Results for 'Haugeland, John'

968 found
Order:
  1. John Haugeland, ed., Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence[REVIEW]Varol Akman - 1998 - ACM SIGART Bulletin 9 (3-4):33-36.
    This is a review of Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence, edited by John Haugeland and published by The MIT Press in 1997.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland ed. by Zed Adams and Jacob Browning. [REVIEW]Apaar Kumar - 2018 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (1):182-184.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Rule-following practices in a natural world.Wolfgang Huemer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1):161-181.
    I address the question of whether naturalism can provide adequate means for the scientific study of rules and rule-following behavior. As the term "naturalism" is used in many different ways in the contemporary debate, I will first spell out which version of naturalism I am targeting. Then I will recall a classical argument against naturalism in a version presented by Husserl. In the main part of the paper I will sketch a conception of rule-following behavior that is influenced by Sellars (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Revisiting the Intentionality All-Stars.Walter Veit - 2022 - Review of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):31-54.
    Eliminativism is a position most readily associated with the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands, denying that there are such things as propositional states. This position has created much controversy, despite the fact that intentionality has long been seen as perhaps the core problem for naturalistic philosophy. There is a more radical interpretation of eliminativism, however, denying not only mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but also intentionality (i.e., aboutness) on a global level. This position traces its contemporary origin back (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception.Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2016 - In Zed Adams & Jacob Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Pres.
    In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere sensory responses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Answering Dreyfus's Challenge: Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism.Kevin Temple - 2017 - Dissertation, The New School
    John McDowell’s debates about concepts with Robert Brandom and Hubert Dreyfus over the past two decades reveal key commitments each philosopher makes. McDowell is committed to giving concepts a role in our embodied coping, extending rational form to human experience. Brandom is committed to defining concepts in a way that helps make rationality distinct. And Dreyfus is committed to explaining how rational understanding develops out of lesser abilities we share with human infants and other animals (I call this “Dreyfus’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Two Pillars of Institutions: Constitutive Rules and Participation.Wolfgang Huemer - 2021 - In Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms: Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives. Routledge.
    The creation of new institutions and the initiation of new forms of behaviour cannot be explained only on the basis of constitutive rules – they also require a broader commitment of individuals who participate in social practices and, thus, to become members of a community. In this paper, I argue that the received conception of constitutive rules shows a problematic intellectualistic bias that becomes particularly manifest in three assumptions: (i) constitutive rules have a logical form, (ii) constitutive rules have no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
    I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   183 citations  
  9. Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem. Sections 2–5 discuss instructively wrong or incomplete previous proposals. Section 6 presents my solution and explains its virtues. Section 7 answers the most common objection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  10. The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  11. Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
    In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  12. Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
    This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  13. A conspicuous art: putting Gettier to the test.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psychologists have argued that laypeople and non-Westerners view Gettier subjects very differently, based on experiments where laypeople tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when effectively probed, laypeople and non-Westerners unambiguously agree that Gettier subjects do not know.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  14. The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.
    Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion’s truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  15. Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
    I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  16. Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):137-155.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely moving world. To show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17. Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
    According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  18. An Ontology of Affordances.John T. Sanders - 1997 - Ecological Psychology 9 (1):97-112.
    I argue that the most promising approach to understanding J.J. Gibson's "affordances" takes affordances themselves as ontological primitives, instead of treating them as dispositional properties of more primitive things, events, surfaces, or substances. These latter are best treated as coalescences of affordances present in the environment (or "coalescences of use-potential," as in Sanders (1994) and Hilditch (1995)). On this view, even the ecological approach's stress on the complementary organism/environment pair is seen as expressing a particular affordance relation between the world (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  19. Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?John Schwenkler - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):308-329.
    Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  20. Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 2000 - Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2):501–547.
    In this paper I refute the chief arguments for cultural relativism, meaning the moral (not the descriptive) theory that goes by that name. In doing this I walk some oft-trodden paths, but I also break new ones. For instance, I take unusual pains to produce an adequate formulation of cultural relativism, and I distinguish that thesis from the relativism of present-day anthropologists, with which it is often conflated. In addition, I address not one or two, but eleven arguments for cultural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  21. The Problem of ESEE Knowledge.John Turri - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:101-127.
    Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  22. Anti‐Atomism about Color Representation.John Morrison - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):94-122.
    According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23. (1 other version)The fall of “augustinian adam”: Original fragility and supralapsarian purpose.John Schneider - 2012 - Zygon 47 (4):949-969.
    The essay is framed by conflict between Christianity and Darwinian science over the history of the world and the nature of human personhood. Evolutionary science narrates a long prehuman geological and biological history filled with vast amounts, kinds, and distributions of apparently random brutal and pointless suffering. It also strongly suggests that the first modern humans were morally primitive. This science seems to discredit Christianity's common meta-narrative of the Fall, understood as a story of Paradise Lost. The author contends that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property.John T. Sanders - 1987 - Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 10 (2):367-99.
    There is a great deal that might be said about justice in property claims. The strategy that I shall employ focuses attention upon the initial acquisition of property -- the most sensitive and most interesting area of property theory. Every theory that discusses property claims favorably assumes that there is some justification for transforming previously unowned resources into property. It is often this assumption which has seemed, to one extent or another, to be vulnerable to attack by critics of particular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  25. Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.John Turri - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
    Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. God and Christianity According To Swinburne.John Hick - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):25 - 37.
    In this paper I discuss critically Richard Swinburne’s concept of God, which I find to be incoherent, and his understanding of Christianity, which I find to be based on a precritical use of the New Testament.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. An infinitist account of doxastic justification.John Turri - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):209-218.
    Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. The Relation between Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics.John Morrison - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17.
    Conception and causation are fundamental notions in Spinoza's metaphysics. I argue against the orthodox view that, due to the causal axiom, if one thing is conceived through another thing, then the second thing causes the first thing. My conclusion forces us to rethink Spinoza's entitlement to some of his core commitments, including the principle of sufficient reason, the parallelism doctrine and the conatus doctrine.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  29. Projects and Property.John T. Sanders - 2002 - In David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    I try in this essay to accomplish two things. First I offer some first thoughts toward a clarification of the ethical foundations of private property rights that avoids pitfalls common to more strictly Lockean theories, and is thus better prepared to address arguments posed by critics of standard private property arrangements. Second, I'll address one critical argument that has become pretty common over the years. While versions of the argument can be traced back at least to Pierre Joseph Proudhon, I'll (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30. The free market model versus government: A reply to Nozick.John T. Sanders - 1977 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1):35-44.
    In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues, first, that free-market anarchism is unstable -that it will inevitably lead back to the state; and, second, that without a certain "redistributive" proviso, the model is unjust. If either of these things is the case, the model defeats itself, for its justification purports to be that it provides a morally acceptable alternative to government (and therefore to the state). I argue, against Nozick's contention, that his "dominant protection agency" neither meets his monopoly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31. Carelessness and Inattention: mind-wandering and the physiology of fantasy from Locke to Hume.John Sutton - 2010 - In Charles T. Wolfe & Ofer Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer. pp. 243--263.
    1. The restless mind[1] Like us, early modern philosophers, both natural and moral, didn’t always understand the springs of their own actions. They didn’t want to feel everything they felt, and couldn’t trace the sources of all their thoughts and imaginings. Events from past experience come to mind again unwilled: abstract thought is interrupted by fantastical images, like the ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants’ by which Hume exemplified ‘the liberty of the imagination’[2]. Then, as now, a failure to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  32. Epistemic Supervenience.John Turri - 2010 - In Matthias Steup, Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 Ed. Blackwell.
    An encyclopedic article on epistemic supervenience in Blackwell companion to epistemology, 2 ed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Practical and epistemic justification in alston’s "Perceiving God".John Turri - 2008 - Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):290 - 299.
    This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to understand how this premise fits into Alston’s main argument. I then present Alston’s main argument, and proceed to clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston’s argument for the premise in question. Without this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Euthyphro, the Good, and the Right.John Milliken - 2009 - Philosophia Christi 11 (1):149-159.
    The Euthyphro dilemma is widely deployed as an argument against theistic accounts of ethics. The argument proceeds by trying to derive strongly counterintuitive implications from the view that God is the source of morality. I argue here that a general crudeness with which both the dilemma and its theistic targets are described accounts for the seeming force of the argument. Proper attention to details, among them the distinction between the good and the right, reveals that a nuanced theism is quite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. A Mystery at the Heart of Berkeley's Philosophy.John Russell Roberts - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 5:214-46.
    There is a problem regarding God and perception right at the heart of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. With respect to this problem, I will argue for : It is intractable. Berkeley has no solution to this problem, and neither can we hope to offer one on his behalf. However, I will also argue for : The truth of need not be seen as threatening the viability of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. In fact, it may even be seen as speaking in its favor.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 1998 - Ratio Juris 11 (3):272-290.
    The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," showing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test.John N. Williams - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Russell: a guide for the perplexed.John Ongley & Rosalind Carey - 2013 - New York: Continuum. Edited by Rosalind Carey.
    Contents: Introduction / Naïve Logicism / Restricted Logicism / Metaphysics (Early, Middle, Late) / Knowledge (Early, Middle, Late) / Language (Early, Middle, Late) / The Infinite.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. The State of Statelessness.John T. Sanders - 1996 - In John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson (eds.), For and Against the State: New Philosophical Readings. Rowman & Littlefield.
    My objective in this paper is to address a handful of issues that typically get raised in discussions of philosophical anarchism. Some of these issues arise in discussions among partisans of anarchism, and some are more likely to be raised in efforts to defend the state against its opponents. My hope is to focus the argument in such a way as to make clearer the main issues that are at stake from the point of view of at least one version (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. Merleau-Ponty on Meaning, Materiality, and Structure.John T. Sanders - 1994 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 25 (1):96-100.
    Against David Schenck's interpretation, I argue that it is not absolutely clear that Merleau-Ponty ever meant to replace what Schenck refers to as the "unity of meanings" interpretation of "structure" with a "material meanings" interpretation. A particular problem-setting -- for example, an attempt to understand the "truth in naturalism" or the "truth in dualism" -- may very well require a particular mode of expression. I argue that the mode of expression chosen by Merleau-Ponty for these purposes, while unfortunate in some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Darwin’s Unkindly Variable: Fitness and the Tautology Problem.John S. Wilkins - manuscript
    Few problems in the philosophy of evolutionary biology are more widely disseminated and discussed than the charge of Darwinian evolution being a tautology. The history is long and complex, and the issues are many, and despite the problem routinely being dismissed as an introductory-level issue, based on misunderstandings of evolution, it seems that few agree on what exactly these misunderstandings consist of. In this paper, I will try to comprehensively review the history and the issues. Then, I will try to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Affordances: An Ecological Approach to First Philosophy.John T. Sanders - 1999 - In Gail Weiss & Honi Fern Haber (eds.), Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture. Routledge. pp. 121--42.
    Interest in "embodiment", and over how one may best express the implications of embodiment, is no parochial question, of interest only to a small number of effete philosophers. It confronts perceptual psychologists, developmental psychologists, and psychotherapists, of course. It may not be surprising, either, that it has become an important issue to some students of history and sociology, and to linguists, literary theorists and aestheticians. But that's not all. As physicists -- working within the very bastion of "objective" analysis -- (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Are Beliefs about God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant.John Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258.
    The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Science.John T. Sanders - 1996 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1996 (Spring).
    Cognitive science is ready for a major reconceptualization. This is not at all because efforts by its practitioners have failed, but rather because so much progress has been made. The need for reconceptualization arises from the fact that this progress has come at greater cost than necessary, largely because of more or less philosophical (at least metatheoretical) straightjackets still worn - whether wittingly or not - by those doing the work. These bonds are extremely hard to break. Even some of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Incommensurability and demarcation.John T. Sanders - 1998 - In R. Dane (ed.), Criticism and Defense of Rationality in Contemporary Philosophy. Rodopi. pp. 65--83.
    If the term "relativism" is understood as relativists take it, everyone is a relativist. If, on the other hand, one understands "relativism" as absolutists do, no one really could consistently be a relativist, despite what they might think. As I hope to show, however, much of this positioning of persons and philosophies is foolish. It misses much that is important in philosophical discussion and focuses attention in directions that lead to dead ends.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Moving and Thinking Together in Dance.John Sutton - 2005 - In Robin Grove, Kate Stevens & Shirley McKechnie (eds.), Thinking in Four Dimensions: creativity and cognition in contemporary dance. Melbourne UP. pp. 51-56.
    The collaborative projects described in this e-book have already produced thrilling new danceworks, new technologies, and innovative experimental methods. As the papers collected here show, a further happy outcome is the emergence of intriguing and hybrid kinds of writing. Aesthetic theory, cognitive psychology, and dance criticism merge, as authors are appropriately driven more by the heterogeneous nature of their topics than by any fixed disciplinary affiliation. We can spy here the beginnings of a mixed phenomenology and ethnography of dance practice (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Llull and Leibniz: The Logic of Discovery.John R. Welch - 1990 - Catalan Review 4:75-83.
    Llull and Leibniz both subscribed to conceptual atomism: the belief that the majority of concepts are compounds constructed from a relatively small number of primitive concepts. Llull worked out techniques for finding the logically possible combinations of his primitives, but Leibniz criticized Llull’s execution of these techniques. This article argues that Leibniz was right about things being more complicated than Llull thought but that he was wrong about the details. The paper attempts to correct these details.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. From Perception to Metaphysics: Reflections on Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty.John T. Sanders - manuscript
    George Berkeley's apparently strange view – that nothing exists without a mind except for minds themselves – is notorious. Also well known, and equally perplexing at a superficial level, is his insistence that his doctrine is no more than what is consistent with common sense. It was every bit as crucial for Berkeley that it be demonstrated that the colors are really in the tulip, as that there is nothing that is neither a mind nor something perceived by a mind. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. That's Outrageous.John Turri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):167-171.
    I show how non-presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to Arthur Prior and lately updated by Dean Zimmerman. Prior and Zimmerman say that non-presentism cannot account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it is equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral outrage.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Cleansing the Doors of Perception: Aristotle on Induction.John R. Welch - 2001 - In Konstantine Boudouris (ed.), Greek Philosophy and Epistemology. International Association for Greek Philosophy.
    This chapter has two objectives. The first is to clarify Aristotle’s view of the first principles of the sciences. The second is to stake out a critical position with respect to this view. The paper sketches an alternative to Aristotle’s intuitionism based in part on the use of quantitative inductive logics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 968