Xunzi's philosophy provides a rich resource for understanding how ethical relationships between humans and nature can be articulated in terms of harmony. In this paper, I build on his ideas to develop the concept of reciprocal harmony, which requires us to reciprocate those who make our lives liveable. In the context of the environment, I argue that reciprocal harmony generates moral obligations towards nature, in return for the existential debt that humanity owes towards heaven and earth. This can be used (...) as a normative basis for an environmental ethic that enables humanity and nature to flourish together. (shrink)

Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available—anti-aboutness truthmaking—that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist’s position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that (...) if strong non-maximalism can be defended, then so can anti-aboutness truthmaking on the very same basis; one can enjoy the benefits of strong non-maximalism without giving up on the idea that truth is always grounded in being. (shrink)

Taking the formal analogies between black holes and classical thermodynamics seriously seems to first require that classical thermodynamics applies in relativistic regimes. Yet, by scrutinizing how classical temperature is extended into special relativity, I argue that the concept falls apart. I examine four consilient procedures for establishing the classical temperature: the Carnot process, the thermometer, kinetic theory, and black-body radiation. I argue that their relativistic counterparts demonstrate no such consilience in defining the relativistic temperature. As such, classical temperature doesn’t appear (...) to survive a relativistic extension. I suggest two interpretations for this situation: eliminativism akin to simultaneity, or pluralism akin to rotation. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann's (1955) argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the (...) infinite particles case. (shrink)

This essay delves into the multifaceted nature of the Tagalog word ano, examining its usage in various contexts and its impact on communication within Tagalog-speaking communities. Three cases of ano are discussed in the essay. The first case pertains to ano accompanied by ostension; the second, pertains to ano accompanied by context clues; and the third, pertains to ano without any ostension or context. In Tagalog communities, ano, despite the lack of ostension or context, is sometimes still used in everyday (...) conversations, presenting the problem of how meaning or understanding of the word ano is still possible. The third case of ano will be further divided into two: IT-ano (ibang tao-ano) and HIT-ano (hindi ibang tao-ano) providing the difference between strangers and acquaintances. By relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of what it means to understand through language-game, this essay discusses how a vague word such as ano gives rise to meaning and understanding. This approach to clarify meaning will relate to the levels of social interaction found in Virgilio Enriquez’s idea of pakikipagkapwa. The analysis will proceed by referring to hypothetical scenarios involving the use of the term ano situated in the everyday conversational use of language by Filipinos. The mode of analysis takes the perspective of the author, who is a native speaker of Tagalog. (shrink)

Preparing general relativity for quantization in the Hamiltonian approach leads to the `problem of time,' rendering the world fundamentally timeless. One proposed solution is the `thermal time hypothesis,' which defines time in terms of states representing systems in thermal equilibrium. On this view, time is supposed to emerge thermodynamically even in a fundamentally timeless context. Here, I develop the worry that the thermal time hypothesis requires dynamics -- and hence time -- to get off the ground, thereby running into worries (...) of circularity. (shrink)

In Everettian quantum mechanics, justifications for the Born rule appeal to self-locating uncertainty or decision theory. Such justifications have focused exclusively on a pure-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a wave function. Recent works in quantum foundations suggest that it is viable to consider a mixed-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a (mixed-state) density matrix. Here, we develop the conceptual foundations for decoherence and branching in a mixed-state multiverse, and extend the standard Everettian justifications for the Born rule to this setting. This (...) extended framework provides a unification of 'classical' and 'quantum' probabilities, and additional theoretical benefits, for the Everettian picture. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to explore, and clarify, some key features in Aquinas’ account of the virtue of temperance, with an eye to answering some common objections raised against a positive evaluation of temperance. In particular, I consider three features of Aquinas’ understanding of temperance: First, the role of the rational mean in temperance; second, the role of rightly ordered passions in temperance; and third, the ‘despotic’ control of reason over the passions in temperance. Along the way I (...) consider three common objections to Aquinas’ account of temperance: the objection that temperance can be misused for evil, the objection that temperance devalues effort, and the objection that temperance devalues strong passions and thereby implicitly devalues the goodness of sexuality. In responding to these objections on behalf of Aquinas, I take the opportunity to clarify and slightly extend Aquinas’ account of temperance. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aquinas’ account of analogy provides resources for resolving the prima facie conflict between his claims that (1) the divine relations constituting the persons are “one and the same” with the divine essence; (2) the divine persons are really distinct, (3) the divine essence is absolutely simple. Specifically, I argue that Aquinas adopts an analogical understanding of the concepts of being and unity, and that these concepts are implicit in his formulation of claims about substance (...) and relation in the Trinity. I then show how Aquinas appeals to key structural features of analogical concepts, notably, the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization, to resolve apparent conflicts between the unity of substance and distinction of relations in the Trinity. (shrink)

[Accepted for publication in Lakatos's Undone Work: The Practical Turn and the Division of Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Science, special issue of Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy. Edited by S. Nagler, H. Pilin, and D. Sarikaya.] Lakatos’s analysis of progress and degeneration in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is well-known. Less known, however, are his thoughts on degeneration in Proofs and Refutations. I propose and motivate two new criteria for degeneration based on the discussion in Proofs and Refutations (...) – superfluity and authoritarianism. I show how these criteria augment the account in Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, providing a generalized Lakatosian account of progress and degeneration. I then apply this generalized account to a key transition point in the history of entropy – the transition to an information-theoretic interpretation of entropy – by assessing Jaynes’s 1957 paper on information theory and statistical mechanics. (shrink)

The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. Putnam and Dickson both (...) take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s structure, given by our best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. This assumes a determinate logical structure of the world given by quantum mechanics. Here, I argue that this assumption is false, and that the world’s logical structure, and hence the related ‘true’ logic, is underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism. (shrink)

I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here’s a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize (...) it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic’s argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti-skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts. (shrink)

Ang papel ay paglalagom ng itinuturing na pinakamahalagang yugto ng buhay ni José Rizal—ang kanyang pagkakatapon sa Dapitan, sa lente ng konseptong “bagani” ng ating mga ninuno. Sa pagbanggit sa lang nauna nang pag-aaral ukol kay Rizal, ipapakitang kung papaanong ang yugto sa Dapitan ay ang katuparan ng kanyang mga layunin sa La Liga Filipina, na kanyang isinabuhay kasama ang bayan. Sa lente ng kasalukuyang pandemyang COVID 19, makikita natin na tila naranasan din ni Rizal sa kanyang pagkakatapon ang ilang (...) bagay na ating dinaranas ngayon, na tila siya isang frontliner na nasa lockdown, inilagay sa kuwarentena, nag-homeschooling, nagkaroon ng lockdown sickness at namahagi ng ayudang pangkabuhayan sa mga mamamayan ng isang natutulog na bayan upang ito ay sumiglang muli. Nawa ay maging inspirasyon sa bayan na anuman ang hamon at mga balakid, walang makapipigil sa isang Pilipino na magsilbi sa bayan gamit ang kanyang mga talento at manatiling liwanag ng katotohanan at kaalaman. (shrink)

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s multiple drafts (...) model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness. (shrink)

We all can identify many contemporary philosophy professors we know to be theists of some type or other. We also know that often enough their nontheistic beliefs are as epistemically upstanding as the non-theistic beliefs of philosophy professors who aren’t theists. In fact, the epistemic-andnon-theistic lives of philosophers who are theists are just as epistemically upstanding as the epistemic-and-non-theistic lives of philosophers who aren’t theists. Given these and other, similar, facts, there is good reason to think that the pro-theistic beliefs (...) of theistic philosophers are frequently epistemically upstanding. Given their impeccable epistemic credentials on non-theistic matters, the amount of careful thought that lies behind their theism, the large size of the community of philosophical theists, as well as other, similar facts, it would be surprising if all or even most of their pro-theistic beliefs were epistemically blameworthy in some or other signicant sense tied to charges such as ‘He should know better than to believe that’ (so mere false belief need not be blameworthy in this sense; the use of ‘blameworthy’ will be claried below). Of course some of the pro-theistic beliefs of some theistic philosophers are epistemically blameworthy; the mere large numbers of fallible theistic philosophers almost guarantees it. My point here is that it would be unexpected if most of the pro-theistic beliefs of theistic philosophers were epistemically blameworthy. (shrink)

Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a (...) rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism. (shrink)

An extended discussion with Frances Kamm about deontology and the methodology of ethical theorizing. (An extended and revised version appears in Alex Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics, OUP 2009).).

I first argue that, contrary to many atheistic philosophers, there is good reason to think the typical theistic philosopher’s retaining of her theism when faced with the Problem of Evil is comparatively epistemically upstanding even if both atheism is true and the typical theistic philosopher has no serious criticism of the atheist’s premises in the PoE argument. However, I then argue that, contrary to many theistic philosophers, even if theism is true, the typical theistic philosopher has no good non-theistic reasons (...) for rejecting any of the atheist’s premises, and she has good non-theistic reasons in favor of the atheist’s premises. In that respect, it’s extremely difficult for the theistic philosopher to respond to the PoE in an informative, non-question-begging way. I close by considering whether theistic philosophers should reject my second thesis. (shrink)

Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...) have causal powers; (2) they are intentional, in other words, they have meaning or representational content. This presumes a distinction between a representational vehicle—a physical state or structure that has causal powers and is responsible for producing behavior—and its content. Consider the following characterization of a device that computes the addition functionReaders will recognize the similarity t. (shrink)

Isn’t there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn’t there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say “Ok, ok. God doesn’t exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that”? Pursuing this (...) question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil. (shrink)

The preface and chapter 1 of my book Scepticism Comes Alive, 2005 OUP.

Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is (...) blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade. (shrink)

Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, and enactive approaches to cognition. In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic account of (...) mental content. I call the resulting package a deflationary account of mental representation and I argue that it avoids the problems that afflict competing accounts. (shrink)

Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account of the nature (...) and function of representation in computational cognitive models. (shrink)

This paper presents results found through searching publicly available U.S. data sources for information about how to handle incidental fndings (IF) in human subjects research, especially in genetics and genomics research, neuroimaging research, and CT colonography research. We searched the Web sites of 14 federal agencies, 22 professional societies, and 100 universities, as well as used the search engine Google for actual consent forms that had been posted on the Internet. Our analysis of these documents showed that there is very (...) little public guidance available for researchers as to how to deal with incidental fndings. Moreover, the guidance available is not consistent. (shrink)

This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".

This is a short essay that presents what I take to be the main questions regarding the epistemology of disagreement.

The epistemological consequences of paradox are paradoxical. They can be usefully generated by telling a series of once-upon-a-time stories that make various philosophical points, starting out innocent and ending up, well, paradoxical. This is an introduction to my Live Skepticism, defended in Skepticism Comes Alive.

If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are false, either (...) (a) the average philosopher’s true commonsensical beliefs are epistemically impoverished, or (b) a good portion of philosophy is bunk and philosophers should give up most of their error theories despite the fact that their supporting arguments are generally as good as or even better than other philosophical arguments. (shrink)

Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance.

This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...) deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, it comments on the significance of the agreement and progress. (shrink)

A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.

My paper analyses the analogy between Computers and the Thomistic separate substances, and argues that Aquinas' account of angels as cognitively intuitive and non-discursive makes the analogical gap between these impossible to bridge. From there, I point the direction away from computers as the way for us to move up the order of cognitive excellence. Instead, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the way to go, since by them we participate in this intuitivity. I then lay out the ascetical (...) presuppositions for the successful participation of this gifts, in particular the necessity for the passive purgations, according to the division of the ascetical life into three stages by Garrigou-Lagrange OP. (shrink)

Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, is plausible (...) or probably true. In order to take skepticism seriously it’s sufficient to hold (a) and (b); one need not hold (c). Indeed, philosophers who accept (a) and (b) never endorse (c). Show me a philosopher who suspects that he is a brain in a vat and I’ll show you someone who is deranged! That’s one thing that bothers undergraduates in philosophy. They object: why on earth do some philosophers take the BIV hypothesis to pose any threat at all to our beliefs given that those very same philosophers think that there’s no real chance that the BIV hypothesis is true? Sure, the BIV hypothesis is formally inconsistent with my belief that I have hands, so if the former is true then my belief is false. But so what? Why should that bare inconsistency matter so much? Is this strange attitude amongst philosophers the result of some logic fetish infecting the philosophical community? It is sometimes said that the skeptical hypotheses are not only inconsistent with our beliefs but are explanatory of our experiences, which is supposed to make them more of a threat. But students aren’t fooled: although the skeptical hypotheses may attempt to explain why our experience is as it is, it’s the kind of attempt appropriate for science fiction movies that are all special effects and virtually no plot. No one with any sense of reality will take the evil demon hypothesis to be even tenuously explanatory. (shrink)

Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...) representation. (shrink)

In this paper I present an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories (a dangerous interpretation it turns out), based primarily on the “two-step” argument of the B deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. I undertake to show that Kant’s distinction between the “pure forms of intuition” and “pure formal intuition” is successful in its attempt to prove that all sensible intuitions presuppose the a priori categories, in a way which is compatible, I claim, with Kant’s statements (...) (in the Aesthetic and elsewhere) that sensible intuition is prior to all concepts; and therefore that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes the Transcendental Analytic. Thus my Interpretation is a "conceptualist" reading of the deduction, in holding that perception, as receptivity, presupposes an underlying spontaneity of the pure understanding and categories. The categories are held to be not just compatible with all possible sensible intuitions, but through their "transcendental content" constitutive of the relation of sensible intuitions to objects - and this explains how our thought can represent objects a priori. It is one of the claims of my interpretation that the logical forms of judgment of general logic derive from the pure categories of transcendental logic, rather than vice-versa. I.e. that the logical forms through which we make empirical judgments by combining analytical concepts in inner sense in time, are originally grounded in an atemporal categorial synthesis in pure intuition (i.e. in the form of time but not the dimension of time), referring an outer intuition in general to the transcendental object of intuition (as “something in general” outside sensibility or receptivity), thereby providing the synthetic unity of the manifold which “..all analysis presupposes.” My conceptualist reading of the deduction, I claim, avoids the problems associated with other conceptualist readings, for example inconsistency with the text (“Intuitions are prior to all concepts.” etc.) and blurring of the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. In my paper I prove that the categories can correctly be held to provide the a priori unity of intuitions, notwithstanding the fact that the latter are “prior to all concepts,” because this unity is not provided by the categories as fully-fledged concepts in the empirical subject, but as the transcendental logical form of these concepts, as a unity in the pure understanding - and the categories therefore require their empirical content or application for their objective reality as concepts. I.e. the categories, as logical functions of judgment for transcendental apperception, in the pure forms of intuition, are prior to all "concepts", correctly speaking, as well as prior to all intuitions, and provide the necessary unity of both. Likewise, at the empirical level my version of conceptualism cannot be accused of blurring the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, or sensibility and understanding, because although the transcendental content of the categories, as a logical function of judgment in the pure forms of intuition, in transcendental apperception, is in necessary relation to sensibility (in combining the manifold in the pure or formal representation of the transcendental object) their empirical content is not. - At the empirical level the divide between spontaneity (as judgment in the empirical subject) and receptivity (as the effect of transcendental synthesis and the transcendental object on outer and inner sense) remains intact. Conceptualist readings of the deduction also have to avoid infringing Kant’s requirement that the sensible manifold originally be given prior to and independently of all acts of the understanding, or otherwise to qualify the requirement in some way - e.g. by taking a Hegelian direction, such as that taken by John McDowell.1 On my reading of the deduction the sensible manifold given indeterminately in the pure forms of space and time must be given prior to the categorial synthesis of the manifold in the pure representation of the transcendental object, i.e. in the pure 'concept' of an object in general affecting sensibility. Therefore Kant’s requirement for an undetermined manifold given prior to, and independently of, all acts of the understanding (“..the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined” [cf.B145/146]) is not infringed. In a later section of the paper, however, I will argue that the transcendental object (of intuition) does have pure theoretical reason as one of its two interacting immanent aspects, but is distinct from pure theoretical reason in the other of its (the transcendental object of intuition's) two interacting immanent aspects, i.e. pure will, which adds a Schopenhauerian element to my interpretation (which will be argued for in a way which supports Kantian optimism over Schopenhauerian pessimism however, in regard to the freedom of the will). Another perceived inconsistency in the deduction, which my interpretation can explain, is Kant’s description (in the B deduction) of the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception as analytic, while in the A deduction it is described as synthetic. I explain this as a difference in the reference of terms such as “my representations” in the two versions - a transcendental reference in the B version but an empirical and transcendental reference in the A version of the principle. I also show that the first part of the two-step B deduction can correctly be characterised by Kant as analytic and the second, concluding part, synthetic (a point of dispute amongst Kant scholars) because transcendental logic (which refers to both the analytic and synthetic aspects of the principle of apperception) “does not abstract from the pure content of knowledge.” While being a “double aspect” rather than “two world” view of transcendental Idealism (because objects of intuition are comprised of both the empirical and transcendental object, i.e. transcendental referent, of intuition, my view differs significantly from the “double aspect” interpretation of Henry Allison (which distinguishes empirical reality from the “God’s eye” view). The view of transcendental idealism resulting from my reading of the deduction, I claim, allows a full empirical realism, because empirical intuitions, as objects of cognition, are the appearance of both the transcendental subject and the transcendental object (i.e. transcendental referent ) of transcendental synthesis (both as “something in general” outside sensibility or receptivity, or rather outside sensibility as receptivity). I conclude that Kant succeeds (although only with the addition of what I have called my 'Schopenhauerian element') in his attempt to prove that we have a transcendental unity of apperception which both constitutes, and is constituted by, the relation of sensible representations to objects, and that since transcendental apperception is the a priori underlying ground of empirical apperception, the categories (as the logical functions of judgment by which transcendental apperception relates sensible representations to objects) are the a priori underlying ground of all experience, and are therefore valid synthetically a priori for all objects of experience. 1 E.g. in “On Pippin’s Postscript.” European Journal of Philosophy 15:3 pp. 395-410. (shrink)

ABSTRACT -/- In this dissertation I make a case for how mental health care, specifically disordered eating, is in need of an adjunctive field of discourse, that being theories on philosophy of consciousness, cosmology, and the new epistemology of science based on physics. Without psychological inquiry and education on new theories about consciousness and new perspectives on the nature of reality, mental health treatment is incomplete and outdated. I bring these topics to the eating disorder field in three ways: by (...) choosing the scientific and philosophical discourse to be added into treatment; by translating the complex and abstract topics into psychologically relevant, lay public coursework; and, finally, through the creation of actual processes that help bring the material into direct experience. The science and philosophy discourse topics that will transform disordered eating are presented through lecture, inquiry for consideration, and discussion options. Consciousness, cosmology, and the new epistemology of science based on physics is simplified with examples of how it can be implemented within individual sessions, group sessions, or workshops for disordered eating treatment and with application to other mental health problems. The psychological application of the material is further enhanced through my description of a variety of experiential processes, from writing assignments and guided visualizations to storytelling, rituals, encounters in nature, and embodiment activities. I have created the lectures, inquiry, and experiential processes within a dynamic body of work, named the Emergence Courses, that have been introduced to professionals treating disordered eating and to clients for use. (shrink)

Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P's truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. In those situations (...) it appears that the confidence with which one holds one's belief should be significantly reduced. My primary goal in this essay is to present and reflect upon a set of cases of disagreement that have not been discussed in the literature but are vital to consider. I argue that in the new cases one is reasonable in not lowering one?s confidence in the belief. Then I articulate and defend an ambitious principle, the Disagreement Principle, meant to answer the question 'Under what conditions am I epistemically blameworthy in retaining my belief with the same level of confidence after I have discovered recognized peers or superiors who disagree with me?'. (shrink)

Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions.

For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.

Comments on Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental.

In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...) that are sensitive to our varying personal conceptions of the referents of those elements) are viciously circular. Thus, the Fregean must give new arguments for her central claims. Second, I offer an original, positive argument for the Millian idea that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Incredibly, the argument appeals to nothing but highly intuitive, pre-theoretical principles regarding folk psychological usage—traditionally the source of Fregean intuitions. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke’s puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). Sosa claims to have found a way to turn the tables on Kripke’s puzzle by using it to argue against Millian theories. I argue that Sosa’s argument on behalf of the Fregean is question-begging. I conclude that Millian theories can be seriously defended without any use of theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions, and Fregeans need to start over arguing for their theory’s central claims. (shrink)

Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...) if she considers these two beliefs and Q, then she is in a position to know that.. (shrink)

Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial (...) claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs. (shrink)

This is an essay for undergraduates. I present the basic problems of reference for descriptions and names.

A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)

One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well.

This is an essay for undergraduates. I set out the statue/clay problem and Tibbles/Tib in rich detail. I also present, with less detail, some other puzzles about material composition.

How can imperceptible knowledge such as professional routines in class immediacy be taught? How to express their main principles and their construction in formation? These routines create a sense of security among both students and teachers; it is a frame favouring successful classroom management. They come under the scope of integrated competencies, and this prompts their analysis in view of understanding a central link within initial professionalization. This paper will present the concept of professional routines as an educational practice in (...) regards to professional development, then the conceptual frame, the analytical method, some results followed by a discussion and conclusion. Comment enseigner un savoir imperceptible comme des routines professionnelles dans l’immédiateté de la classe? Comment dégager les principes organisateurs et leur construction en formation ? Pour une gestion de classe efficace, il est essentiel de recourir à des routines professionnelles. Elles soutiennent le sentiment de sécurité tant chez l’enseignant que chez les élèves. Elles relèvent de compétences incorporées, ce qui force à leur analyse pour une articulation phare dans une formation professionnalisante. Nous présenterons le concept des routines professionnelles comme un savoir-faire nécessaire au développement professionnel, le cadre conceptuel, la méthodologie, quelques résultats et la discussion suivie de la conclusion. (shrink)