etc. For survival and growth, they have to rely upon healthy relations with all these stockholders. Hence organizations need to provide good returns for shareholders but also good jobs for employees, reliable products for consumers, responsible relations with the community and a clean environment. -/- Business ethics is the application of general ethical principles to business dilemmas and encompasses a broader range of issues and concerns than (...)
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  45. (1 other version)Doing a Double Take: (Further) Against the Primary Sound Account of Echoes.Jeff Hawley - unknown
    Presented at Philosophy Across Disciplines Conference 2021, Newcastle University. -/- As noted by philosopher Robert Pasnau, “our standard view of sound is incoherent” at best. A quick perusal of how we discuss and represent sound in our day-to-day language readily highlights a number of inconsistencies. Sound might be described roughly as emanating from the location of its material source (the ‘crack of the snare drum over there’ distal theory), as a disruption somewhere in the space in-between the sounding object and (...)
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  46. Autism: The Very Idea.Simon Cushing - 2012 - In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 17-45.
    If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of course, some of those symptoms themselves might be hard to observe definitively. Compare with telling whether or not someone is bleeding: while it might be hard to tell if someone is bleeding internally, we know what it takes to find out, and when we have the right access and instruments we can settle (...)
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  47. Ethical Issues with Artificial Ethics Assistants.Elizabeth O'Neill, Michal Klincewicz & Michiel Kemmer - 2023 - In Carissa Véliz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines the possibility of using AI technologies to improve human moral reasoning and decision-making, especially in the context of purchasing and consumer decisions. We characterize such AI technologies as artificial ethics assistants (AEAs). We focus on just one part of the AI-aided moral improvement question: the case of the individual who wants to improve their morality, where what constitutes an improvement is evaluated by the individual’s own values. We distinguish three broad areas in which an individual might think (...)
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  48. The moral truth.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Common-sense allows that talk about moral truths makes perfect sense. If you object to the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s assertion that it is a truth that ‘all men’ are ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’, you are more likely to object that these rights are not unalienable or that they are not endowed by the Creator, or even that its wording ignores the fact that women have rights too, than that this is not the sort of (...) which could be a truth. Whether it is a truth or not seems beside the point, anyway; the writers of the Declaration could just have well written, ‘We hold it to be self-evident that all men are created equal, and also that it is self-evident that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,’ save only that its cadence would lack some of the poetic resonance of the version which garnered Hancock’s signature. Yet famously, ethical noncognitivists have proclaimed that moral sentences can’t be true or false – that, like ‘Hooray!’ or ‘dammit!’, they are not even the kinds of things to be true or false. Noncognitivism is sometimes even defined as the view that this is so, but even philosophers who define ‘noncognitivism’ more broadly, as consistent with the idea that moral sentences may be true or false, have believed that they needed to do important philosophical spadework in order to make sense of how moral sentences could be true or false. In this article we’ll look at the puzzle about moral truth as it is faced by early noncognitivists and by metaethical expressivists, the early noncognitivists’ contemporary cousins. We’ll look at what it would take for expressivists to ‘earn the right’ to talk about moral truths at all, and in particular at what it would take for them to earn the right to claim that moral truths behave in the ways that we should expect – including that meaningful moral sentences which lack presuppositions are true or false, and that classically valid arguments are truth-preserving.. (shrink)
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  49. Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.
    Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as (...)
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  50. The future of death: cryonics and the telos of liberal individualism.James Hughes - 2001 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 6 (1).
    This paper addresses five questions: First, what is trajectory of Western liberal ethics and politics in defining life, rights and citizenship? Second, how will neuro-remediation and other technologies change the definition of death for the brain injured and the cryonically suspended? Third, will people always have to be dead to be cryonically suspended? Fourth, how will changing technologies and definitions of identity affect the status of people revived from brain injury and cryonic suspension? I propose that Western liberal thought is (...)
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