Results for 'Gerald O'collins'

968 found
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  1. Betraying Trust.Collin O'Neil - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
    Trust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an already existing obligation. Two forms of trust (...)
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  2. Methodological and Inducement Manipulation.Collin O’Neil - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (11):55-57.
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  3. Consent in Clinical Research.Collin O'Neill - 2017 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 297-310.
    This article addresses two areas of continuing controversy about consent in clinical research: the question of when consent to low risk research is necessary, and the question of when consent to research is valid. The article identifies a number of considerations relevant to determining whether consent is necessary, chief of which is whether the study would involve subjects in ways that would (otherwise) infringe their rights. When consent is necessary, there is a further question of under what conditions consent is (...)
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  4. Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions.Marcello Di Bello & Collin O’Neil - 2020 - Ethics 130 (2):147-178.
    Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other (...)
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  5. The teaching of computer ethics on computer science and related degree programmes. a European survey.Ioannis Stavrakakis, Damian Gordon, Brendan Tierney, Anna Becevel, Emma Murphy, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, Radu Dobrin, Viola Schiaffonati, Cristina Pereira, Svetlana Tikhonenko, J. Paul Gibson, Stephane Maag, Francesco Agresta, Andrea Curley, Michael Collins & Dympna O’Sullivan - 2021 - International Journal of Ethics Education 7 (1):101-129.
    Within the Computer Science community, many ethical issues have emerged as significant and critical concerns. Computer ethics is an academic field in its own right and there are unique ethical issues associated with information technology. It encompasses a range of issues and concerns including privacy and agency around personal information, Artificial Intelligence and pervasive technology, the Internet of Things and surveillance applications. As computing technology impacts society at an ever growing pace, there are growing calls for more computer ethics content (...)
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  6. Efeitos sonoros enquanto fala audiovisual: Análise de Gerald McBoing-Boing à luz do §528 das Investigações Filosóficas.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2011 - Revista Ciberlegenda (PPGCOM - Universidade Federal Fluminense) 24:126-137.
    Dentro da produção da UPA, estúdio que buscou rivalizar esteticamente com os preceitos da Disney no cinema de animação nos anos 1950, Gerald McBoing-Boing é a personagem mais emblemática, estrelando quatro curtas de animação que representam os preceitos do estúdio. No entanto, o mote narrativo de McBoing-Boing é que ele não se comunica com sons, mas sim por efeitos sonoros, e se fazendo entender. Para entender quais são as possibilidades linguísticas desse uso sonoro e como ele não nos aparece (...)
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  7. Fisiologia do Ciclo Estral dos Animais Domésticos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva -
    FISIOLOGIA DO CICLO ESTRAL DOS ANIMAIS -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido e IPA -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- O cio ou estro é a fase reprodutiva dos animais, onde as fêmeas apresentam receptividade sexual seguida de ovulação. Para tanto, é necessário entender a fisiologia do estro para a realização do manejo reprodutivo dos animais. Em geral, as fêmeas manifestam comportamentos fora do comum quando estão ciclando, tais comportamentos devem ser observados para que não percam o pico de ovulação (...)
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  8. Comportamento Sexual dos Animais Domésticos.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro Da Silva -
    COMPORTAMENTO SEXUAL DOS ANIMAIS OBJETIVO O estudante explicará a conduta sexual de fêmeas e machos de diferentes espécies domésticas para detectar a fase de receptividade sexual, com a finalidade de programar de maneira adequada a monta ou a inseminação artificial. A observação da conduta sexual dos animais é indispensável para o sucesso da estação reprodutiva em uma determinada propriedade. Logo, o estudante obterá o alicerce necessário sobre os pontos teóricos e práticos a serem observados para a seleção dos animais aptos (...)
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  9. Wittgenstein on Reasonable Doubt and Calling Bullshit.Frank Hernandez - 2021 - Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy 1 (9):74-88.
    In this essay I analyze a passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. This excerpt contains the expression “O, rubbish!” (Ach Unsinn), which I consider to be closely related to the notions of “bullshit” developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald A. Cohen. The relevance of this essay is illustrated with lively examples, both related to contemporary society and identified by Wittgenstein about 70 years ago. The paper is organized in six sections containing 1) an introduction to the topic, 2) an (...)
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  10. Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Political Philosophy / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Filosofia Política.Everton Maciel (ed.) - 2021 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.
    Nossa seleção de verbetes parte do interesse de cada pesquisador e os dispomos de maneira histórico-cronológica e, ao mesmo tempo, temática. O verbete de Melissa Lane, “Filosofia Política Antiga” vai da abrangência da política entre os gregos até a república e o império, às portas da cristianização. A “Filosofia Política Medieval”, de John Kilcullen e Jonathan Robinson, é o tópico que mais demanda espaço na nossa seleção em virtude das disputas intrínsecas ao período, da recepção de Aristóteles pelo medievo e (...)
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  11. Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. Does this make conceptual sense or is this merely political rhetoric? And what are the implications for these individuals within groups? Collins outlines a Tripartite Model of group duties that can target political demands at the right entities, in the right way and for the right reasons.
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  12. Collective Responsibility Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):943-954.
    Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...)
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  13.  80
    Climate obligations and social norms.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (2):103-125.
    Many governments are failing to act sufficiently strongly on climate change. Given this, what should motivated affluent individuals in high-consumption societies do? This paper argues that social norms are a particularly valuable target for individual climate action. Within norm-promotion, the paper makes the case for a focus on anti-fossil fuel norms specifically. Section 1 outlines gaps in the existing literature on individuals’ climate change obligations. Section 2 characterises social norms. Section 3 provides seven reasons why social norms are a particularly (...)
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  14. The Core of Care Ethics.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The ethics of care has flourished in recent decades yet we remain without a succinct statement of its core theoretical commitment. This book uses the methods of analytic philosophy to argue for a simple care ethical slogan: dependency relationships generate responsibilities. It uses this slogan to unify, specify and justify the wide range of views found within the care ethical literature.
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  15.  88
    States’ culpability through time.Stephanie Collins - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1345-1368.
    Some contemporary states are morally culpable for historically distant wrongs. But which states for which wrongs? The answer is not obvious, due to secessions, unions, and the formation of new states in the time since the wrongs occurred. This paper develops a framework for answering the question. The argument begins by outlining a picture of states’ agency on which states’ culpability is distinct from the culpability of states’ members. It then outlines, and rejects, a plausible-seeming answer to our question: that (...)
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  16.  97
    I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):283-304.
    Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don’t hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don’t hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call ‘moral self-awareness’. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have (...)
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  17. Duties of Group Agents and Group Members.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (1):38-57.
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  18.  81
    Virtue Ethics and the Ecological Self: From Environmental to Ecological Virtues.Gérald Hess - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (1):23.
    This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self. Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing, or something that complements it by (...)
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  19.  54
    Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231–248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...)
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  20.  24
    Beyond Individualism.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - In Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.), Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, Stephanie Collins examines the idea that individuals can acquire ‘membership duties’ as a result of being members of a group that itself bears duties. In particular, powerful and wealthy states are duty-bearing groups, and their citizens have derivative membership duties (for example, to contribute to putting right wrongs that have been done in the past by the group in question, and to increase the extent to which the group fulfils its duties). In addition, she argues, individuals have (...)
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  21. Interconnected Blameworthiness.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):195-209.
    This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...)
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  22. Filling Collective Duty Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (11):573-591.
    A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. I (...)
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  23.  21
    The Government Should Be Ashamed: On the Possibility of Organisations' Emotional Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2018 - Political Studies 4 (66):813-829.
    When we say that ‘the government should be ashamed’, can we be taken literally? I argue that we can: organisations have duties over their emotions. Emotions have both functional and felt components. Often, emotions’ moral value derives from their functional components: from what they cause and what causes them. In these cases, organisations can have emotional duties in the same way that they can have duties to act. However, emotions’ value partly derives from their felt components. Organisations lack feelings, but (...)
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  24. We the People: Is the Polity the State?Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):78-97.
    When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...)
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  25. Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):38-58.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...)
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  26. Against the epistemic value of prediction over accommodation.Robin Collins - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):210-224.
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  27.  65
    Precis of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):85-89.
    This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.
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  28. The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights.Stephanie Collins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):701-722.
    A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...)
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  29. Shahryari on Bloor and the Strong Program.Finn Collin - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (3):70-76.
    In “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social”, Shahram Shahryari (2021) advances the following thesis: In his Strong Program in the sociology of science, David Bloor blames traditional philosophy of science for adopting a dualist strategy in explaining scientific developments, as it employs rational explanation for successful science and social explanation for flawed science. Instead, according to Bloor, all scientific developments should be explained monistically, i.e. in terms of social causes. This is also (...)
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  30. The Evil-God Challenge: Extended and Defended.John M. Collins - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (1):85-109.
    Stephen Law developed a challenge to theism, known as the evil-god challenge (Law (2010) ). The evil-god challenge to theism is to explain why the theist’s responses to the problem of evil are any better than the diabolist’s – who believes in a supremely evil god – rejoinders to the problem of good, when all the theist’s ploys (theodicy, sceptical theism, etc.) can be parodied by the diabolist. In the first part of this article, I extend the evil-god challenge by (...)
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  31. Precis – The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World.Gerald Gaus - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):8-13.
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  32.  29
    Role Obligations to Alter Role Obligations.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - In Alex Barber & Sean Cordell (eds.), The Ethics of Social Roles. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Many roles are situated within organizations. The occupants of these roles often confront a dilemma between (i) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and functions of the role, as bestowed upon the role by the organization’s decision-making procedures, and (ii) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and function that the role should ideally have. This chapter argues that this dilemma should be resolved in favour of (ii). Yet this does not require forgoing role-based considerations in favour of extra-role considerations. Instead, we should (...)
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  33.  28
    Duties and Poverty.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - In Gottfried Schweiger & Clemens Sedmak (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty. Routledge.
    This chapter focuses on the question of who has duties regarding poverty and what those duties demand, from within the perspective of contemporary analytic normative philosophy. The chapter is structured in three sections. Section 1 considers the duties of those living in poverty, which might be either self-regarding or other-regarding duties, and which must be tempered by concerns of overdemandingness. Section 2 considers the duties of affluent individuals. These are imperfect duties grounded in affluent individuals’ relations to the structures that (...)
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  34. Reevaluating the Dead Donor Rule.Mike Collins - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2):1-26.
    The dead donor rule justifies current practice in organ procurement for transplantation and states that organ donors must be dead prior to donation. The majority of organ donors are diagnosed as having suffered brain death and hence are declared dead by neurological criteria. However, a significant amount of unrest in both the philosophical and the medical literature has surfaced since this practice began forty years ago. I argue that, first, declaring death by neurological criteria is both unreliable and unjustified but (...)
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  35.  68
    Distributing States' Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (3):344-366.
    In order for states to fulfil their moral duties, costs must be passed to individual citizens. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
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  36. Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think that this (...)
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  37.  70
    How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):815-831.
    Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferences. I reject these. Instead, collective overdemandingness complaints should be reinterpreted as complaints about inability or third-party costs. These are (...)
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  38.  53
    Corporations’ Duties in a Changing Climate.Stephanie Collins - 1920 - In Jeremy Moss & Lachlan Umbers (eds.), Climate Justice and Non-State Actors: Corporations, Regions, Cities, and Individuals. UK: Routledge.
    The urgency of the problem of climate change calls upon us to investigate the climate duties of agents beyond the state. Individuals are the most salient candidate in this respect. In section I, I argue that the idea that individuals might have duties to reduce their emissions raises difficult issues about individual difference-making. The rest of the chapter, then, focuses on what I take to be the third most-salient duty-bearer: large for-profit corporations. These entities have largely been overlooked in philosophical (...)
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  39. The Detoxification of Desire.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    Agency is an amazing thing: it transduces cognitivity into causality, it makes thought real. How it does so has been a matter of considerable dispute, the resolution of which has been hampered by moral complications. The supposition of a rational basis for morality can play an essential role in clarifying agency by providing a ground for legitimizing the objects of desire and the motivation they provide. The four-stage model of agency presented here – deliberation, calculation, intention, and enactment – emerges (...)
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  40.  31
    A Human Right to Relationships?Stephanie Collins - 2022 - In Kimberley Brownlee, Adam Neal & David Jenkins (eds.), Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter asks whether there is a human right to close personal relationships. It begins by providing a prima facie argument in favour of such a right: humans’ interests in close personal relationships are important, universal, and fundamental. It then explains that there are problems with the distribution, demandingness, and motivation of the correlative duties. The result is that each individual bears a human right only to ‘intimacy consideration’, not to close personal relationships themselves. The chapter then argues that things (...)
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  41.  26
    Who Does Wrong When an Organisation Does Wrong?Stephanie Collins - 2018 - In Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski & Tracy Lynn Isaacs (eds.), Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice. Nw York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
    When an organisation does wrong, each of the members is part of the entity that authored that wrong—or so I shall assume. But it does not follow that each of the members has herself done wrong. Doing wrong, I will assume, results from the combination of two conditions: first, authoring (or being part of the entity that authored) a harm; and second, lacking an excuse for that (part-) authorship. To answer my title question, then, we have to know which members (...)
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  42. A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  43. A Critique of Yuval Noah Harari’s Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind.Brian J. Collins - 2023 - Philosophy Now 154:48-50.
    The foundational principles of representative democracy are under attack globally. What we desperately need are enlightened and persuasive public intellectuals who can help us see through the fog of our fear, anger, and disillusionment, to find our rational political commitments again. One of these public intellectuals is undoubtedly Yuval Noah Harari, the bestselling author of three recent books – Sapiens, Homo Deus, and 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. Harari is also a frequent contributor in the popular press, and a (...)
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  44. Group Responsibility and Historicism.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):754-776.
    In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...)
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  45.  71
    Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):700-716.
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  46. Supposition and choice: Why 'causal decision theory' is a misnomer.John Collins - unknown
    This paper has as its topic two recent philosophical disputes. One of these disputes is internal to the project known as decision theory, and while by now familiar to many, may well seem to be of pressing concern only to specialists. It has been carried on over the last twenty years or so, but by now the two opposing camps are pretty well entrenched in their respective positions, and the situation appears to many observers (as well as to some of (...)
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  47. Unsharpenable Vagueness.John Collins & Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague (...)
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  48. Achieving SDG 4: A Challenge of Education Justice.Gerald Wangenge-Ouma, Emmanuel Manyasa & Patrick Effiong Ben - 2024 - In Tawana Kupe (ed.), Higher Education and SDG4: Quality Education. Leeds: Emerald Publishing.
    The main point in this chapter is that SDG 4 targets cannot be achieved without education justice, which entails that every child, young person and adult benefit from quality education and lifelong learning. There is no justification for the injustices arising from poor-quality education and exclusion as they exist today. Accordingly, tackling the problem of social, political and economic exclusion that emerges from the education sector, and the limitations they impose on the prospects of some individuals, must be prioritised to (...)
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  49. Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - In David R. Morrow (ed.), Moral Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This short article provides an overview of "care ethics" for students who are new to moral theory.
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  50. Organismal Superposition and Death.Michael Nair-Collins - 2024 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 67 (1):22-30.
    ABSTRACT:Organismal superposition holds that the same individual both is and is not an organism, as a consequence of organismal pluralism. When coupled with the assumption that death is the cessation of an organism, this entails that there is no unique answer as to whether brain death is biological death. This essay argues that concerns about organismal pluralism and superposition do not undermine a theory of biological death, nor entail any metaphysical indeterminacy about the biological vital status of a brain-dead individual.
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