Results for 'Kevin Cherry'

559 found
Order:
  1. Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice.Myisha Cherry - 2018 - In Adrienne M. Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. New York: Routledge Handbooks in Philoso.
    Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2.  56
    (1 other version)Forgiveness, Exemplars, and the Oppressed.Myisha Cherry - 2017 - In Kathryn J. Norlock (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. Rowman & Littlefield International.
    I argue that while moral exemplars are useful, we must be careful in our use of them. I first describe forgiveness exemplars that are often used to persuade victims to forgive such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesus of Nazareth. I also explain how, for Kant, highlighting these figures as moral exemplars can be useful. I then explain two kinds of rhetorical strategies that are used when attempting to convince victims to forgive. Last, I explain (a la (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Errors and Limitations of Our “Anger-Evaluating” Ways.Myisha Cherry - 2017 - In Myisha Cherry & Owen Flanagan (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Anger. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 49-65.
    In this chapter I give an account of how our judgments of anger often play out in certain political instances. While contemporary philosophers of emotion have provided us with check box guides like “fittingness” and “size” for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by themselves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, inconsistently, and erroneously. If anger—particularly anger in a political context—can provide information and spark positive change or political destruction, then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  4. Solidarity Care: How to Take Care of Each Other in Times of Struggle.Myisha Cherry - 2020 - Public Philosophy Journal 3 (1):12.
    Being aware of social injustices can cause existential and mental pain; comes with a burden; and may impede a flourishing life. However, I shall argue that this is not a reason to despair or to choose to be willfully ignorant. Rather, it’s a reason to conclude that being conscious is not enough. Rather, during times of oppression, resisters must also prioritize well-being. One way to do this is by extending what I refer to as solidarity care. I begin by providing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5. Gendered Failures in Extrinsic Emotional Regulation; Or, Why Telling a Woman to “Relax” or a Young Boy to “Stop Crying Like a Girl” Is Not a Good Idea.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):95-111.
    I argue that gendered stereotypes, gendered emotions and attitudes, and display rules can influence extrinsic regulation stages, making failure points likely to occur in gendered-context and for reasons that the emotion regulation literature has not given adequate attention to. As a result, I argue for ‘feminist emotional intelligence’ as a way to help escape these failures. Feminist emotional intelligence, on my view, is a nonideal ability-based approach that equips a person to effectively reason about emotions through an intersectional lens and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Political anger.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12811.
    Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. Value-Based Protest Slogans: An Argument for Reorientation.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - In Michael Cholbi, Brandon Hogan, Alex Madva & Benjamin S. Yost (eds.), The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 13.
    When bringing philosophical attention to bear on social movement slogans in general, philosophers have often focused on their communicative nature—particularly the hermeneutical failures that arise in discourse. Some of the most popular of these failures are illustrated in ‘all lives matter’ retorts to ‘black lives matter’ pronouncements. Although highlighting and criticizing these failures provides much needed insight into social movement slogans as a communicative practice, I claim that in doing so, philosophers and slogans’ users risk placing too much importance on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. On James Baldwin and Black Rage.Myisha Cherry - 2022 - Critical Philosophy of Race 10 (1):1-21.
    What I aim to elucidate in this article is Baldwin's moral psychology of anger in general, and black rage in particular, as seen in his nonfiction. I'll show that Baldwin's thinking is significant for moral psychology and is relevant to important questions at the intersection of philosophy of emotions, race, and social philosophy. It also has pragmatic application to present-day anti-racist struggle. Baldwin's theoretical account of Black rage, I'll argue, dignifies Blacks by centering them as people with agential capacities and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. State Racism, State Violence, and Vulnerable Solidarity.Myisha Cherry - 2017 - In Naomi Zack (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race. New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.
    What makes #BlackLivesMatter unique is the implication that it isn’t only some black lives that matter, that is, not only the most commonly referenced male lives. Rather, the hashtag suggests that all black lives matter, including queer, trans, disabled, and female. This movement includes all those black lives who have been marginalized within the black liberation tradition, as well as in greater society. The movement highlights the ways in which black people have been traditionally deprived of dignity and human rights. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10. Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. The interplay between resentment, motivation, and performance.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):147-161.
    ABSTRACTWhile anger in sports has been explored in philosophy, the phenomenon known as having a ‘chipped shoulder’ has not. In this paper I explore the nature, causes, and effects of playi...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. (1 other version)Coming out of the Shade.Myisha Cherry - 2017 - In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Philosophy's Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 21-30.
    I claim that professional philosophers need to seriously rethink how they do philosophy, where they do philosophy, and with whom they do philosophy. My suggestion is that they “leave the shade” of their philosophical bubbles by making their work accessible to each other and to the public and by engaging with thinkers outside of philosophy. I argue that if philosophers do not “leave the shade,” we may witness the decline and even the eradication of the field of philosophy, as we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. The Color and Content of Their Fears: A Short Analysis of Racial Profiling.Myisha Cherry - 2016 - Radical Philosophy Review 19 (3):689-694.
    In response to Zack’s “White Privilege​ and Black Rights”, I consider her account of the hunting schema in light of police violence against black women. I argue that although Zack provides us with a compelling account of racial profiling and police brutality, the emotional aspect she attributes to the hunting schema is too charitable. I then claim that Zack’s hunting schema fails to account for state violence against black women and in doing so she only tells a partial story of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. City Sense and City Design: Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch.Kevin Lynch - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Kevin Lynch's books are the classic underpinnings of modern urban planning and design, yet they are only a part of his rich legacy of ideas about human purposes and values in built form. City Sense and City Design brings together Lynch's remaining work, including professional design and planning projects that show how he translated many of his ideas and theories into practice. An invaluable sourcebook of design knowledge, City Sense and City Design completes the record of one of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Racialized Forgiveness.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (4):583 - 597.
    This article introduces a concept that I refer to as racialized forgiveness. Cases that exemplify certain conditions that I take as paradigmatic of the problem of racialized forgiveness include instances in which: who is forgiven or not is determined by the race of the offender; praise and criticisms of forgiveness are determined by the race of the victim; and praise and criticisms of forgiveness are, at least implicitly, racially self-serving. I argue that this practice is morally objectionable because of its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  98
    Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: Précis of Appearance & Explanation.McCain Kevin & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
    The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. Different versions of this theory generate different versions of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  18. What an [En]tangled Web We Weave: Emotions, Motivation, and Rethinking Us and the “Other”.Myisha Cherry - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (2):439-451.
    In Entangled Empathy, Lori Gruen offers an alternative ethic for our relationships with animals. In this article, I examine Gruen's account of entangled empathy by first focusing on entangled empathy's relation to the moral emotions of sympathy, compassion, and other emotions. I then challenge Gruen's account of how entangled empathy moves us to attend to others. Lastly, and without intending to place humans at the center of the conversation, I reflect on the ways entangled empathy can help us solve some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Compositionality in Perception: A Framework.Kevin J. Lande - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. To Shape a New World, Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry.Myisha Cherry - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):656-664.
    To Shape a New World, ShelbyTommie and TerryBrandon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.
    There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”-style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring to someone involves preferring to make any decision (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  22. Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.
    This paper is about guessing: how people respond to a question when they aren’t certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don’t explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In particular, our account of guessing yields new theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  23. Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions.Kevin P. Tobia - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):458-471.
    Rule-Consequentialism faces “the problem of partial acceptance”: How should the ideal code be selected given the possibility that its rules may not be universally accepted? A new contender, “Calculated Rates” Rule-Consequentialism claims to solve this problem. However, I argue that Calculated Rates merely relocates the partial acceptance question. Nevertheless, there is a significant lesson from this failure of Calculated Rates. Rule-Consequentialism’s problem of partial acceptance is more helpfully understood as an instance of the broader problem of selecting the ideal code (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Explanationism: Defended on All Sides.Kevin Mccain - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):333-349.
    Explanationists about epistemic justification hold that justification depends upon explanatory considerations. After a bit of a lull, there has recently been a resurgence of defenses of such views. Despite the plausibility of these defenses, explanationism still faces challenges. Recently, T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have argued that explanationist views fail to provide either necessary or sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. I argue that Byerly and Martin are mistaken on both accounts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  25. (3 other versions)Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
    A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   319 citations  
  26. (1 other version)Black People Look Up and Down, White People Look Away: Charles Mills, James Baldwin, and White Ignorance.Myisha Cherry - 2022 - Radical Philosophy Review 25 (2):219-235.
    I examine how James Baldwin explored white ignorance—as conceived by Charles Mills—in his work. I argue that Baldwin helps us understand Mills’s account of white ignorance more deeply, showing that while only mentioned briefly by Mills, Baldwin provides fruitful insights into the phenomenon. I also consider the resources Baldwin provides to find a way out of white ignorance. My aim is to link these thinkers in ways that have been largely ignored.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. On the Cultivation of Civic Friendship.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:193-207.
    I examine the possibility of civic friendship to solve the problem of over-doing democracy, paying close attention to how it can counter affective polarization and social homogeneity. In Section I, I explore civic friendship as a solution to polarization. In section II, I argue that Talisse’s civic friendship—in the context of nonpolitical collaboration—is akin to Aristotle’s utility and pleasure-friendships. Given the nature of civic friendship, in Section III–VI I make amendments to Talisse’s proposal. I argue that if civic friendship is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  29. Who's Messing With Your Mind?Myisha Cherry - 2015 - In Robert Greene & Rachel Robison-Greene (eds.), Orange is the New Black and Philosophy. Open Court.
    In this chapter, mixed with moral psychology and ethics, I explore the topic of manipulation by analyzing “Orange Is The New Black” season two antagonist, Yvonne “Vee” Parker. I claim that Vee is a master manipulator. I begin by laying out several definitions and features of manipulation. Definitions include covert influence, non-rational influence, the effect of non-rational influence, and intentionally making someone or altering a situation to make someone succumb to weaknesses. Features include trust, deception, emotion, false belief, and vulnerability. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars.Kevin Richardson - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):468-483.
    It is natural to think that social groups are concrete material particulars, but this view faces an important objection. Suppose the chess club and nature club have the same members. Intuitively, these are different clubs even though they have a common material basis. Some philosophers take these intuitions to show that the materialist view must be abandoned. I propose an alternative explanation. Social groups are concrete material particulars, but there is a psychological explanation of nonidentity intuitions. Social groups appear coincident (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31. Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.
    Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32. Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).
    Do people tend to be overconfident? Many think so. They’ve run studies on whether people are calibrated: whether their average confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of those opinions that are true. Under certain conditions, people are systematically ‘over-calibrated’—for example, of the opinions they’re 80% confident in, only 60% are true. From this empirical over-calibration, it’s inferred that people are irrationally overconfident. My question: When and why is this inference warranted? Answering it requires articulating a general connection between being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Sensitivity hasn’t got a Heterogeneity Problem - a Reply to Melchior.Kevin Wallbridge - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):835-841.
    In a recent paper, Melchior pursues a novel argumentative strategy against the sensitivity condition. His claim is that sensitivity suffers from a ‘heterogeneity problem:’ although some higher-order beliefs are knowable, other, very similar, higher-order beliefs are insensitive and so not knowable. Similarly, the conclusions of some bootstrapping arguments are insensitive, but others are not. In reply, I show that sensitivity does not treat different higher-order beliefs differently in the way that Melchior states and that while genuine bootstrapping arguments have insensitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  34. Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
    Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  35. Métaphysique et Ontologie.Kevin Mulligan - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    Les mots « métaphysique » et « ontologie » se disent de façons multiples à l’intérieur de la philosophie analytique et ailleurs dans la philosophie du vingtième siècle. Ils sont souvent employés pour parler de la théorie ou l’analyse de ce qu’il y a, des espèces principales de ce qu’il y a et de leurs rapports. Mais les positivistes viennois, par exemple, appelaient « métaphysiques » les philosophies qu’ils n’aimaient pas (Carnap 1985, Campbell 1976 ch. 2)1. Et si Quine parle (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36. Tracing thick and thin concepts through corpora.Kevin Https://Orcidorg Reuter, Lucien Baumgartner & Pascale Willemsen - 2024 - Language and Cognition.
    Philosophers and linguists currently lack the means to reliably identify evaluative concepts and measure their evaluative intensity. Using a corpus-based approach, we present a new method to distinguish evaluatively thick and thin adjectives like ‘courageous’ and ‘awful’ from descriptive adjectives like ‘narrow,’ and from value-associated adjectives like ‘sunny.’ Our study suggests that the modifiers ‘truly’ and ‘really’ frequently highlight the evaluative dimension of thick and thin adjectives, allowing for them to be uniquely classified. Based on these results, we believe our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  38. The importance of examples for moral education: An Aristotelian perspective.Kevin McDonough - 1995 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 14 (1):77-103.
    The paper develops and contrasts two views about the role of examples in moral education — one based on R.M. Hare's recent “two-level” conception of moral reasoning and one based on Aristotle's conception ofphronesis. It concludes that a Harean view leads to a harmful and impoverished form of moral education by encouraging children to ignore or distort the complexity of particular moral judgments. It also concludes that an Aristotelian view, by emphasizing the importance of rich examples such as those found (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39. Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  40. Moral rules, utilitarianism and schizophrenic moral education.Kevin McDonough - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 26 (1):75–89.
    R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. “The Season of Exaggerated Hopes”: Richard T. Greener in the Reconstruction University.Kevin J. Harrelson - 2024 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 62 (3):449-474.
    abstract: Richard T. Greener was the first Black graduate of Harvard College in 1870, and he served briefly as a professor of philosophy at the University of South Carolina from 1873 to 1877. Historians and biographers have uncovered many of the facts of his unusual life, but to date his philosophy has remained unappreciated. This essay reconstructs his philosophy from published and archival sources, evaluating it in relationship to the work of his better-known mentor, Frederick Douglass. I argue that Greener’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect.Kevin P. Tobia - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):396-405.
    Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for the better of comparable magnitude. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  43. Development of an Offline Computer- Based Assessment Tool in Statistics and Probability Utilizing MS PowerPoint and MS Excel.Cherry Mae Cabrera & Jupeth Pentang - 2023 - International Journal of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 3 (4):73-100.
    This capstone project aimed to develop an offline computer-based assessment (CBA) tool that uses a computer instead of a traditional paper test in evaluating student learning. This addresses the difficulties faced by teachers in administering quarterly assessments. Incorporating technology into student assessment can increase student interest because of the immediate feedback generated automatically and can help teachers improve their work performance. This capstone project employed a developmental approach and utilized a modified ADDIE (Analysis, Design, and Development) model to design the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Mental Structures.Kevin Lande - 2020 - Noûs (3):649-677.
    An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  45. Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):37-43.
    The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  46. (1 other version)Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.
    The Twin Earth thought experiment invites us to consider a liquid that has all of the superficial properties associated with water (clear, potable, etc.) but has entirely different deeper causal properties (composed of “XYZ” rather than of H2O). Although this thought experiment was originally introduced to illuminate questions in the theory of reference, it has also played a crucial role in empirically informed debates within the philosophy of psychology about people’s ordinary natural kind concepts. Those debates have sought to accommodate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  47. Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.
    Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot rationally be modest: you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. The Soldier's Share: Considering Narrow Proportionality for Lethal Autonomous Weapons.Kevin Schieman - 2023 - Journal of Military Ethics.
    Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine blame (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Experimental Jurisprudence.Kevin Tobia - 2022 - University of Chicago Law Review 89:735-802.
    “Experimental jurisprudence” draws on empirical data to inform questions typically associated with jurisprudence or legal theory. Scholars in this flourishing movement conduct empirical studies about a variety of legal language and concepts. Despite the movement’s growth, its justification is still opaque. Jurisprudence is the study of deep and longstanding theoretical questions about law’s nature, but “experimental jurisprudence,” it might seem, simply surveys laypeople. This Article elaborates and defends experimental jurisprudence. Experimental jurisprudence, appropriately understood, is not only consistent with traditional jurisprudence; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  50. Willful ignorance and self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
1 — 50 / 559