Schrödinger’s equation says that the Hamiltonian is the generator of time translations. This seems to imply that any reasonable definition of time operator must be conjugate to the Hamiltonian. Then both time and energy must have the same spectrum since conjugate operators are unitarily equivalent. Clearly this is not always true: normal Hamiltonians have lower bounded spectrum and often only have discrete eigenvalues, whereas we typically desire that time can take any real value. Pauli concluded that constructing a general a (...) time operator is impossible. Here we show how the Pauli argument fails when one uses an external system to track time, so that time arises as correlations between the system and the clock. In this case, the time operator is conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian and not to the system Hamiltonian, but its eigenvalues still satisfy the Schrödinger equation for arbitrary system Hamiltonians. (shrink)

ES: La economía tradicional explica la evolución de los individuos y del conocimiento de forma muy parcial. Los nuevos medios exigen una reconsideración del papel del individuo y del valor comunal del conocimiento que permita una reorientación del sentido económico y las acciones individuales. Frente a la teoría de juegos tradicional de suma 0, es posible encontrar formulaciones cooperativas que muestran su robustez y pertinencia. EN: Classical economics explains the evolution of individuals and knowledge in a very partial way. New (...) technological means require a reconsideration of the role of individuals and communal value of knowledge. This rethinking allows a reorientation of both the economic sense and individual actions to become a reality. Against a classical theory of zero-sum games, it is possible to reshape cooperative ways that show their robustness and pertinence. (shrink)

(Relato breve de ideas). [...] Algo atormenta a María, mi más admirada científica. El tesoro que custodia es tan grande, que la mínima irregularidad hace saltar todas las alarmas. Las nuevas arrugas de su frente se expanden en ondas concéntricas y hacen subir la tensión. [...].

I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

Tras analizar sucintamente las consecuencias científicas y filosóficas de la identidad mente-cerebro, se señalan argumentos a favor y en contra de mantener el debate mente-cerebro. En particular se consideran las nuevas técnicas de exploración del cerebro como argumento en contra de tal debate. Las deficiencias e insuficiencias de tales técnicas aconsejan mantener el debate mente-cerebro y no asumir el materialismo.

Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...) cases, or whether lay intuitions vary depending on individual factors (e.g. ethnicity) or factors related to specific types of Gettier cases (e.g. cases that include apparent evidence). We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge. Although participants rated true beliefs in Gettier and Skeptical Pressure cases as being justified, they were significantly less likely to attribute knowledge for these cases than for matched true belief cases. This pattern of response was consistent across different variations of Gettier cases and did not vary by ethnicity or gender, although attributions of justification were found to be positively related to measures of empathy. These findings therefore suggest that across demographic groups, laypeople share similar epistemic concepts with philosophers, recognizing a difference between knowledge and justified true belief. (shrink)

La questione sulla verità del cristianesimo è fondamentale e ineludibile. In essa si trova uno dei filoni fondamentali del pensiero di Joseph Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI. In fondo si trovano coinvolti una serie di argomenti che si possono riassumere nel rapporto tra fede e ragione, tra il Dio della fede e il Dio dei filosofi. Nella visione cristiana ambedue non si contrappongono, ma s’incontrano. La “distinzione mosaica” s’incontra con la “distinzione socratica” . La pretesa di verità del cristianesimo conduce a (...) delle conseguenze sia nell’ambito della religione, sia in quello della filosofia e della morale. Per superare la crisi del cristianesimo abbiamo bisogno di recuperare la fiducia nela ragione e tornare alla ricerca della verità. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

In this work, we discuss the failure of the principle of truth functionality in the quantum formalism. By exploiting this failure, we import the formalism of N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. This is done by describing quantum states as particular valuations associated with infinite non-deterministic truth tables. This allows us to introduce a natural interpretation of quantum states in terms of a non-deterministic semantics. We also provide a similar construction for arbitrary probabilistic theories based (...) in orthomodular lattices, allowing to study post-quantum models using logical techniques. (shrink)

¿Llegarán los ordenadores a sustituir a los seres humanos? Lo que hasta hace unas décadas parecía una pregunta de ciencia-ficción, es ahora defendido con seriedad por algunos especialistas en inteligencia artificial. El presente articulo dibuja las más importantes líneas de investigación en este campo y las posiciones más relevantes respecto de la relación hombre-maquina pensante. La conclusión que propone el autor supone una decidida apuesta por un humanismo en el que quepa integrar el desarrollo tecnológico sin perder de vista sus (...) innegables implicaciones éticas. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. (...) In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false. (shrink)

Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...) is no perceived object at all. The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing (...) modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

The opening of Protagoras leads to a dramatic misunderstanding concerning the companion’s suspicion that Socrates has been in pursuit of the young Alcibiades. The remark that today Socrates paid him no attention and forgot about him, together with the announcement that the supposed reason for such a strange incident was the alleged wisdom of Protagoras, mitigates and confuses Socrates’ previous acknowledgement that indeed he has come from being with Alcibiades just now. The narration following the meeting with the sophist reinforces (...) that Alcibiades, while having been present and come to the aid of Socrates, was neither the aim of Socrates’ erotic pursuit, nor left the meeting to enjoy his company in private. However, previous studies claim that this impression could be false and prompted ironically by Socrates in the dialogue in order to redirect the attention of this companion, who would judge the relationship with Alcibiades inappropriate. This paper discusses previous studies and provides new textual evidence that could confirm that the drama indicates that Socrates, in spite of his dissimulation, actually appears to be in pursuit of Alcibiades. It also explains how Socrates’ feigned forgetting, which makes it possible to avoid the matter, may be read as a necessary precaution of the philosophy in its public appearance, to protect the course of a certain educational relationship with the youngster which has just begun. (shrink)

The common 4th century B.C. view according to which Homer was regarded as a poet and a wise man, the leading and most honorable, to the point of being considered “the educator of Greece” (Pl. Resp. 606e-607a), is strongly supported by the Platonic dialogues. The works of Plato are the main available source to get to know not only the great pedagogical esteem for Homer, but also the several educational traditions that used or relied on Homeric poetry in Classical Athens. (...) We are certainly used to thinking of Socrates as standing out for contesting or blaming such customs and methods provided by rhapsodes, sophists and common people (Pl. Resp.; Ion; Hp. mi.). But conversely, he is also often depicted quoting, alluding to or remaking on Homeric passages when presenting his own views. Socrates even claims to feel a certain friendship or reverence for the poet and declares to be charmed by contemplating things through him, whom he considers to be amongst the few deserving to be called “philosophers” (Pl. Resp. 595b; 607c-d; Phdr. 278b-279b). The puzzling twofold nature of the Socratic attitude towards Homer, coupled with the fact that Plato would become a figure as honored as the poet was, led ancient literary criticism to focus on the Platonic use and sharing of material and techniques proper to Homeric poetry. Works like those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Maximus of Tyre, Longinus and above all Proclus, not only pointed out the philosopher’s debt to the poet, but even considered him to be an admirer of the Homeric genius unlike anyone else, and whose emulation basically attempted to reach and outperform the pedagogical power that the legendary poet had (Dion. Hal. Pomp. I, 13; Max. Tyr. Or. 26; [Longinus]; Subl. XIII, 2-3; Procl., In R. VI, 163.13-164.7; 202.7-205.23). With an analogous spirit, studies of contemporary Platonists suggest that the dialogues were shaped using the Homeric text, especially the Odyssey, as a template, and making Socrates appear as going through equivalent experiences to those of Odysseus’ “νόστος”. With respect to Protagoras, previous attempts focused on explicit references to books X and XI, placing the dispute with the sophist and the events at Callias’ house in the symbolic context of Odysseus’ encounter with Circe and the following journey into the underworld. I attempt to bring that reading one step further, paying special attention to the narrated character and the dramatic context for the singing of those episodes and the parallel ones in Protagoras. In first place, I consider the whole dialogue refiguring the episode in the Odyssey that works as a dramatic frame for the singing of Odysseus’ past adventures, the arrival at Phaeacia and the reception at Alcinous’ court. I regard Odysseus’ need to sing the Apologue as a call for hospitality to secure a safe passage home, working as a pattern for Socrates’ need of a tale at his own appearance in Athens to fulfill and secure a philosophical education in the city. In second place, I take into consideration the metanarrative dimension of such remaking. Since Socrates’ narration comes in response to a certain “Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης”, a “praiser of Homer” (Pl. Prt. 309b1), as Odysseus’ Apologue is to Demodocus the “ἀοιδὸς”, I examine how the dialogue could evince a dispute for pedagogical primacy amongst the different narratives and uses of poetry in Athens, a dispute that the Platonic narrative would attempt to surpass precisely by imitating Homer. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

[ES] En este trabajo propedéutico, a través de los propios textos de Kant, intentaré ofrecer una descripción equilibrada y una reconstrucción sucinta de los argumentos que ofrece Kant acerca de la posibilidad e imposibilidad de la metafísica. En primer lugar presentaré algunas críticas a la metafísica, luego visualizaré la noción kantiana de metafísica, así como sus razones y momentos constitutivos; y finalmente, analizaré que tipo de conocimiento es la metafísica y las características y naturaleza de esta para que sea viable (...) dicha «ciencia». Para realizar este cometido, asumiré la hipótesis de que la metafísica para Kant, en correspondencia con la resolucion de la tercera cuestion del conocimiento, es una ciencia que integra razón práctica y teórica en un sistema universal que busca la transcendencia. Si la metafísica tiene alguna posibilidad, ésta probablemente sería la vía. [EN] In this propaedeutic work, through Kant’s own texts, I will try to offer a balanced description and a succinct reconstruction of Kant’s arguments about the possibility and impossibility of Metaphysics. In the first place I will present some criticisms of Metaphysics, then I will visualize the Kantian notion of Metaphysics, as well as its constitutive reasons and moments; and finally, I will analyze what kind of knowledge is Metaphysics and the characteristics and nature of it, so that this «science» is viable. In order to carry out this task, I will assume the hypothesis that Kant’s Metaphysics, in correspondence with the resolution of the third question of knowledge, is a science that integrates practical and theoretical reason into a universal system that seeks transcendence. If Metaphysics has any chance, this would probably be the way. (shrink)

La migración internacional nos enfrenta con problemas irresolubles desde la figura moderna del Estado nacional, su concepto de ciudadanía y su noción de justicia. Juan Carlos Velasco critica las limitaciones y la orientación de las políticas contemporáneas que nos hacen percibir a la migración como una “invasión”, y propone un modo radicalmente diferente de entender e intervenir el fenómeno desde lo trasnacional. Nacer de uno u otro lado de una línea divisoria es un evento azaroso, no obstante delimitar la (...) frontera es una construcción histórico-política: la desigualdad en las oportunidades que ofrecen las naciones es una situación estructural de injusticia que se perpetúa con las políticas de exclusión de los migrantes y la deslegitimación de su derecho a buscar una vida mejor. Esa circunstancia genera fracturas sociales, injustificables pero normalizadas, que imposibilitan alcanzar la justicia global. Velasco presenta un análisis completo que abarca las dimensiones política, jurídica y moral del tema, en el que lleva a la filosofía política a un terreno práctico del que se desprenden las claves para entender y actuar en esta nueva era en la que, debido a los conflictos sociales y políticos, la migración vuelve a ser argumento de discusión relevante. (Texto de la CONTRAPORTADA del libro). (shrink)

El presenta trabajo describe y caracteriza de manera breve y concisa lo que podría ser una ontología del arte. En la primera sección se presentan las dificultades actuales, así como las nociones y preguntas principales de la ontología. En la sección segunda, se bosquejan las definiciones y caracterizaciones actuales de la ontología, se hace especial hincapié, en la ontología aplicada. En la tercera, cuarta y quinta sección se caracteriza y configura lo que podría ser una ontología del arte, se evidencian (...) sus limitaciones así́ como sus perspectivas y trazabilidad para hacer viable dicha ontología; adicionalmente se abordan los aportes del realismo anglosajón a la cuestión. El propósito de esta caracterización es hacer evidente que es plausible dar un tratamiento integral al problema de la realidad y su configuración y desarrollo en los mundos regionales, como, el mundo del arte. (shrink)

Marjorie Perloff is a distinguished commentator on the literature of this century, best known for her work on Futurism, one of the pre-First War international and inter-art avant garde movements. Radical Artifice takes on the avant garde since 1960, observed from the angle of the institutions of popular culture -- in particular television talk shows, and graphic advertisements. The project of the book is to respond to Charles Bernstein's decree: "There is no natural look or sound to a poem. Every (...) element is intended, chosen. That is what makes a thing a poem" (qtd. 35). "Why, Perloff asks, "is the natural now regarded with such suspicion?" (35). (shrink)

Leibniz is commonly labeled a foe of Molinism. His rejection of robust libertarian freedom coupled with some explicit passages in which he distances himself from the doctrine of middle knowledge seem to justify this classification. In this paper, I argue that this standard view is not quite correct. I identify the two substantive tenets of Molinism. First, the connection between the conditions for free actions and these free actions is a contingent one: free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions. (...) Second, God knows what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances prevolitionally—that is, prior to God willing anything. I argue that Leibniz himself endorses a version of both tenets and utilizes them for theoretical purposes similar to those of Molinists. I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend—rather than a foe—of Molinism. (shrink)

Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...) and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know-how in the literature, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know-how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. (shrink)

El proceso de aprehensión de lo cognoscible, en la filosofía contemporánea, ha sido tratado desde diversas perspectivas, entre ellas la fenomenológica y la analítica. Cada una de estas perspectivas aportan unos presupuestos filosóficos y procesos metodológicos que nos proporcionan marcos de trabajo para indagar en las vías de aprehensión del conocimiento; sin embargo, empleadas por separado son insuficientes y limitadas. En absoluto se trata de procurar un método universal, sino de integrar e indagar sobre diversos presupuestos, procesos, patrones y estructuras (...) para avanzar en la indagación de la aprehensión del conocimiento. En este sentido, en la primera parte, abordaremos la necesidad de tener reglas (definitorias y estratégicas) para ser parte y avanzar en cualquier «juego», en especial el del conocimiento. En la segunda y tercera, describiremos los «métodos» desarrollados por José Ferrater Mora (operaciones filosóficas) y Nicolai Hartmann (pensar sistemático), los que pueden ser un punto de partida, vías a considerar en este proceso. En la parte final, a modo de contraste, se ofrece en un gráfico un esquema metodológico de los dos métodos analizados. (shrink)

Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, not only tries to establish a relationship that is direct, coherent, inter-operational and "precise" between this science, its name as a science, and its object of study, but also begins an indignation that tries to set a science — materially adequate and formally correct — to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν. In order to complete this task, Aristotle does an in-focus strategy that consists on the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in its categories, that allows Aristotle the (...) possibility of formulate a science ἐπιστήμη to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν at the same time that supports the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in the "different categories or supreme genres" of τὸ ὄν. Due to this argumentation, Aristotle distinguishes the ἐπιστήμη σοφία of any other type of knowledge: the former is fundamentally an enquiry "about the first causes (πρῶτα αἴτια) and the principles (ἀρχὰς)". With this conception in mind, Aristotle was able to characterize several related forms of the ἐπιστήμη σοφία which, as a whole, eventually allow him to establish a science of the principles and causes "maximally universal and referred to…everything real", and in consequence, to "that that is, as long as something is". In this work, I will try to reconstruct such arguments, and offer some observations and conjectures referred to these notions that plausibly incline the scale in favor of an ontological reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in order to contribute to clarify the confusion that exists between the aim of the discipline with the justification to establish the existence of its own object. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that many scholars involved in the contemporary free will debates have underappreciated the philosophical appeal of agent causation because the resources of contemporary emergentism have not been adequately introduced into the discussion. Whereas I agree that agent causation’s main problem has to do with its intelligibility, particularly with respect to the issue of how substances can be causally relevant, I argue that the notion of substance causation can be clearly articulated from an emergentist framework. According (...) to my proposal, a free agent is _a causally powerful substance that emerges in an anomic way from her constitutive mental events_, downwardly constraining, selecting and, in this way, having control on them. As we shall see, this particular concept of agent causation not only makes sense of the deep insight behind agent libertarianism, but it also provides us with the resources to solve some of the main objections that have been raised against it. It is true that here I cannot develop a complete defense of the evidential credentials of emergentism. Still, even if the considerations that follow do not serve to convince detractors of agent causal libertarian accounts of free will, they do suggest that libertarian agent causation is more promising than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

[ES] En recientes décadas se ha observado un renovado interés por algunos de los temas clásicos de la ontología, desde áreas de conocimiento externas a la filosofía, sin embargo, este renacimiento ontológico ha «estimulado» una multiplicidad y diversidad de teorías y concepciones «ontológicas» que ha dado como consecuencia una proliferación de «ontologías» y de interminables batallas para determinar qué tipo de «entidades» estudian sus respectivos «dominios», que a su vez se consideran autónomos e independientes entre sí, inclusive de la propia (...) ontología. En este sentido, el propósito de este trabajo es caracterizar y representar de manera adecuada estas «ontologías», dentro del marco general del debate acerca de la naturaleza de la ontología. Es así que, en la primera sección haré un diagnostico de la ontología contemporánea; en la segunda proporcionaré algunas definiciones y caracterizaciones de las principales concepciones, en especial de las denominadas «ontologías aplicadas»; y en la tercera analizaré sí estas concepciones pueden ser consideradas diversos tipos de ontología o simplemente son diversos niveles de ontología. El marco de la discusión no se centrará en confrontar todas estas nociones, sino en describirlas y analizarlas para ofrecer un enfoque sobre el estado actual de la ontología y sus problemas. [EN] In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in some of the classic themes of ontology, from areas of knowledge external to philosophy; however, this ontological revival has «stimulated» a multiplicity and diversity of «ontological» theories and concepts that has resulted in a proliferation of «ontologies» and endless battles to determine what kind of «entities» study their respective «domains», which in turn are considered autonomous and independent, even of ontology itself. In this sense, the purpose of this work is to adequately characterize and represent these «ontologies», within the general framework of the debate about the nature of ontology. Thus, in the first section I will make a diagnosis of contemporary ontology; in the second I will provide some definitions and characterizations of the main concepts, especially the so-called «applied ontologies»; and in the third I will analyze whether these concepts can be considered different types of ontology or simply are different levels of ontology. The framework of the discussion will not center on confronting all these notions, but to describe and analyze them to provide a focus on the current state of ontology and its problems. (shrink)

La noción de mundos posibles, sostiene que nuestro mundo es un mundo entre otros, un subconjunto de todas las cosas que existen. Esto implica aceptar que existen mundos estructuralmente equivalentes con sus propios lenguajes [formales], que entre sí no tienen ningún estatuto privilegiado, p.e., el mundo y lenguaje del arte o el mundo y lenguaje de la física; no obstante, la idea de aceptar otros mundos equivalentes como mundos posibles epistémica y ontológicamente legítimos para acceder y expresar lo cognoscible del (...) mundo no goza de gran aceptación. En este sentido, de entre las múltiples dimensiones de la noción de mundos posibles anotada, su dimensión lógica, es una de las más extendidas, ésta se entiende como un posible estado de cosas o un posible curso de eventos. Empero, esta concepción es la más restrictiva de la noción de mundos posibles, no sólo porque dicha noción transmuta en una especie de «técnica predictiva» que nos permite analizar y visualizar posibles escenarios de un estado de cosas o un curso de eventos, sino porque fundamentalmente, la noción de mundos posibles pierde gran parte de su potencia conceptual. Hablar de proposiciones como conjuntos de mundos posibles, no es un error, pero es limitar innecesariamente el alcance y campo de acción de la noción de mundos posibles. Si entendemos dicha noción en la versión primaría de Lewis [«Nuestro mundo actual es sólo un mundo entre otros»], sería plausible recuperar, entre otras, las dimensiones ontológica y epistémica de la noción de mundos posibles, y por ende la posibilidad objetiva de indagar en formas alternativas y legitimas de acceder y expresar lo cognoscible del mundo; en este sentido, en este trabajo me propongo: (1) retomar la noción primaria de mundos posibles de Lewis, para analizar y explicitar brevemente sus limitaciones, virtudes y requerimientos; (2) examinar las condiciones de posibilidad de un mundo; y, (3) sugerir los lineamientos epistémicos que deberían considerarse y explicitarse cuando se habla de y desde un mundo posible a la hora de expresar un enunciado. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

This paper looks into two Scottish Philosophical Societies of the Eighteenth century: The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, and the Select Society of Edinburgh. I intend to show that they were planned, constructed, and carried out according to the experimental method of natural philosophy, and that it was this factor that enhanced the influence they had in the development of the country. An examination of the minute books, discourses, abstracts and question lists of these societies will provide enough evidence to support (...) the claim that experimental philosophy and its method were the decisive factors for the developing and huge success of these societies. (shrink)

Este artículo trata de una inscripción constructiva omeya andalusí del año 387 / 4 enero 997-2 enero 998, hoy perdida, pero transmitida a través de un resumen castellano incluido en una lápida de 1259 "reparada" en 1575. Se intenta la restitución del texto árabe original y se estudian los hechos y los personajes documentados.

Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude (...) relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.

In this paper I present an overview of the doctrine known as Positive Aesthetics regarding aesthetic judgements about nature. According to this view, all pristine nature is always beautiful and, generally, although not necessarily, human intervention tends to introduce ugliness in nature. One of the strong practical motivations behind this claim is an attempt to ground our reasons to preserve natural environments in aesthetic reasons. Positive Aesthetics has been defended within contrary approaches to nature appreciation such as the cognitivists and (...) the anti-cognitivist. Recently, the possibility of real ugliness in nature has been defended; at the same time, it is argued that the presence of ugly items in nature does not lead necessarily to the idea that they are not aesthetically valuable. Hence, natural ugliness can be a reason to preserve nature. In this sense, the denial of the Positive Aesthetics claim is shown to be compatible with the appeal to aesthetic negative qualities as a source of reasons for preserving natural environments. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether considerations about a priori domains and abstract objects favor atheism over theism.

Una imagen muy generalizada a la hora de entender el software de computador es la que lo representa como una “caja negra”: no importa realmente saber qué partes lo componen internamente, sino qué resultados se obtienen de él según ciertos valores de entrada. Al hacer esto, muchos problemas filosóficos son ocultados, negados o simplemente mal entendidos. Este artículo discute tres unidades de análisis del software de computador, esto es, las especificaciones, los algoritmos y los procesos computacionales. El objetivo central es (...) entender las prácticas cientficas e ingenieriles detrás de cada unidad de software, así como analizar su metodología, ontología y epistemología. (shrink)

Algunas de las preguntas fundamentales de la filosofía del arte son: 1) ¿Qué es una obra de arte?, 2) ¿Qué es Arte?, 3) ¿Qué es el arte? Responderlas es determinar el sentido del arte. Este tipo de preguntas están planteadas bajo la fórmula ¿Qué es X?, es decir, preguntas en las cuales en lo simple esta lo complejo, preguntas en donde lo simple no quiere decir que sean sencillas; son preguntas que traen dentro de si su naturaleza y carácter metafísico-ontológico-gnoseológico, (...) y hasta axiológico. No es el propósito de este trabajo hacer frente o resolver estos problemas, sino proporcionar una aproximación al concepto de “obra de arte” en la época actual y como podría entenderse en relación a ciertos problemas ontológicos y epistemológicos actuales. -/- [Extended Version of: Vélez León, Paulo (2006). «Aproximaciones a la ¿obra de arte?». En Políticas al borde. Una investigación sobre el arte contemporáneo cuencano en los discursos políticos actuales, editado por Paulo Vélez León y Hernán Pacucuru. Cuenca: Universidad de Cuenca/Bienal Internacional de Cuenca, 2006, pp. 1-12]. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo, analizamos el cuento El Inmortal de Borges prestándole principal atención a las situaciones donde se entrelazan, o se tratan sin diferenciar demasiado, cuestiones vinculadas con la animalidad y la divinidad. Sostenemos que esta especie de confusión o falta de precisión al tratar cuestiones que se alejan tanto de la identidad personal y del Yo, como la inmortalidad, no es un elemento casual ni sin fundamento, sino que puede ser analizado filosóficamente adentrándonos la otredad animal. El Inmortal (...) nos manifiesta que la filosofía podría no haber sido lo suficientemente precisa al tratar la otredad, permitiendo que animalidad y divinidad, o más bien ciertas propiedades características de cada una, puedan amalgamarse dentro de los lindes de este concepto. Que el cuento de Borges haga convivir de forma tan característica la inacción con la inmortalidad hace de esta obra un objeto de reflexión obligatorio para todos los interesados en el concepto de otredad. (shrink)