This paper is a reply to Professor William Lane Craig's “Graham Oppy On The kalām Cosmological Argument” Sophia 32.1, 1993, pp. 1–11. Further references to the literature are contained therein.

In ‘Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’ , 367–75), Professor William Lane Craig undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the kalam cosmological argument in The Miracle of Theism is ‘superficial’, and that Mackie ‘has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument’ . I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute the kalam cosmological argument. Consequently, the purpose of this (...) paper is to reply to Craig's criticisms on Mackie's behalf. (shrink)

Craig (1981) presents and defends several different kalam cosmological arguments. The core of each of these arguments is the following ur argument.

This paper begins with a fairly careful and detailed discussion of the conditions under which someone who presents an argument ought to be prepared to concede that the argument is unsuccessful. The conclusions reached in this discussion are then applied to William Lane Craig’s defense of what he calls “the kalam cosmological argument.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the chief contention of the paper is that Craig ought to be prepared to concede that “the kalam cosmological argument” is not a successful argument. The (...) paper pays particular attention to Craig’s recent criticisms of Adolf Grünbaum’s contention that “the kalam cosmological argument” presupposes “the normalcy of nothingness”; and it also addresses some methodological issues raised by Craig’s response to my previous criticisms of his replies to critiques of “the kalam cosmological argument” provided by Grünbaum, Hawking, and Davies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that contemporary (...) cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway. (shrink)

William Lane Craig has revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is now one of the most discussed arguments for God’s existence in the secondary literature. Still, the reception of Craig’s argument among philosophers of religion has been mostly critical. In the interest of developing an argument that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support, I will lay the philosophical groundwork for a new kalām cosmological argument that, in contrast with Craig’s (...) argument, does not adopt such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite. (shrink)

Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, at least inter alia, by physicists---Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking---and philosophers of science---Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are “superficial, iII-conceived, and based on misunderstanding.” I argue that, while some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do suffice to undermine the dialectical efficacy of kalam cosmological arguments.

Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig's argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future. Craig disagrees. I show that Craig's reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem (...) to support the impossibility of an endless future. (shrink)

William Lane Craig has argued that there cannot be actual infinities because inverse operations are not well-defined for infinities. I point out that, in fact, there are mathematical systems in which inverse operations for infinities are well-defined. In particular, the theory introduced in John Conway's *On Numbers and Games* yields a well-defined field that includes all of Cantor's transfinite numbers.

Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious (...) legitimacy of the science of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

A brief life sketch of Dr A P J Abdul Kalam.

Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.). (shrink)

This is a commissioned review of Copan, P. and Craig, W. The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe New York: Bloomsbury, US$172.50, ISBN 978-1-50-133587-7.

This is a review of *The Kalām Cosmological Argument* (edited by Paul Copan and William Lane Craig). In this review, I focus primarily on the papers in the first volume by Waters, Loke, and Oderberg. (I have also written an independent review of the second volume.).

This study aims to shed light on the position of Imām al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) on atomism. It consists of three sections. The first section will delineate some theories of matter along with the meaning of certain pertinent terms, which were widely accepted during al-Māturīdī’s time. The following section will discuss whether Imām al-Māturīdī understood such notions as body (jism), substance (jawhar), and accident (ʿaraḍ) within the frame of traditional Islamic atomism. Moreover, this section will give some information on how al-Māturīdī (...) approached the issues pertaining to physics and cosmology. The last section will cover the development of atomism in the Māturīdiyya kalām school after Imām al-Māturīdī. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Explicit atheism is a philosophical position according to which belief in God is irrational, and thus it should be rejected. In this paper, I revisit, extend, and defend against the most telling counter arguments the Kalām Cosmological Argument in order to show that explicit atheism must be deemed as a positively irrational position.

Māturīdī, one of the prominent Kalām scholar, is mostly considered to have played a significant role in the construction of a sustainable religious approach today. This recognition originates from his joint reference to intellect and divine inspiration with regard to issues in Kalām in addition to his contributions to the Sunni way of thinking. His balanced use of the intellect and divine inspiration in his solutions for issues of Hidāyat increased his popularity. In the Muslim world, just as (...) in any other community, perception of reality or guidance not as a process but as outright values of their community causes such problems as religious fanaticism and advocacy for sole truth. To solve such problems, a sound understanding of guidance in Muslim communities should be constructed in the light of scientific and social realities. In this respect, determining unique and comprehensive interpretations of Māturīdī of the issue will be of great help for establishing a peaceful religious understanding for the common future of humanity. In the center of Māturīdī’s interpretations of guidance lies his approach to guidance with respect to its methods and varieties. Besides presenting the definitions of these methods and varieties, the current study analyzes Māturīdī’s interpretations of how these methods and varieties interact. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

I hold that the considerations adduced in kalam cosmological arguments do not embody reasons for reflective atheists and agnostics to embrace the conclusion of those arguments, viz. that the universe had a cause of its existence. I do not claim to be able to show that reflective theists could not reasonably believe that those arguments are sound; indeed, I am prepared to concede that it is epistemically possible that the arguments procede validly from true premises. However, I am prepared to (...) make the same concession about the following argument: Either 2+2=5 or God exists; 2+2?5; therefore God exists . But nobody could think that this argument deserves to be called a proof of its conclusion (even if it is sound). Of course, this latter argument is obviously circular: (almost) no one who was not antecedently persuaded of the truth of the conclusion would (have reason to) believe the first premise. But this fact does not entail that admittedly non circular arguments, such as the kalam cosmological arguments, cannot fail to be equally dialectically ineffective. And, indeed, that is the view which I wish to defend: there is not the slightest reason to think that kalam cosmological arguments should be dialectically effective against reasonable and reflective opponents. (shrink)

In ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument Neither Bloodied nor Bowed’ , David Oderberg provides four main criticisms of the line of argument which I developed in ‘Time, Successive Addition, and Kalam Cosmological Arguments’ . I argue here that none of these lines of criticism succeeds. Further I re-emphasise the point that those who maintain that the temporal series of past events is formed by ‘successive addition’ are indeed thereby committed to a highly contentious strict finitist metaphysics.

This paper is a critical review of *Big Bang Cosmology* by Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. (The book is a collection of previously published papers; most are concerned, in one way or another, with kalam cosmological arguments for the existence of God.).

This paper is a response to David Oderberg's discussion of the Tristram Shandy paradox. I defend the claim that the Tristram Shandy paradox does not support the claim that it is impossible that the past is infinite.

The book discusses the structure, content, and evaluation of cosmological arguments. The introductory chapter investigates features essential to cosmological arguments. Traditionally, cosmological arguments are distinguished by their appeal to change, causation, contingency or objective becoming in the world. But none of these is in fact essential to the formulation of cosmological arguments. Chapters 1-3 present a critical discussion of traditional Thomistic, Kalam, and Leibnizian cosmological arguments, noting various advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. Chapter 4 offers an entirely new approach (...) to the cosmological argument - the approach of theistic modal realism. The proper explananda of cosmological arguments on this approach is not change, causation, contingency or objective becoming in the world. The proper explananda is the totality of metaphysical reality - all actualia and all possibilia. The result is the most compelling and least objectionable version of the cosmological argument. (shrink)

The cosmological argument, while considered to be deductive by some of its propounders, is not considered fool-proof by others. However, given the fact that causality is intrinsic to our thinking, reasoning towards ultimate causality remains significant. Andrew Loke capitalizes on this in his recent book.

Bu kitapta, Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr’ın (öl. 534/1139) kelâmî görüşleri, Telḫîṣü’l-edille li-ḳavâʿidi’t-tevḥîd adlı eserinde Allah’ın isimlerinin anlamlarını açıklarken yaptığı yorumlar çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr, 6./12. yüzyıl Hanefî-Mâtürîdî âlimlerinden biridir. Kelâma dair Telḫîṣü’l-edille eserinde esmâ-i hüsnâ konusuna ayrıntılı olarak yer vermektedir. İki cilt hâlinde yayımlanan bu eserin yaklaşık üçte birlik bir kısmını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu kısım incelendiğinde, Saffâr’ın Allah’ın varlığı, birliği ve sıfatları ile ilgili konular başta olmak üzere pek çok konuyu 175 esmâ-i hüsnâya dayanarak izah ettiği görülmektedir. (...) O, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde yer vermediği bazı isimlere ise müstakil başlıklar altında değinmektedir. Örneğin el-Mütekkelim ismi kelâm sıfatını bağlamında ve halku’l-Kur’ân ile icâz’ul-Kur’ân gibi konularla ilişkili bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Bu isimler de listeye dahil edildiğinde sayı 178’e ulaşmaktadır. Bu durumda eserin yarısını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu teşkil etmektedir. -/- Saffâr, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde alfabetik bir sıra içerisinde ele aldığı ilâhî isimleri öncelikle lugavî (semantik) yönden izah etmektedir. Sonrasında ise değerlendirdiği ilahî ismi, bir kelâm konusu ile bağlantı kurarak kelâmî perspektifle açıklamaktadır Esmâ-i hüsnâ temelinde ele alınan konuların hilâfet meselesi hariç diğer kelâm bahislerini kapsadığı görülmektedir. Saffâr öncesi Hanefî-Mâtürîdî kelâm literatürü içinde esmâ-i hüsnânın bu kadar kapsamlı ele alındığı başka bir eser bilinmemektedir. -/- Bu kitap; üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. “Metodolojik Çerçeve” başlıklı giriş bölümünde çalışmanın konusu, önemi, amacı, yöntemi ve kaynakları hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Birinci bölümde Saffâr’ın yaşadığı sosyokültürel çevre olan Mâverâünnehir bölgesi ile Buhara ve Merv şehirlerinin siyasî, sosyal ve dinî durumu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde esmâ-i hüsna konusunun anlaşılmasına temel oluşturan isim, tesmiye, müsemmâ, sıfat ve vasf gibi kavramlar ile esmâ-i hüsnânın sayısı ve ihsâsı gibi kelâmî tartışmalara değinilmiştir. Sonrasında Saffâr öncesi dönemde kaleme alınan esmâ-i hüsnâ litaratürü hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Bölüm sonuna Saffâr’ın rivayet ettiği 178 ilahî isme dair ayrıntılı bir tablo eklenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde öncelikle, Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâyı izah ederken dikkate aldığı kelâmî ilkeler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Sonrasında ise Saffâr’ın Telḫîṣü’l-edille’de ilâhî isimleri açıklarken ortaya koyduğu kelâmî görüş ve değerlendirmeler belirlenerek sistematik bir şekilde kategorize edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda ele alınan her konunun sonuna ilgili ilâhî isimleri ve bağlantılı olduğu tartışmaları içeren tablolar eklenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde ise Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâ anlayışına dayanan kelâm yöntemine dair ulaştığımız sonuçlara yer verilmiştir. Bu kitapta onun, esmâ-i hüsnânın %75’inde kelâmî yorumlarda bulunduğu ve bilgi-varlık bahsinden âhiret hayatına kadar bütün kelâm konularını esmâ-i hüsnâ ile bağlantılı yorumladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ulaşılan bu sonuçlar, Saffâr’ın kelâm anlayışının ilâhî isimlerin yorumuna dayandığını ortaya koymaktadır. [his book discusses the theological views of Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār d. 534/1139), within the framework of his comments on the meanings of Allah’s names, provided in his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla. Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār is one of the Ḥanafite-Māturīdite scholars in the 6th/12th century. In his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd on kalām, he spared extensive space for al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Approximately one third of this work, published in two volumes, is devoted to al-asmāʾ al-husnā. An examination of the related section reveals that al-Ṣaffār explains many issues, particularly those related to the existence, unity and attributes of Allah, based on 175 al-asmāʾ al-husnā. He mentions some of the names that he does not include in the al-asmāʾ al-husnā section under separate headings. For example, the name al-Mutakallim is addressed within the context of the attribute of kalām and in relation to subjects, such as the khalq al-Qurʾān and i‘jaz al-Qurʾān. Upon the addition of these names to the list, the number names reaches 178. This means that half of the work deals with the subject of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. -/- al-Ṣaffār lists the divine names in alphabetical order and explains them semantically in the chapter of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then he goes on to clarify each divine name through a theological lens with a specific reference to the subject of kalām. In the pre-Saffar Ḥanafite-Māturīdite theological literature, there is no other work that addresses al-asmāʾ al-husnā in such an extensive way. -/- This book consists of three main sections. The first section titled “Methodological Framework”, elaborates on the focus, significance, purpose and method of the study, along with the sources used. The first part describes the political, social and religious status of Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr) region and the cities of Bukhara and Marw, the sociocultural environment in which Saffar lived. The second chapter addresses various concepts, which promote the understanding of al-asmāʾ al-husnā, such as name, tasmiya, musammā, attribute and qualification in addition to the theological debates such as the number and iḥṣāʾ of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then, it provides information about the al-asmāʾ al-husnā literature produced in the pre- Ṣaffār period. The end of each chapter comes with a detailed table with the 178 divine names mentioned by al-Ṣaffār. In the third chapter, the author initially discusses the theological principles that al-Ṣaffār considered while explaining the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. This section also determines and systematically categorizes the theological views and evaluations put forward by al-Ṣaffār while explaining the divine names in Talkhīṣ al-adilla. The tables with the divine names and the related discussions can be seen at the end of the discussion for each subject. The last section presents the conclusions reached, regarding the kalām method based on al-Ṣaffār’s understanding of the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. The present study revealed that he made theological interpretations in 75% of the al-asmāʾ al-husnā and interpreted all theological issues ranging from the subjects of knowledge and existence to the Afterlife in connection with the al-asmāʾ al-husnā. These results indicate that al-Ṣaffār's understanding of kalām is based on the interpretation of the divine names.]. (shrink)

This paper is a response to David Oderberg's criticisms of a previous paper of mine. (Bibliographical details are provided in the article.).

This paper provides a taxonomy of cosmological arguments and givesgeneral reasons for thinking that arguments that belong to a given category do not succeed.

William Lane Craig modified Bertrand Russell’s Tristram Shandy example in order to derive an absurdity that would demonstrate the finitude of the past. Although his initial attempt at such an argument faltered, further developments in the literature suggested that such an absurdity was indeed in the offing provided that a couple extra statements were also shown to be true. This article traces the development of a particular line of argument that arose from Craig’s Tristram Shandy example before advancing an argument (...) of its own that attempts to fill in the relevant gaps so as to yield a new argument for the finitude of the past. (shrink)

Divine intention is an important problem for both philosophy and Kalam. This problem has two aspects as the subject and action of the intention. The intention of the subject occurs for the motion or the action itself. The intention of the action is to reach the motion or the action itself. According to this, when a person travels to Mecca to visit Kaaba, the visit is the intention of the subject and the journey is the intention of the action. In (...) this context, does Allah have an intention? And what are the intentions of the actions aris-ing from him? In the Islamic philosophy, the first question is handled as "intention of the sub-ject/divine intention” and the second question as "the intention of the actions/divine inten-tion of the actions". In order to answer the first question, we must examine all types of inten-tions. Each subject takes action to benefit them, to benefit others and to act for the sake of the goodness and kindness. Allah would be dependent being if he acted to benefit him and to make up for a flaw for the first of these intentions. In the second intention type, if Allah acted for someone else, this sit-uation would be on the degree of cause for the subject and he would be passive. For the third intention type which is to act to reach for perfection, it would deem Allah as a dependent being. The above-mentioned intentions are flawed. On the contrary, Allah is perfect and does not need any of these intentions to create. Thus, he is not subject to any of these possible inten-tions. These intentions are only used by imperfect subjects. Of course, it does not mean that Allah does not have intentions. According to Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, intention of Allah is the love towards his essence which is free from any flaw. According to this, all beings are entailed to the divine essence and they exist due to the love of essence of Allah. Allah has a direct intention as well as an indirect one. As mentioned before, Allah is in love with his essence. Allah loves the works and actions of his essence as well, according to the principal that one, who loves the essence, loves the works and actions of that essence as well. In this context, the love of essence of the Allah is a direct intention, while the love of his es-sence's works and actions is an indirect intention. After the divine intention is explained, we must also explain the intention of the divine ac-tions. According to both Mulla Sadra and Avicenna, since possible beings are flawed, their intention is to reach to certain perfections which are compatible with themselves. Mulla Sadra states that Allah bestows motivation to possible beings to advance towards the perfection and he claims that these beings make use of that motivation to be perfect. Therefore, possible beings try to make up their flaws and reach to perfection. Since Allah is the absolute perfect being, the final intention of the possible beings is Allah. In other words, all beings that seek for perfection, take example of him. The other intentions act as a primary tool to reach the final intention. How can flawed beings by essence reach to perfections compatible with them? Avicenna and Mulla Sadra stated different opinions on the search of perfection of the flawed beings in the Islam philosophy. According to Avicenna, beings change with extinction and creation. This change happens by accident and the substance stays constant. In accordance with this approach, this change and development is only possible with accidental motion. It occurs with the replacement between forms. But the theory of the Avicenna has some flaws. Because forms are not the intentions of each other and first hyle is not strong enough to have an intention. Thus, no form is superior to the other. It is also not possible to have substance development because the substance and es-sence of the material are constant. It only goes through changes in appearance with the acci-dental motion. It is clear that the changes in the appearance and the shape are not standards for perfection. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra's development theory, which is based on the fundamentality of existence, existential gradation and substantial motion, suggests that the material world is moving towards the perfection. The motion in the substance of material beings is reason of substantial and accidental developments. All beings try to promote themselves to a higher position by reaching perfection in accordance with their intentions. Thus, the theory of Avicenna focuses on the accidental and formal changes in the search of perfection of the material beings, while Mulla Sadra’s theory explains accidental changes as well as the essential ones. Mulla Sadra does not limit the explanation of which Allah is the intention of possible beings to ontological dimension. According to him, Allah is an intention of possible beings as well. He points out the Hadith Qudsi "I was a hidden treasure, I desired to be recognized so I created the creature" and states that "This (Hadith Qudsi) indicates that he is the subject and the in-tention of the universe in an ontological manner as well as the intention of the universe in an epistemological manner." Thus, according to Mulla Sadra, possible beings have two inten-tions, to reach to and understand Allah. (shrink)

Since the spread of Islam in Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr), religious understandings based on the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) have always been dominant in the region. Therefore, it was not possible for other understandings, which may seem to be opposite to Abū Ḥanīfa’s opinions, to be influential in the region. That Najjāriyya and Karrāmiyya could not be perennial in the region may be an example of this case. Similarly, Māturīdiyya, which benefited from Abū Ḥanīfa’s treatises of creed and his (...) rational method, could not adequately get the support of people at the time of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) because the school was seen as an opposite approach to the prevailing imaginations about Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, the Ḥanafī jurists (Ḥanafī fuqahāʾ), who were influential in not only people but also bureaucracy, and the Ḥanafī theologians (Ḥanafī mutakallimūn), who followed al-Māturīdī’s theological method , did not come to terms on their interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa. The Ḥanafī jurists who benefited mostly from juridical sources and manāqibworks were thinking different from the Ḥanafī theologians who relied on the treatises of Abū Ḥanīfa on such issues as the legitimacy of Kalām as a scholarly discipline, the responsibility of people of fatra(ahl al-fatra: people having no access to the message of Islam), and the creation of faith (īmān). The Ḥanafī jurists took different stance on various issues and argued that faith is not created; the informative (khabarī) attributes of God (ṣifāt Allāh) mentioned in the Qurʾān cannot be interpreted (taʾwīl); no one can be held accountable for faith only based on the intellect unless the message of the Prophet reaches to her or him; the people of fatracannot be responsible for faith. They also stated that Abū Ḥanīfa broke his relationship with the theological (kalāmī) issues in the last years of his life. Although these jurists accepted Abū Ḥanīfa’s distinction between faith and deeds and his view of the stability of one’s faith without increasing or decreasing they condemned theological discussions on these issues by going beyond the limits of the treatise of creed. While the Ḥanafī theologians known as the Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand who adopted the religious views of Imām al-Māturīdī of Samarqand acknowledged the intellect and considered it as an independent source in religion, the Ḥanafī jurists known as the Ḥanafī scholars of Bukhārāauthorized the intellect only in understanding the transmission (naql) and its interpretation. The different opinions of the two groups can be seen clearly on the question of the religious responsibility of the people of fatra. When we look at the debates regarding Kalām and the Islamic law, we can see that the difference between these two cities (Samarqand and Bukhārā) stems from their methodological views on the epistemological values of the reason (ʿaql) and the transmission (tradition). Māturīdiyya is a school of theology established by the Ḥanafī theologians who upheld the necessity and significance of Kalām. It is possible to say that the Ḥanafī jurists did not contribute to the establishment and systematisation of this school; rather, they tried to prevent it. Our findings show that the Ḥanafī jurists who lived in Transoxiana differ from each other because of their different understandings of Abū Ḥanīfa. In the historical process extending today it is evident that the religious views of the Ḥanafī jurists and their interpretation of Abū Ḥanīfa have been prominent and effective, not that of Māturīdiyya, which is the understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians. (shrink)

Sunni or Sunnism stands for Ahlu As-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah which is also called ASWAJA. Many people publish and debate it without clear meaning and reference. This article is a demonstrative-linguistic study that outlines the meaning and reference to the term "Sunni" to understand it clearly. This research shows that Sunnis have at least two groups. First, Sunni Ahlu Al- Ḥadīts, the path of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyyah, which tends to be puritan and at some point raises hardline intolerant Muslims. (...) Second, moderate Sunnis, who opened the space for fiqh schools other than Ibn Hanbal, and chooses to refer to moderate Islamic thinkers, such as Ash-Shāfi'i in fiqh (Islamic law), Al-Asy`ari in kalam (Islamic theology) and Al -Ghazali in Sufism (Islamic mysticism). The two Sunni groups were both Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah. The first group tends to embody the phrase Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah terminologically (iṣṭilāḥan), while the second group tends to display the phrase linguistically (lughatan). (shrink)

An eternal society with the abilities of ordinary humans in each year of its existence would have had the ability to actualize a logical contradiction. This fact casts doubt on the metaphysical possibility of an infinite past. In addition to using this paradox in an argument against an infinite past, one can also use the paradox mutatis mutandis as a decisive argument against the sempiternality of God.

This paper discusses the treatment of "infinity" in philosophy of religion, including its use in discussions of divine attributes, and its use in various arguments about the existence of God (including the kalam cosmological argument and Pascal's wager). The aim of the paper is to set out -- and where possible, to resolve -- various foundational problems about infinity.