Spinoza, le spinozisme et les fondements de la sécularisation est un ouvrage dédié à la mémoire d’Emmanuel Levinas, dont l’auteur a été l’élève durant plusieurs années. Il vise, à travers une analyse d’ordre philosophique, historique, épistémologique et théologique, à mettre au jour les conditions d’émergence interrelatées du spinozisme et de la sécularisation. Pour ce faire, il souligne, entre autres, l’importance des polémiques anti-maimonidiennes, des débats sur les attributs divins, la substance, l’infini, du marranisme et de la Kabbale sur la (...) formation du spinozisme, ainsi que son rapport à la pensée contemporaine. Il mène une recherche interdisciplinaire devant permettre d’éclairer l’origine des difficultés théoriques que ce système philosophique présente. (shrink)

Spinoza, le spinozisme et les fondements de la sécularisation est un ouvrage dédié à la mémoire d’Emmanuel Levinas, dont l’auteur a été l’élève durant plusieurs années. Il vise, à travers une analyse d’ordre philosophique, historique, épistémologique et théologique, à mettre au jour les conditions d’émergence interrelatées du spinozisme et de la sécularisation. Il présente une recherche interdisciplinaire devant permettre d’éclairer l’origine des difficultés théoriques que ce système philosophique présente. Ce volume est le premier d’une pentalogie consacrée à Spinoza et au (...) Spinozisme, dont les autres paraîtront dans la même collection. Spinoza, Spinozism and the Foundations of Secularization is a book dedicated to the memory of Emmanuel Levinas, whose author was a student for several years. It aims, through a philosophical, historical, epistemological and theological analysis, to bring to light the interrelated conditions of emergence of Spinozism and secularization. It presents interdisciplinary research to shed light on the origin of the theoretical difficulties that this philosophical system presents. This volume is the first of a pentalogy devoted to Spinoza and Spinozism, the others of which will appear in the same collection. (shrink)

The perpetual secretary of the Berlin Academy Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey is best known as a populariser of Christian Wolff’s doctrines. As of Formey’s activity in the Berlin Academy, scholars have mostly emphasized his role in the controversy over monads with Leonhard Euler, while overlooking other interesting contributions Formey presented in the “speculative philosophy” class of the Academy. In this paper, I analyse two articles Formey published in 1747 on the Mémoires de l’Académie de Berlin, namely the Preuves de (...) l’existence de Dieu, ramenées aux notions communes and the Examen de la preuve qu’on tire des fins de la nature, pour établir l’existence de Dieu. In these texts, Formey presents some of Wolff’s methodological and metaphysical ideas, in an implicit dialogue with other members of the Academy – in particular, with the president Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis – who were also interested in metaphysics and the philosophical method. Formey reworks the Wolffian arguments as to make them more accessible, in order to promote an open confrontation over core philosophical questions. Far from adopting a controversial tone, Formey’s attitude is rather conciliatory: any disagreement, as he thinks, can be easily settled once the true method for philosophizing is made available to everybody. (shrink)

Le mémoire de Master 2. Soutenu en 2012 à Paris VIII sous la direction de Ch. Ramond. A study of Spinoza's account of "singular things" in the Ethics along with the classic French literature on the subject. -/- TABLE DES MATIÈRES: INTRODUCTION GENERALE (p. 3 – 4) PREMIERE PARTIE : DE LA NATURE DE DIEU AUX CHOSES SINGULIERES (p. 5 – 97) INTRODUCTION (p. 5 – 16) : DU RAPPORT DE L’INFINIMENT INFINI ET DU FINI. Pourquoi l’Éthique commence par l’infiniment (...) infini (Dieu). De l’immanentisme spinoziste. Abrégé de la réalité des choses singulières. Que celles-ci sont « en autre chose » et que cet autre est Dieu. Rôle important de la « cause de soi » dans l’ontologie spinoziste. Description de la démarche à suivre. PREMIER PAS (p. 17 – 39) : DE LA « CAUSE DE SOI ». Sur la définition de la « cause de soi ». De la méthode géométrique, et de la raison pour laquelle l’Éthique commence avec cette définition d’un Ens causa sui. Comment la notion de la « cause de soi » fonde l’idée de Dieu. Du monisme intégral chez Spinoza. De « l’esprit » du spinozisme et du déterminisme absolu. Du dédoublement de Dieu. INTERMEDE (p. 40– 60) : DE LA PROPOSITION 16 ET DES MODES INFINIS. Derechef, du dédoublement de Dieu, et en particulier, du renversement de la situation théorique du qualitatif et du quantitatif dans le système. Rôle de la Proposition 16 dans le système. Comment celle-ci scelle le passage de l’Ens causa sui à l’Ens effectus sui. Pourquoi I 16 est controversé. Comment I 16 nous apprend que Dieu ne produit nécessairement tout qu’à condition de produire de l’intelligible. De l’intellect de Dieu. Des modes, et des modes infinis en particulier. À propos du souci néoplatonicien. SECOND PAS (p. 61 – 91) : DE L’ESSENCE ET L’EXISTENCE DES CHOSES EN ÉI. Les Propositions 24 et 25. Comment Dieu scinde les essences des existences. Que toute chose finie est par essence dans un rapport intime avec sa cause infinie et verticale. Le Scolie de la Proposition 25. Sur la démonstration de la définition des « choses particulières ». Sur la controverse de l’attribut. Les Proposition 26 et 28. Comment les choses existent. De la causalité horizontale et de l’indéfini. Analyse de la notion de l’infini. De l’impossibilité de comprendre totalement l’existence d’une chose. Ce qui veut dire « Deus quatenus ». FIN DE LA PREMIERE PARTIE (p. 92 – 97) : DE LA NATURE NATURANTE ET LA NATURE NATUREE. Analyse du Scolie de la Proposition 29. De l’asymétrie du dédoublement de la Nature. Du salut spinoziste. DEUXIEME PARTIE : DE L’UNITE DES CHOSES SINGULIERES (p. 98 – 153) INTRODUCTION (p. 98 – 102) : DU RAPPORT DE L’ESSENCE A L’EXISTENCE. Ce qui se passe lorsqu’on quitte une Partie de l’Éthique. De ce qu’on a vu dans notre Première Partie. De la causalité verticale et de la causalité horizontale. Comment les essences peuvent-elles retrouver les existences, et vice versa. Description de la démarche à suivre. PREMIER PAS (p. 103 – 127) : DE L’ESSENCE Sur la définition d’une « essence ». De sa positivité. Que ce qu’un individu est par essence n’est que ce qu’il peut comprendre. De la Proposition 8, de son Corollaire et de son Scolie. Que l’existence de l’essence d’une chose ne se confond pas avec l’existence de la chose elle-même. Contre l’idée que les essences sont des choses « possibles ». Sur la notion des « grandeurs intensives » et sur la notion du « profondeur » chez Spinoza. SECOND PAS (p. 128 – 149) : DU CONATUS A LA PHYSIQUE Sur le concept du conatus. Du fait qu’il est l’essence actuelle d’une chose. Qu’on ne peut pas distinguer entre notre puissance ou effort pour persévérer dans l’être et l’être dans lequel nous nous persévérons. Du dynamisme introduit par le biais du conatus. Du rapport du quantitatif et du qualitatif, de l’idée des instants d’éternité, et du problème des essences qui sont instantanées. De la « petite physique » dans la Deuxième Partie de l’Éthique. Sur ses enjeux théoriques. Sur le matérialisme de Spinoza. De la définition de l’Individu comme rapport fixe de mouvement et de repos. Des corps simples, et que pour toute chose existante il n’est pas donné une essence. De la définition des choses singulières, et encore de la mutabilité ontologique de celles-ci. FIN DE LA DEUXIEME PARTIE (p. 150 – 153) : DE LA FINITUDE Sur l’Axiome de la Quatrième Partie de l’Éthique. Que certains rapports de mouvement et de repos en remplacent d’autres. Sur la raison pour laquelle tout rapport ne peut pas coexister. Que la destructibilité vient du biais de l’Étendue, et en particulier, du problème de l’espace. Que la chose singulière véhicule une tension entre la partie et le tout, et encore, du salut spinoziste. CONCLUSION GENERALE (p. 154 – 157) ENGLISH SUMMARY (p. 158 – 159) BIBLIOGRAPHIE (p. 160 – 165) TABLE DES MATIERES (p. 166 – 169). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify Spinoza’s views on some of the most fundamental issues of his metaphysics: the nature of God’s attributes, the nature of existence and eternity, and the relation between essence and existence in God. While there is an extensive literature on each of these topics, it seems that the following question was hardly raised so far: What is, for Spinoza, the relation between God’s existence and the divine attributes? Given Spinoza’s claims that there are (...) intimate connections between God’s essence and his existence – “God’s essence and his existence are one and the same”(E1p20) – and between God’s essence and the attributes – “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence” (E1d4), we would naturally expect that by transitivity, there is a significant relation between God’s existence and the attributes. Yet, as far as I know, there is little, if any, attempt in the existing literature to explicate such a relation, and it is one of my aims of this study to both raise the question and answer it. Eventually, I will argue that for Spinoza God is nothing but existence, and that the divine attributes are just fundamental kinds of existence, or, what is the same, as I will later argue, the intellect’s most fundamental and adequate conceptions of existence. In the first part of the paper I provide some background for Spinoza’s brief discussion in the TTP of God’s name and essence by studying the claims of Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed that God’s true essence is necessary existence, and that this essence is denoted by the ineffable Hebrew name of God, the Tetragrammaton (YHVH). In the second part of the paper I point out similar claims Spinoza presents in the TTP, and show how they respond to and echo Maimonides’ discussion in the Guide. In the third part, I examine Spinoza’s apparently conflicting claims in the Ethics about the relationship between God’s essence and existence. In some places Spinoza claims that God’s essence and existence are strictly identical (E1p10: “God’s essence his existence are one and the same”), but in other passages he makes the apparently much more modest claim that God’s essence involves existence (E1d1, E1p7d and E1p11d), which may lead one to believe that there is more to God’s essence than mere existence. I show that Spinoza’s understanding of the relation denoted by the Latin ‘involvit’ is consistent with the strict identification of essence and existence in God, and that Spinoza identifies God’s essence with self-necessitated existence, or eternity. Indeed, Spinoza’s understanding of eternity [aeternitas] as self-necessitated existence (E1d8) is one of the very few Spinozistic concepts that has no trace in Descartes. In this part I will also solve the long-standing problem of the sense in which the infinite modes can be called ‘eternal.’ In the fourth part I turn to the relation between the divine attributes and God’s existence and argue that, for Spinoza, the attributes are self-sufficient and adequate conceptions of existence. Finally, I will attempt to explain what brought Spinoza to deify existence. -/- Part I: “In that Day shall God be One, and his Name One”- Maimonides on God’s Name and Essence. -/- 1.1 Before we delve into the texts, let me suggest a few distinctions between various views on the issue of the relation between essence and existence in God. The view I suspect both Maimonides and Spinoza subscribe to can be termed the divine essence-existence Identity Thesis. -/- Identity Thesis (IT): God’s essence is existence and nothing but existence. We should distinguish the Identity Thesis from the much more common view according to which God’s essence contains existence, or (which I take to be roughly the same) that existence is one of the properties or perfections which constitute God’s essence. The latter view allows for the possibility (though it does not demand) that there is more to God’s essence than bare existence (e.g., God’s essence may include omniscience, omnipotence, etc.). I will term this view the divine essence-existence Containment Thesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 417-418 [Access article in PDF] Heidi M. Ravven and Lenn E. Goodman, editors. Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 290. Cloth, $78.50. Paper, $26.95.The current anthology presents an important contribution to the study of Spinoza's relation to Jewish philosophy as well as to contemporary scholarship of Spinoza's metaphysics and political (...) theory.In the opening essay, Lenn Goodman takes upon himself the ambitious task of evaluating Spinoza's positions as to several central disputes throughout the history of philosophy. In this rich and extensive essay Goodman argues that Spinoza's radical rationalism makes him pursue syntheses between traditionally opposed poles. Lee Rice's article, "Love of God in Spinoza," carefully analyzes Spinoza's concept of love and suggests the existence of three kinds of love parallel to the three kinds of knowledge. Warren Montag addresses the unresolved issue of Spinoza's relation to the Kabbalah. Montag sides with Deleuze against the association of Spinozism with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation, arguing that unlike the Neo-Platonists and Kabbalists, Spinoza's view of God rules out any hierarchy, and does not assume a descent from primal simplicity into complexity. Edwin Curley contributes a beautiful reading of the story of Job and of Maimonides' interpretation of the story. Curley follows Maimonides' discussion of the various positions regarding the question of divine providence and his attempt to identify the speeches of the characters of the book of Job with each of these positions. Following a sensitive consideration of various attempts to [End Page 417] recover Maimonides' own rather concealed view about providence, Curley concludes that "[W]hatever you think Maimonides' final word on Job is, our examination of him certainly supports [Spinoza's] claim that [Maimonides] reads Scripture in terms of Platonic or Aristotelian speculations" (170).Warren Zev Harvey's essay addresses Spinoza's most neglected work, the Compendium of the Grammar of the Hebrew Language. Apart from providing an outline of Spinoza's work as a Hebrew grammarian ("a noun-intoxicated grammarian") and pointing out some of Spinoza's more eccentric views about the nature of the Hebrew language, Harvey makes a compelling case for the importance of the book for the study of Spinoza's metaphysics. He points out a fascinating analogy which Spinoza draws between the parts of speech: (proper) noun, adjectives, and participles, and Spinoza's key metaphysical terms: substance, attributes, and modes. (Think about the weighty implications of this analogy for Curley's interpretation of the substance-mode relation.) According to Harvey, Spinoza's claim that all Hebrew words are derived from nouns is a linguistic parallel to Spinoza's pivotal metaphysical doctrine which makes all things be in the substance (or God). Kenneth Seeskin's article discusses the views of Maimonides and Spinoza on the question of creation and God's relation to the world. Seeskin reconstructs an interesting critical dialogue between these two philosophers. According to Seeskin, both philosophers held that an effect must be similar to its cause. Maimonides' commitment to Negative Theology and to the denial of any common measure between God and finite things forced him to deny causal or explanatory relation between God and the world. What Maimonides can suggest instead is rather to prove that the emergence of the world ex nihilo and according to the divine will, is possible, and even likely given certain astronomical facts of medieval science. Thus, Maimonides would hold that "although we have grounds for believing that creation occurred, we will never be in a position to say how" (120). For Spinoza, such a view constitutes nothing but a "sanctuary of ignorance." Thus, according to Seeskin, Spinoza affirms a clear causal relation between God and the world of finite things insofar as God is said to explain the world. While I tend to agree with most aspects of this analysis, it is important to note that Spinoza also claims that "between the finite and infinite there is no relation" (Letter 54). This... (shrink)

Henry More est le plus connu des Platoniciens de Cambridge et l’Enchiridion Metaphysicum, son dernier ouvrage, représente l’accomplissement de sa pensée. Il s’agit d’une enquête métaphysique dont le principal objectif est d’établir l’existence d’une substance immatérielle, d’une âme du monde, sorte d’intermédiaire entre Dieu et le monde par laquelle les choses agissent. More nous invite ainsi à découvrir la vraie métaphysique qui consiste en la découverte de la nature véritable de l’étendue des êtres spirituels comme Dieu, les anges et (...) les démons, l’espace, les âmes individuelles des hommes ou des bêtes. Ce manuel de métaphysique prend appui sur le mécanisme cartésien pour mieux le contredire et démontre que l’extension spirituelle est la principale qualité des esprits. Cette doctrine conduira More à re-diviniser l’espace pour l’instituer à l’instar des kabbalistes de l’école de Safed, comme lieu de la possibilité de l’existence du monde. More montre ainsi les limites des mécanismes d’Hobbes et de Descartes tout en essayant de composer avec d’autres savants mécanistes tels que Robert Boyle et Robert Hooke. Quelques années plus tard, à Cambridge, Newton, sur les pas d’Henry More, pensera la nature de son espace physique comme un espace de nature divine, comme un Sensorium Dei. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------- Biographie de l'auteur: Françoise Monnoyeur est Docent en philosophie (Associate Professor). Elle enseigne la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences en France, aux États-Unis et en Suède. Elle est chercheur associée au centre Jean Pépin, Paris, France. Ses principaux ouvrages portent sur Descartes, l’infini, la matière, la vie. (shrink)

Y a-t-il des Idées et peut-on démontrer qu’elles existent ? Parmi les protagonistes anciens de la controverse qui a opposé partisans et adversaires des Idées, Aristote mérite une attention toute particulière. De fait, si – au moment où Aristote intervient dans le débat autour de l’hypothèse des Idées – ce débat a déjà une histoire, c’est avec lui que cette histoire atteint une maturité qui est à la fois d’ordre doctrinal et doxographique. De fait, non seulement Aristote est le premier (...) à avoir défini certaines au moins des propriétés de ce qui est et se dit en commun de plusieurs, mais encore a-t-il pris soin d’inscrire ces définitions dans la continuité de l’héritage socratique dont il s’est explicitement revendiqué tout en dénonçant sa dérive aux mains des successeurs de Socrate. L’objectif principal du cycle de conférences a été d’étudier les objections qu’Aristote a formulées à l’encontre des partisans des Idées en prenant comme fil conducteur la notion de substance que sa discussion des Formes platoniciennes tantôt présuppose, tantôt mobilise explicitement. Pour ce faire, nous avons procédé à une lecture détaillée d’un certain nombre de documents, tirés aussi bien de ses écrits d’école que des vestiges de ses traités perdus, où Aristote rejette la notion d’un universel substantiel (autant dire, en l’occurrence, séparé) et s’efforce de mettre à mal les arguments que ses partisans avançaient pour prouver son existence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spinoza: Une Lecture d'AristoteYitzhak MelamedFrédéric Manzini. Spinoza: Une Lecture d'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009. Pp. 334. Paper, $39.95.The occasion that prompted the current study was the discovery of a tiny typo in the text of Spinoza's Cogitata Metaphysica—the appendix to his 1663 book, Descartes' Principle of Philosophy. As it turned out, this typo, a reference to Book XI instead of Book XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics, was (...) inadvertently reproduced by Spinoza from a contemporary edition of Aristotle's works, allowing Manzini to identify precisely the edition used by Spinoza as the 1548 edition of Aristotle's works printed in Basel by Johannes Oporinus. It also led him to conclude that, contrary to the belief of many, Spinoza read Aristotle's text very closely, and convinced him of the importance of studying the dialogue between the two great philosophers.The book is comprised of three parts, reversing the order of Spinoza's presentation of his philosophy in the Ethics. The first part discusses Spinoza's ethical and political theories—where, the author claims, the influence of Aristotle is most manifest—against the background of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Here, much attention is given to the notions of the summum bonum and beatitude. The second part discusses Aristotelian and Spinozistic theories of knowledge. In the third and final part, dedicated to metaphysics and first philosophy, the author compares the philosophers' absolutely impersonal conceptions of God, examines their conceptions of substance, and develops a reading of what he calls Spinoza's "ousio-theology" (305).According to Manzini, Aristotle was one of Spinoza's first major philosophical interlocutors, and there is no doubt he is right about this. This conclusion, however, is unsurprising, [End Page 126] since seventeenth-century philosophers, whether devoted Aristotelians or determined anti-Aristotelians, conversed in an Aristotelian philosophical language. Manzini shows that Spinoza engaged directly with Aristotle's text, but also tries to substantiate an even stronger claim by stressing the agreements between the two philosophers.There are two reasons that make it difficult to see Spinoza as being consciously and positively influenced by Aristotle, however. First, Spinoza's dialogue with his philosophical predecessors is, without exception, highly critical and polemical. He does not usually mention philosophers with whom he agrees (e.g. Crescas and Machiavelli). Secondly, several of Spinoza's explicit references to Aristotle are highly critical. Consider, for example, Spinoza's claim, in a letter to Hugo Boxel, that "the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me" (Letter 56), or his mockery of the "delusions of the Aristotelians and Platonists" (Theological Political Treatise [TTP], Pref.; cf. ch. 13). Manzini suggests that in these passages Spinoza is not so much addressing Aristotle, but rather using him as a foil to target medieval Aristotelianism (13). Looking closely at the context, my impression is that he is right about the passages in the TTP, but not about the quote from Letter 56. More importantly, the claim that Spinoza uses Aristotle's name as a foil is a double-edged sword that may also serve to undermine Manzini's argument. Throughout the book, Manzini points out interesting and significant similarities between Spinoza's and Aristotle's texts, but to establish direct positive influence one must consider and rule out mediating agents. In the present case there is plenty of evidence that Spinoza read medieval Hebrew Aristotelians closely. Unfortunately, most of the Hebrew authors mentioned by Spinoza were never translated into modern European languages, and there are very few, if any, good studies of Spinoza's dialogue with these texts; in the absence of such translations and studies, some of Manzini's conclusions must remain tentative.Manzini's erudition and analysis of the text are impressive. For example, near the end of his celebrated Letter on the Infinite, Spinoza criticizes "recent Peripatetics" for misunderstanding the ancient method of proving God's existence, citing Crescas's correct formulation of the ancient proof. Manzini rightly points out that the proof Spinoza ascribes to the "recent Peripatetics" was in fact Aristotle's, while the alleged "ancient" proof (which allows for actual infinity and relies on Avicennian... (shrink)

[from the publisher's website] Questions about the existence and attributes of God form the subject matter of natural theology, which seeks to gain knowledge of the divine by relying on reason and experience of the world. Arguments in natural theology rely largely on intuitions and inferences that seem natural to us, occurring spontaneously—at the sight of a beautiful landscape, perhaps, or in wonderment at the complexity of the cosmos—even to a nonphilosopher. In this book, Helen De Cruz and Johan De (...) Smedt examine the cognitive origins of arguments in natural theology. They find that although natural theological arguments can be very sophisticated, they are rooted in everyday intuitions about purpose, causation, agency, and morality. Using evidence and theories from disciplines including the cognitive science of religion, evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, and the cognitive science of testimony, they show that these intuitions emerge early in development and are a stable part of human cognition. -/- De Cruz and De Smedt analyze the cognitive underpinnings of five well-known arguments for the existence of God: the argument from design, the cosmological argument, the moral argument, the argument from beauty, and the argument from miracles. Finally, they consider whether the cognitive origins of these natural theological arguments should affect their rationality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost of Spinoza’s arguments for God’s existence do not rely on any special feature of God, but instead on merely general features of substance. This raises the following worry: those arguments prove the existence of non-divine substances just as much as they prove God’s existence, and yet there is not enough room in Spinoza’s system for all these substances. I argue that Spinoza attempts to solve this problem by using a principle of plenitude to rule out the existence of other (...) substances and that the principle cannot be derived from the PSR, as many claim.Abbreviation: PSR: Principle of Sufficient Reason. (shrink)

Dans L’Évolution créatrice, Bergson a critiqué le problème qui consiste à se demander pourquoi il y a de l’être plutôt que rien, et l’a qualifié de pseu­do-problème. Environ un quart de siècle plus tard, il a brièvement récapitulé cette critique dans l’article « Le Possible et le réel ». Cette récapitulation n’est pas juste un résumé, et son examen nous révèlera les divers éléments difficiles à discerner dans L’Évolution créatrice: on peut citer entre autres, l’adoption par Bergson du principe d’inconcevabilité, (...) bien connu des philosophes du XVIIe siècle, et la vigilance dont il fait preuve vis-à-vis du fonctionnement trompeur du langage usuel, apparentée à celle de la philosophie du langage ordinaire. Je reconstruis et examine cette version récapitulative, et mets en lumière la nouvelle argumentation vis-à-vis du problème et le caractère aussi traditionnel que révolutionnaire de la philosophie de Bergson. Mot-clef : Bergson. Existence. Néant. Principe d’inconcevabilité. Philosophie du langage ordinaire. (shrink)

The question of Spinozist determinism and necessitarianism have been extensively studied by commentators, while the relationship between the notions of divine will and free will still requires elaborate studies. Our article seeks to contribute to such research, by clarifying the analyses of these questions by authors that Spinoza has confronted: Maimonides, as well as other Jewish philosophers, and Leibniz who criticized Spinozist determinism. We will study the consequences of these analyses on two examples that Spinoza gave to refute free will, (...) namely the dream and the situation of Buridan's ass. -/- Résumé: La question du déterminisme spinoziste et du nécessitarisme a été largement étu-diée par les commentateurs, tandis que la relation entre les notions de volonté divine et de libre arbitre nécessite encore des études plus élaborées. Notre article cherche à contribuer à ces recherches, en clarifiant les analyses de ces questions par des auteurs auxquels Spinoza s’est confronté : Maïmonide, ainsi que d’autres philosophes juifs, et Leibniz qui a lui-même critiqué le déterminisme spinoziste. Nous étudierons les conséquences de ces analyses sur deux exemples que Spinoza a donnés pour réfuter le libre arbitre, à savoir le rêve et la situa-tion de l’âne de Buridan. (shrink)

The seventeenth century was an important period in the conceptual development of the notion of the infinite. In 1643, Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647)—Galileo’s successor in the chair of mathematics in Florence—communicated his proof of a solid of infinite length but finite volume. Many of the leading metaphysicians of the time, notably Spinoza and Leibniz, came out in defense of actual infinity, rejecting the Aristotelian ban on it, which had been almost universally accepted for two millennia. Though it would be another two (...) centuries before the notion of the actually infinite was rehabilitated in mathematics by Dedekind and Cantor (Cauchy and Weierstrass still considered it mere paradox), their impenitent advocacy of the concept had significant reverberations in both philosophy and mathematics. In this essay, I will attempt to clarify one thread in the development of the notion of the infinite. In the first part, I study Spinoza’s discussion and endorsement, in the Letter on the Infinite (Ep. 12), of Hasdai Crescas’ (c. 1340-1410/11) crucial amendment to a traditional proof of the existence of God (“the cosmological proof” ), in which he insightfully points out that the proof does not require the Aristotelian ban on actual infinity. In the second and last part, I examine the claim, advanced by Crescas and Spinoza, that God has infinitely many attributes, and explore the reasoning that motivated both philosophers to make such a claim. Similarities between Spinoza and Crescas, which suggest the latter’s influence on the former, can be discerned in several other important issues, such as necessitarianism, the view that we are compelled to assert or reject a belief by its representational content, the enigmatic notion of amor Dei intellectualis, and the view of punishment as a natural consequent of sin. Here, I will restrict myself to the issue of the infinite, clearly a substantial topic in itself. (shrink)

At the opening of the Ethics Spinoza defines God as a substance consisting of infinitely many attributes. Still, the reader of the Ethics will find only two of these attributes discussed in any detail in Parts Two through Five of the book. Addressing this intriguing gap between the infinity of attributes asserted in E1d6 and the discussion of merely the two attributes of Extension and Thought in the rest of the book, Jonathan Bennett writes: “Spinoza seems to imply that there (...) are other [attributes] – he says indeed that God or Nature has “infinite attributes.” Surprising as it may seem, there are reasons to think that by this Spinoza did not mean anything entailing that there are more than two attributes.” In this paper I show that Bennett’s claim is fundamentally wrong and deeply misleading. I do think, however, that addressing Bennett’s challenge helps us better understand Spinoza’s notion of infinity. I begin by summarizing Bennett’s arguments and then turn to examine briefly the textual evidence for and against his reading. I respond to each of Bennett’s arguments, and conclude by pointing out some theoretical considerations that, I believe, simply refute his reading. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text (...) we assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

Les approches de la tradition philosophique de la morale reposent principalement sur des concepts et des théories métaphysiques et théologiques. Parmi les concepts éthiques traditionnels, le plus important est la théorie du commandement divin (DCT). Selon la DCT, Dieu donne des fondements moraux à l'humanité par sa création et par la Révélation. Morale et Divinité sont inséparables depuis la civilisation la plus lointaine. Ces concepts plongent dans un cadre théologique et sont principalement acceptés par la plupart des adeptes des trois (...) traditions abrahamiques : le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam : la partie la plus considérable de la population humaine. Tenant la foi et la Révélation pour ses fondements, les Théories du Commandement Divin ne sont pas strictement sujettes à la démonstration. Les opposants à la conception de la morale du Commandement divin, fondée sur l'impossibilité de démontrer ses présupposés métaphysiques et religieux, ont tenté pendant de nombreux siècles (mais sans succès) d'en dévaloriser l'importance. Ils ont soutenu l'argument selon lequel il ne montre pas de preuves matérielles et de cohérence logique et, pour cette raison, ne peut pas être considéré à des fins scientifiques ou philosophiques. Ce n'est qu'une croyance et, en tant que tel, doit être compris. Outre ces oppositions extrêmes, de nombreux autres concepts contreviennent aux théories du Commandement Divin, d'une manière ou d'une autre, en partie ou en totalité. (shrink)

L’usage de la raison et de la foy ou l’accord de la foy et de la raison (1704) by Pierre-Sylvain Régis can be considered his last attempt to defend the ‘new philosophy’ of René Descartes by vindicating its agreement with faith and protecting it from censorship. This contribution offers an analysis of the theories expounded by Régis in this treatise, showing how these evolved from those of his earlier Système de philosophie (1690), and arguing that both are characterized by a (...) reinterpretation of the Cartesian metaphysics on an empirical basis. In particular, Régis offered an empirical interpretation of the relations between substances, attributes and modes, by which he criticized Spinoza’s metaphysics and attempted to solve the riddle of Descartes’ dualism. (shrink)

According to the second law of thermodynamics, irreversible processes in an isolated system move towards the goal of reaching maximum entropy. In this state, mechanical work is converted to thermal energy and thermodynamic equilibrium occurs; which is determined by the equilibrium in temperature, pressure, etc. Assuming that the universe is an isolated system, the second law of thermodynamics states that the fate of the universe is a state of thermodynamic equilibrium in which all mechanical energies are converted to thermal energy (...) and the heat is dispersed all throughout the universe. In this state, there will be no movement and the universe will expire; an event called the “heat death”. This theory has certain theological implications that can serve as a proof for the perishability of the material world. And since decay implies creation, the heat death theory can be considered an argument in favor of the temporal originatedness of the material world. (shrink)

Averiguando la esboza de Filolao, tomando cuenta del recurso acesorio que hizo verodImilmente a datos observacionales.

Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge, there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations (...) by break- ing existing patterns of delaying large-scale investment in low-carbon energy and efficiency. As we will see in this chapter, it does appear to be technically feasible to transfer the costs of investments made today to the future in such a way that people alive today do not incur any net cost. the aim of this chapter is to take seriously the possibility that climate change has produced an extremely intractable political problem and that we must now consider strong measures that can break existing patterns of delaying mitigation. I defend the claim that if climate change involves a stark conflict of interests between current and future generations, then borrowing from the future would be both strategically and normatively much better than the status quo. Nevertheless, I challenge the borrowing from the future proposal on the grounds that it is not in fact the powerful tool for motivating existing agents that its proponents imagine it to be. The purpose of developing this critical argument is not, however, simply to throw doubt onto the idea of borrowing from the future. If we really do find ourselves in a political context where the prospects for effective action are very poor then strategic forms of buck-passing may make an important positive contribution to avoiding dangerous global cli- mate change. Consequently, if debt financing is not as powerful of a motivational tool as imagined we still have strong reasons, I will argue, to identify other strategies that will change agents’ incentive structures. To this end, I propose an alternative form of passing on the costs of mitigation to the future that warrants consideration. (shrink)

The problem of personal identity contains various questions and issues, but the main issue is persistence; how can one person remain the same over time? Modern philosophers have proposed various solutions to this problem; however, none are without problems. David Hume rejected the notion of personal identity as fictitious and posited a theory that personal identity is merely a bundle of perceptions which does not remain the same over time. Hume’s approach to personal identity is flawed, and Derek Parfit pushed (...) back against Hume’s complete rejection of personal identity through his argument of psychological continuity; a continuous chain of overlapping cognitive connections between beliefs, preferences, memories, and other characteristics can meet the criterion of identity. However, Parfit falls short in only acknowledging mental features as the essential property of personal identity; physical features such as age, race, sex, etc. have a significant impact on one’s understanding of themselves. Through a combination of Hume’s bundle theory and Parfit’s psychological continuity, an understanding of what personal identity is and how it is able to remain constant over time can be reached. In this paper, I argue that personal identity is a bundle of mental and physical features that persists through time through psychological continuity. (shrink)

Aims: The purpose of this study is to identify the factors associated with the academic performance of Grade 10 students during their First Quarter of school as well as the significant correlation between the factors and student academic performance in Mathematics. -/- Study Design: Descriptive Correlation Design. -/- Place and Duration of Study: The study was conducted at Agusan National High School in Cagayan de Or City's East 1 District during the school year: 2022 – 2023. -/- Methodology: The respondents (...) were Two hundred thirty-one (231) students in Grade 10 at Agusan National High School in Cagayan de Oro City's East 1 District. This study used a researcher-made questionnaire that underwent validity and reliability testing and the academic performance of the students. -/- Results: The results showed that students agree with routines related to mastering Mathematics at a high level. Furthermore, there is no correlation between student study habits and Mathematics performance in terms of self-confidence, but there is a substantial positive association between the student's study habits and performance in terms of attitude. The study habits and learning techniques used by students were found to be important determinants of how well they performed in Mathematics. The researcher strongly suggested using the enhancement plan in teaching Mathematics to Junior High school students. -/- Conclusion: Students have a very positive attitude toward their study habits when learning Mathematics. Students felt that studying and learning Mathematics was essential. Students' success and academic growth depend heavily on their Mathematics performance. It is essential for pupils to master and comprehend its concepts. Students' study habits in terms of attitudes have an impact on how they learn Mathematics. (shrink)

Cultural landscapes represent a complex category where the nature-culture dichotomy seem to not be able to unfold the main features and the profound relations that humans have with the environment. Drawing on ethnographic data collected in the saltpans of Se-ovlje (Slovene Istria) and Janubio (Lanzarote--Canary Islands) this article examines informant`s perceptions about the awareness of the importance and the enhancement of the holistic values of both saltpans, as well as the impacts and benefits of tourism. Comparing these perceptions about both (...) cultural landscapes, I try to suggest that the complex fruitfully relations between humans and nature in these saltpans are at odds with the neoliberal logic of nature which exploit and commoditize its resources depriving them of their respective agency. A sustainability to contrast the harmful activities of the market ought to be understood not as a simply isolation and fencing of nature for the sake of conservation, but as a preservation that need to foster the continuity of the deep interactions between human culture and non-human nature which are the core of the cultural landscapes. (shrink)

This essay discusses the continued importance that religion holds in African life, not only in terms of numbers of believers, but also regarding the varieties of religious experience and its links with politics and the “public sphere(s)”. Coinciding with the wave of democratization and economic liberalization efforts since about 1990, a notable growth of the public presence of religion and its political referents in Africa has been witnessed; alongside “development”, religion will remain a hot issue in the future political trajectory (...) of the continent. Its renewed presence in public spheres has also led to new understandings of what religion means and how it figures into both “world-making” and identity politics. This will prolong the challenges associated with the role and status of religion in the “secular state model” found in most African countries. Can these states, while “besieged” by believers, maintain neutrality among diverse worldviews, and if so, how? The paper discusses these issues in a general manner with reference to African examples, some taken from fieldwork by the author, and makes a philosophical argument for the development of a new kind of “secular state” that can respect the religious commitments of African populations. (shrink)

Close examination of the works of David Hume shows that his aim to explain the problem of evil is to attack natural theology and introduce it as a situation that is non-epistemological and unsystematic. So, contrary to what the majority of interpretations which typically express that he makes an argument against the existence of God, Hume wants to show that the statements of natural theology are rationally unprovable, and he does not want to totally decline them. As a matter (...) of fact, they ontologically exist, and are epistemologically out of human cognition. This article shows that the popular interpretation is false, and this would be done in two ways: the first is Hume’s statements about the cause of the world, and the second is Hume’s solutions for the problem of evil, that have mystical streaks. Based on these fact, it will be shown that Hume is not an atheist, but he is a mystical fideist. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the delegation of authority for the performance of the medical staff and its relationship to improving the quality of health care in Al-Shifa Medical Complex in the southern Palestinian governorates. Administrators, and technicians) with a total of 2150 employees, and the questionnaire was distributed to a stratified random sample of 330 employees, and 302 questionnaires were retrieved, with a rate of 91.5%. One of the most important results of the study was the existence of a (...) statistically significant relationship between delegation of authority and the quality of health care. One of the most important recommendations of the study was to strengthen the direction of senior management towards excellence in patient service, because the patient represents a fundamental focus in health services. (shrink)

This manuscript presents an English translation of the work titled “Begründung Einer Strengen Implikation” by the German logician and mathematician Wilhelm Ackermann (1896-1962), first published in June 1956.

At the opening of her article, Acker writes, "I am using this essay to do two things. To read a short passage from Philosophy in the Bedroom by the Marquis de Sade. To read one of his tales. The more that I write my own novels, the more it seems to me that to write is to read." The two main divisions in the text bear the following headings: "To write in order to lead the reader into a labyrinth from (...) which the reader cannot emerge without destroying the world" and "Reading a tale by de Sade: writing or reading whose only purpose is to destroy itself.". (shrink)

Estamos siendo testigos de grandes avances tecnológicos y, a la vez, de grandes desastres naturales y sociales que nos impulsan a plantearnos cuáles son las causas últimas de la degradación natural ecológica. El abuso en el uso de los recursos tal vez pueda tener relación con el abuso en el uso de la tecnología; incluso ser causa de la gran desigualdad social en el acceso a bienes necesarios para llevar una vida digna, raíz de muchos conflictos sociales. La ecología es (...) una disciplina científica, pero cada vez es más habitual ampararse en este término para lanzar opiniones o generar un debate de ideologías de índole catastrofista que no hacen más que generar malestar social sin visos de solución práctica. Las reflexiones sobre la ecología nos parece que deben plantearse de una forma interdisciplinar, pero no de cualquier manera, sino respetando el estatuto epistemológico de cada área del saber. Cuidar el método científico, en el ámbito científico; el filosófico, en el suyo propio; e incluso el teológico. El tema de nuestra relación con la naturaleza nos afecta tan íntimamente que casi todas las áreas del conocimiento pueden decir algo al respecto. En el presente trabajo comenzamos ese diálogo y presentamos las ideas básicas desde las que se podría plantear un modo de actuar humano respetuoso para con los demás hombres y los demás seres de la naturaleza, que mejore nuestro modo de vivir y evite más daños y perjuicios. A esto nos referimos cuando hablamos de “ética ambiental”. La ecología nos toca de cerca porque tiene que ver con el modo de habitar nuestro mundo y las relaciones que tenemos con los demás seres vivos y no vivos. A fin de poder delinear las líneas principales de una ética orientada al medioambiente es preciso, en primer lugar, conocer los datos científicos sobre el tema; en segundo lugar, analizar los problemas graves que se están detectando y comprender que muchas de sus causas todavía son desconocidas y precisan de un estudio más detenido; finalmente, es conveniente revisar las alternativas de solución que nos orienten a llevar una vida mejor, donde se sugieran modos de obrar que no nos cierren el camino hacia ese destino común que tenemos como seres humanos, y que integre al resto de criaturas porque no somos los únicos seres vivientes del planeta. La propuesta de una “ética ambiental” apunta a considerar un verdadero “ecologismo solidario”. (shrink)

Al final de su libro “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana señala que la nomología, explicación según las leyes de la naturaleza, requiere de una nomogonía, una consideración del origen de las leyes. Es decir, que el orden que observamos en el mundo natural requiere una instancia previa que ponga ese orden específico. Sabemos que desde la revolución científica la mejor manera de explicar dicha nomología ha sido mediante las matemáticas. Sin embargo, en las últimas décadas se han presentado algunas propuestas (...) basadas en modelos matemáticos que fundamentarían muchos aspectos de la realidad. Dos claros ejemplos provienen de Roger Penrose y Max Tegmark. Esto lleva a pensar en una posición no solo nomológica sino además nomogónica de la matemática. ¿Puede la Naturaleza estar fundada por las matemáticas como señalan algunos físico-matemáticos? Y en ese caso, ¿sería pertinente buscar una nomo-génesis de esta índole en la constitución de la conciencia? -/- At the end of his book “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana points out that nomology, explanation according to the laws of nature requires a nomogony, an account of the origin of the laws. This means that the order that we can observe in the natural World demands something prior to posit that specific order. Since the scientific revolution we know that the best way to explain that nomology has been through mathematics. Anyway, in recent decades a number of proposals based on mathematical models that found many aspects of reality has been offered. Two clear examples come from Roger Penrose and Max Tegmark. This drives us to think of a position of mathematics as not only nomological but also nomogonical. Can Nature be founded by mathematics as some physicists and mathematicians point out? And, in this case, would be relevant this kind of approach to search a nomo-genesis in the constitution of consciousness? (shrink)

Esta obra compila los estudios presentados en las I Jornadas de Filosofía del Instituto CEU de Humanidades Ángel Ayala y está prologada por Abelardo Lobato, O. P. Los filósofos tienen el deber de buscar y alcanzar la verdad apelando a las fuerzas de la razón, la cual, por cierto, no impide otras vías genuinas de conocimiento, como la fe. La búsqueda intelectual exige un trabajo de análisis que debe afinarse ante las obcecaciones que a menudo se interponen en el horizonte (...) de la existencia humana. En no pocos momentos de la historia ha habido claudicaciones generalizadas ante esa búsqueda, olvidos más o menos conscientes de que las verdades se alcanzan si se mantiene la esperanza de sabiduría y el amor a ella. El relativismo y el escepticismo se presentan casi como el polo opuesto de esa esperanza y ese amor; como una consecuencia de la “con-fusión” cultural, de las mentiras interesadas y de la desidia moral de algunas sociedades. La nuestra, la europea occidental, es una de ellas. El relativismo afecta al modo de pensar y de comportarse del hombre y es habitual que le lleve por vericuetos que a la postre terminan dañándole a él y a sus congéneres. En este libro se analizan algunos errores que han llevado a suscribir las tesis del relativismo y a rechazar la posibilidad de dar con algunas verdades comunes para todos. La obra tiene dos partes, una histórica y otra temática. Las páginas con enfoque histórico estudian las tesis que sobre el relativismo han mantenido algunos pensadores o corrientes de la filosofía. De su lectura se puede extraer la conclusión de que el fenómeno del relativismo es tan viejo y tan actual como el propio hombre y su apertura inteligente a la verdad. Filósofos de la época antigua de la talla de Protágoras, Pirrón o los “Académicos” coetáneos de San Agustín; modernos como Descartes; contemporáneos como Wittgenstein o Kuhn han dejado huellas que luego abrieron el camino hacia un régimen de pensamiento en que el hombre abandona la posibilidad de admitir verdades universales. Algunos argumentos favorables al relativismo —y, más aún, algunas actitudes “propedéuticas” de él— se han ido instalando culturalmente hasta consolidarse de manera cada vez más indiscutida. La segunda parte analiza el relativismo de forma temática, como un asunto abordable desde las diversas ramas del saber filosófico. Así, se tratan las repercusiones que tiene esta forma de pensamiento en la pragmática, la lógica, la estética o la religión, y se intentan desenmascarar los tópicos y falsos argumentos que justifican un comportamiento ético o religioso “abierto a todas las opciones”. (shrink)

En este libro, el autor examina un amplio abanico temático y de fuentes en el campo moral y filosófico. La propuesta se concentra en delinear la concepción de un humanismo responsable en el seno de la comunidad. Despejar el camino hacia esa meta, irse abriendo paso teóricamente entre las nociones y corrientes que el pensamiento ha hilado a lo largo de los siglos sobre la cuestión, dialogar con ellas y presentar una visión que nos interpela por su novedad y actualidad (...) es su gran contribución. (shrink)

La afectividad humana es compleja y muchas veces se ha cometido el error de considerarla como desligada de otras facultades, especialmente de la inteligencia, como si fueran actos completamente separados e independientes. Las manifestaciones afectivas son de diverso grado, ya en mi tesis doctoral mostré la conveniencia de hablar al menos de tres dimensiones afectivas, cada una de ellas según su relación más o menos directa con las facultades superiores y con la persistencia de su presencia a lo largo de (...) nuestra vida. -/- La primera dimensión trataría de los afectos inferiores, más conocidos como pasiones o emociones. Su característica principal consiste en ser intensas, pasajeras y causar inmutaciones corporales en nosotros. La segunda trata de los afectos intermedios, donde intervienen más directamente tanto la voluntad como la inteligencia. Son más continuos y estables en el tiempo, y suelen presentar aspectos positivos o negativos desde un punto de vista ético; son los sentimientos. Así, la amistad es un sentimiento, pero también lo son los celos o el rencor. Finalmente, la tercera dimensión afectiva está dada por los afectos superiores del hombre, son los que se encuentran tan radicalmente asentados en nosotros que, de alguna manera, indican nuestra forma de ser y ordenan y desordenan los afectos de niveles inferiores. Aquí estaríamos hablando, por ejemplo, del amor espiritual, aquél que lleva a dar la vida por algo alguien. Y también de la desesperación que impulsa al hombre a la sensación de vacío existencial que cierra su horizonte y muchas veces lo lleva por la senda de la depresión psicológica. -/- En este estudio nos centramos en los afectos de la primera dimensión: los afectos inferiores. (shrink)

En 1968 Raquel Carson comenzaba una revolución en el pensamiento, quizá una de las de mayor peso en la actualidad. En su libro "La primavera silenciosa" acusaba del deterioro ambiental al poder ilimitado del ser humano. La creencia surgida en la modernidad de que todo lo que el hombre decidía era en sí mismo lo mejor por haber sido fruto de una voluntad libérrima, daba primacía y legitimidad absoluta a su acción sobre la naturaleza. Surgieron con gran fuerza numerosos grupos (...) ecologistas que adoptaron un pensamiento que responde al nombre de "ecología profunda" o "Deep Ecology" descrito por primera vez por Arme Naess en un artículo publicado por la revista Inquiry y titulado "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement". Los principios que proponía este movimiento (Naess 1984) pueden ser resumidos en ocho grandes puntos: 1) la vida de los seres no humanos es un valor en sí: 2) la riqueza y la diversidad de estas formas de vida son también valores en sí; 3) los seres humanos no pueden intervenir de manera destructiva en la vida; 4) a este respecto, la intervención humana actual es eminentemente excesiva; 5) por consiguiente, las reglas de juego deben ser radicalmente modificadas; 6) esta modificación radical debe hacerse tanto a nivel de las estructuras económicas como de las estructuras ideológicas y culturales; 7) a nivel ideológico, el cambio principal consiste en apreciar más la calidad de la vida que el goce de los bienes materiales; 8) las personas que acepten estos principios tienen la obligación de contribuir, directa o indirectamente a la realización de los cambios fundamentales que aquellos implican. (shrink)

El estudio acerca de la influencia de las pasiones en el voluntario libre ha sido recurrente en la tradición tomista. Sin embargo, las causas de los dos efectos psicológicos de la intentio volitiva mencionados por Tomás de Aquino, la redundantia y la distractio, pasaron desapercibidas, y podrían aclarar algunos comportamientos consecuencia de la dinámica de las pasiones del hombre. La acción de la intentio volitiva originada por los afectos, al alcanzar cierto grado de intensidad, puede llegar a sobrepasar el control (...) de la voluntad y la inteligencia. Además, otro punto original de esta temática es que, a la par que el influjo de “abajo hacia arriba” (pasiones hacia la voluntad) —algo ya mencionado por Aristóteles cuando habla de la intemperancia y por los medievales en el estudio de la voluntad—, también puede detectarse otro de “arriba hacia abajo” (influjos afectivos superiores que influyen en la inteligencia —conocimiento afectivo⎯ y ésta sobre la voluntad), de tal manera que cierto tipo de concentraciones psicológicas hacen que la persona deje de tener sensaciones somáticas hasta producirse en él evasiones temporales, trances inconscientes y efectos extremos similares. Finalmente, desde el punto de vista de la Historia de la Filosofía, este trabajo también muestra que ha habido un olvido en el estudio de esta faceta volitiva de la intentio, ya que se ha estudiado sobre todo su aspecto ético, pero sin relación con la intentio cognoscitiva (“intencionalidad”). En cualquier caso, las tesis sobre la intentio y sus efectos muestran cómo es preciso rebasar el estudio del ámbito natural-biológico para completarlo con el ámbito personal-cultural. (shrink)

El presente libro constituye una propuesta para la educación en este siglo XXI. El autor entiende la educación como un proceso de humanización: la educación es una acción que posibilita que el ser humano pueda vivir cada vez más humanamente. A lo largo de estas páginas, insiste en que la educación se refiere al ser humano que es persona, lo que significa que tiene un valor infinito, que es un ser libre, autónomo y responsable, que la educación no tiene como (...) objetivo centrar al individuo sobre sí mismo, sino descentrarlo, para que sea capaz de abrirse hacia los demás. hacia la sociedad, porque la educación debe suscitar una sociedad de personas, una verdadera humanidad. El autor entiende, además, que cualquier intento de reducir la educación a una simple transmisión de conocimientos o a una mera información. es un verdadero atentado contra el ser humano. No existe razón alguna que pueda Justificar el descuido en esta tarea y, menos aún, transformarla en una imposición arbitraria por motivos sociales. políticos. económicos y religiosos. (shrink)

Desde la consideración de Tomás de Aquino del conocimiento por connaturalidad, "el conocimiento que aporta a la inteligencia más datos que los puramente racionales, especialmente todos los datos proporcionados por la afectividad", es posible hacer un acercamiento integral a la realidad y establecer una relación con otras áreas de sabiduría y sus objetos de estudio. Esto ayuda a confrontar algunos problemas filosóficos reales, como la pérdida de la visión holística de la realidad, el reduccionismo epistemológico y el relativismo gnoseológico. Recordar (...) el estudio iniciado en la primera parte del siglo XX por tomistas bien conocidos sobre la connaturalidad ayudaría a comprender mejor la realidad y el ser humano, y facilitaría el diálogo entre Filosofía, Ciencia y Teología sobre temas como Ecología, Estética o Mística. (shrink)

Uno de los temas fundamentales de la filosofía realista es la intentio. Este concepto surgió en la filosofía árabe a partir de la idea aristotélica que explica la posibilidad del alma de apropiarse de las formas de las cosas. La intentio es el vínculo referencial entre la realidad y el intelecto en el acto de conocer. En la primera parte del artículo se hace una revisión conceptual del término con especial énfasis en Avicena y Averroes; y en la segunda parte (...) se explica la idea de la intentio en dos filósofos tomistas contemporáneos. El objetivo principal de este estudio es volver a subrayar la conexión real que se establece entre el sujeto cognoscente y las cosas de la realidad. Se trata de una de las genuinas características del conocimiento realista en oposición al conocimiento inmanentista. (shrink)

La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...) ordinarios de conocimiento que nos revelan aspectos a los que no podemos llegar de otra forma. (shrink)

I shall in this paper, assume three basic moments. My principal objective is to show that belief in reincarnation from the Igbo narrative is logically coherent with simultaneous subsistence in the ancestral realm. In the first, I engage the question of metaphysics from a socio-hermeneutic perspective to decipher its position as characteristically Igbo; in the second, I propose a scale of eschatology and juxtapose it with the Christian schema such that, I exploit my provision of an Igbo anthroposophy to show (...) how a unique individual exists that is still, the reincarnation of an ancestor. In the final analysis, I demonstrate the uniqueness of the eschatological schemes of the Igbos and Christians, in an effort to interpretatively spell out their fundamental differences and apparent similarities. With this in mind, I am pledged by intellectual troth to portraying the consistence of individual haecceity and reincarnation, making use of Igbo anthroposophy as my operative argumentatory legerdemain. (shrink)

Trong thế giới cạnh tranh thời đại số (“digital”), phương tiện kỹ thuật cung cấp nhiều thuận lợi cho việc sản xuất nội dung. Tuy thế, sự phong phú nội dung và đầu tư cho xúc tiến, tiếp thị gia tăng cũng lại khiến cho quá trình cạnh tranh tìm một chỗ đứng cho sản phẩm trở nên hết sức gian nan.Sản phẩm gần đây của nhóm nghiên cứu, chuyên khảo [1] của AISDL, ra đời sau những bài học gian (...) khó thu lượm được từ trước. Như thế, ý thức của mọi người về mức độ thách thức trong việc “chạm tới” người tiêu dùng. (shrink)

One of the oldest questions in science and philosophy is whether reality is fundamentally discrete, or fundamentally continuous. In this short essay I show that this question should first be classified into two main categories. 1) Intrinsic existence, 2) Behavioral existence. I show that the first category should be continuous by definition, while the second category could probably be either continuous or discrete.

Bourdieu argues that political inclination is dependent upon one's position in the academic field, and not vice versa. Distinguishing between three hierarchically arranged fields of power, he places the academic field in a middling position between the political and social fields. He posits a hierarchy of the faculties, in which those at the top are closer to political power. Bourdieu supports his argument using empirical data gathered through publicly available sources, presented in tabular form. University professors, Bourdieu argues, are (...) subordinate in the field of power to managers of industry and business, but are nonetheless "holders of an institutionalized form of cultural capital," and therefore culturally dominant with respect to writers and artists (36). These academics, especially those at the top of the social hierarchy, present higher percentages of "indices of social integration and respectability" (36-37). According to Bourdieu, two antagonistic principles of hierarchization are at play in the university field: "the social hierarchy, corresponding to capital inherited and economic and political capital . (shrink)