The aim of this critical note is to discuss Heraclitus' use of analogy as a pattern of thought not only with argumentative value but also ontological and epistemological status. Heraclitus' analogy is of two kinds and is expressed in the use of the adverbs ὥσπερ ("as") and ὅκωσπερ ("just as"). The first is used as an explanatory device, while the second denotes the ontological homogeneity of logos. Analogy reveals not only the inherent opposition of logos in each single thing, but (...) also the interdependent common interrelation between things. (shrink)

ميتافيزيقيا المعاناة كتابة: جياني فاتيمو ترجمة: وليم العوطة -/- ينتقد الكاتبُ التقليدَ الغربي الطويل في تمجيد الألم الجسديّ والذهنيّ بوصفه وسيلةً مفضّلة في ‏تعلّم الحقائق الأساسية. تشكّل هذه المثلنة[الأمثلة] للألم والأسى، وللزهدِ عامّةً، جزءًا أساسيًا من ‏الميتافيزيقيا الغربية، وبوصفها كذلك فقد ألقت بأثرها على الطبّ الغربي والحقول الأخرى، بما فيها ‏التحليل النفسيّ. يمكن أيضًا توسيع نقد هايدجر للميتافيزيقيا الغربية ليطال أيديولوجيتنا الحالية في ‏الإنكار، وبمعارضتها يضع الكاتب قبولَ المرء بتاريخيته الجذرية.‏ .

Plotinus: Virtue Ethics This article focuses on the virtue ethics of Plotinus and its implications for later accounts of virtue ethics, particularly in Porphyry and Iamblichus. Plotinus' ethical theory is discussed in relation to the aim of the virtuous person to become godlike, the role of disposition in the soul's intellectualization, the four … Continue reading Plotinus: Virtue Ethics.

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived (...) in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I offer a (...) tentative suggestion as to how a hallucinatory experience may still be mistaken for a genuine perceptual experience. (shrink)

Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’, according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the (...) past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to unitism and to the B-theory. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism. (shrink)

In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is inadequate. We conclude by suggesting that (...) one possible reason for the failure of the functionalist approaches is that they begin from the assumption that thought is a form a of willed action. (shrink)

Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...) I suggest that visual experience, unlike thought, is directly penetrated only by practical non-propositional knowledge. I specify this weak cognitive penetrability in anti-representational terms. In particular, I suggest that the dependence of visual content on practical non-propositional knowledge should be conceived as a rational non-inferential relation, for it is in this way that we can account for the distinctive content of visual experience. (shrink)

According to McDowell’s transcendental empiricism, the world view depends on experience, which in turn depends on the world view. This seems to be in accord with the thesis that experience is theory-laden, but it also seems to introduce a problem of vicious circularity. I argue that McDowell’s account has the resources to avoid the problem of vicious circularity by exploiting the idea of a wider circle that involves more relata and more kinds of rational dependence. But the acceptance of this (...) idea entails that experience, though concept-laden, is not theory-laden. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to complement and extend Cécile Laborde’s argument against the Swiss minaret ban, which emphasizes the exclusion of Muslim citizens from equal national belonging. We argue that if we take seriously the normativity that is embedded in the Swiss direct democratic context (Carens 2004), especially in its ability to determine the substance of national belonging, then the symbolic exclusion of Muslims from political belonging is more relevant than the former with regard to democratic justice. Section 1 (...) defines basic notions and presents some arguments that were circulated in Swiss public political debate during the referendum campaign. Section 2 will present extant arguments in normative political philosophy about the ban. Section 3 expands our argument, which can be summarized as follows: the double absence of recognition of Muslims as (i) equal autonomous subjects and (ii) as political agents calls into question the legitimacy of the direct democratic process that led to the ban, making it unjust by the standards implicit within democratic practices in Switzerland. (shrink)

Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...) ways an entity can be located in time, emerged. In this article, we provide a precise map of the conceptions at stake, complete the debate by introducing a version of endurantism not yet considered in the debate — we call transcendentism — and show that it allows us to provide an effective interpretation of the relation of trans-world identity and an intuitive solution in the temporal case. (shrink)

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a (...) definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for the location of immanent universals, the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it makes extended simples impossible. (shrink)

This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...) insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation. (shrink)

Nous proposons une logique épistémique quadrivalente AR4.

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Child health inequalities violate children’s rights to optimal wellbeing. Different issues worldwide affect children’s physical and mental health as well as their development, influencing their future as adults. Inequities are avoidable inequalities. Despite improvements in the past two decades, the ambitious goals of global agendas have, for the most part, remained as expectations with regard to childhood rights, social justice, and health equity in practice. The concept of social determinants of health has become part of the common language in certain (...) settings, but this is still too little to improve health in practice on a global scale, particularly for underprivileged subgroups of the community, as children and adolescents often are. Pediatric health professionals and their organizations are also responsible for guaranteeing children’s and adolescents’ right to health and better wellbeing, helping to reduce health inequalities. (shrink)

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven, promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment (...) and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

In this historical article, Newton da Costa discusses Francisco Miró Quesada’s philosophical ideas about logic. He discusses the topics of reason, logic, and action in Miró Quesada’s work, and in the final section he offers his critical view. In particular, he disagrees with Miró Quesada’s stance on the historicity of reason, for whom “reason is essentially absolute”, whereas for da Costa it “is being constructed in the course of history”. Da Costa concludes by emphasizing the importance of (...) Miró Quesada’s theory of logic and reason, despite it still being incomplete. -/- Historical article by Newton da Costa, annotated and translated by J. C. Cifuentes and L. F. Bartolo Alegre. (shrink)

I defend my paper “Aquinas, Geach, and Existence”[1]against objections from Luca Gili, who argued that, according to Aquinas, future contingents do not enjoy genuine existence but exist in God’s mind only.[1] Damiano Costa, “Aquinas, Geach, and existence”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 3.

This paper is a contribution to graded model theory, in the context of mathematical fuzzy logic. We study characterizations of classes of graded structures in terms of the syntactic form of their first-order axiomatization. We focus on classes given by universal and universal-existential sentences. In particular, we prove two amalgamation results using the technique of diagrams in the setting of structures valued on a finite MTL-algebra, from which analogues of the Łoś–Tarski and the Chang–Łoś–Suszko preservation theorems follow.

This article introduces some concepts that help exploring the ontological import of universal logic. It studies the notions of an antilogic and counterlogic associated to each logic and shows some of their properties. It presents the notion of galaxy, as the class of possible worlds compatible with a given logic.We explore some consequences of these developments.

Desde os tempos mais remotos, busca-se por equilíbrio entre o delito e a punição. Este artigo estabelece uma relação entre o conceito de Justiça em Aristóteles e a proporcionalidade em matéria penal. Para melhor compreensão do tema, inicia-se o estudo pelos principais pontos da obra Ética a Nicômaco, especialmente o Livro V, que trata da Justiça. A partir de então, aborda-se o princípio da proporcionalidade e a forma pela qual os conceitos de Aristóteles influenciaram a concepção desse princípio. Ato contínuo, (...) investiga-se a realidade atual do sistema carcerário, sendo avaliadas as estatísticas produzidas pelos órgãos competentes. Por conseguinte, enfatiza-se o Estado de Coisas Inconstitucional para verificar a questão penitenciária à luz da decisão da Suprema Corte brasileira na ADPF n. 347/DF. Ao final, pondera-se acerca da forma pela qual se pune no Brasil para investigar se suas premissas respeitam ou não as balizas do conceito de Justiça aristotélico e o princípio da proporcionalidade. Para o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa, utilizou-se o método qualitativo, por meio da leitura de obras que obedecem ao eixo temático exposto nos objetivos e que permitem o fichamento do repertório selecionado. Além de ter sido analisada juriprudência, foram coletados dados do censo penitenciário. Finalmente, articulou-se o material consultado com as estatísticas do sistema prisional. Concluiu-se nesta pesquisa que o Poder Executivo é omisso e ineficiente para garantir os direitos dos encarcerados, não obstante todo o avanço normativo sobre o tema. Como se não bastasse, na prática forense brasileira a proporcionalidade não é mais que mera previsão abstrata. (shrink)

Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed with Geach on (...) both points. In this paper, I argue that in several passages of his corpus, most notably those in which he is concerned with God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas implicitly subscribes to a theory of being and time according to which: past and future entities are attributed existence in act, there is theoretical need for introducing a tenseless notion of existence. (shrink)

In the world of Philosophy for Children (P4C), the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a (...) problem with regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C (which, we think, will help to clarify some of the dialogues and debates within P4C as a philosophical field), we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference. (shrink)

O Programa de Filosofia para Crianças de Matthew Lipman e Ann Margaret Sharp tem pouco mais de 40 anos e à sua criação de imediato se sucederam a difusão e a adaptação em diversos contextos geográficos e culturais. Quer isto dizer que a história da Filosofia para Crianças, sobretudo nas últimas décadas, tem consistido numa marcha, mais ou menos vertiginosa, de inovação e renovação. E nem sempre este ritmo de rápida disseminação se tem mostrado compatível com a sedimentação de reflexões (...) apuradas sobre as diferentes dimensões e problemáticas que a prática coloca. A formação dos facilitadores de sessões de Filosofia para Crianças, de acordo com o modelo da comunidade de investigação filosófica de Lipman e Sharp, é uma das dimensões deste projeto pioneiro que aguardam um debate de maior desenvolvimento. A presente reflexão pretende contribuir para essa discussão, apresentando de forma concisa algumas posições que consideramos relevantes para a compreensão do que está em causa. Não temos a pretensão de assumir a forma acabada de um cânone, mas de justificar opções que nos parecem decisivas no presente contexto de implementação da Filosofia para Crianças em Portugal. Esperamos, assim, contribuir para que se possa gerar uma comunidade alargada de diálogo sobre este tópico. (shrink)

Este ha sido el mundo infantil – imposible y contradictorio – que sentimos habitar en este escrito, en esta escritura. En ese mundo, como ahora, el inicio y el final coinciden. En ese mundo, que Heráclito llamaría aión, es la infancia la que gobierna. Un gobierno infantil. Por lo tanto, es tiempo de callarnos. De estarnos sin tanta luz y sin tantas palabras. Para dormir y soñar. Es tiempo de terminar. O de comenzar. Los y las lectores infantiles (no) tienen (...) la palabra. Nosotros ya (no) la tenemos… (¡hipo!). (shrink)

Departing from basic concepts in abstract logics, this paper introduces two concepts: conjunctive and disjunctive limits. These notions are used to formalize levels of modal operators.

A child arrives as a new world because in her and with her we feel that the whole world can start over. But that is not the only reason. A child also arrives as a new world because her arrival tells us what, being so simple, we had almost forgotten: that the world is not just old and unquestionable. The child doesn’t let us be indif-ferent; she breaks with conformity and arrives as hope, reeking of the unpredictable. Of questions. A (...) similar arrival to that of a child is that of certain childlike ideas, such as the idea offered by Matthew Lipman when he created “philosophy for children.” We cele-brate his childlike, daring, irreverent, inquiring character, commemorating his birth nearly 50 years ago. With this childlike idea, a new world began—or at least it be-came possible to start—in worlds which were already a little old and stuck in con-formity. When those in institutionalized philosophy and education heard about the audacity of welcoming children among their reputable interlocutors in dialogue and thought, they frowned and turned up their noses. Philosophy for children? How come? Childhood in philosophy? (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to examine Deleuze’s fascination with “spiritual automata” as a counterpoint to his more famous notion, the “body without organs”. I shall argue that both are grounded in a deep reflection, on Deleuze’s part, on the problems and issues generated by Spinoza’s notion of parallel attributes. Ultimately, I argue, the development of the two notions is motivated by identical metaphysical worries regarding the tenability of transformation, persistence, and affective interrelations between individuals. The answer, for both thinkers, (...) is the insertion of a “third” relational term, which virtually interfaces with each without violation of their parallel development. For Spinoza, such term is the absolutely infinite substance; for Deleuze, it is instead the notion of sense and the faculty of sense-making. (shrink)

Mostrando le analogie tra il modello di Homo oeconomicus e quello che chiameremo Animal oeconomicum, nonché la genealogia del ragionamento “economico” applicato al comportamento animale, vengono messi in risalto gli impliciti e le debolezze di alcuni ragionamenti etologici frequenti; revisioni e critiche che hanno ridimensionato il concetto di Homo oeconomicus sono applicabili anche all’interpretazione raziocinante e calcolatrice del comportamento animale.

How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and do not have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.

In this short article, I analyze forms of public speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on Austin’s theory of speech acts. I argue that because of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force attached to such individuals’ offices and their public figures, their public speech qualifies for being framed as speech acts—which are not covered by even a broad understanding of freedom of speech or right to privacy. Therefore, I formulate a call for the assessment of public (...) speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on “linguistic responsibility.” This framework accounts for the peculiar power structure that such individuals can and do exploit to bring about considerable real-world effects through what could be understood as an exploitation of their speech act power. (shrink)

The article presents an analysis centered on the emotional lapses of artificial intelligence (AI) and the influence of these lapses on two critical aspects. Firstly, the article explores the ontological impact of emotional lapses, elucidating how they hinder AI’s capacity to develop a moral sense. The absence of a moral emotion, such as sympathy, creates a barrier for machines to grasp and ethically respond to specific situations. This raises fundamental questions about machines’ ability to act as moral agents in the (...) same manner as human beings. Additionally, the article sheds light on the practical implications within human-machine relations and their effect on human friendships. The lack of friendliness or its equivalent in interactions with machines directly impacts the quality and depth of human relations. This concerningly suggests the potential replacement or compromise of genuine interpersonal connections due to limitations in human-machine interactions. (shrink)

In the debate about Christian attitudes to other religions, a threefold typology has emerged depicting differing Christian responses: pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism. (This typology is not restricted to the Christian debate alone.) Traditionally, pluralism is opposed to exclusivism, the former claiming that it is arrogant and untenable to make exclusive truth claims, and that all religions are potentially equal paths to salvation and truth. In contrast, I argue that pluralism must always logically be a form of exclusivism and that nothing (...) called pluralism really exists. The main purpose of my paper is to show that there is no high-ground in the pluralist position, for in principle its logic is no different from the exclusivist position. If this is established, then the debate can proceed with more substantial issues regarding the justification and clarification of truth claims. (shrink)

I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.

Capítulo de livro publicado em "Uma introdução à filosofia do direito" Itamar Luís Gelain (Org.) .- Ijuí: Ed. Unijuí, 2015. - 368 p. - (Coleção direito, política e cidadania; 37). . ISBN 978-85-419-0 I 75-8.

Indagando a possibilidade e o sentido de uma poética do eu, será nosso objetivo clarificar, a partir do contributo incontornável do filósofo francês Paul Ricœur, de que forma o texto poéticose assume como uma mediação fundamental da compreensãodo si, bem como da sua configuração e refiguração enquanto um si mesmo. Neste sentido, atentaremos especialmente nas obras Temps et Récit (1983‑85) e Soi-Même Comme un Autre (1990), fulcrais para entendermos a relação que o filósofo tece entre narrativa, tempo e identidade, mais (...) especificamente a importância da mediação narrativa para a superação das apo‑rias ligadas às experiências humanas da temporalidade e da construção identitária. Gravitaremos, neste contexto, em torno da noção seminal de identidade narrativa –enquanto ponto de mediação entre uma identidade idem e uma identidade ipse. (shrink)

After almost a decade of study, research, and dissemination in the field of philosophy for children (p4c), the University of the Azores has created a Master’s degree in Philosophy for Children. While it may appear to be just another university course of study in the academic field of philosophy, we believe that this Master’s is a case study in its own right, as it has allowed us to think about what p4c is capable of when it takes over the university. (...) Not only has the Master’s degree helped shape p4c, but p4c has itself driven the development of the Master’s. Through this process, a different way of existing “within the university” emerges, revealing points worthy of attention that conventional academia does not always value. This article reflects on some of the ideas relating to this process and, without any pretension of establishing rules or claiming to be a finished product, offers some considerations that in our view constitute a turning point for the way people exist within the university. After experiencing a Master’s based upon p4c, neither the university nor philosophy itself can be understood in the same way as before. What is it about p4c, then, that makes it capable of transforming whatever it touches? (shrink)

De modo geral, este texto é uma incursão em lógica filosófica e filosofia da lógica. Ele contém reflexões originais acerca dos conceitos de paraconsistência, modalidades e cognoscibilidade e suas possíveis relações. De modo específico, o texto avança em quatro direções principais: inicialmente, uma definição genérica de lógicas não clássicas utilizando a ideia de lógica abstrata é sugerida. Em seguida, é mostrado como técnicas manuais de paraconsistentização de lógicas são usadas para gerar sistemas particulares de lógicas paraconsistentes. Depois, uma definição de (...) possibilidade lógica é proposta por meio da ideia de limites de sequências de fórmulas. Por fim, muitas abordagens distintas ao paradoxo de Fitch e, consequentemente, aos limites do conhecimento são apresentadas considerando as reflexões anteriores. (shrink)

This study aims at assessing the meaning and the extent of the possible relationship between philosophy and literature in and from two significant contemporary thinkers, Maurice Blanchot and Paul Ricoeur. -/- Based on the assumption that both represent the human effort of touching and configuring an essential bottom which seems to escape an immediate seizure – although it is generally considered that philosophy does it through the conceptual/critical discourse and literature through the metaphorical/poetic discourse – the key problem we wish (...) to answer is to know, in that attempt, whether the mentioned activities can or must come close, especially the first in relation to the second. Such problem inevitably disseminates itself in a set of questions which we propose ourselves to think by having the mentioned authors as a starting point: can literature, in its specificity, open new possibilities of expression or mediation of a being or a neuter which precedes us and, therefore, assume itself as a privileged locus for (the calling for) philosophical reflection? Is it philosophically desirable, or even inevitable, a proximity to literature? Or, more radically, is the defense of a clear separation between philosophy and literature sustainable? In that sense, the essay is divided in three moments: in the first, we clarify the conceptions of the language, of the written text and of the relation author-work-reader from which the authors go from; in the second, we intend to think about how the poetic text opens new possibilities of expression or mediation due to its own world and devices; lastly, we will assess more thoruoghly the meaning and the extent that the relation philosophy-literature acquires in each of the proposals. -/- Although they share a few assumptions, our authors’ perspectives will display different concerns or impulses – one we shall call retrospective and another we shall call prospective – which will lead us to different answers. (shrink)