Grounding is all the rage in analytical metaphysics. But here I give three reasons for not appealing to a primitive relation of grounding in formulating physicalism. (1) It probably can't do the key job it would need to do. (2) We don't need it, since we already have realization. (3) It is probably not even consistent with physicalism.

Обсуждается широкий круг проблем взаимоотношения сознания и материи. Особое внимание уделено анализу структуры и свойств сознания в рамках информационной эволюции. А также – анализу роли специфических (невычислительных) свойств сознания в процедуре классических и квантовых измерений. В частности, подробно обсуждается вопрос о «клонировании» сознания (возможности копирования его свойств его на новый материальный носитель). Мы надеемся, что сформулированный нами обобщенный принцип дополнительности откроет новые пути для исследования проблем сознания в рамках фундаментальной физической картины мира.

Derk Pereboom has recently elaborated a formulation of non-reductive physicalism in which supervenience does not play the central role and realization plays no role at all; he calls his formulation “robust non-reductive physicalism”. This paper argues that for several reasons robust non-reductive physicalism is inadequate as a formulation of physicalism: it can only rule out fundamental laws of physical-to-mental emergence by stipulating that there are no such laws; it fails to entail the supervenience of the mental on the physical; it (...) appeals to two relations that are physicalistically unacceptable; and it rules out certain epistemically possible ways that the world might turn out to be according to current physics. This paper further argues that the difficulties faced by Pereboom’s robust non-reductive physicalism can all be avoided if physicalism is instead formulated by appeal to a carefully-defined relation of realization. (shrink)

This paper argues against both conceptual and linguistic analysis as sources of a priori knowledge. Whether such knowledge is possible turns on the nature of concepts. The paper's chief contention is that none of the main views about what concepts are can underwrite the possibility of such knowledge.

Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.

Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new (...) formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising. (shrink)

Just like Rudolf Carnap, but in a slightly different composition, I divide language into three types of conceptual means: classification, specifically scientific and specifically general comparative concepts of different types. I associate classification concepts with the ability to reason on any topic, that is, with reasonable thinking. Concrete scientific comparative concepts determine the comprehension of natural and social processes, their objective cognition in the form of rational thinking (reason), while concrete universal comparative concepts define philosophy (wisdom), understood as knowledge of (...) the universal. Based on three types of thinking (prudence, reason, wisdom) in 2010 at a symposium in Greece, I presented the ideas of morality in the context of human development in the form of a proposed article. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism, as presented in his 1996 book, The Conscious Mind, is inconclusive. The key point is that, while the argument seems to assume that someone competent with a given concept thereby has access to the primary intension of the concept, there are physicalist-friendly views of conceptual competence which imply that this assumption is not true.

A wide range of problems of the relationship between consciousness and matter are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the structure and properties of consciousness in the framework of information evolution. The role of specific (non-computational) properties of consciousness in the procedure of classical and quantum measurements is analyzed. In particular, the issue of "cloning" of consciousness (the possibility of copying its properties onto a new material carrier) is discussed in detail. We hope that the generalized principle (...) of complementarity formulated by us will open up new ways for studying the problems of consciousness within the framework of the fundamental physical picture of the world. (shrink)

This paper argues in unprecedented empirical and philosophical detail that, given only what science has discovered about pain, we should prefer the materialist hypothesis that pains are purely material over the dualist hypothesis that they are immaterial. The empirical findings cited provide strong evidence for the thesis of empirical supervenience: that to every sort of introspectible change over time in pains, or variation among pains at a time, there corresponds in fact a certain sort of simultaneous neural change over time, (...) or variation at a time. The empirical supervenience of pain on the neural is shown in turn to favor the hypothesis that pains are, in a sense that is made precise, purely material. (shrink)

A new method of adult and children mental development is investigated – the trilogy of mind, which basic operation is the logic operation of comparison. This method was created considering Aristotle's understanding of philosophy as “the science about the first reasons and origins” of cognition, the beginning of presocratic cognition of the surrounding world. This new method is an effective mean of mental thinking development that is oriented at the understanding of natural and social processes with the help of general (...) scientific comparative notions – kinds of opposition, worked out in ancient times. (shrink)

This paper is guided by, and begins to make plausible, the idea that there can be a naturalistic metaphilosophy, i.e., an inquiry that takes philosophy as an object of study in something like the way that contemporary (naturalistic) philosophy of science takes science as an object of study. The paper’s more specific goal is to ventilate certain provocative speculations concerning the character of philosophy’s cognitive achievement, especially over time. But this more specific goal will be approached indirectly, through addressing in (...) a preliminary way the question what the proper relationship is between philosophy and the study of philosophy’s history. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of socio-philosophical approaches to charity in the context of social development. The author analyzes the phenomenon of mercy through the prism of various philosophical traditions and views: Confucianism and the period of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, German classical philosophy, Russian religious philosophy, Western philosophical thought of the twentieth century, neo-Marxism and post-Marxism. The author comes to the conclusion that at different periods of the socio-philosophical thought development, the understanding of mercy (...) is different and receives a variety of interpretations: charity, love for neighbors, altruistic love-agape, the manifestation of the subject’s activity in the context of social practice, etc. Mercy appears as an inner motive based on compassion, sacrifice, and active participation in the needs of others. Moreover, the value of mercy permeates all religious trends, defining the role of a person in his/her interaction with all others. At the present stage of development, mercy can be considered as an element of the social ethics of responsibility, and also serves as a factor in the active participation of individuals in self-organizing self-government, the formation of civil associations with the aim of implementing reforms in society. (shrink)

In earlier work, I proposed and defended a formulation of physicalism that was distinctive in appealing to a carefully-defined relation of physical realization. Various philosophers (Robert Francescotti, Daniel Stoljar, Carl Gillett, and Susan Schneider) have since presented challenges to this formulation. In the present paper, I aim to show that these challenges can be overcome.

I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.

My goal in this paper is to provide critical discussion of Michael Rea’s case for three of the controversial theses defended in his World Without Design (Oxford University Press, 2002): (1) that naturalism must be viewed as what he calls a “research program”; (2) that naturalism “cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence,” as he puts it; and (3) that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting realism about material objects.

The article "Philosophy is the unborn child of science: in search of a universal commonly used language" explores the problem of creating a universal philosophical language that includes not only the language of classification concepts of natural language that define people's reasoning thinking, but also the language of comparative concepts, which is the basis their mind and wisdom. At the same time, the author divides comparative concepts into two parts, the first of which is determined by particular concepts – concepts (...) of practical mind peculiar to natural and exact sciences, while the second part is determined by extremely general concepts – categories of pure mind, which were supposed to become the beginnings of philosophy as a verifiable rigorous science. Along with the majority of thinking people, the author sees that as a cumulative rigorous science, philosophy has not taken place, and therefore considers it an unborn child of science. In this regard, he analyzes various philosophical traditions and comes to the conclusion that "everything is known in comparison." Therefore, the basis of a language that would facilitate effective communication between different philosophical directions, as well as between natural and humanitarian disciplines, can only be the language of comparative concepts. As a result of using the four types of opposition identified by Aristotle as the principles of philosophy: "contradictory", "correlated", "opposite", "deprivation and possession", the author built a philosophical Matrix from which he approaches the creation of such a universal language. At the same time, the Matrix includes other more complex comparative concepts than those of Aristotle – concepts of pure mind found by the author in the teachings of outstanding thinkers of the past: Lao Tzu, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and K. Marx, but today misunderstood or forgotten. The comparative concepts returned from oblivion, in the author's opinion, represent a valuable contribution to many areas of philosophy and linguistics, and can be useful for philosophers, psychologists, educators, linguists and anyone interested in the problem of language in philosophy and their undeniable role in the development of mind and wisdom. (shrink)

The article "Philosophia of Pure Mind: Declassification of the basic Biblical Mysteries" offers a tool for solving biblical mysteries — this is the philosophy of pure mind, which brings to life conceptual thinking with private and extremely general comparative concepts — concepts of practical mind and categories of pure mind. From these positions, an active study of the fundamental biblical mysteries is carried out, and not just their description or discussion. The investigation implies their comprehension related to the understanding of (...) reality, which we find in the first lines of the Torah, in which comparative concepts are represented by gradation (light and darkness, day and night) and orthogonal views, i.e. the relationship between two pairs of opposites (day and night — evening and morning): "And there was evening, and it was morning: day one." Thus, through the concepts of practical mind, the author reveals the general idea of the Creator, reflecting the harmony of nature in Words, each of which is a comparative concept of one kind or another. This is the key to uncovering the Biblical mysteries, namely: how the Word of God relates to the mystery of the fall, to the mysteries of the Book of Creation (Sefer Yetzira), the mystery of the Holy Trinity and the Sign of the Cross. Finally, how the proposed thinking helps to understand and gain a more complete understanding of the essence of these mysteries within the framework of one more general problem. Moreover, the root of all these problems, in my opinion, is that the mind thinking of people, given to them, as well as to all living things from nature through sensations, was supplemented by a person with a multi-valued reason thinking with classification concepts of natural language. In this connection, the natural human mind, through unambiguous comparative concepts, was supplanted by reason, apparently absent in animals. All of this unfolds against the background of three successive Reformations, which gave rise to three Abrahamic religions dating back to the patriarch of the Semitic tribes, Abraham. Whereas the beginning of these reforms is associated with the struggle of Moses for faith in the invisible God Yahweh, perceived as a civil war between the supporters of Moses as one part of the Jews with another part of them worshipping the God of their ancestors, the creator of all things — Ilohim. The article concludes with an understanding of the 4th Reformation, which aimed to create a modern synthetic religion with the help of AI. (shrink)

Animal mind philosophy and the related philosophy of language are rich and developing fields of philosophy. Enriched with the language of comparative concepts, they can become the threshold of a cumulative, verifiable strictly scientific "philosophy of pure mind", asserting a fundamentally new view of the problem of society, man and his place among other beings. My understanding of the mind through the prism of nonverbal and verbal thinking allowed me to get an idea of three completely different stages in the (...) development of the mind – reason, mind and wisdom. I understand reason as thinking by classification concepts of natural language, mind – as thinking by concrete scientific comparative concepts verified with the help of the senses. Whereas wisdom, understood by me in the light of "pure reason", is connected with the generalization of many particular comparative concepts. At the same time, I proceed from the fact that we are all perceiving beings, and our brain, being formed in the light of the relations of similarity and difference, perceives (comprehends – grasps) the energy present in the environment (energy in general), and converts it into sensory data. Presented by the Aristotle-Rotenfeld philosophical Matrix, in the form of concrete universal concepts of different types, they expand its cognitive capabilities step by step. Thus, with the help of spatial representations and integral visual images – drawings used by me, I show how to make nonverbal rational thinking of humans and animals verbal, expressing it in comparative terms. (shrink)

This is a critical, but sympathetic, examination of the manifesto for naturalized metaphysics that forms the first chapter of James Ladyman and Don Ross's 2006 book, Every Thing Must Go, but it has wider implications than this description suggests.

A new method of mental development of children (and adults) is considered, the basis of which is the logical operation of comparison. The method was created taking into account the Aristotelian understanding of philosophy as "the science of first causes and beginnings." It can act as a fundamentally new pedagogical approach to school education, since comparative concepts make it possible to demarcate between reason, two forms of intelligence and wisdom. Therefore, the new thinking proposed in this article, which consists in (...) the ability to identify the different and distinguish the identical (same) within the framework of a cumulative series of comparative concepts, is a tool for integrating knowledge, which, in my opinion, should be introduced into the sphere of traditional school education. In this connection, around each of the comparative concepts, the main subjects will be reorganized and lined up in a certain order. As a result, behind different physical or social phenomena, students - schoolchildren or students will learn to see the same content, so the problem with memorizing large amounts of educational material disappears. (shrink)

Since its inception, philosophy has been engaged in comprehending the unity of the world, and its main focus was determined by the intention to reduce to a single basis all the changing diversity of not only natural, but also social phenomena. But that didn't happen. Thus, the search for grounds for the integration of natural science and humanities knowledge is currently a rather serious problem, which has no theoretical solution yet. To solve the problem of integration of knowledge, I propose (...) a new conceptual apparatus of philosophy in the form of a cumulative series of comparative concepts lying between the ultimate abstractions of identification and distinction, which are the concepts of "identity" and "difference". -/- . (shrink)

This paper presents an irreducibly inductive argument for physicalism based on the causal closure of the physical (for which it argues), and defends it against various detractors.

Critical comments on David Papineau's idea that people find physicalism about phenomenal consciousness unbelievable because they commit what he calls the 'antipathetic fallacy'.

At the heart of one of the many problems concerning consciousness, there are flaws in our thinking that impede a philosophical understanding of the world. At the same time, I understand philosophy as a rigorous science aimed at “knowledge of the general”, reflecting the most fundamental and universal relations of reality, meaningful thanks to two types of comparative concepts. One of them is specific-scientific comparative concepts of different types, reflecting the beginnings of natural scientific knowledge, while the second type is (...) specific-general comparative concepts of different types. Without creating a concrete-universal theory, with the generally recognized philosophical language of comparative concepts, it is impossible to explain one of the fundamental difficulties: with the help of what linguistic means can consciousness be entered as a subjective reality into the physical picture of the world, how to fill this “gap in explanation”? In my opinion, this is the language comparative concepts of different types. (shrink)

At the heart of one of the many problems concerning consciousness, there are flaws in our thinking that impede a philosophical understanding of the world. At the same time, I understand philosophy as a rigorous science aimed at “knowledge of the general”, reflecting the most fundamental and universal relations of reality, meaningful thanks to two types of comparative concepts. One of them is specific-scientific comparative concepts of different types, reflecting the beginnings of natural scientific knowledge, while the second type is (...) specific-general comparative concepts of different types. Without creating a concrete-universal theory, with the generally recognized philosophical language of comparative concepts, it is impossible to explain one of the fundamental difficulties: with the help of what linguistic means can consciousness be entered as a subjective reality into the physical picture of the world, how to fill this “gap in explanation”? In my opinion, this is the language comparative concepts of different types. (shrink)

This critical study takes Nagel's book to task for its obscurity, and for its under-argued rejection of naturalism.

The paper argues that a broadly functionalist picture of psychological phenomena is quite consistent with at least one interesting thesis of psychological reductionism.

A new constructivist approach to modeling in economics and theory of consciousness is proposed. The state of elementary object is defined as a set of its measurable consumer properties. A proprietor's refusal or consent for the offered transaction is considered as a result of elementary economic measurement. Elementary (indivisible) technology, in which the object's consumer values are variable, in this case can be formalized as a generalized economic measurement. The algebra of such measurements has been constructed. It has been shown (...) that in the general case the quantummechanical formalism of the theory of selective measurements is required for description of such conditions. The economic analogs of the elementary slit experiments in physics have been created. The proposed approach can be also used for consciousness modeling. (shrink)

We propose an axiomatic approach to constructing the dynamics of systems, in which one the main elements 9e8 is the consciousness of a subject. The main axiom is the statements that the state of consciousness is completely determined by the results of measurements performed on it. In case of economic systems we propose to consider an offer of transaction as a fundamental measurement. Transactions with delayed choice, discussed in this paper, represent a logical generalization of incomplete transactions and allow for (...) a more rigorous approach to studying the properties of the algebra of economic measurements. Considering the behavior of an object as a sequence of actions and choices allows extending the obtained results to random systems, which include the subject's consciousness as one of its elements. The specifics, on which the description of fundamental measurements is based, allows easily transferring the formalism of Schwinger's theory of selective measurements (and the consequent quantum-mechanical formalism) to the economic and social systems. (shrink)

The aggressive intrusion of science, technology and technology into the space of children as the least protected social group requires their protection from aggressive anthropologically-oriented practices. However, regularly conducted theoretical discussions of this problem do not lead to the solution of the problem of the ecology of childhood, since only one of the possible forms of understanding reality has been fixed within the framework of the international humanitarian and scientific community. We are talking about conceptual reasoning thinking, which is based (...) on classification concepts and provides for a pluralism of opinions, the multitude of which does not lead to unambiguous scientific humanitarian knowledge for everyone. The created conditions do not contribute to the emergence of an interdisciplinary research methodology, the formation of which is associated with the need for a fundamentally different way of thinking – thinking in comparative terms, which, unlike the natural sciences, is absent today in humanitarian knowledge. Whereas the new thinking proposed in this article, consisting in the ability to identify the different and distinguish the identical (one) within the natural range of comparative concepts, on the contrary, is a tool for integrating knowledge, therefore, in my opinion, it should be introduced into the sphere of traditional school education. In this connection, the main academic subjects will be reorganized around each of the comparative concepts and constructed in a certain order. As a result, students – schoolchildren or students - will learn to see the same content behind different physical or social phenomena, so the problem of memorizing large volumes of educational material disappears. The new approach will accelerate the process of formation of an interdisciplinary methodology of socio-cultural analysis, will contribute to the implementation of a comprehensive state policy, will give a new impetus to socio-cultural and anthropo-pedagogical practice. (shrink)

The present paper discusses the problem of quantum-mechanical properties of a subject’s consciousness. The model of generalized economic measurements is used for the analysis. Two types of such measurements are analyzed – transactions and technologies. Algebraic ratios between the technology-type measurements allow making their analogy with slit experiments in physics. It has been shown that the description of results of such measurements is possible both in classical and in quantum formalism of calculation of probabilities. Thus, the quantum-mechanical formalism of the (...) description of states appears as a result of idealization of the selection mechanism in the proprietor's consciousness. (shrink)

Materialism is nearly universally assumed by cognitive scientists. Intuitively, materialism says that a person’s mental states are nothing over and above his or her material states, while dualism denies this. Philosophers have introduced concepts (e.g., realization, supervenience) to assist in formulating the theses of materialism and dualism with more precision, and distinguished among importantly different versions of each view (e.g., eliminative materialism, substance dualism, emergentism). They have also clarified the logic of arguments that use empirical findings to support materialism. Finally, (...) they have devised various objections to materialism, objections that therefore serve also as arguments for dualism. These objections typically center around two features of mental states that materialism has had trouble in accommodating. The first feature is intentionality, the property of representing, or being about, objects, properties, and states of affairs external to the mental states. The second feature is phenomenal consciousness, the property possessed by many mental states of there being something it is like for the subject of the mental state to be in that mental state. (shrink)

The algebra of transactions as fundamental measurements is constructed on the basis of the analysis of their properties and represents an expansion of the Boolean algebra. The notion of the generalized economic measurements of the economic “quantity” and “quality” of objects of transactions is introduced. It has been shown that the vector space of economic states constructed on the basis of these measurements is relativistic. The laws of kinematics of economic objects in this space have been analyzed and the stages (...) of constructing the dynamics have been formulated. In particular, the “principle of maximum benefit”, which represents an economic analog of the principle of least action in the classical mechanics, and the principle of relativity as the principle of equality of all possible consumer preferences have been formulated. The notion of economic interval between two economic objects invariant to the selection of the vector of consumer preferences has been introduced. Methods of experimental verification of the principle of relativity in the space of economic states have been proposed. (shrink)

This paper concerns Sydney Shoemaker's view, presented in his book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), of how mental properties are realized by physical properties. That view aims to avoid the "too many minds" problem to which he seems to be led by his further view that human persons are not token-identical with their bodies. The paper interprets and criticizes Shoemaker's view.

Many scholars in various fields of knowledge have already investigated the nature of emotions with humans and even animals. There exist several theories and suggestions how emotions sway the moods and refer to the maturity of a persona. This article aims to pursue some issues relating to how emotions had been working on the lengthy itinerary of civilization and what they had led it to. For the positive emotions contain the fundamental components or ‘vitamins’ to generate a healthy social and (...) cultural environment, or in simple terms ‘societal happiness’, the policy of spreading and adopting them in different times, in singular spheres is to be traced. (shrink)

The problem of measurement in economic models and the possibility of their quantum-mechanical description are considered. It is revealed that the apparent paradox of such a description is associated with a priori requirement of conformity of the model to all the alternatives of free choice of the observer. The measurement of the state of a trader on a stock exchange is formally defined as his responses to the proposals of sale at a fixed price. It is shown that an analogue (...) of Bell's inequalities for this measurement model is violated at the most general assumptions related to the strategy of the trader and requires a quantummechanical description of the dynamics of his condition. In the framework of the theory of weak continuous quantum measurements, the equation of stock price dynamics and the quantum-mechanical generalization of the F. Black and M. Scholes model for pricing options are obtained. The fundamental distinctions between the obtained model and the classical one are discussed. (shrink)

This critical study aims mainly to do two things: (i) throw some cold water on the claim that supervenience can be used to formulate a doctrine of non-reductive physicalism, and (ii) rebut an argument for physicalism offered (separately) by David Papineau and Barry Loewer. -/- The title alludes to the following lyric from "Mary Poppins", and was intended to hint that there is less to supervenience than meets the eye: -/- It's supercalifragilisticexpialidocious Even though the sound of it is something (...) quite atrocious If you say it loud enough, you'll always sound precocious Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious. (shrink)

Substantial review of Michael Rea's, World without design: the ontological consequences of naturalism. It is an improved version of my paper, "Rea On Naturalism" in Philo, 2004, revised in light of Rea's comments on the earlier paper. The discussion focuses on Rea’s case for three of his theses: that naturalism must be viewed as a ‘research programme’; that naturalism ‘cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence’, as he puts it; and that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting realism about (...) material objects. (shrink)

Review of Robert Kirk's The Conceptual Link From Physical To Mental (Oxford University Press, 2013).

We analyze the properties of optimum portfolios, the price of which is considered a new quantum variable and derive a quantum analog of the Black-Scholes formula for the price of financial variables in assumption that the market dynamics can by considered as its continuous weak measurement at no-arbitrage condition.

This is a critical study of Sydney Shoemaker's, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007). It focuses on (i) the relationship between his subset theory of realization and the higher-order property theory of realization, and (ii) his attempt to solve the problem of mental causation.

This is a critical notice of Timothy Williamson's, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007). It focuses on criticizing the book's two main positive proposals: that we should “replace true belief by knowledge in a principle of charity constitutive of content”, and that “the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is tantamount to a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking”.

Though there is much else in Levine's book that is also worthy of discussion, this critical study focuses exclusively on his central positive thesis that phenomenal consciousness exhibits two features that “both resist explanatory reduction to the physical: subjectivity and qualitative character” (p. 175).

The paper discusses the possibility of constructing economic models using the methodology of model construction in classical mechanics. At the same time, unlike the "econophysical" approach, the properties of economic models are derived without involvement of any equivalent physical properties, but with account of the types of symmetry existing in the economic system. It has been shown that at this approach practically all known mechanical variables have their "economic twins". The variational principle is formulated on the basis of formal mathematical (...) construction without involving the subjective factor common to the majority of models in economics. The dynamics of interaction of two companies has been studies in details, on the basis of which we can proceed to modeling of more complex and realistic economic systems. Prediction of the possibility of constructing economic theory on the basis of primary principles analogously to physics has been made. (shrink)

A review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk's Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk's sense. I also argue (...) that the problems with Melnyk's brand of Realization Physicalism generalize to other potential attempts to express Physicalism in terms of realization. The burden of proof is on the Realization Physicalist to show that physicalist intuitions can be adequately captured with the notion of realization. (shrink)

The work of Gregory Bateson offers a metaphysical basis for a “process psychology,” that is, a view of psychological practice and research guided by an ontology of becoming—identifying change, difference, and relationship as the basic elements of a foundational metaphysics. This article explores the relevance of Bateson's recursive epistemology, his re-conception of the Great Chain of Being, a first-principles approach to defining the nature of mind, and understandings of interaction and difference, pattern and symmetry, interpretation and context. Bateson's philosophical contributions (...) will be drawn into relationship with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language as use, Melnyk's theory of causal levels of explanation, Korzybski's account of map and territory, the rejection of the heuristic rigidity of substantialist ontologies, and a cybernetics communication science-informed approach to contextual bi-directionality of causality. We thereby arrive at an understanding of Bateson's process psychology that, given its ecological-systemic nature, is explanatorily applicable across the mind sciences. This process psychology equips us to answer the question: What is mind? Not by explanatory appeal to substantial entities contained within mind, but instead by recourse to the contextually relevant patterns for understanding mind to a particular purpose. We have thereby attended to the gulf between heuristics and fundamentals, between psychological models and an onto-epistemic account of reality. Insufficient attention has been given to characterising the vital nature of Bateson's philosophical oeuvre to psychological practice. This article draws out Bateson's relevance to establishing foundational principles for a process psychology capable of reinvigorating psychological thought. (shrink)