Aristotle argued that you need some wealth to live well. The Stoics argued that you could live well with or without wealth. But the Cynics argued that wealth is a hinderance. For the Cynics, a good life consists in self-sufficiency, or being able to rule and help yourself. You accomplish this by living simply and naturally, and by subjecting yourself to rigorous philosophical exercises. Cynics confronted people to get them to abandon extraneous possessions and positions of power to live better. (...) And while the Cynics were experts in living in this way, their ascetic lifestyles made their message curious to some audiences. This paper reflects on Cynic ascetic practices and the ways others perceived them. (shrink)

Our era is characterized by a significant conflict between populism and anti-populism, both politically and culturally. Populist groups and leaders often portray themselves as the true voices of the common people, gaining electoral support or even taking power by framing society as a battle between the ordinary people and the elite, challenging the political and economic establishment. Conversely, parties within the liberal political spectrum counteract the rise of populism by articulating a strong anti-populist discourse, sometimes successfully dominating the political arena. (...) However, despite the increase in studies on populism, there are not many publications regarding anti-populism. This article seeks to examine the anti-populist discourse in Argentina and Greece, two countries with many similarities in political, economic, and cultural aspects. By analyzing the key ideas of anti-populist discourse, we aim to highlight the common anti-populist logic marked by typical paths of modernization, which not only opposes populism but also frequently disregards or opposes specific social groups, such as minorities. (shrink)

Este breve texto busca ofrecer algunas ideas acerca de la democracia, su importancia, y la fundamental relación que guarda con las humanidades y las ciencias sociales.

While the idea that philosophy requires self-transformation is historically pervasive, it exerts considerable influence on the post-Kantians who first aim to systematize Kant’s idealism by grounding it on a first principle. In the 1790s, Fichte and Schelling offer competing accounts of the self-transformation that they regard as essential to positing a first principle. Their accounts raise two central questions. First, what makes this kind of self-transformation possible? Second, are there different possible expressions of philosophical self-transformation? In what follows, I will (...) articulate the Fichtean and Schellingian answers to these central questions. For Fichte, the one who summons me to posit a first principle makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has an exclusively idealist expression in that I can only genuinely posit the I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation depends on mutual recognition and vindicates precisely one philosophical system (Section 1). For Schelling, a brute act of will makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has either an idealist or a realist expression in that I can genuinely posit either the I or the not-I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation does not depend on mutual recognition and vindicates one of two possible philosophical systems (Section 2). Thus, whereas Fichtean self-transformation is recognitive and non-pluralistic, Schellingian self-transformation is pluralistic and non-recognitive. I conclude with a discussion of how Jacobi poses a challenge to Fichte’s and Schelling’s answers to the two central questions (Section 3). (shrink)

With the recent report of a live birth after use of Mitochondrial replacement therapy, sometimes called ‘Three-parent IVF’, the clinical application of the technique is fast becoming a reality. While the United Kingdom allows the procedure under regulatory scrutiny, it remains effectively outlawed in many other countries. We argue that such prohibitions may violate individuals’ procreative rights, grounded in individuals’ interest in genetic affinity. The interest in genetic affinity was recently endorsed by Singapore’s highest court, reflecting an emphasis on the (...) importance of biological ties found across the globe. We apply that reasoning to make the case for a right to ‘Three-parent IVF’. (shrink)

The global economic crisis, the popular discontent against traditional parties and post-democratic forms of governance, as well as the sharp increase in migrant and refugee arrivals have led to the resurgence of populist parties around the world. Left-wing parties usually express an inclusionary populist discourse with patriotic features, while right-wing parties utilize an exclusionary populism with strong nationalist and xenophobic characteristics. In Greece in recent years, the radical left party of SYRIZA rose to power through a left-wing populist and anti-imperialist (...) discourse. Alexis Tsipras formed a paradox coalition government with the radical right party of ANEL to reach an agreement that would lessen the effects of austerity policies. However, once in office, SYRIZA transformed some features of its political style and began to follow a type of "pragmatic populism". This paper examines the relationship between populism and anti-imperialism, while analyzing SYRIZA's discourse in opposition and in power. The questions that it attempts to answer are: does Tsipras express an anti-imperialist discourse both in opposition and in power? What forces are considered imperialist by SYRIZA? Can the notion of "crypto-colonialism" explain the rise of left-wing populism in Greece? (shrink)

In recent years, and especially after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, right-wing and left-wing populist parties and movements have enjoyed significant political success in Europe. One of these parties is SYRIZA in Greece. In this paper, we explore some of the particular characteristics of the political discourse articulated by SYRIZA in power. The core argument of the paper is that the Greek radical left party continues to express an inclusionary populist discourse after its rise to power. We examine (...) this issue by utilising the methodology of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. Moreover, we attempt to substantiate the view that populism does not always have a negative connotation and is not deterministically associated with nationalism or racism. Furthermore, we try to establish whether the concept of "crypto-colonialism” is an important key to understanding the rise of inclusionary populism to power in Greece. Finally, we analyse various manifestations of Greek anti-populism in order to highlight the danger that derives from this kind of stereotypical discourse. (shrink)

SYRIZA is the first radical left party in Europe which managed to seize power through a strong inclusionary populist and anti-austerity discourse. In this paper, we examine the political discourse articulated by SYRIZA in power (2015-17) through Laclau’s theory and “Populismus” approach and we utilize the lexicometric tool of “Populismus Observatory” to search the frequently appeared words in Alexis Tsipra’s discourse. “Populismus” is a research project and an open access web-based Observatory at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (School of Political (...) Science) that analyzes populism through a discursive methodological framework. The simple lexicometric analysis can help us to sketch a statistical outline of the discourse, followed by theoretical scrutiny. Our aim is to find if SYRIZA transforms its rhetoric after the conquest of power (January 2015) and which central signifiers tends to use and avoid. Furthermore, we argue that the concept of “crypto-colonialism” can explain the dominance of egalitarian populism in the Greek politics but we question the use of the term for any inclusionary populist case. Moreover, we underline the failure of SYRIZA to fulfill the popular demands and we seek out the reasons of this fiasco. Finally, we try to answer to the following question: Does the case of SYRIZA prove that populism fails wherever it comes from (right or left)? (shrink)

In recent years, in the era of multiple crises, there are many political parties and leaders that use conspiracy theories in their discourse, trying to explain facts and figures on politics, economy, society, environment and space. There is an ongoing debate in populism studies on the possible connection between the populist phenomenon and conspiracy theories, thus creating two main theoretical camps. On the one hand, there are many scholars who recognize a strong correlation between the two phenomena, with some of (...) them believing that they are directly equated. On the other hand, there are several researchers who consider populism as a phenomenon with its own unique essence without predetermined characteristics. Hence, the question that arises here is: Is conspiracism endogenous to populism, or not? In this article, I first look at the definitions of conspiracy theories/conspiracism and populism, attempting to avoid stereotypical readings. After that, I highlight the discussion that takes place in academia around the internal features of the populist phenomenon and its possible connection with conspiracism, with the aim of showing that populism presents a unique logic, without a necessary connection to conspiracism. Finally, I focus on the Greek case of recent years, describing an example where the concept of conspiracy theory became a polemical tool against political rivals, negatively affecting politics and society. My analysis is based on post-structuralist theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, taking into account aspects of other approaches to populism. (shrink)

Η πρόσφατη δυναμική επανεμφάνιση των λαϊκιστικών κομμάτων διεθνώς αναζωπύρωσε τη συζήτηση γύρω από τον λαϊκισμό και τη σχέση που αναπτύσσει με τη (φιλελεύθερη) δημοκρατία. Πολλές από τις «κυρίαρχες» επιστημονικές αναλύσεις άσκησαν ισχυρή κριτική στον λαϊκισμό μέσα από μια στερεοτυπική οπτική, εντοπίζοντας συγκεκριμένα παθολογικά χαρακτηριστικά στο φαινόμενο, ενώ υπήρξε ένας αριθμός μελετών που κράτησε τις αποστάσεις του από τις στρεβλές θεωρητικές αναγνώσεις. Ένα από τα πολιτικά κόμματα που απασχόλησαν τους ακαδημαϊκούς στην Ελλάδα ήταν η περίπτωση του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, τόσο στην αντιπολίτευση όσο (...) και στην εξουσία. Δεν ήταν λίγοι οι ερευνητές που επιχείρησαν να ιχνηλατήσουν και να κατανοήσουν τη μετάβαση της ριζοσπαστικής αριστεράς από ένα κινηματικό κόμμα της νεολαίας σε κόμμα εξουσίας μέσα από την ανάλυση Λόγου. Στο συγκεκριμένο άρθρο μελετάμε την έννοια του λαϊκισμού και την περίπτωση του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ μετά το ξέσπασμα της οικονομικής κρίσης. Αρχικά, εννοιολογούμε τον λαϊκισμό, ακολουθώντας τις θεωρητικές και μεθοδολογικές κατευθύνσεις τριών σημαντικών προσεγγίσεων [των Ερνέστο Λακλάου και της Σχολής του Έσσεξ (λογοθεωρητική), Πιερ Οστιγκί (κοινωνικοπολιτισμική) και Μπέντζαμιν Μόφιτ (επιτελεστική)], οι οποίες παρά τις διαφορές που παρουσιάζουν διαθέτουν ιδιαίτερα σημεία σύνδεσης, ενώ υπογραμμίζουμε και τη στερεοτυπική ανάγνωση των αντι-λαϊκιστικών αναλύσεων. Στη συνέχεια, αναδεικνύουμε τα χαρακτηριστικά που έλαβαν στο πέρασμα των ετών διάφορες λαϊκιστικές εμπειρίες, ενώ στο τέλος επικεντρωνόμαστε στην περίπτωση της ελληνικής ριζοσπαστικής αριστεράς (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ), με στόχο να εξετάσουμε τα χαρακτηριστικά του πολιτικού της λόγου στην αντιπολίτευση και την εξουσία (2009-2019). Εξέφρασε έναν λαϊκιστικό λόγο; Ποιες ήταν οι επιπτώσεις του αριστερού λαϊκισμού στην δημοκρατία, την κοινωνία και τη πολιτική;. (shrink)

Cushman, Young, & Greene (2010) urge the consolidation of moral psychology around a dual-system consensus. On this view, a slow, often-overstretched rational system tends to produce consequentialist intuitions and action-tendencies, while a fast, affective system produces virtuous (or vicious) intuitions and action-tendencies that perform well in their habituated ecological niche but sometimes disastrously outside of it. This perspective suggests a habit-corrected-by-reason picture of moral behavior. Recent research, however, has raised questions about the adequacy of dual-process theories of cognition and behavior, (...) which tend to distinguish categorically between fast, affect-laden, automatic, sometimes-unconscious, nearly-incorrigible mental processes and slow, rational, effortful, conscious, corrigible mental processes. Processes of one alleged type often have properties associated with the contrary type. For instance, rational processes can be emotional, and fast thinking can perform logical operations. In addition, the fast-slow binary transforms a continuous temporal scale into a dichotomous one, losing potentially important information along the way. While these problems are beginning to be addressed in some subfields of psychology, moral psychology has yet to grapple with them. In this theoretical paper, we argue that moral psychology needs a framework that accounts for our knowledge of both temporal and spatial (anatomical) dimensions of the brain basis of moral cognition and virtuous decision-making. We argue that methodologies with very fine-grained temporal granularity, such as electroencephalography (EEG), should be used to complement more frequently used methodologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We outline how this might be accomplished using generosity, gratitude, and integrity as a case study. (shrink)

-- 05.04.2024 -- Intervention held at the Italian Philosophical Society’s national congress’ section entitled "Texts, Words and Images: Philosophical Traditions and Translations", at Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy -- -/- The aim of this intervention is to briefly advance an interpretation of the post- COVID19 digitalisation processes as to be recognised within the philosophical framework of Vorstellung Metaphysik, “metaphysics of representation”. I would maintain that the formula, firstly indicated by Martin Heidegger, can provide us with a tool (...) to interpret contemporary culture as founded on an “iteration” of individual and collective consciousness into non-existent digital realities. Moreover, I will argue that these concepts are philosophically relatable to those of alienation and reification that come from Marxist traditions. Ultimately, the analysis will try to use the above mentioned tools to delve into an interpretation of remote working and education as potential carriers of alienation. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. (...) Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

Esta es una presentación crítica de la traducción del texto con el que James Beattie critica el ataque a la materia de Goerge Berkeley.

-- 04.08.2024 -- Intervention held at the XXV World Congress of Philosophy in Rome, Italy -- The aim of this paper is to propose an interpretation of philosophy’s tasks as those of a “critical theoresis”. The formula draws from both Plato’s utilisation of the word ϑεώρησις and Herodotus’ particular use of the verb κρίνω. While the former indicates a cultural dimension that in itself implies an active participation of subjects in the objective social world, the latter expresses an hermeneutical principle (...) that unites the concepts of “explanation” and “interpretation”. Therefore, I intend to use these key-concepts together in order to picture a type of philosophy that tries to underline the criteria of a normative theory that does not fail to assume a critical standpoint in interpreting social reality. (shrink)

A rapidly growing body of scholarship embraces virtue jurisprudence, a series of (often ad hoc) attempts to incorporate the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics into legal theory. Broadly understood, virtue ethics describes an approach to moral questions that emphasizes the importance of developing and embodying various virtues, often as manifestations of human flourishing. Scholars typically contrast virtue ethics with deontological and consequentialist moral theories, tracing virtue-centered analysis to ancient Greek philosophers, and in particular to Aristotle. Virtue ethics has experienced a (...) revival over the past 65 years; but, long before that, it proved especially influential in Catholic moral thought, particularly through the work of Aquinas. Perhaps relatedly, scholars have seized on virtue jurisprudence to defend a range of politically conservative positions, such as originalist constitutional interpretation and the propriety of utilizing the law to regulate ostensibly “private” immoralities. This Article reveals the radically underappreciated progressive promise of virtue jurisprudence. Virtue jurisprudence requires no religious commitments whatsoever, but a strong version entails acceptance of the moral significance of developing one’s character—both within and without the law. On a compelling understanding of the virtues, rejecting a state of perpetual disadvantage under the law is a meaningful marker of the virtue of self-respect, and a repudiation of the vice of servility that would otherwise be imposed by the legal system itself. Thus, contrary to the predominant tenor of research on the subject, virtue jurisprudence can ground significant resistance to—and even defiance of—the law. In making this argument, the Article also draws novel connections between virtue jurisprudence and literature on (inter alia) race, feminism, and sexual orientation to reveal the unnoticed potential of virtue jurisprudence to push forward work in those and related areas. At a time when massive and widespread protests across the United States reflect a groundswell of support for overturning certain long-standing, legally-ingrained, systemic disadvantages of people of color, many might be surprised to learn that virtue jurisprudence can serve as a potent theoretical ally. (shrink)

Ethical decision-making frameworks assist in identifying the issues at stake in a particular setting and thinking through, in a methodical manner, the ethical issues that require consideration as well as the values that need to be considered and promoted. Decisions made about the use, sharing, and re-use of big data are complex and laden with values. This paper sets out an Ethics Framework for Big Data in Health and Research developed by a working group convened by the Science, Health and (...) Policy-relevant Ethics in Singapore Initiative. It presents the aim and rationale for this framework supported by the underlying ethical concerns that relate to all health and research contexts. It also describes a set of substantive and procedural values that can be weighed up in addressing these concerns, and a step-by-step process for identifying, considering, and resolving the ethical issues arising from big data uses in health and research. This Framework is subsequently applied in the papers published in this Special Issue. These papers each address one of six domains where big data is currently employed: openness in big data and data repositories, precision medicine and big data, real-world data to generate evidence about healthcare interventions, AI-assisted decision-making in healthcare, public-private partnerships in healthcare and research, and cross-sectoral big data. (shrink)

Definição de IPP da vaca A idade ao primeiro parto (IPP) da vaca, como o próprio nome indica, é a idade em que a vaca tem o seu primeiro parto e, portanto, o seu bezerro(a). Representa o início do retorno econômico do investimento realizado na criação de novilhas. É o ponto de partida onde a vaca começa a produzir descendentes para venda ou reposição e leite para venda, sendo as duas fontes de renda na pecuária de duplo propósito ou dupla (...) aptidão, com criação de raças produtoras de carne e leite. Qual deve ser a IPP da vaca? Para as condições tropicais, espera-se que o primeiro parto da novilha ocorra entre: 29 – 35 meses, o que seria possível se os animais atingissem a gestação aos 20-26 meses de idade. Em condições tropicais, foram relatados valores de idade ao primeiro parto em bovinos mestiços de duplo propósito entre 32 e 48 meses (Aranguren et al., 1993; Rosendo et al., 1993). Isto mostra que existe um amplo valor de melhoria que parece ser basicamente influenciado pela componente nutricional. (shrink)

The Four-Colour Theorem (4CT) proof, presented to the mathematical community in a pair of papers by Appel and Haken in the late 1970's, provoked a series of philosophical debates. Many conceptual points of these disputes still require some elucidation. After a brief presentation of the main ideas of Appel and Haken’s procedure for the proof and a reconstruction of Thomas Tymoczko’s argument for the novelty of 4CT’s proof, we shall formulate some questions regarding the connections between the points raised by (...) Tymoczko and some Wittgensteinian topics in the philosophy of mathematics such as the importance of the surveyability as a criterion for distinguishing mathematical proofs from empirical experiments. Our aim is to show that the “characteristic Wittgensteinian invention” (Mühlhölzer 2006) – the strong distinction between proofs and experiments – can shed some light in the conceptual confusions surrounding the Four-Colour Theorem. (shrink)

Este documento presenta las conclusiones del ejercicio de reflexión realizado por un grupo variado de miembros de la comunidad rosarista, en torno a la educación de calidad que deseamos, que se llevó a cabo en el marco del aterrizaje del nuevo PID 2020, donde aprender a aprender tiene un papel protagónico, pues se convierte en la apuesta pedagógica de la Universidad. Aprender a aprender es uno de esos conceptos esquivos de los que casi todo el mundo cree saber su significado, (...) pero que, en realidad, es conocido por pocos. Parte del trabajo que hemos deseado hacer es, entonces, una clarificación del concepto y sus alcances, para que el discurso de la Universidad en este tema tenga un referente claro y sus planes de acción concuerden con la dimensión y retos que esta práctica conlleva. De esta manera, el documento comienza por una breve explicación de cómo entendemos el aprender a aprender en la Universidad del Rosario, buscando exponer no solo cómo se diferencia, sino en qué se asemeja a conceptos relacionados; después, ofrece una descripción del papel que los diferentes actores (los estudiantes, los profesores, la evaluación y la universidad misma) han de jugar en dicho modelo pedagógico . (shrink)

En este texto presento algunas ideas acerca de la actual “crisis de las humanidades” en el sistema universitario. En particular, exploro cómo los propios humanistas hemos sido en buena medida responsables de ella. Y ofrezco algunas ideas para ir acercándonos a una solución en el futuro.

En el debate contemporáneo entre determinismo e indeterminismo, la mecánica cuántica es utilizada por los libertaristas como recurso para escapar al determi-nismo propuesto por la física clásica, y como búsqueda de un fundamento para la posibilidad de la libertad de la voluntad y de la responsabilidad moral. En el presente artículo se mostrará que toda defensa de la libertad que recurra a la mecánica cuántica ha de poder sortear al menos dos problemas: el que plantea el que he decidido llamar (...) el principio de escala, y el que resulta de lo que Robert Kane define como el principio de suerte. Se mostrará, además, que responder al primer problema no implica responder al segundo. Finalmente, a través de un análisis de las más recientes propuestas que desean sortear este último, se mostrará que ninguna de las propuestas ofrece una explicación convincente acerca de cómo la mecánica cuántica puede ayudar a resolver la cuestión de la libertad de la voluntad. Antes bien, parece que la mecánica cuántica contribuye a su complicación. (shrink)

We characterize a type of functional explanation that addresses why a homologous trait originating deep in the evolutionary history of a group remains widespread and largely unchanged across the group’s lineages. We argue that biologists regularly provide this type of explanation when they attribute conserved functions to phenotypic and genetic traits. The concept of conserved function applies broadly to many biological domains, and we illustrate its importance using examples of molecular sequence alignments at the intersection of evolution and cell biology. (...) We use these examples to show how the study of conserved functions can integrate knowledge of a trait’s causal effects on fitness and its history of natural selection without invoking adaptation. We also show how conserved function provides a novel basis for addressing objections against evolutionary functions raised by Robert Cummins. (shrink)

An English translation of Leibniz's fragment "Horizon rerum humanarum... " in which he announces a plan to demonstrate "that the number of truths or falsehoods enunciable by humans as they are now is limited; and also that if the present condition of humanity persisted long enough, it would happen that the greatest part of what they would communicate in words, whether by talking or writing, would have to coincide with what others have already communicated in the past; and moreover that (...) new humans would lead an entire life that appears thoroughly the same to the senses as lives that others have already led." . (shrink)

Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.

Talk at the ASSC4 conference (Brussels, 2000).

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

Materialism in the philosophy of mind — materialismPM — is the view that everything mental is material (or, equivalently, physical). Consciousness — pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on — certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness — consciousness! — is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view introduced by members of the Vienna Circle (...) in the late 1920s, also has nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. [3] Recently the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ have come to be treated as synonymous, and as names for a position in the philosophy of mind that does involve denial of the existence of consciousness. They’ve been used to name a position that (i) directly rejects the heart of materialism (materialismPM) and (ii) is certainly false. This is a pity, because they’re good terms for a view that is very likely true. (shrink)

It is commonplace to observe that digital technologies facilitate our access to information on a scale unimaginable in previous eras, leading many to call this the “Information Age.” The vaunted advantages of unprecedented data flow obscure a dark corollary: the more modes of engaging with data are available to a people, the more modes are available for manipulating them. Whether through social media, blogs, email, newspaper headlines, or doctored images and videos, the public is indeed bombarded by information, and much (...) of it is misleading or outright false. Much of it, in fact, is propaganda. As the methods for manipulating mass audiences continue to multiply, a clear understanding of the concept of propaganda has never been more relevant. -/- This Article constructs a precise, novel account of propaganda, incorporating notable scholarly insights into the concept as well as the overlooked lessons of the law’s fragmented efforts to regulate it. To bring this new theoretical framework into focus and demonstrate its importance in the Information Age, the Article connects the underlying theory to contemporary communications practices, many of which are enhanced by the availability of new technology. Notably, in doing so, the Article also develops the first systematic account of political gaslighting, which properly understood (and counterintuitively, perhaps) constitutes a form of propaganda. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Two attitudes are possible: one, that the world is an absolute jungle and that the exercise of coercive power by rulers is only a manifestation of this; and the other, that it is both necessary and right that there should be this exercise of power, that through it the world is much less of a jungle than it could possibly be without it, so that one should in principle be glad of the existence of such power, and only take exception (...) to its unjust exercise. (shrink)

Schelling scholars face an uphill battle. His confinement to the smallest circles of ‘continental’ thought puts him at the margins of what today counts as philosophy. His eclipse by Fichte and Hegel and inheritance by better-read thinkers like Kierkegaard and Heidegger tend to reduce him to a historical footnote. And the sometimes obscure formulations he uses makes the otherwise difficult writings of fellow post-Kantians seem comparatively more accessible. For those seeking to widen these circles, see through this eclipse and elucidate (...) these formulations, a deeper internal challenge is to make sense of the appearance and disappearance of intellectual intuition in Schelling’s work. The term’s apotheosis is often attributed to the height of German idealism and especially to Schelling’s identity philosophy, outside which he subjects the term to a radical critique. The identity philosophy aims to cognize the absolute ground of the system of knowledge and the system of nature, for which cognition Schelling enlists intellectual intuition. While the identity philosophy falls between a Fichtean debut and a late attack on Hegel, it is difficult to determine its exact parameter. I propose that a necessary condition for doing so is to clarify the explanatory role of intellectual intuition—that is, the specific problem to which it is the intended solution—on which the identity philosophy depends. To this end, I will trace a nexus of problems that Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition is meant to solve. Doing so will not only help to delineate the identity philosophy, but show it to be continuous with Schelling’s earlier and later periods. In §1, I account for the nexus of the problems of grounding, freedom and meaning. These problems demand, respectively, a principle by which cognition forms a system rather than an aggregate, a principle by which a system of cognition is compatible with freedom rather than incompatible and a principle by which a system of freedom can show why there is meaning rather than none. In §2, I reconstruct Schelling’s argument in the identity philosophy for why intellectual intuition can resolve this nexus of problems and, in §3, his arguments during other periods of his thought for why it cannot. I conclude in §4 by suggesting why the identity philosophy is continuous with these periods. Beyond fulfilling the interpretive task of making sense of intellectual intuition in Schelling’s sprawling corpus, my aim is thus to contribute to a unified reading of the latter. (shrink)

Rolla (2021) argumentou que a prática de avaliar teorias epistemológicas com base em intuições geradas pela consideração de certos casos, como os cenários hipotéticos envolvendo cérebros encubados, clarividentes e anjos da guarda epistêmicos, é um erro. Um erro que, uma vez reconhecido, faria com que os problemas e métodos que ocupam a epistemologia mudassem significativamente. Neste artigo, defendo que a argumentação de Rolla não se sustenta: há falhas no modo como Rolla caracteriza o uso das intuições, as suposições de Rolla (...) podem gerar consequências implausíveis e há um contraexemplo para as alegações dele. Portanto, epistemólogos podem manter os problemas e a metodologia que Rolla critica. (shrink)

The question of the cognitive role of fictionality is this: what is the correct cognitive attitude to take to p, when it is fictional that p? We began by considering one answer to this question, implicit in the work of Kendall Walton, that the correct response to a fictional proposition is to imagine that proposition. However, this approach is silent in cases of fictional incompleteness, where neither p nor its negation are fictional. We argue that that Waltonians should embrace a (...) pluralistic account of the cognitive role of fictional incompleteness: in some cases of fictional incompleteness, we are permitted to resolve the incompleteness during our engagement with the target fiction, and in other cases, we are obliged not to resolve the incompleteness. But though pluralism is accommodated by Walton’s wider account of fictionality, it puts tension on his motivating idea that fictionality stands to the imagination as truth stands to belief. And so we develop a rival conception of the cognitive role of fictionality that is built around a different analogy: on this evidentialist approach, (known) fictionality stands to the imagination as evidence stands to credence. (shrink)

Recientemente entre los defensores de la responsabilidad moral colectiva ha surgido una línea que defiende que los colectivos no sólo son moralmente responsables, sino que además pueden serlo aun si ninguno de los individuos que compone el colectivo es moralmente responsable. A esta posición se la puede denominar la tesis de la autonomía moral colectiva o TAMC. Creo que esta tesis no sólo es errada, sino que además es bastante peligrosa. El objetivo de este texto será mostrar que no hay (...) argumentos fuertes para sostener la verdad de la TAMC, más aún, que la TAMC requiere de una condición contradictoria para poder ser verdadera. Para ello comenzaré por mostrar, en la primera sección, una diferencia importante acerca de las acciones colectivas y por qué para algunos es plausible pensar que los colectivos son moralmente responsables. En las tres secciones siguientes reconstruiré brevemente las teorías de Peter French, Margaret Gilbert y David Copp, todos ellos defensores de la TAMC. En la sección cinco ofreceré las características básicas de la responsabilidad moral. En la sección seis presentaré un requisito que considero indispensable para el funcionamiento de la TAMC, pero mostraré que es imposible de obtener, para, en la última sección, mostrar cómo French, Gilbert y Copp, así como cualquier otra defensa de la TAMC, caen inevitablemente en el error de solicitar algo imposible. (shrink)

In the Vocation of Man, Fichte makes the striking claim that life is eternal, rational, our true being, and the final cause of nature in general and of death in particular. How can we make sense of this claim? I argue that the public lectures that compose the Vocation are a popular expression of Fichte’s pre-existing commitment to what I call immortalism, the view that life is the unconditioned condition of intelligibility. Casting the I as an absolutely self-active or living (...) power enables his philosophical account of both the intelligibility of objects and of what it means to die. This explains his characterization of the Wissenschaftslehre as a system in which ‘all is act, movement, and life’. In Sect. 1, I explain the context of Jacobi’s use of ‘caput mortuum’ as a term for the thing in itself. In Sects. 2 and 3, I reconstruct two immortalist arguments from Fichte’s Jena period. The first is that the I’s self-activity rules out the existence of the thing in itself and thereby vanquishes ‘death’s head’. The second is that, insofar as the I charges us with the moral perfection of nature, it is the final cause of our entire life, including its end. This is to say that the I puts our every moment into question, even our last. In Sect. 4, I use these immortalist arguments to interpret the striking claim from the Vocation. (shrink)

A Trindade corresponde a um ponto central da fé cristã. Apesar da simplicidade com que falamos da Trindade no dia-a-dia, a sua doutrina consiste num enorme desafio de interpretação. Para auxiliar na sua compreensão, vários Modelos foram formados numa tentaive de apresentar a interpretação correta, correspondendo com a ortodoxia cristã. Ao longo desta dissertação, irei apresentar os diferentes Modelos existentes, dando uma breve refutação tanto para o Modelo Psicológico como Constitucional. De seguida, apresentarei o Modelo Social proposto por Swinburne, que (...) será tratado no restante da investigação. De forma a analisar o modelo proposto por este autor, irei apresentar e refutar as principais objecções feitas ao mesmo. Essas objeções serão cinco: Argumento Histórico, Objeção Triteísta, Problema do 4º Elemento Divino, Problema da Negociação e Problema da Necessidade e da autoridade do Pai. Procurarei demonstrar que a base do Modelo é sólida, necessitando, contide, de alguns ajustes para que possa sobreviver às duas objecções finais. Deste modo, defenderei que o Modelo Social de Swinburne, feitas as devidas alterações, não só permite uma leitura consistente da Trindade, preservando a ortodoxia cristã, como é o melhor Modelo para este fim. (shrink)

Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe- notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo- lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis- cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in- teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys- tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of (...) time the ”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec- tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability of the ”phase space”, no laws of mo- tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep- tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical level, that of the very phase space. Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces in that discipline. The role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under- stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This will restrict causal analyses to differential cases. Mutations or other causal differ- ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi- ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym- metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding of the living state of matter. (shrink)

En 1969 Harry Frankfurt publica su seminal artículo “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. Allí ataca la necesidad del principio de posibilidades alternativas (PPA) para la adscripción de responsabilidad moral a los agentes cuando estos realizan una acción. Desde entonces, muchos han sido los intentos de defender el PPA y de mostrar su necesidad para la adscripción de la responsabilidad moral. En este ensayo se examina uno de esos intentos: el que se basa en la causalidad-agencial propuesta por Thomas Reid (1710-1796), (...) y que cuenta con William Rowe como uno de sus defensores dentro de la discusión contemporánea. Esto, con el objetivo de mostrar que, si bien esta defensa podría permitir la aparición de lo que se conoce como un “parpadeo” de libertad, ello no es suficiente para sustentar la atribución de responsabilidad moral. (shrink)

The prevalent views of animal liberty among animal advocates suggest that liberty is merely instrumentally valuable and invasive paternalism is justified. In contrast to this popular view, I argue that liberty is intrinsically good for animals. I suggest that animal well-being is best accommodated by an Objective List Theory and that liberty is an irreducible component of animal well-being. As such, I argue that it is good for animals to possess liberty even if possessing liberty does not contribute towards their (...) subjective well-being, and even in some cases where it has a negative effect upon their subjective well-being. To establish this view I argue that if animals are agents, as I assume they are, then like humans they must be able to determine the course of their own lives (to some extent). Further, having the opportunity to self-determine one’s life just is the very same thing as liberty, and having the opportunity to determine the course of one’s life is intrinsically good. Thus liberty has intrinsic value for humans and animals. So, in addition to the instrumental harms of having one’s liberty restricted, I claim that restricting animals’ liberty in principle harms them because it undermines their capacity for self-determination and fails to acknowledge their authority as agents to make their own choices. (shrink)

We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity (...) aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers. (shrink)

It can be hard to see where money fits in the world. Money seems both real and imaginary, since it has obvious causal powers, but is also, just as obviously, something humans have just made up. Recent philosophical accounts of money have declared it to be real, but for very different reasons. John Searle and Francesco Guala disagree over whether money is just whatever acts like money, or just whatever people believe to be money. In developing their accounts of institutions (...) as a part of social reality, each uses money as a paradigm institution, but they disagree on how institutions exist. Searle argues that the institution of money belongs to an ontological level separate from the physical world, held up by the collective intentions of a group, while Guala claims that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and is just whatever performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group believes about it. Here, we argue that any purely functional account like Guala’s will be unable to capture the distinctive phenomenon of money, since monetary transactions are defined by the attitudes transactors hold toward them. Money will be obscured or misidentified if defined functionally. As we go on to show by examining recent work by Smit et al., belief in money does not require taking on all of Searle’s ontological commitments, but money and mental contents will stand or fall together. (shrink)