Results for 'Hard problem'

999 found
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  1. Self, Sense and Autonomy.Matthew Ian Harding - manuscript
    This study advances a refutation of Physicalism. It demonstrates that it cannot, coherently, be maintained. An alternative approach based on Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ is developed. This is an account where the physical world is constituted by a freely acting self from a phenomenology that is ontologically neutral. By doing so, the, so-called, ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is dissolved. It will be shown that the self is compelled to attribute moral and aesthetic value to the world that it has (...)
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  2. The 'Hard Problem' of Phenomenal Perception.Dieter Wandschneider - 2015 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 69:550–568.
    The center of this investigation is the hard problem of phenomenal perception. To be clear, hereby it is thought of higher animals; accordingly the problem of Human consciousness will explicitly not be treated. The so-called explanatory gap (Levine), i.e. missing a neural explanation of experiences, here is emergence-theoretically countered: It is argued that systems own properties and laws different from those of their components. Applied to the brain the phenomenal character of perception is explained as an emergence (...)
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  3. The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago).Marcin Miłkowski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):73-88.
    In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic (...)
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  4. The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.
    Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i.e. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Chalmers suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem.” Against this, I argue that work on the meta-problem will likely fail to make the hard problem any easier. For each of the main stances (...)
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  5. The Hard Problem of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
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  6. What hard problem?Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Philosophy Now (99).
    The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hardproblem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting (...)
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  7. The Hard Problem of Consciousness from a Bio-Psychological Perspective.Franz Klaus Jansen - 2017 - Philosophy Study 7 (11):579-594.
    Chalmers introduced the hard problem of consciousness as a profound gap between experience and physical concepts. Philosophical theories were based on different interpretations concerning the qualia/concept gap, such as interactive dualism (Descartes), as well as mono aspect or dual aspect monism. From a bio-psychological perspective, the gap can be explained by the different activity of two mental functions realizing a mental representation of extra-mental reality. The function of elementary sensation requires active sense organs, which create an uninterrupted physical (...)
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  8. Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Mind.Alexandros Syrakos - manuscript
    The mind is our most intimate and familiar element of reality, yet also the most mysterious. Various schools of thought propose interpretations of the mind that are consistent with their worldview, all of which face some problems. Some of these problems can be characterised as ``hard'', not in the sense of being difficult to solve (most problems concerning the mind are difficult), but in the sense of being most likely insurmountable: they bring to the surface logical inconsistencies between the (...)
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  9. The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Grad Paweł - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) (...)
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  10. The given and the hard problem of content.Pietro Salis - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content (...)
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  11. The Impossibly Hard Problem of Consciousness: Showing the hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved, and the way forward.Jorrit Jan Walinga - manuscript
    I show the sort of solution currently commonly imagined as fitting the hard problem of consciousness is impossible to reach. The category mistake implicit in the problem can be dealt with, but the reformulated version will still never reach complete predictive ability and intuitiveness. Applications of this proof of impossibility and attempts by others to solve the hard problem are discussed. An overarching phenomenological-cognitive framework is proposed, partially to show the possibilities which are still open (...)
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    The Hard Problem of Consciousness Made Slightly Easier.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    We can best understand the nature of consciousness through metaphor, by putting ourselves imaginatively in the place of the brain. Neural processes evoke sensation and meaning in the way that words evoke mental images. Conscious experience is (like) a virtual reality produced by the brain, guided by interaction with the external world. Explanation occurs in the field of view of the subject, so to speak. To explain the existence of that field inevitably involves circularity.
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  13. The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Progressivism of Scientific Explanation.John Park - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    Several philosophers believe that with phenomenal consciousness and neurobiological properties, there will always be some kind of epistemic gap between the two that will lead to a corresponding ontological gap. In order to address those who espouse this hard line position, I will first briefly examine certain aspects of the history of scientific explanation. I will put forth a positive thesis that there is what I call a progressivism to scientific explanations in certain fields, where kinds of explanations tend (...)
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  14. The hard problem of ‘educational neuroscience’.Kelsey Palghat, Jared C. Horvath & Jason M. Lodge - 2017 - Trends in Neuroscience and Education 6:204-210.
    Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and motivation that plague interdisciplinary fields like educational neuroscience. Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions (...)
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  15. Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for (...)
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  16. Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):45-54.
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. (...)
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  17. I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation.Brian D. Earp - 2012 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
    Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers' (1995) assertion that there is a "hard problem of consciousness" worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about (...)
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  18. Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness as an Integrated Information Theorist.Robert Chis-Ciure & Francesco Ellia - 2021 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):255-271.
    In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and propose our own layered view of the hard problem, showing how 2 separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it’s (...)
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  19. Disjunction and distality: the hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content.William Roche - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7197-7230.
    The disjunction problem and the distality problem each presents a challenge that any theory of mental content must address. Here we consider their bearing on purely probabilistic causal theories. In addition to considering these problems separately, we consider a third challenge—that a theory must solve both. We call this “the hard problem.” We consider 8 basic ppc theories along with 240 hybrids of them, and show that some can handle the disjunction problem and some can (...)
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  20. The Parallactic Leap: Fichte, Apperception, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.G. Anthony Bruno - 2021 - In Parallax: The Dependence of Reality on its Subjective Constitution.
    A precursor to the hard problem of consciousness confronts nihilism. Like physicalism, nihilism collides with the first-personal fact of what perception and action are like. Unless this problem is solved, nature’s inclusion of conscious experience will remain, as Chalmers warns the physicalist, an “unanswered question” and, as Jacobi chides the nihilist, “completely inexplicable". One advantage of Kant’s Copernican turn is to dismiss the question that imposes this hard problem. We need not ask how nature is (...)
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  21. Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps.Işık Sarıhan - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):1-13.
    Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such (...)
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  22. Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.
    Spacetime functionalism is the view that spacetime is a functional structure implemented by a more fundamental ontology. Lam and Wüthrich have recently argued that spacetime functionalism helps to solve the epistemological problem of empirical coherence in quantum gravity and suggested that it also (dis)solves the hard problem of spacetime, namely the problem of offering a picture consistent with the emergence of spacetime from a non-spatio-temporal structure. First, I will deny that spacetime functionalism solves the hard (...)
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  23. "The 'Causes' of the Hard Problem".Greg P. Hodes - 2019 - Neuroquantology 16 (9):46-49.
    This note calls attention to the fact that efficient causes – the sort of cause that changes something or makes something happen – can play no constitutive role in the immediate, cognitively conscious relation between cognitive subject and a cognit-ive object. It notes that: (1) it is a necessary condition for an efficient causal relation that it alter its relata; and (2) it is a necessary condition for a conscious cognitive relat-ion that it does not alter its relata. This has (...)
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  24. Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Rodrigo Díaz - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):55-75.
    In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors (...)
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  25. A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Paulo J. Negro - 2019 - Bentham Science.
    A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness addresses the fundamental mechanism that allows physical events to transcend into subjective experiences, termed the Hard Problem of Consciousness. -/- Consciousness is made available as the abstract product of self-referent realization of information by strange loops through the levels of processing of the brain. Readers are introduced to the concept of the Hard Problem of Consciousness and related concepts followed by a critical discourse of different theories (...)
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  26. Why the hard problem of consciousness will never be solved.Philip Davies - manuscript
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that (1) that the hard problem of consciousness is concerned with subjective experience; (2) subjective experience arises from the measure of absolute quantities directly by our senses; (3) objective experience, on the other hand, arises from the measure of relative quantities which are invariant to perception; (4) only relative quantities can be shared with others; (5) consequently the hard problem is forever locked inside the head of each individual (...)
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  27. Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Richard McDaniel - manuscript
    The hard problem of consciousness is a symptom of a fact of all scientific explanations. This article demonstrates through analogy with uncontroversial explanations that the hard problem of consciousness either shouldn't be considered a problem or that all scientific explanations are also lacking in the same way as an explanation of consciousness.
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  28. Cognitive Neuroscience and the Hard Problems.Jan Faye - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (6):561-575.
    This paper argues that the fundamental problem of cognitive neuroscience arises from the neuronal description of the brain and the phenomenal description of the conscious mind. In general philosophers agree that no functional approach can explain phenomenal consciousness; some even think that science is forever unable to explain the qualitative character of our experiences. In order to overcome these challenges, I propose a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the brain according to which brain states are characterized by (...)
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  29. Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.
    According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience (...)
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  30. Experiencing a Hard Problem?Dimitris Platchias - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):115-30.
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  31. Can Quantum Mechanics Solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness?Basil J. Hiley & Paavo Pylkkänen - 2022 - In Shan Gao (ed.), Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford, UK:
    The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to consciousness (Chalmers 1995). Regardless of many attempts to solve the problem, there is still no commonly agreed solution. It is thus very likely that some radically new ideas are required if we are to make any progress. In this paper we turn to quantum theory to find out whether it has anything to offer in our attempts to understand (...)
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  32. What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies.Greg P. Hodes - 2005 - Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.
    David Chalmers argues that consciousness -- authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -- cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the “hard problem.” I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be (...)
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  33. On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.
    Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the (...)
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  34. A Parsimonious Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Complexity and Narrative.Maxson J. McDowell - manuscript
    Three decades after Chalmers named it, the ‘hard problem’ remains. I suggest a parsimonious solution. Biological dynamic systems interact according to simple rules (while the environment provides simple constraints) and thus self-organize to become a new, more complex dynamic system at the next level. This spiral repeats several times generating a hierarchy of levels. A leap to the next level is frequently creative and surprising. From ants, themselves self-organized according to physical/chemical laws, may emerge an ant colony self-organized (...)
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  35. Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.
    Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks (...)
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  36. The answer to the hard problem of consciousness.Leibel Morosow - unknown
    Some people are dualists and some are materialists, but for some reason they can't convince each other, they always seem to be talking past each other, so what is going on?
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  37. A Short Solution to the Hard Problem.A. T. Bollands - manuscript
    This very short paper provides a panpsychic solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. It was presented to the Philosophical Society of the Oxford University Department of Continuing Education (OUDCE) on 18th August 2019, and posted on Twitter (@ATBollands) on the 20th August, 2019. It solves the Hard Problem by 1) making the case for Panpsychism, and 2) solving the Combination Problem (Panpsychism's equivalent of the Hard Problem). -/- The paper aims to be (...)
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  38. The Paradox of Thought: A Proof of God’s Existence from the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Christopher Morgan - 2017 - Philosophy and Theology 29 (1):169-190.
    This paper uses a paradox inherent in any solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness to argue for God’s existence. The paper assumes we are “thought machines”, reading the state of a relevant physical medium and then outputting corresponding thoughts. However, the existence of such a thought machine is impossible, since it needs an infinite number of point-representing sensors to map the physical world to conscious thought. This paper shows that these sensors cannot exist, and thus thought cannot (...)
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  39. Hard, Harder, and the Hardest Problem: The Society of Cognitive Selves.Venkata Rayudu Posina - 2020 - Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):75-92.
    The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of individual experiences and the experiencing self. Determining how the collective social consciousness influences and is influenced by the individual selves constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing parallels between individual cognition and the collective knowing of mathematical science, here we present a conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. Our (...)
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  40. Form, Qualia and Time: The Hard Problem Reformed.Stephen E. Robbins - 2013 - Mind and Matter 2:153-181.
    The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. (...)
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  41.  90
    Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives.Tobias A. Wagner-Altendorf - forthcoming - Acta Analytica.
    David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I (...)
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  42. The conscious electromagnetic information field theory: The hard problem made easy?J. McFadden - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):45-60.
    In the April 2002 edition of JCS I outlined the conscious electromagnetic information field theory, claiming that consciousness is that component of the brain's electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neurons and is thereby capable of communicating its informational content to the outside world. In this paper I demonstrate that the theory is robust to criticisms. I further explore implications of the theory particularly as regards the relationship between electromagnetic fields, information, the phenomenology of consciousness and the meaning of (...)
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  43. On the Solutions to the Hard Problems.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    There is a profound difference between asking a 'hard problem' and asking a 'hard problem' that has qualia in the question. There are plausible answers to the former that are nevertheless clearly not answers to the latter. I give a method by which hard problems will be able to be solved, if possible. I speculate on the (possible) causal efficaciousness of consciousness in evolution and in quantum mechanics.
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  44.  19
    Emergent Illusionism: A New Paradigm for the Hard Problem of Consciousness | Shubham Kulathinal Dominic | (4th edition).Shubham Dominic - forthcoming - Philosophical Academics.
    Different philosophers from ancient Greek philosophers to contemporary thinkers tried to present unique views on consciousness. But what consciousness actually is remains unknown. Scientists today study neural firing patterns, neurotransmitters, fMRI scans map neural constellations and brain circuits. Yet, the bridge between neurons and the fragrance of rain or the taste of chocolate remains elusive. How does a network of cells conjure the magic of qualia? This makes the hard problem of consciousness. In this situation, emergent illusionism proposes (...)
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  45. On the Big Bang, Qualia, Einstein’s Train, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Hard Problems, etc.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    On Einstein's Train and the Big Bang in Fragmental Presentism, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Qualia, Hard Problems, etc.
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  46. What we know and how we know it: Cartesian meditations on some hard problems at the interface of science and empiricist philosophy.Michael LaFargue - manuscript
    Laboratory science is our only source of knowledge about the world as it is apart from our perceptions of the world. Empiricist philosophy, relying on evidence consisting in human perceptions, can only give us knowledge of phenomena making up the world-perceived, which recent neuroscience tells us is wholly and entirely constructed by our neuron-based human perceptual apparatus. In this light, empiricist philosophy should explicitly and fundamentally be reconceived as a method of thinking critically about phenomena, i.e. as a stripped down, (...)
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  47. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: a heuristic approach to the hard problem of consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, (...)
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  48. Can Science Explain consciousness? Toward a solution to the 'hard problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system (...)
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  49. Emergence of Consciousnesses Shows the Hardness of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Rajakishore Nath - 2006 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 23 (2):167-181.
    I have argued that emergentism is a non-computational theory of mind, because this theory says that mind or consciousness emerges from material objects, but it will not be reduced to that matter. That is to say that the higher level of quality emerge from a lower level of existence. It emerges therefrom, and does not belong to that level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existence with its social laws of behaviour. Thus, emergentism is an anti-reductionists' theory of (...)
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  50. Appendix 3 and the Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Jacob Parr - manuscript
    The author , after Bergson , provides a formal deduction which defends Bergson ’s claim that “ the character of movements which are externally identical are internally different “ . The author is responding to Diana Coole and Samantha Frost ’s “ Introducing the New Materialisms ” , wherein neither Coole nor Frost showed a knowledge of Bergson or his existence whatsoever despite seemingly having to have read Deleuze and Deleuze ’s contemporaries … -/- The author also presents a novel (...)
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