Results for 'Raz'

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Joseph Raz
Columbia University
  1. Raz on Practical Reason and Political Morality.Jonathan Floyd - 2017 - Jurisprudence 8 (2):185-204.
    This article examines the relationship between Raz's theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines (...)it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reasondesires, goals, and competitive pluralism––combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality––what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life options. As it turns out, if we are reasonable, in terms of the former theory, then we are likely to be immoral, in terms of the latter one. (shrink)
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  2. Raz on Reasons, Reason, and Rationality: On Raz's From Normativity to Responsibility.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies:1-21.
    This is a synoptic and critical commentary on Joseph Razs From Normativity to Responsibility.
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  3. Political Anarchism and Razs Theory of Authority.Bruno Leipold - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (3):309-329.
    This article argues that using Joseph Razs service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies (...)the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Razs theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, in these cases, anarchist groups and societies and not the state have legitimate authority. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Razs theory, have some legitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Razs service conception and also provide suggestive evidence that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcilable. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical. (shrink)
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  4. Joseph Raz on the Problem of the Amoralist.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1):85-93.
    Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these (...)
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  5.  47
    Raz on Authority and Democracy.David Rondel - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):211-230.
    ABSTRACT: I argue that Joseph Razs service conception of authority cannot convincingly account for the nature and source of democratic authority. It cannot explain why decisions (...)made democratically are more likely to be sound than decisions made non-democratically, and therefore, why democratic decisions might be understood as constituting moral reasons for action and compliance independently of their instrumental dimensions. My argument is that democratic authority cannot be explained completely in terms of the truth or soundness of the outcomes it tends toward. A full account of democratic authority must involve non-instrumental values about the moral caliber of democratic procedures. (shrink)
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  6. Non-Positivism and Encountering a Weakened Necessity of the Separation Between Law and MoralityReflections on the Debate Between Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz.Wei Feng - 2019 - Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 158:305-334.
    Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in (...)the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then thenecessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In hisReplyto Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity oflegal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of theseparation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Razs three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be calledexclusivelegal positivism, the otherinclusivelegal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledgenecessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexys argument. (shrink)
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  7. Do desacordo ao paradoxo epistêmico: uma análise da concepção de serviço de autoridade de Raz à luz da teoria doponto-cegode R. Sorensen.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Dissertatio 48:242-257.
    Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational (...)to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to irrationally acting; second, according to theblindspotstheory, we outline some restrictions from a theory of rationality to the authority. (shrink)
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  8.  79
    Interpreting the Claim to Legitimate Authority: an Analysis of Joseph Raz's Objection Against Incorporating Moral Norms Into Law.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - [email protected]: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 18 (3):319-332.
    From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued (...)
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  9. The Morality of Freedom. Joseph Raz.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - Ethics 98 (4):850-852.
    This thesis examines the relationship between nihilism and postmodernism in relation to the sublime, and is divided into two parts: theory and literature. Beginning with histories of (...)
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  10. Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?Ruth Chang - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view thathard choicesare hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, (...)
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  11. The Relational Conception of Practical Authority.N. Adams - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (5):549-575.
    I argue for a new conception of practical authority based on an analysis of the relationship between authority and subject. Commands entail a demand for practical deference, (...)
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  12. Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life.S. Matthew Liao - 2015 - In The Right to Be Loved. Oxford University Press USA.
    What grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a genuine human right? This chapter offers a new answer: human beings have human rights to (...)
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  13. Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief.Arnon Keren - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):61-76.
    The paper discusses Linda Zagzebski's account of epistemic authority. Building on Joseph Raz's account of political authority, Zagzebski argues that the basic contours of epistemic authority (...) match those Raz ascribes to political authority. This, it is argued, is a mistake. Zagzebski is correct in identifying the pre-emptive nature of reasons provided by an authority as central to our understanding of epistemic authority. However, Zagzebski ignores important differences between practical and epistemic authority. As a result, her attempt to explain the rationality of belief on authority by applying an analogue of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis to the domain of belief fails. A successful explanation of the rationality of belief on authority will need to be attuned to the differences between political and epistemic authorities. (shrink)
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  14.  86
    Legal Directives and Practical Reasons.Noam Gur - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirementse.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulationsmake to normative reasons (...)relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. -/- It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigmit constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements. (shrink)
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  15. Law's Authority is Not a Claim to Preemption.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
    Joseph Raz argues that legal authority includes a claim by the law to replace subjectscontrary reasons. I reply that this cannot be squared with the existence (...)
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  16. Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and Exclusionary Reasons’.Christian Piller - 2006 - In J. A. Pinto S. Miguens (ed.), Analyses. pp. 98-105.
    I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are (...)such reasons. Then I turn to Razs idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, dont determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Razs conception of exclusionary reasons. (shrink)
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  17. On Legitimacy and Authority: A Response to Krehoff.Bas van der Vossen - 2008 - Res Publica 14 (4):299-302.
    In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoffs articleLegitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoffs use of (...) Razs theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions. Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoffs conclusions. (shrink)
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  18. The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
    I examine the impact of the presence of anarchists among key legal officials upon the legal positivist theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. For purposes (...) of this paper, an anarchist is one who believes that the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond prudential reasons, such as avoiding sanction. I show that both versions of positivism require key legal officials to endorse the law in some way, and that if a legal system can continue to exist and function when its key officials reject the reason-giving character of law, then we have a reason to re-examine and amend legal positivism. (shrink)
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  19. Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Ratio 28 (1):65-80.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something (...)
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  20. The Impossibility of Political Neutrality.Noriaki Iwasa - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):147-155.
    For some contemporary liberal philosophers, a huge concern is liberal neutrality, which is the idea that the state should be neutral among competing conceptions of the moral (...)
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  21. Medical Complicity and the Legitimacy of Practical Authority.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2020 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 12.
    If medical complicity is understood as compliance with a directive to act against the professional's best medical judgment, the question arises whether it can ever be (...)justified. This paper will trace the contours of what would legitimate a directive to act against a professional's best medical judgment (and in possible contravention of her oath) using Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. The service conception is useful for basing the legitimacy of authoritative directives on the ability of the putative authority to enable subjects to comply better with reasons that already apply to them. Hence, the service conception bases the legitimacy of practical authority on a certain kind of greater knowledge or expertise. This helps to focus the conundrum regarding complicity on the clash of expertise between the medical expert and the governing body tasked with coordinating behaviour and otherwise devising rules for the social good. The ethical dilemma presented by a hypothetically legitimate directive to act against a professional's best medical judgment also serves to highlight the moral dimension of one's duty to obey a legitimate authority. (shrink)
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  22. Three Conceptions of Practical Authority.Daniel Star & Candice Delmas - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (1):143-160.
    Joseph Razs much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second- personal (...)conception of practical authority.1 We believe that the best place to start understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relation to action, rather than belief. We do not wish to deny that there might be properties of practical authority (as distinct from the species of authority that is concerned with belief) that are peculiar to it, but, unlike both Raz and Darwall, we do not believe that such features play a role in defining or delimiting practical authority. (shrink)
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  23. The Methods of Normativity.Hass Binesh - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30 (1):159.
    This essay is an examination of the relationship between phenomenology and analytic method in the philosophy of law. It proceeds by way of a case study, the (...)
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  24.  58
    Liberalism After Communitarianism.Charles Blattberg - 2021 - In Gerard Delanty & Stephen Turner (eds.), Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory. Routledge.
    Theliberal-communitariandebate arose within anglophone political philosophy during the 1980s. This essay opens with an account of the main outlines of the debate, showing how (...)liberals and communitarians tended to confront each other with opposing interpretations of John RawlsTheory of Justice (1999; originally published in 1971) and Political Liberalism (2005; originally published in 1993). The essay then proceeds to discuss four forms ofliberalism after communitarianism’: Michael Freedens account of liberalism as an ideology; Joseph Raz and Will Kymlickas perfectionist liberalisms; the liberalism of value pluralists such as Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams; and Judith N. Shklars liberalism of fear. It concludes with the suggestion that there are times when liberals of every kind should set aside their ideology, even if only temporarily, in order to listen to their interlocutors with truly open minds. (shrink)
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  25. Reaching for My Gun: Why We Shouldn'T Hear the Word "Culture" in Normative Political Theory.Simon Cushing - 2007 - 1st Global Conference: Multiculturalism, Conflict and Belonging.
    Culture is a notoriously elusive concept. This fact has done nothing to hinder its popularity in contemporary analytic political philosophy among writers like John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, (...)
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  26. Why Legal Rules Are Not Speech Acts and What Follows From That.Marcin Matczak - manuscript
    The speech-act approach to rules is commonplace in both Anglo-American and continental traditions of legal philosophy. Despite its pervasiveness, I argue in this paper that the (...) approach is misguided and therefore intrinsically flawed. My critique identifies how speech-act theory provides an inadequate theoretical framework for the analysis of written discourse, a case in point being legal text. Two main misconceptions resulting from this misguided approach are the fallacy of synchronicity and the fallacy of a-discursivity. The former consists of treating legal rules as if they were uttered and received in the same context, the latter consists of treating legal rules as relatively short, isolated sentences. Among the consequences of these fallacies are an excessive focus on the lawmakerssemantic intentions and the neglect of the semantic and pragmatic complexity of rules as sets of utterances (discourses) -/- To redress these flaws, I propose analysing legal rules through the prism of complex text-acts. My paper presents the consequences of this revised approach for legal interpretation, supporting Joseph Raz's idea of minimal legislative intent. (shrink)
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  27. Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparabilitymeans (...)
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  28. Trust and Belief: a Preemptive Reasons Account.Arnon Keren - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615.
    According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the (...) trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust. Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides independent reasons supporting a doxastic account. (shrink)
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  29. Assessing Law's Claim to Authority.Bas van der Vossen - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
    The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection, arguing that (...)
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  30. In Defense of Content-Independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
    Discussions of political obligation and political authority have long focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in (...)these debates, the notion of content-independence is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or increasingly irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their source or container. I then solve the long-standing puzzle of whether the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is consistent with the fact that some laws must fail to bind due to their egregiously unjust content. Finally I defend my understanding of content-independence against challenges and show why it retains a place of special importance for questions about the law and political obligation. Content-independence highlights that it is some feature of the law or law-making process in general that is supposed to generate moral obligations for citizens, not the merits of particular laws. (shrink)
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  31. What DoesLegal ObligationMean?Daniel Wodak - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):790-816.
    What do normative terms likeobligationmean in legal contexts? On one view, which H.L.A. Hart may have endorsed, “obligationis ambiguous in moral and legal (...) contexts. On another, which is dominant in jurisprudence, “obligationhas a distinctively moralized meaning in legal contexts. On a third view, which is often endorsed in philosophy of language, “obligationhas a generic meaning in moral and legal con- texts. After making the nature of and disagreements between these views precise, I show how linguistic data militates against both rivals to the generic meaning view, and argue that this has significant implications for jurisprudence. (shrink)
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  32. Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical (...)reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move onto analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Changs recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples. (shrink)
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  33. In defense of exclusionary reasons.N. P. Adams - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):235-253.
    Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Razs proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and (...)consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Razs motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)
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  34.  76
    Racje wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne.Bernard Williams & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 67 (1):231-246.
    Artykuł, opublikowany po raz pierwszy w 1979 r., jest jednym z najczęściej cytowanych tekstów filozoficznych z drugiej połowy XX wieku. Tekst Bernarda Williamsa zainicjował kilka ważnych debat, (...)
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  35. In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle.Simon Rippon - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2):1-21.
    I make the observation that English sentences such asYou have reason to take the bus or to take the traindo not have the logical form (...)
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  36. A Self-Determination Theory Account of Self-Authorship: Implications for Law and Public Policy.Alexios Arvanitis & Konstantinos Kalliris - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):763-783.
    Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of ones own life is a (...) significant component of ones own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Razs conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the principles of self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists callliberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life. (shrink)
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  37. Struktura Evoluční Teorie F. A. Hayeka.Pavel Doleček - 2014 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 36 (3):309-336.
    Studie má za cíl představit strukturu Hayekova evolucionismu. Argumentace postupuje v několika krocích: Východiskem je historicko- systematická expozice způsobu, jakým evoluční teorie ovlivnila Hayekovu filosofii, především s (...)
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  38.  86
    Oko mysli: Agnes Arberová k otázce biologického hlediska.Matěj Pudil - 2018 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 40 (1):107-126.
    Práce se zabývá filosofickou analýzou vědeckého výzkumu, kterou v polovině minulého století provedla botanička Agnes Arberová. Její koncepce je cenným příspěvkem k otázce kontextu vzniku vědeckého objevu (...)
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  39.  30
    Przejrzeć -Zrobienie Świat Społeczny (Making the Social World) autor: John Searle (przegląd poprawiony 2019). [REVIEW]Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Witamy Do Piekła Na Ziemi Dzieci, Zmiany Klimatu, Bitcoiny, Kartele, Chiny, Demokracja, Różnorodność, Dysgenika, Równość, Hakerzy, Prawa Człowieka, Islam, Liberalizm, Dobrobyt, Sieć, Chaos, Głód, Choroby, Przemoc, Sztuczna Inteligencja, Wojna.
    Przed skomentowaniem książki, oferuję uwagi na temat Wittgenstein i Searle i logicznej struktury racjonalności. Eseje tutaj w większości już opublikowane w ciągu ostatniej dekady (choć niektóre (...)
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  40.  27
    Recenzja "Filozofii w nowym wieku" (Philosophy in a New Century) autor John Searle (2008) (przegląd poprawiony 2019). [REVIEW]Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Witamy Do Piekła Na Ziemi - Dzieci, Zmiany Klimatu, Bitcoiny, Kartele, Chiny, Demokracja, Różnorodność, Dysgenika, Równość, Hakerzy, Prawa Człowieka, Islam, Liberalizm, Dobrobyt, Sieć, Chaos, Głód, Choroby, Przemoc, Sztuczna Inteligencja, Wojna.
    Przed skomentowaniem książki, oferuję uwagi na temat Wittgenstein i Searle i logicznej struktury racjonalności. Eseje tutaj w większości już opublikowane w ciągu ostatniej dekady (choć niektóre (...)
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  41. The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.
    According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability (...)
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  42. Manifest als Medium des Protestes in der Berliner Dadabewegung und im Wiener Aktionismus.Kalina Kupczyńska - 2004 - Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Germanica 4:199-209.
    Tematem artykułu jest manifest jako gatunek dominujący w awangardzie historycznej (w tym wypadku w dadaizmie), jak i w neoawangardzie austriackiej (akcjonizm wiedeński). Ten ostatni, radykalny ruch sztuki (...)
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  43.  16
    Practical Reasons and Interpretation of Customary International Law.Kostiantyn Gorobets - forthcoming - In Panos Merkouris, Jörg Kammerhofer & Noora Arjärvi (eds.), The Theory and Philosophy of Customary International Law and its Interpretation. Cambridge, UK:
    When we say that we interpret customary international law, what is this thing that we actually interpret? Depending on how we answer this question, our view on (...)
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  44. The Rule of St. Benedict and Modern Liberal Authority.Linda Zagzebski - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):65 - 84.
    In this paper I examine the sixth centuryRule of St. Benedict’, and argue that the authority structure of Benedictine communities as described in that document satisfies (...)
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  45.  41
    商事法의 動態的發展的 理解를 위한 小考 - 世界的 차원의 商事法 槪念은 法哲學的으로.Kiyoung Kim - 2012 - 기업법연구 26 (4):55-88.
    The paper aims at rethinking the traditional understanding of commercial law, and tentatively provides its cosmopolitan concept under the backdrop of extended commercial exchange and corresponding development (...)
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  46. Fernsehen als multikulturelles Medium. Am Beispiel des Deutschen Fernsehen.Aleksander Kozłowski - 2002 - Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Archaeologica 3:219-227.
    Telewizja określana jest jako najważniejszy środek masowego przekazu a zarazem najważniejszy wynalazek XX w., który - według socjologów - zrewolucjonizował m.in. nasz styl życia oraz sposób percepcji informacji (...) a jednocześnie ma ogromne możliwości kształtowania naszych poglądów i opinii. Powstanie telewizji nie jest związane - jak mogłoby się to wydawać - z okresem powojennym, lecz jest wynalazkiem, dla którego przesłanki technologiczne zostały stworzone już w połowie XIX w. Szersze znaczenie zdobyła ona jednak dopiero w latach trzydziestych w Niemczech jako potencjalny instrument propagandy faszystów. W roku 1935 rozpoczęto po raz pierwszy nadawanie regularnego programu telewizyjnego, a w następnym przeprowadzono pierwszą relację telewizyjną z Olimpiady Sportowej w Berlinie. W okresie powojennym początki telewizji w Niemczech datują się na rok 1954, kiedy otwarto pierwszą publiczną stację telewizyjną pod nazwą ARD. W roku 1963 utworzono drugą publiczną stację telewizyjną ZDF. Powołaniu tej stacji towarzyszyły burzliwe dyskusje społeczne i polityczne. Po pierwszym okresie ostrej konkurencji obie stacje telewizyjne rozpoczęły współpracę między sobą i to zarówno na płaszczyźnie programowej, jak i produkcyjnej. Kolejnym wielkim krokiem w rozwoju telewizji było utworzenie sieci prywatnych stacji radiowych i telewizyjnych. Ich powstanie było możliwe dzięki nowej technologii przekaźnikowej, tzn. techniki satelitarnej oraz odpowiednim regulacjom prawnym. Pierwszym takim programem była - istniejąca zresztą do dzisiaj - stacja SAT 1, która rozpoczęła nadawanie swojego programu w styczniu 1995 r. Po niej powstały lawinowo następne, takie jak: RTL plus, PRO 7, Tele 5, VOX, VIVA i wiele innych. Socjologowie kultury i kulturoznawcy podkreślają, że telewizja ma ogromne możliwości przekazywania widzom informacji przede wszystkim z zakresu szeroko rozumianej kultury. Zastępuje kino, koncert i teatr. Jest oczywiście rzeczą dyskusyjną i otwartą rozpatrywanie jakości artystycznej poszczególnych programów, jednak niezmienny jest fakt, że głównym źródłem naszych informacji przede wszystkim politycznych, społecznych, ale także i kulturalnych jest telewizja. Specjaliści przewidują dalszy jej intensywny rozwój w XXI w. i to zarówno na płaszczyźnie technologicznej, jak i też programowej. (shrink)
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  47. Review of Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights[REVIEW]Robert Mark Simpson - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):517-520.
    This is a review of a long, comprehensive, and mostly very good collection of philosophical essays on human rights. I briefly summarise the main ideas put forward (...)
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  48.  93
    Incoherent but Reasonable: A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism.Wes Siscoe & Alexander Schaefer - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):573-603.
    A strength of liberal political institutions is their ability to accommodate pluralism, both allowing divergent comprehensive doctrines as well as constructing the common ground necessary for diverse (...)
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  49. The Second-Person Standpoint in Law and Morality.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):1-3.
    The papers of this special issue are the outcome of a two-­‐day conference entitledThe Second-­‐Person Standpoint in Law and Morality,” that took place at the (...) University of Vienna in March 2013 and was organized by the ERC Advanced Research GrantDistortions of Normativity.” -/- The aim of the conference was to explore and discuss Stephen Darwalls innovative and influential second-­‐personal account of foundational moral concepts such asobligation“, „responsibility“, andrights“, as developed in his book The Second-­‐Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Harvard University Press 2006) and further elaborated in Morality, Authority and Law: Essays in Second-­‐Personal Ethics I and Honor, History, and Relationships: Essays in Second-­‐Personal Ethics II (both Oxford University Press 2013). -/- With the second-­‐person standpoint Darwall refers to the unique conceptual normative space that practical deliberators and agents occupy when they address claims and demands to one another (and to themselves). The very first sentence of Darwalls examination of the second-­‐personal conceptual paradigm summarizes the gist of the argument succinctly when he claims thatthe second-­‐person standpoint [is] the perspective that you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one anothers conduct and will.” (Darwall 2006, 3) The Second-­‐Person Standpoint reminds us that this perspective has been ignored for much too long and that it better take centre stage in any philosophical analysis of moral phenomena, in order to yield a satisfying account of morality as a social institution. The negative part of Darwalls strategy is to show that neither a purely first-­‐personal approach (represented by Kant and contemporary Kantians), nor a third-­‐personal state-­‐of-­‐affairs-­‐perspective (represented by most varieties of contemporary consequentialism) are capable of accounting for the categorical bindingness characteristic of moral obligation. The latter feat can only be accomplished, and this is the positive part of Darwalls argument, when those second-­‐ personal normativefelicity conditionsand conceptual presuppositions are acknowledged and spelled out that are already presupposed in every instance of issuing (putatively valid) claims and demands. It is especially second-­‐personal competence and second-­‐personal authority that are the bedrock of these normative conceptual presuppositions, without which engaging in any meaningful address would be impossible. Kantians and utilitarians alike have neglected this critical dimension of the normative landscape. -/- In addition to working out an original conception of moral obligation, the first eight chapters of The Second-­‐Person Standpoint articulate this fundamental insight with respect to a variety of traditional projects in ethical theory such as developing accounts of moral responsibility, rights, dignity, and autonomy. In this context, special emphasis is to be awarded, on the one hand, to Darwalls refreshing second-­‐personal interpretation of Strawsons influential account of reactive attitudes and moral responsibility and, on the other, to his historically well-­‐informed reconstruction of Samuel Pufendorfs often neglected version of an enlightened theistic voluntarism concerning moral authority. Darwall dedicates the second part of The Second-­‐Person Standpoint to the urgent question: how should one respond to the sceptical challenge that expresses utter indifference to the second-­‐person standpoint, including all its multifarious normative presuppositions and implications? What commits us to all this? It is at this point that Darwall, firstly, refines his criticisms of the Kantian, first-­‐personal, paradigm of normativity and emphasizes that only if one already incorporates the second-­‐personal conceptual apparatus into a Kantian analysis of moral obligation is the latter going to yield a convincing account. Secondly, and this certainly is one of the highlights of Darwalls theory, the Second-­‐Person Standpoint employs themes from Fichtes philosophy of right in order to strengthen the case for the inescapability of taking up the second-­‐person standpoint of moral obligation. In his contribution for this special issue Darwall further develops his diagnosis that Fichtes thought offers in many respects a more promising, since more second-­‐personal, foundation of morality than, for example, Kants. -/- By now, the impact of Darwalls second-­‐person standpoint theory has far transcended the confines of contemporary debates on moral obligation. Darwall has put to use the second-­‐personal apparatus to critical engagements with Joseph Razs theory of legal authority and Derek Parfits convergence arguments for his recent Triple Theory of moral wrongness. The constant theme that unifies all these diverse applications remains the one so impressively presented in The Second-­‐Person Standpoint: without paying attention to theinterdefinableandirreduciblecircle of (four) foundational second-­‐ personal concepts (valid demand, practical authority, second-­‐personal reason, and accountability), neither superior epistemic status (Raz) nor the identification of optimific states of affairs (Parfit) are potent enough sources to generate anything close to the authority relationships that underlie the idea involved in obligating ourselves and one another. Given all of the above, it comes as no surprise that Darwall reserves his strongest sympathies for a specific ethical theory, namely contractualism. Our commitment to equal basic second-­‐personal authority, that Darwall arrives at through his Fichtean rectification of the Kantian project, leads him to the endorsement of a contractualist paradigm in the spirit of broadly Rawls and Scanlon. -/- . (shrink)
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  50. Replikowalność Wiedzy a Transhumanistyczny Stan Osobliwości.Kawalec Pawel - 2013 - In Leszczyński D. (ed.), Wiedza. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. pp. 335-348.
    Zwolennicy transhumanizmu upatrują przyszłego podmiotu wiedzy w maszynach, które miałyby być inteligentniejsze od ludzi, ich twórców. Jeżeli raz zaistniałaby taka możliwość stworzenia inteligentniejszych podmiotów, to w kolejnym (...)
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