Peter D. Thomas’s book The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism draws us to reflect on a point that Gramsci’s interpreters have often neglected: the particular structure of the Prison Notebooks, i.e., the ways in which the text was constituted and, dependent on that, the fundamental methodological criteria for its interpretation. Thomas’s book is a consummate synthesis between the deep and detailed study of the Notebooks text and the need to reconstruct some order within; between close historicalphilosophical assessment and theoretical (...) proposal within contemporary Marxist (and para-Marxist) debate. Consequently, this book confronts us – as Gramsci’s present-day readers – with a task that no-one can face alone, but that is nonetheless extraordinarily urgent: the task of intervening in the debate within the post-modern and post-Marxist Left so that the link between Marxism and philosophy is resumed, starting out from Gramsci himself. In short: a revival of Marx through Gramsci, through – in turn – a return of the philosophy of praxis as Marxism for our own day. (shrink)

Dalle decisioni algoritmiche alle raccomandazioni sugli acquisti, dai sex robot alla sorveglianza sociale, dalla cybersicurezza all’autonomia operativa dei veicoli e delle armi, l’impatto dell’intelligenza artificiale e della robotica sulla vita delle persone è sempre più ramificato e pervasivo. Il volume offre un quadro d’insieme delle questioni etiche sollevate dall’incontro tra automi e individui nella società contemporanea: la protezione dell’autonomia a fronte della raccolta minuziosa di dati personali, le forme di benessere collettivo da promuovere attraverso l’automazione, la trasparenza e l’equità delle (...) decisioni prese con il supporto di un algoritmo, il ruolo dei sistemi intelligenti nella crisi ambientale. L’automazione non è segno incontrovertibile di sventura, ma nemmeno indizio sicuro di progresso. Cosa sarà delle persone, delle società e della vita sul nostro pianeta dipende in modo cruciale da come sapremo affrontare le sfide etiche dell’età degli automi. (shrink)

Il principale obiettivo teoretico di questo lavoro consiste nel tentativo di verificare, attraverso un’indagine storico-genealogica e concettuale, come nella filosofia di Gilles Deleuze si assista ad un radicale mutamento del paradigma relativo alla nozione di trascendentale. Si tratta, in altre parole, di ripercorrere alcune delle tappe fondamentali che conducono il filosofo parigino a “purificare” il trascendentale da ogni riferimento ad una coscienza soggettiva egologica che si fondi in quanto principio genetico del mondo. Si riterrà utile procedere analizzando, in primo luogo, (...) il rapporto che Deleuze intrattiene con le istanze originarie del soggettivismo trascendentale kantiano, ove il trascendentale stesso, nel pensiero del filosofo tedesco, è strettamente connesso all’Io penso in quanto facoltà appercettiva dell’intelletto che incarnerebbe le condizioni di possibilità dell’esperienza. In secondo luogo, si tratterà di orientarsi nel dibattito critico che Deleuze intrattiene con la fenomenologia di Edmund Husserl, ed in particolar modo con la lettura husserliana della Critica della Ragion Pura di Kant, ove il padre fondatore dell’indirizzo fenomenologico novecentesco è colui che fa leva sullo stretto rapporto che sussiste tra il trascendentale e la coscienza. Nonostante il percorso storico, tracciato dal concetto di trascendentale, abbia inizio con l’opera di Kant, ritengo non sia possibile evitare un pur breve confronto con il ruolo che l’ego ha avuto nella formulazione cartesiana del cogito; si dovrà, per ciò stesso, considerare la particolare lettura deleuziana che riconosce nel cogito cartesiano il “luogo” in cui confluiscono tutte le facoltà del soggetto, permettendo di identificare il cogito stesso con una forma embrionale di piano di immanenza, seppur non adeguatamente radicalizzata nella misura in cui il cogito cartesiano resta saldamente ancorato al soggetto. Ritengo, tuttavia, che il più considerevole obiettivo di questa proposta d’indagine non si risolva in una ricostruzione meramente storico-genealogica. Si tratterà, al contrario, di verificare come l’importanza degli esiti raggiunti da Deleuze mediante l’opera di purificazione della nozione di trascendentale sia da individuare su due fronti: 1. La teorizzazione del concetto di campo trascendentale permette a Deleuze di disegnare una forma di temporalità non psicologica e non cronologica fondata sul paradosso secondo cui il tempo costituirebbe un’interiorità non psicologica, o per meglio dire, una dimensione autenticamente trascendentale nella quale il soggetto vive e diviene. 2. In antitesi ai proponimenti della fenomenologia husserliana, l’esito autentico del progetto di purificazione del trascendentale da ogni istanza egologica consiste nell’interruzione della correlazione a priori tra il soggetto e il mondo, nella destituzione della filosofia da ogni pregiudizio antropocentrico, e nella rideterminazione dell’umano niente più che come un effetto, o un caso, del mondo. (shrink)

Las normas nacionales y el campo de batalla tecnológico, industrial, económico e incluso militar de las aplicaciones de la inteligencia artificial se enfrentarán significativamente entre las potencias mundiales a medida que avance la carrera por la supremacía geopolítica estratégica. China y Estados Unidos están considerados como las dos naciones punteras en I+D (investigación y desarrollo). Estados Unidos alberga algunas de las principales empresas e instituciones de IA, y cuenta con un sólido historial de innovación y espíritu emprendedor en el sector (...) tecnológico. China, por su parte, ha avanzado considerablemente en I+D gracias a la financiación pública, a un gran número de jóvenes investigadores y al espíritu de competencia del Partido Comunista Chino. Rusia, por su parte, con un liderazgo pragmático y demencial, avanza en IA a paso firme y sin mayores reservas. Cada uno de los tres países ha publicado su normativa ética para la IA y, como objetivo de este capítulo, se presenta un análisis ponderado de cada uno. (shrink)

Si la plupart des sept articles que Pierre Duhem fit paraître dans la «Revue des questions scientifiques» entre 1892 et 1896 ont déjà fait l’objet d’excellents commentaires spécifiques, il demeure assez difficile de percevoir ce qui pourrait rendre compte tout à la fois de leur enchaînement, de la grande diversité des thématiques dont ils témoignent, et des évolutions conceptuelles qui s’y manifestent. Constatant que ces articles suscitèrent des critiques aussi vives qu’inattendues, l’auteur du présent volume, destiné à accompagner leur lecture, (...) soutient que pour répondre à cette difficulté, il convient d’accorder davantage d’attention aux circonstances de leur rédaction et, plus particulièrement, à l’accueil qui leur fut réservé. S’attacher à le faire permet en outre de faire émerger la thématique principale dont il fut constamment question lors de ces débats : celle des rapports en physique et métaphysique. (shrink)

In un verso di Ariosto, la sorte di Giordano Bruno. SPECIALE V CENTENARIO ORLANDO FURIOSO (1516–2016).

BEN ALI (Souad) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Présentation (pp. 5-6). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Introduction (pp. 7-13). BEN ALI (Souad), Aux origines de l’épistémologie historique: un retour à Pierre Duhem est-il justifiable ? (pp. 15-57). BORDONI (Stefano), De Cournot à Duhem: la naissance d’une tradition critique (pp. 59-93). FORTINO (Mirella), L’épistémologie de Duhem est-elle une ennemie de la rationalité ouverte ? (pp. 95-122). LEITE (Fábio Rodrigo), Quelques notes sur le prétendu réalisme struc­turel attribué à Pierre Duhem (pp. 123-164). ROUMENGOUS (Lucas), La continuité de (...) la physique à la métaphysique: un argument en faveur du néo-thomisme de Pierre Duhem ? (pp. 165-198). SEIDENGART (Jean), Duhem et les limites de son phénoménisme: la théorie physique peut-elle se contenter de sauver les phénomènes ? (pp. 199-219). STOFFEL (Jean-Fran­çois), Pierre Duhem et la revendication d’une tradition phéno­mé­naliste: à propos de son «Essai sur la notion de théorie physique de Platon à Galilée» (pp. 221-268). STOFFEL (Jean-François), L’«Histoire de la physique» de Pierre Duhem: contexte d’une publication singulière et historique de l’usage du terme «révolution» (pp. 271-300). BORDONI (Stefano), L’«Histoire de la physique» de Pierre Duhem: une histoire synthétique et tran­chante (pp. 301-310). DUHEM (Pierre), Histoire de la physique / manuscrit édité par Souad BEN ALI et Jean-François STOFFEL (pp. 311-406). Présentation des auteurs (pp. 407-409). Table des matières (pp. 411-412). (shrink)

This paper analyzes the objections of Adolf Reinach to Kant’s transcendental apriorism, shedding light on (1) the speculative distance separating their conceptions of philosophy (namely Reinach’s phenomenology and Kant’s transcendental critique), and (2) the consequential misunderstanding which is at the core of Reinach’s confrontation with Kant. In particular, attention is paid to the issue of the transcendental constitution of objectness, i.e. the question of the givenness of an object with respect to certain functions proper to the subject. In order to (...) illustrate how such a concept is completely absent in Reinach, I will compare his position with those of Husserl, in their relations with Kant’s interpretation of Hume’s philosophy. (shrink)

At the very beginning of On Interpretation (I, 1, 16a3-14) Aristotle distinguishes four levels and discusses their relationships. From this text, we can infer the following: 1. There are four levels: writing, speaking, mental experience and external world. Since writing and speaking can truly be taken as belonging to the same realm, we can reduce Aristotle’s distinction to three realms: language, thought and external world. 2. The realm of language, in both levels of writing and speaking, is different for different (...) people but both of the other realms of thought and external world are the same for them. By this Aristotle must mean that though people of different languages have different writings and speaking words, the things that are in the world and their affections on people’s thought are the same. 3. The relations both between language and thought and in language itself is symbolization: ‘Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.’ 4. The relation between external world and thought is similarity: ‘Those things of which our mental experiences are similarities (παθἠματα τῆς ψυχῆς ... ὁμοιώματα).’ (ΟΙ., 16a7) In de Anima (16a8-9; II, 5, 418a4-5; II, 4, 429a10-11; 429a13-16; 429a23) Aristotle describes thoughts as ‘likenesses of objects.’ Paolo Crivelli says that in these addresses Aristotle believe that ‘a thought is of an object just if it is a likeness of it’ and ‘to be a likeness of an object is to be the result of a process of likening of which that object is a cause.’ This, Crivelli believes, is indeed the basis of the sameness of the objects of thoughts: they are results of the same processes of likening by the same objects. 5. There is a correspondence between nouns and verbs on the one hand and objects of thought without co-positing and positing away on the other hand: ‘Nouns themselves and verbs are like objects of thought (νοἠματι) without co-positing and positing away.’ (OI, I, 1, 16a13-14) A. Relationship between external world and thought The following can be inferred from Aristotle’s works about the relationship between thought and external world: 1. ‘The soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation is in a way what is sensible.’ (So., Γ, 8, 431b21-23) In fact, ‘within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible.’ (So., Γ, 8, 431b26-27) 2. It is the form of the external objects that are in thought (So., Γ, 8, 431b26-29) and the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things (ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα, καὶ ὃσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἓξις καὶ πάθη). (So., Γ, 8, 432a3-6) 3. While external objects are perishable, objects of thought seem to be eternal. (PrA., A, 33, 47b21-22) B. Relationship between language and the external world 1. There is a correspondence between the external world and the true statements about them: ‘If it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white.’ (OI, I, 9, 18a39-b5) 2. While external objects ‘does seem in some way the cause of’ the truth or falsity of lingual statements, ‘the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence.’ (Cat., 12, 14b18-22; cf. OI, I, 9, 18b36-19a6) Thus, the external objects reciprocate as to implication of existence with the corresponding true statement about them and thus are prior to them.’ (Cat., 12, 14b11-23) 3. The opposition between an affirmation and negation corresponds to an opposition in the external world between the objects underlying those statements. (Cat., 10, 12b6-15) 4. The correspondence of the whole structure of the external world and language for Aristotle is so that in analyzing the language he shows himself as analyzing the external world. It is in fact a very crucial and controversial dispute whether Aristotle’s philosophy in its very decisive parts is theorizing about language or about external world. In most of his important theories, he begins with discussing language. In fact, language is where he enters the discussion and, in many cases, where he finishes it. In these cases, he either does not discuss external world at all or only derives some principles or conclusions about it. In some other cases he begins from language but ends in external world. a) Daniel W. Graham thinks that language is Aristotle’s ‘model of the world.’ He refers to ‘subjecthood’ as what formally characterizes primary substance and explains how it bases reality in Aristotle: while to be an absolute subject is equal to be fully real, to be a predicate of a subject is equal to be real. ‘Language is not merely a tool to get around in the world; it reveals the structure of the world … the deep structure of language is isomorphic with the world… In this word, logic can reveal connections between elements because language and the world have a form in common. He lists Trendelenburg (1846, 11-13), Gillespie (1925) and (Ackrill (1963, 78-81) as those who have the same idea. b) Emphasizing on the force of τί in Aristotle’s statement when he says that assertions affirm something (τί) of something (τί) makes Peter Simpson (p. 85) to stress, in his interpretation of Jacob’s theory, on the ontological aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy. Jacob says that in his theory of predication, Aristotle focuses on ‘things’ and not words or concepts and predication is a relationship between extralinguistic entities rather than merely linguistic ones; something extralinguistic and ontological. c) Quoting Ackrill ((1963, 73): ‘the categories classify things, not words’) and Kahn ((1978, 248): ‘Aristotle never regards predication as a grammatical or linguistic relation of word to word, nor does he ever speak of subject and predicate as concepts united in judgment’), Fabio Morales says that Aristotle is not classifying predication in Categories but the attributes or properties these stand for.’ d) Graham thinks that the theory of synonymity-homonimity is not purely linguistic, since it is things rather than words that have these properties. (shrink)

However, there are a few points about what we can call ‘relation’ in Aristotle’s works: 1. Sound is always of something in relation to something and in something and it is impossible for one body only to generate a sound. (So., B, 8, 419b9-10) 2. Corresponding relation: ‘Let then C be to D as A, white, is to B, black; it follows alternado that C:A :: D:B. if then C and A belong to one subject, the case will be the (...) same with them as with D and B…’ 3. ‘And the case is similar in regard to the states of the soul, all of which (like those of body) exist in virtue of particular relations… In the first place, it is much more true of the possession of knowledge that it depends upon a particular relation. And further, it is evident that there is no becoming of these states. For that which is potentially possessed of knowledge becomes actually possessed of it not by being set in motion at all itself but by reason of the presence of something else; i.e. it is when it meets with the particular object that it knows in a manner the particular through its knowledge of the universal.’ (Phy., Z, 3) 4. The negation of a relation must be the negation of that relation and not of its elements: ‘For the expression ‘it is true’ stands on a similar footing to ‘it is.’ For the negation of ‘it is true to call it white’ is not ‘it is true to call it not-white’ but ‘it is not true to call it white.’ (PsA., A, 46, 52a32-) 5. The fact that Aristotle does not have any word for relation is taken by some scholars (e.g. Fabio Morales ) as an evidence that Aristotle lays emphasis on the relata instead of the relation itself. 6. Knowledge and relation. Aristotle has a very interesting assertion about the relation between knowledge and relation: ‘It is much more true of the possession of knowledge that it depends upon a particular relation [instead of alteration]. And further, it is evident that there is no becoming of these states. For that which is potentially possessed of knowledge becomes actually possessed of it not by being set in motion at all itself but by reason of the presence of something else: it is when it meets with the particular object that it knows in a manner the particular through its knowledge of the universal.’ (Phy., Z, 3) . (shrink)

RESUMO A Transferência de Embrião (TE) em bovinos se trata de uma técnica mundialmente disseminada com objetivo de aumentar a capacidade reprodutiva da fêmea. Mantém vínculo direto com outras técnicas das biotecnologias da reprodução, como, a Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), Produção In Vitro e In Vivo de embriões (PIVE) e Transferência de Embrião em Tempo Fixo (TETF), sendo estas, técnicas que fazem parte de um processo, que vai desde a seleção de doadoras, passando pelo preparo dos embriões até sua inovulação em (...) receptoras criteriosamente selecionadas. Com seu avanço, várias tecnologias de manejo vêm sendo implantadas: formas no transporte de embriões, protocolos de sincronização de doadoras e receptoras, e protocolos de recuperação de oócitos para produção de embriões. Isto infundiu a tecnologia, porém, os investimentos previstos para a produção de um animal de alto mérito genético limita sua utilização. Contudo, esta análise abordou avanços tecnológicos essenciais para o sucesso da TE, incluindo novos protocolos, sexagem de embriões, além do uso de embriões congelados Direct Transfer (DT) e vitrificados. No entanto, é claro que o sucesso do procedimento está no processo como um todo, em destaque ressalta-se que é de grande valia que o profissional apto a executar a técnica esteja sempre preparado e atualizado garantindo qualidade, eficiência e sustentabilidade na pecuária. Esta revisão foi desenvolvida com o propósito de adquirir conhecimento teórico, de forma detalhada e crítica, nas técnicas e procedimentos de Transferência de Embriões em bovinos, incluindo a colheita, manipulação e implantação de embriões. Palavras-chaves: Bovino, doadora, embrião, receptora. ABSTRACT Embryo Transfer (ET) in cattle is a globally widespread technique aimed at enhancing the reproductive capacity of females. It is closely linked to other techniques in reproductive biotechnologies, such as Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), In Vitro and In Vivo Embryo Production (PIVE), and Timed Embryo Transfer (TET), all of which are part of a process that ranges from donor selection, through embryo preparation, to their inoculation into carefully chosen recipients. With its advancement, various management technologies have been implemented: including methods for embryo transport, synchronization protocols for donors and recipients, and oocyte recovery protocols for embryo production. Although technology has been infused, the anticipated investments for producing animals of high genetic merit limit its widespread use. However, this analysis addressed essential technological advances for the success of ET, including new protocols, embryo sexing, as well as the use of frozen-thawed (DT) and vitrified embryos. Nevertheless, it is clear that the success of the procedure lies in the entire process. Notably, it emphasizes the significant value of having a qualified professional who is always prepared and updated to ensure quality, efficiency, and sustainability in livestock farming. This literary review was developed with the purpose of acquiring theoretical knowledge, in a detailed and critical way, on the techniques and procedures of Embryo Transfer in cattle, including the collection, manipulation and implantation of embryos. Keywords: Bovine, donor, embryo, recipient. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARUSELLI, P.S; MADUREIRA, E.H. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. 2000, Anais.. São Paulo: Fundação da Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, USP, 2000. BARUSSELI, P.S. et al. Importância do emprego da eCG em protocolos de sincronização para IA, TE e SOV em tempo fixo. Biotecnologia de reprodução em bovinos (3° Simpósio Internacional de Reprodução Animal Aplicada). 2008. BRANDÃO, G.V.R. Revisão de Literatura: Transferência de Embrião em Bovinos. Curitibanos-SC, 2019. BUENO, A.P.; BELTRAN, M.P.; Produção in vitro de embriões bovinos. Revista Científica Eletrônica De Medicina Veterinária. ISSN 1679-7353, ano VI, n.11, Julho, 2008. CAETANO, S.G; SILVA, N.V.S. Inseminação artificial de bovnos em tempo fixo (IATF) – Revisão de literatura. UNIFUCAMP, Monte Carmelo- M.G, Junho, 2023. CARVALHO, V.H.S. et al. Impactos das biotécnicas da reprodução animal e o melhoramento genético na pecuária de corte. PUBVET, São Luis De Montes Belos, v.17, n.8, p.1-10, 2023 DANTAS, K.S.A.; NUNES, C. C. C.; FERREIRA, J.; DANTAS, R. A. A. Seleção de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões (PIVE) em bovinos no Nordeste do Brasil. Ciência Animal, Fortaleza, v. 28, p. 1-14, 2018. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Transferência de Embriões nos Animais e a Indústria de Embriões no Brasil. DIAS, L.R.O. Fatores que afetam a produção de embriões pela Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI) em bovinos. 2021. 85 f. Tese (Doutorado em [nome do programa]) - Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2021. DOMINGUES, P.F.; LANGONI, H. Manejo Sanitário Animal. Editora de Publicações Biomédicas Ltda - EPUB, Rio de Janeiro, 2001. 209 p. EMBRAPA. MINERAIS NA EFICIÊNCIA REPRODUTIVA DE BOVINOS. SÃO CARLOS- SÃO PAULO 2008. FIDELIS, C.A.S. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo intracornual profunda em bovinos. Dissertação (mestrado acadêmico). Araguaína - TO, 2019. GONÇALVES, R.L.R.; VIANA, J.H.M. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Anais do XXIII Congresso Brasileiro de Reprodução Animal, 2019, Gramado, RS, 2019, p. 156-159. GOUVEIA, F.F. A Produção in vitro de embriões Bovinos. Monografia (Conclusão do curso de Medicina Veterinária) – Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2011. GREGIANINI, J.T.F. et al. Avaliação de embriões bovinos utilizando sêmen sexado e convencional. In: SEMINÁRIO DA EMBRAPA ACRE DE INICIAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA E PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO, 4., 2021, Rio Branco, AC. Atividades agropecuárias e florestais para o desenvolvimento sustentável da Amazônia: Anais... Rio Branco, AC: Embrapa Acre, 2022. Pôster. GUARDA, A.C.A. Biotecnologia na reprodução animal: Uma visão teórico/prática de produção in vitro de embriões bovino. 2023. 28p. Trabalho de Conclusão de curso (Bacharelado de Zootecnia). Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia Goiano – Câmpus Rio Verde, Rio Verde, GO, 2023. HAFEZ, E.S.E.; HAFEZ. Reprodução animal / [coordenador de tradução da 7. ed. original Renato Campanarut Barnabe]. – Barueri, SP : Manole, 2004, il.; HONORATO, M.T. et al. Importância da escolha de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões em bovinos. PUBVET, Londrina, V. 7, N. 19, Ed. 242, Art. 1601, Outubro, 2013. HOPPER, R.M. Bovine Reproduction. Wiley Blackwell, Capítulo 78, p. 723-733, 2015. LIMA, Fabio Junior Arruda. Transferência de embriãos em tempo fixo em bovinos: Relato de Caso. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação em medicina veterinária)- Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina-Campus Curitibanos. Curitibanos, 2018. MACHADO, R. et al. Metodologia para obtenção de concepto bovino. Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste, ISSN 1981-2078, São Carlos-SP, 2009. Disponível em:. Acessado em 11 de outubro, 2023 BASTOS, M.R. et al. Criopreservação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vitro. In: MENDONÇA, P. P. et al. (Org.). Tópicos Especiais em Ciência Animal XI. 1. ed. Alegre: CAUFES, 2022. Capítulo 13. MELO, R. et al. Utilização de ECG e FSH em protocolos de superovulação em bovinos. Manejo, Nutrição e Produção Animal: Tópicos Atuais em Pesquisa, v. 1, n. 1, p. 110-116, 2023. OLIVEIRA, C.S. et al. Biotécnicas da Reprodução em Bovinos. EMBRAPA, 2014. PASA, C. Transferência de embriões em bovinos. Biodiversidade, v. 7, n. 1, 2008. PAZZIM, L.V.L. Transferencia de embriões em bovinos: Revisão de literatura. Monografia (Trabalho conclusão de curso) - Universidade federal de Santa Catarina. Curitibanos, 2021. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. et al. Produção de embriões bovinos in vivo e in vitro. Revista CFMV, Ano XX, p. 73-82, 2014. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. Produção de Embriões Bovinos In Vivo e In Vitro. 2011. 22 f. Monografia (Especialização) - Curso de Medicina Veterinária, UFV, Viçosa, 2011. PILLA, L.F.C. Congelamento ultra-rapido de embriões bovinos com etilenoglicol associado ou não a trealose. 2005. 37f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Area de concentração em Fisiopatologia da Reprodução), Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria. RIBEIRO, L.V.P.; RIGOLON, L.P.; CAVALIERI, F.L.B.; SEKO, M.B.; MARTINEZ, A.C.; RIBEIRO, M.G.; MARTINS, R.R.; ÁVILA, M.R.; DE CONTI, J.B. Recuperação de oócitos e recuperação in vitro de embriões de vacas estimuladas com FSH ou eCG. Archivos de zootecnia. v. 60, n. 232, p. 1021-1029, 2011. ROCHA, J.R.; SANTOS, L.M. As vantagens da sexagen de embriões em bovinos. Revista científica eletrônica de medicina veterinária, ano IV, n.8, janeiro de 2007. RUBIN, M.I.B; Histórico dos 20 anos da Sociedade Brasileira de Tecnologia de Embriões, 2005. SANTOS, P.H. Impactos da superestimulação ovariana sore a diferenciação das celulas da grranulosa bovina. Dissertação de Mestrado em Farmacologia e Biotecnologia - UNESP. 2017. SEIDEL, G.E.J.; SEIDEL, S. M. Training manual for embryo transfer in cattle 2005. SENEDA, M.M.; ESPER, C.R.; GARCIA, J.M.; ANDRADE, E.R. Aspecto técnicos e biológicos da obtenção de oócitos bovinos: Revisão de Literatura. Ciências agrárias, Londrina, v. 23, n. 1, p. 101-110, 2002. SILVA, D.P.; TOLEDO, H.R.P.; SILVA, R.A.B.; CARVALHO, G.F.; MELO, A.F.; GARCIA, M.S.; et al. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): revisão de literatura. Zootecnia: Pesquisa e práticas contemporâneas - volume 2, 255-266, 2021. SPELL, A.R.; BEAL, W.E.; CORAH, L.R.; LAMB, G.C. Evaluating recipient and embryo factors that affect pregnancy rates of embryo transfer in beef cattle. Theriogenology, v. 56, p. 287-297, 2001. SPRÍCIGO, J.F.W.; DODE, M.A.N. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): uma Alternativa para Produção de Embriões Bovinos. Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia, Brasília, 2016. VALLE, E.R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e os métodos de controle. EMBRAPA, 1991. VIANA, J.H.M. Classificação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vivo. Comunicado Técnico (EMBRAPA). ISSN 1678-3131, Juiz De Fora-MG, Novembro, 2009. VIANA, J.H.M. 2017 Statistics of embryo production and transfer in domestic farm animals: Is it a turning point? In 2017 more in vitro-produced than in vivo-derived embryos were transferred worldwide. Embryo Transfer Newsl, v.36(4), p.8-25, 2018. VIANA, J.H.M.; SIQUEIRA, L.G.; PALHAO, M.P.; CAMARGO, L.S.A.; Features and perspectives of the Brazilian in vitro embryo industry. Anim Reprod, v.9, p.12-18, 2012. WÜNSCHE JÚNIOR, A.G et al. Avaliação de uma segunda lavagem uterina sobre a recuperacão de embriões em vacas Nelore. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, Londrina, v. 29, n.3, p. 677-684, jul./set. 2008. (shrink)

A critical review of the main themes arising out of recent literature on the semantics of ordinary event talk. The material is organized in four sections: (i) the nature of events, with emphasis on the opposition between events as particulars and events as universals; (ii) identity and indeterminacy, with emphasis on the unifier/multiplier controversy; (iii) events and logical form, with emphasis on Davidson’s treatment of the form of action sentences; (iv) linguistic applications, with emphasis on issues concerning aspectual phenomena, the (...) telicity/atelicity distinction, the treatment of statives, and temporal quantification. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pruss proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can (...) be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated. (shrink)

In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt (...) for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false. (shrink)

L’Intelligenza Artificiale Generativa (IAG) pone sfide inedite all’educazione universitaria. Dalla definizione dei contenuti alla valutazione delle prove e alla determinazione delle modalità di esame, questo nuovo e potente strumento inaugura una stagione di cambiamenti su cui è urgente riflettere. La tecnologia contribuisce da sempre a dare forma al lavoro didattico, il quale evolve anche alla luce delle opportunità e dei rischi che essa introduce. Come far sì che l’evoluzione stimolata dall’IAG sia felice, ovvero serva i valori e gli obiettivi della (...) didattica e delle persone che la vivono? Ne ho discusso con alcuni colleghi dell’Unità di Studi META del Politecnico di Milano – docenti impegnati a vario titolo in corsi di carattere filosofico e sociale rivolti a studenti di formazione tecnica. (shrink)

It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about (...) knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument. (shrink)

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give (...) an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, the contemporary scientific realist is concerned to justify belief in what we might call theoretical truth, which includes truth based on ampliative inference and truth about unobservables. Many, if not most, contemporary realists say scientific realism should be treated as ‘an overarching scientific hypothesis’ (Putnam 1978, p. 18). In its most basic form, the realist hypothesis states that theories enjoying general predictive success are true. This hypothesis becomes a hypothesis to be tested. To justify our belief in the (...) realist hypothesis, realists commonly put forward an argument known as the ‘no-miracles argument’. With respect to the basic hypothesis this argument can be stated as follows: it would be a miracle were our theories as successful as they are, were they not true; the only possible explanation for the general predictive success of our scientific theories is that they are true. (shrink)

Recent research in the field of social robotics has shed light on the considerable role played by biases in the design of social robots. Cues that trigger widespread biased expectations are implemented in the design of social robots to increase their familiarity and boost interaction quality. Ethical discussion has focused on the question concerning the permissibility of leveraging social biases to meet the design goals of social robotics. As a result, integrating ethically problematic social biases in the design of robots-such (...) as, e.g., discriminatory gender stereotypes-has been opposed as morally unacceptable. Building on this debate, the present paper explores a related but different question: would it be permissible to design social robots in ways that intentionally challenge widespread discriminatory social biases, thus fostering moral education? The analysis shows that, while the potential benefits of such a design strategy could be significant, its practical endorsement raises important ethical issues. Hence, caution and further discussion are advised. (shrink)

David Chalmers argued against the claim that for all p, or even for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that p iff actually p. Instead of criticizing Chalmers’s argument, I suggest that it can be generalized, in a sense, and in interesting ways, concerning other principles about contingent a priori truths. In particular, I will argue that the puzzle presented by Chalmers runs parallel to others that do not turn on ‘actually’. Furthermore, stronger arguments can be presented that (...) do not turn on apriority either, though they do entail the conclusion of Chalmers’s argument. All such puzzles involve interactions between rigidifying sentence-forming devices with factive operators. (shrink)

This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive (...) ethical questions about what should be done in a given context. What are some of the ways in which this aim has been pursued? In this paper, we employ a case study approach to examine and critically evaluate four strategies from the recent literature by which scholars in bioxphi have leveraged empirical data in the service of normative arguments. (shrink)

We present a sound and complete Fitch-style natural deduction system for an S5 modal logic containing an actuality operator, a diagonal necessity operator, and a diagonal possibility operator. The logic is two-dimensional, where we evaluate sentences with respect to both an actual world (first dimension) and a world of evaluation (second dimension). The diagonal necessity operator behaves as a quantifier over every point on the diagonal between actual worlds and worlds of evaluation, while the diagonal possibility quantifies over some point (...) on the diagonal. Thus, they are just like the epistemic operators for apriority and its dual. We take this extension of Fitch’s familiar derivation system to be a very natural one, since the new rules and labeled lines hereby introduced preserve the structure of Fitch’s own rules for the modal case. (shrink)

In response to the many social impacts of automated mobility, in September 2020 the European Commission published Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles, a report in which recommendations on road safety, privacy, fairness, explainability, and responsibility are drawn from a set of eight overarching principles. This paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary research where philosophers and engineers joined efforts to operationalize the guidelines advanced in the report. To this aim, we endorse a function-based working approach to support the implementation (...) of values and recommendations into the design of automated vehicle technologies. Based on this, we develop methodological tools to tackle issues related to personal autonomy, explainability, and privacy as domains that most urgently require fine-grained guidance due to the associated ethical risks. Even though each tool still requires further inquiry, we believe that our work might already prove the productivity of the function-based approach and foster its adoption in the CAV scientific community. (shrink)

This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the (...) content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”. (shrink)

We introduce a novel point of view on the “models as mediators” framework in order to emphasize certain important epistemological questions about models in science which have so far been little investigated. To illustrate how this perspective can help answer these kinds of questions, we explore the use of simplified models in high energy physics research beyond the Standard Model. We show in detail how the construction of simplified models is grounded in the need to mitigate pressing epistemic problems concerning (...) the uncertainty inherent in the present theoretical and experimental contexts. (shrink)

History appears already to the young Gramsci as a system of forces in unstable balance, which struggle to position themselves on the side of history, to identify with it. For this reason, in his reading of Marxism, the unity of history is a result, the product of a successful strategy of hegemony building. This article reviews the Gramscian theory of hegemony and tries to show its coherence with the philosophy of praxis, that is, with the notion of the fundamentally practical (...) nature of reality. In particular, it is argued that, on the one hand, a crisis of hegemony must be understood as disintegrating a hegemonic system, which allows subordinated hegemonic moments to emerge; on the other hand, the crisis itself is determined by the formulation of hegemonic discourses that try to escape their condition of subordination. (shrink)

Tasks, tools, and techniques that we perform, use, and acquire, define the elements of expertise which we value as the hallmarks of goal-driven behavior. Somehow, the creation of tools enables us to define new tasks, or is it that the envisioning of new tasks drives us to invent new tools? Or maybe it is that new tools engender new techniques which then result in new tasks? This jumble of issues will be explored and discussed in this diverse collection of papers. (...) Individually, few of the papers are related to each other by topic or by techniques of analysis. Collectively, all focus on tasks performed using tools and discuss the techniques of tool use which enable differences in performance and expertise across individuals, societies, and (even) species. -/- . (shrink)

En este artículo se plantean algunas consideraciones clásicas que santo Tomás de Aquino formuló sobre la fundamentación de la ley como producto de la razón y su relación con las leyes de los hombres. Se analiza el papel de la sindéresis como vínculo del individuo con la ius naturae y se concluye que la vida buena tiene un referente en el “estado de derecho” y en la práctica sistemática de las virtudes morales.

This chapter tries to answer the following question: How should we conceive of the method of mathematics, if we take a naturalist stance? The problem arises since mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, because mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Moreover, natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some authors tried to naturalize (...) mathematics by relying on evolutionism. But several difficulties arise when we try to do this. This chapter suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics, it is better to take the method of mathematics to be the analytic method, rather than the axiomatic method, and thus conceive of mathematical knowledge as plausible knowledge. (shrink)

There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors (...) think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account. (shrink)

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human (...) arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not self-defeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating. (shrink)

“Love hurts”—as the saying goes—and a certain amount of pain and difficulty in intimate relationships is unavoidable. Sometimes it may even be beneficial, since adversity can lead to personal growth, self-discovery, and a range of other components of a life well-lived. But other times, love can be downright dangerous. It may bind a spouse to her domestic abuser, draw an unscrupulous adult toward sexual involvement with a child, put someone under the insidious spell of a cult leader, and even inspire (...) jealousy-fueled homicide. How might these perilous devotions be diminished? The ancients thought that treatments such as phlebotomy, exercise, or bloodletting could “cure” an individual of love. But modern neuroscience and emerging developments in psychopharmacology open up a range of possible interventions that might actually work. These developments raise profound moral questions about the potential uses—and misuses—of such anti-love biotechnology. In this article, we describe a number of prospective love-diminishing interventions, and offer a preliminary ethical framework for dealing with them responsibly should they arise. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge and adjudicate between the two positions that have come to prominence in the scientific realism debate: deployment realism and structural realism. I discuss a set of cases from the history of celestial mechanics, including some of the most important successes in the history of science. To the surprise of the deployment realist, these are novel predictive successes toward which theoretical constituents that are now seen to be patently false were genuinely deployed. Exploring the implications for (...) structural realism, I show that the need to accommodate these cases forces our notion of “structure” toward a dramatic depletion of logical content, threatening to render it explanatorily vacuous: the better structuralism fares against these historical examples, in terms of retention, the worse it fares in content and explanatory strength. I conclude by considering recent restrictions that serve to make “structure” more specific. I show however that these refinements will not suffice: the better structuralism fares in specificity and explanatory strength, the worse it fares against history. In light of these case studies, both deployment realism and structural realism are significantly threatened by the very historical challenge they were introduced to answer. (shrink)

In this paper I critically evaluate the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, and find it wanting. I then introduce the various ways in which artifacts can come to influence moral value, and our evaluation of moral situations and actions. Here, following van de Poel and Kroes, I introduce the idea of value sensitive design. Specifically, I show how by virtue of their designed properties, artifacts may come to embody values. Such accounts, however, have several shortcomings. In agreement with Michael Klenk, (...) I raise epistemic and metaphysical issues with respect to designed properties embodying value. The concept of an affordance, borrowed from ecological psychology, provides a more philosophically fruitful grounding to the potential way(s) in which artifacts might embody values. This is due to the way in which it incorporates key insights from perception more generally, and how we go about determining possibilities for action in our environment specifically. The affordance account as it is presented by Klenk, however, is insufficient. I therefore argue that we understand affordances based on whether they are meaningful, and, secondly, that we grade them based on their force. (shrink)

Recent research in the field of social robotics has shed light on the considerable role played by biases in the design of social robots. Cues that trigger widespread biased expectations are implemented in the design of social robots to increase their familiarity and boost interaction quality. Ethical discussion has focused on the question concerning the permissibility of leveraging social biases to meet the design goals of social robotics. As a result, integrating ethically problematic social biases in the design of robots-such (...) as, e.g., discriminatory gender stereotypes-has been opposed as morally unacceptable. Building on this debate, the present paper explores a related but different question: would it be permissible to design social robots in ways that intentionally challenge widespread discriminatory social biases, thus fostering moral education? The analysis shows that, while the potential benefits of such a design strategy could be significant, its practical endorsement raises important ethical issues. Hence, caution and further discussion are advised. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic and thorough philosophical analysis of the ways in which driving automation crosses path with ethical values. Upon introducing the different forms of driving automation and examining their relation to human autonomy, it provides readers with in-depth reflections on safety, privacy, moral judgment, control, responsibility, sustainability, and other ethical issues. Driving is undoubtedly a moral activity as a human act. Transferring it to artificial agents such as connected and automated vehicles necessarily raises many philosophical questions. When (...) driving is automated, what happens to its ethical dimensions? Could artificial agents accomplish ethical objectives on our behalf, take moral decisions in our place, and drive us into a more ethical transportation future? In doing so, would they be “moral” as we are or in a way that is similar to, but also remarkably different from, our own? And what role is yet to be played by human responsibility and commitment? The book addresses these questions with the aim of stimulating an interdisciplinary dialogue between different stakeholders. They include automotive engineers, computer scientists, and moral philosophers, as well as industry representatives, policymakers, regulators, transportation experts, and the general public. Indeed, connected and automated vehicles will not take the high road for us . We must drive them there. (shrink)

This article presents a challenge that those philosophers who deny the causal interpretation of explanations provided by population genetics might have to address. Indeed, some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and support the causal interpretation of natural selection. The problem I am concerned with here arises for the statisticalists because the (...) debate on the nature of natural selection intersects the debate on whether mathematical explanations of empirical facts are genuine scientific explanations. I argue that if the explanations provided by population genetics are regarded by the statisticalists as non-causal explanations of that kind, then statisticalism risks being incompatible with a naturalist stance. The statisticalist faces a dilemma: either she maintains statisticalism but has to renounce naturalism; or she maintains naturalism but has to content herself with an account of the explanations provided by population genetics that she deems unsatisfactory. This challenge is relevant to the statisticalists because many of them see themselves as naturalists. (shrink)

In this article, we perform a detailed proof theoretic investigation of a wide number of relevant logics by employing the well-established methodology of labelled sequent calculi to build our intended systems. At the semantic level, we will characterise relevant logics by employing reduced Routley-Meyer models, namely, relational structures with a ternary relation between worlds along with a unique distinct element considered as the real (or actual) world. This paper realizes the idea of building a variety of modular labelled calculi by (...) reflecting, at the syntactic level, semantic informations taken from reduced Routley-Meyer models. Central results include proofs of soundness and completeness, as well as a proof of cut- admissibility. (shrink)

Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of divine omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all truths—is false. In particular, we here have in mind to focus on two such arguments: the set theoretic argument and the semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run parallel to, respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful arguments against the (...) classical doctrine of omniscience. What we are here interested in is a way in which these arguments can be generalized. In particular, we show how generalizations of those arguments can target, explicitly, alternatives to the classical doctrine of omniscience, including what we here call 'restricted omniscience' and 'open future open theism'. As a corollary, considerations of Grim-style arguments do not support these alternatives to the classical doctrine of omniscience over the classical doctrine. We conclude that what is paradoxical is not the classical doctrine of omniscience just as such; rather, what is paradoxical is a core commitment shared by the classical doctrine and its more modest alternatives, namely, the thesis that God is a perfectly logical reasoner. (shrink)

This essay joins Wilhelm Dilthey’s conception of the metaphysical impulse as a flight from the tragedy of human finitude with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s understanding of how language bewitches intelligence. We contend that there are features of the phenomenology of language that play a constitutive and pervasive role in the formation of metaphysical illusion.

In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of Johnson and Noorman’s (2014) three conceptualizations of the agential roles artificial systems can play. I argue that two of these conceptions are unproblematic: that of causally efficacious agency and “acting for” or surrogate agency. Their third conception, that of “autonomous agency,” however, is one I have reservations about. The authors point out that there are two ways in which the term “autonomy” can be used: there is, firstly, the engineering sense (...) of the term, which simply refers to the ability of some system to act independently of substantive human control. Secondly, there is the moral sense of the term, which has traditionally grounded many notions of human mor-al responsibility. I argue that the continued usage of “autonomy” in discussions of artificial agency complicates matters unnecessarily. This occurs in two ways: firstly, the condition of autonomy, even in its engineering sense, fails to accurately describe the way “autonomous” systems are developed in practice. Secondly, the continued usage of autonomy in the moral sense introduces unnecessary meta-physical baggage form the free will debate into discussions about moral agency. In order to understand the debate surrounding autonomy, we would therefore first need to settle many seemingly intractable metaphysical questions regarding the existence of free will in human beings. (shrink)

The semantic view of theories is normally considered to be an ac-count of theories congenial to Scientific Realism. Recently, it has been argued that Ontic Structural Realism could be fruitfully applied, in combination with the semantic view, to some of the philosophical issues peculiarly related to bi-ology. Given the central role that models have in the semantic view, and the relevance that mathematics has in the definition of the concept of model, the fo-cus will be on population genetics, which is (...) one of the most mathematized areas in biology. We will analyse some of the difficulties which arise when trying to use Ontic Structural Realism to account for evolutionary biology. (shrink)

This paper investigates and develops generalizations of two-dimensional modal logics to any finite dimension. These logics are natural extensions of multidimensional systems known from the literature on logics for a priori knowledge. We prove a completeness theorem for propositional n-dimensional modal logics and show them to be decidable by means of a systematic tableau construction.

How should one conceive of the method of mathematics, if one takes a naturalist stance? Mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, since mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some naturalists try to naturalize mathematics relying on Darwinism. But several difficulties arise when one tries to naturalize (...) in this way the traditional view of mathematics, according to which mathematical knowledge is certain and the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method. This paper suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics through Darwinism, it is better to take the method of mathematics not to be the axiomatic method. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, filters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in agent-like systems, which might prompt certain reactions from users. Specifically, we might find ourselves feeling frustrated if these systems do not meet our expectations. In normal situations, this might be fine, but with the ever increasing sophistication of AI-systems, this (...) might become a problem. While it seems unproblematic to realize that being angry at your car for breaking down is unfitting, can the same be said for AI-systems? In this paper, therefore, I will investigate the so-called “reactive attitudes”, and their important link to our responsibility practices. I then show how within this framework there exist exemption and excuse conditions, and test whether our adopting the “objective attitude” toward agential AI is justified. I argue that such an attitude is appropriate in the context of three distinct senses of responsibility (answerability, attributability, and accountability), and that, therefore, AI-systems do not undermine our responsibility ascriptions. (shrink)

In the process of scientific discovery, knowledge ampliation is pursued by means of non-deductive inferences. When ampliative reasoning is performed, probabilities cannot be assigned objectively. One of the reasons is that we face the problem of the unconceived alternatives: we are unable to explore the space of all the possible alternatives to a given hypothesis, because we do not know how this space is shaped. So, if we want to adequately account for the process of knowledge ampliation, we need to (...) develop an account of the process of scientific discovery which is not exclusively based on probability calculus. We argue that the analytic view of the method of science advocated by Cellucci is interestingly suited to this goal, since it rests on the concept of plausibility. In this perspective, in order to account for how probabilities are in fact assigned in uncertain contexts and knowledge ampliation is really pursued, we have to take into account plausibility-based considerations. (shrink)

Le principali concezioni del progresso scientifico sono tre: la concezione epistemica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento della conoscenza; la concezione semantica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento delle verità; la concezione problem-solving, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento del numero dei problemi che si è in grado di risolvere. La concezione epistemica è ritenuta la più compatibile con una prospettiva realista. Di recente, Dellsén ha (...) proposto la concezione “noetica”, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento dell’understanding di un fenomeno da parte degli scienziati. Dellsén sostiene che la concezione noetica sia una concezione realista del progresso più adeguata di quella epistemica. Scopo di questo articolo è valutare se la concezione noetica sia più adeguata della concezione epistemica. (shrink)