This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though (...) they can be overridden, and (ii) that this is best explained by a view that takes these factors to correlate with rights. The second aim is to show that the truth of rights contributionism matters for normative ethics. More specifically, it is argued that rights contributionism clears the way for deontologists to justify the pre-theoretically plausible verdict that we have a duty to save the greater number in so-called Taurek scenarios – scenarios in which we have to choose between saving either a greater or a smaller number of different people. The chapter offers a novel and distinctively deontological explanation of this verdict that is based on the assumption that everyone has a pro tanto right to be saved in a Taurek scenario. (shrink)

Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. First of all, it is based (...) on the classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how we can arrive at moral judgements. (shrink)

A mais de um século que o fenômeno da automatização dos meios de trabalho vem criando grande apreensão entre nós. Afinal, seríamos todos substituídos por máquinas em algum futuro próximo? Seriam todas as formas de trabalho automatizáveis? Tais questionamentos vêm levantando uma série de críticas pela comunidade engajada em ética de máquina e ética da inteligência artificial. Contudo, gostaria de nesta breve resenha, atacar este problema por outro ângulo, afinal, podemos criticar tal fenômeno de uma ampla variedade de pontos de (...) vista. Gostaria de convidar o leitor a avaliar pela seguinte perspectiva: e se a automação dos meios de trabalho for algo benéfico? E se a emancipação humana realmente venha através de nosso desenvolvimento tecnológico? Se a resposta for sim, por quê quê ainda trabalhamos tanto? Acredito que se os processos de automação forem aplicados a pontos chave de nossa estrutura social, podemos vir a emancipar o indivíduo de uma realidade onde realmente trabalhamos por motivo nenhum, inutilmente. Se abandonarmos a cultura do consumismo, a cultura que atrela o trabalho e o consumo a moralidade, uma alternativa mais próspera seria adotarmos a cultura que abraça o valor da autonomia e liberdade do indivíduo humano. (shrink)

The discussion develops the view that public justification in Rawls’s political liberalism, in one of its roles, is actualist in fully enfranchising actual reasonable citizens and fundamental in political liberalism’s order of justification. I anchor this reading in the political role Rawls accords to general reflective equilibrium, and examine in its light the relationship between public justification, pro tanto justification, political values, full justification, the wide view of public political culture and salient public reason intuitions. This leaves us with (...) the question of how a more plausible, post-Rawlsian political liberalism should understand the commitment to discursive respect and robust discursive equality that is reflected in its view of actualist and fundamental public justification. (shrink)

Tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como desde una perspectiva práctica, el fenómeno de la "estetización" no parece ser portador de buenos augurios. En el ámbito teórico, la estetización ha sido vinculada con la crisis de los discursos orientados en términos de verdad, mientras que en el terreno práctico, ella ha sido asociada a ciertos procesos culturales que conducirían a la debacle de los principios normativos. Dejando de lado la problemática teórica, el presente trabajo se concentra en el (...) debate en torno al fenómeno práctico de la estetización de la política. En primer lugar, nos remontamos a la historia de la condena filosófica de la estetización de la esfera política para ocuparnos luego, en un segundo momento, de algunas posiciones esteticistas y antiesteticistas de finales del siglo XX. Posteriormente, procuramos avanzar en una redescripción de esta problemática que nos permita rescatar un sentido productivo de lo estético para el pensamiento político. Para esto último, nuestro trabajo se apoya en las reflexiones de la actual coeditora de la Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Juliane Rebentisch. Tomando como parámetro algunos de los supuestos de sus investigaciones, aquí intentaremos demostrar hasta qué punto la estetización de la vida política puede contribuir al desarrollo de una concepción renovada de esta última. Both from a theoretical and from a practical perspective, the phenomenon of "aestheticization" does not seem to anticipate anything particularly good. On a theoretical level, it has been linked to the crisis of discourse-oriented in terms of truth, while in the practical, has been associated with certain cultural processes that lead to the the collapse of the normative principles. Leaving aside the theoretical issues, this paper focuses on the debate on the phenomenon of the aestheticization of the political culture. First, it goes back to the history of philosophical condemnation of the aestheticization of the political sphere. In a second time, he deals with some conceptions of the late twentieth century. Subsequently, the paper seeks to advance a redescription of this problem that allows rescue a productive sense of aesthetics for political thought. For the latter, our article is based on the reflections of Juliane Rebentisch and attempts to show how the aestheticization of political life can help to develop a new concept of the same. (shrink)

Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para (...) entender el concepto de acción intencional. Esta concepción causal de la justificación y de la acción intencional no se ve expuesta al problema de las cadenas causales desviadas que afecta a las teorías causales ortodoxas ni a la amenaza deI epifenomenismo de las propiedades mentales. -/- Both causal and non-causal action theories take the justification relation to be a non-causal, purely conceptual or logical relation between reasons and action. According to causal theorists, intentional action has to satisfy, besides the justification condition, an additional and independent causal condition. In this paper it is held, however, that justification is already a causal concept, so that there is no need to resort to an independent causal requirement in order to understand the concept of intentional action. This causal view of justification and intentional action does not face either the problem of wayward causalchains which infects orthodox causal theories or the threat of epiphenomenalism of mental properties. (shrink)

Resumen: Tanto Perry Anderson como Alex Callinicos y Terry Eagleton han desarrollado un trabajo cultural y filosófico sobresaliente. Sin embargo, los tres han malinterpretado la obra de Ludwig Wittgenstein. La concepción de la filosofía de Wittgenstein no está en tensión con la filosofía marxista en el modo en el que ellos lo sugirieron y Wittgenstein no cometió los errores que le atribuyeron Anderson, Callinicos e Eagleton. Los marxistas se beneficiarían si consideraran más seriamente la obra de Wittgenstein porque ello (...) los ayudaría a comprender más claramente la naturaleza de los problemas epistemológicos y metafísicos como así también los ayudaría a fortalecer y complementar sus propias concepciones de las confusiones filosóficas. En este trabajo examinaré los errores de sus interpretaciones de Wittgenstein y espero también poder proporcionar alguna indicación de las razones por las cuales Wittgenstein es considerado por muchos como el filósofo más importante del siglo XX. (shrink)

Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la (...) corporalidad y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’. -/- Transhumanism and philosophical posthumanism have paid special attention to human corporeality in relation to technological breakthroughs. This article begins by pointing out how the two movements differ significantly about the inheritance of humanism. Subsequently, the transhumanist notion of ‘morphological freedom’ is addressed from the proposals of More, Sandberg, and Bostrom. Then, paradigmatic cases of body modifications through cybernetic implants are considered. Finally, the issues of identity, corporeality, and the disagreement between the two currents regarding ‘mind uploading’ are problematized. (shrink)

For Machiavelli, religion is valued not by the importance of its founder, the content of its teachings, the truth of its dogmas or the significance of its rites. It is not the essence of what really matters but its function and importance for collective life. Religion teaches to recognize and respect political rules through the religious commandments. This collective norm could assume the outer coercive aspect of the military discipline as well as the inner persuasive character of civic and moral (...) education for the production of collective consensus. -/- Para Maquiavel, o que confere valor a uma religião não é a importância de seu fundador, o conteúdo dos ensinamentos, a verdade dos dogmas ou a significação dos mistérios e ritos. Importa não a essência da religião e sim sua função e importância para a vida coletiva. A religião ensina a reconhecer e a respeitar as regras políticas a partir do mandamento religioso. Essa norma coletiva pode assumir tanto o aspecto coercivo exterior da disciplina militar ou da autoridade política quanto o caráter persuasivo interior da educação moral e cívica para a produção do consenso coletivo. (shrink)

The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, (...) is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge. (shrink)

El trabajo aborda, desde una perspectiva marxista, un importante y complejo problema teórico asociado a la supuesta falsedad de toda ideología. Se trata del problema de la veracidad de la valoración, calificado más de una vez como de imposible solución, dado el vínculo de los juicios valorativos con las necesidades, intereses y otros fenómenos subjetivos de la conciencia humana. La negación de la existencia de la verdad valorativa conduce inevitablemente a su negación en la ideología, compuesta fundamentalmente por juicios valorativos (...) y, por lo tanto, sirve de sustento gnoseológico a las diversas variantes de la teoría de la desideologización. El enfoque crítico de estas consideraciones se desarrolla en el artículo sobre la base del análisis de la dialéctica de lo general y lo particular en la verdad valorativa, haciendo énfasis, ante todo, en la especificidad de esta última en comparación con cualquier otra verdad del conocimiento. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In (...) the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Se tratan algunas de las discusiones vertidas en el coloquio Lippmann de 1938, evento que puede considerarse con los datos actuales como la escena inaugural del neoliberalismo. Se muestra tanto la heterogeneidad de dos grupos de pensadores que marcarán posteriormente la línea alemana y norteamericana de pensadores neoliberales. Al mismo tiempo se muestran algunas de sus coincidencias principales en torno a una idea de democracia para el mercado.

O uso dos nomes próprios sem nenhum outro indexador externo aos seus portadores expressa uma escolha narrativa em Úrsula (1859), romance de Maria Firmina dos Reis (1822-1917). Esse uso permite introduzir uma concepção de maternidade como condição para historicidade em contexto patriarcal e escravocrata. A autora não assina a novela, senão sob a descrição indefinida de “uma maranhense”, e, como pretendo demonstrar, essa indefinição é consistente com a vindicação da universalidade na narrativa, em que a autoria de uma história não (...) deve influenciar o sentido da denúncia da escravidão e do patriarcado. O uso dos nomes como descrições, em contraste, desempenha a função normativa de condenar a escravidão e o patriarcado e de condicionar uma historicidade. Primeiro, farei uma breve consideração histórica e biográfica, buscando contextualizar Úrsula, tanto na história do Brasil como na história da literatura do Brasil, com o intuito de situar a natureza abolicionista do texto. Em seguida, tratarei da relação de coextensão entre natureza e liberdade na determinação desse abolicionismo. Depois, chamarei a atenção para o sentido da escolha narrativa pelo uso dos nomes como descrições definidas. Por fim, apresentarei como esse uso permite à autora introduzir uma noção de historicidade, a partir do atrelamento do abolicionismo à função materna. Este último passo é o que constitui o ineditismo e a potência feminista do texto de Firmina, sob o manto da prosa romântica de folhetim. (shrink)

Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of (...) conceptual improvement. (shrink)

I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. I argue that the salient (...) probabilities are the agent’s sincere, sane, subjective probabilities, and that this thesis is relevant whether your risk-taking pertains to the probability of killing a person or to the probability that the person you kill is not liable to be killed. I then defend the view’s relevance to intentional killing; show how it differs from an account of blameworthiness; and explain its significance for all-things-considered justification and justification under uncertainty. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to questions about, and criticisms of, my article “Towardan African Moral Theory” that have been put forth by Allen Wood, Mogobe Ramose, Douglas Farland and Jason van Niekerk. The major topicsI address include: what bearing the objectivity of moral value should have on cross-cultural moral differences between Africans and Westerners; whether a harmonious relationship is a good candidate for having final moral value; whether consequentialism exhausts the proper way to respond to the value of a (...) harmonious relationship; what makes a moral theory count as “African”; how the existing literature on African ethics relates to the aim of analytically developing and defending a single foundational moral principle; whether the intuitions I appeal to ground an African moral theory are pro tanto rightmakers or general moral truths; whether the moral theory I defend can capture pro tanto rightness; and whether the best interpretation of African ethics is self-regarding (deeming the only basic moral reason for action to be that it would develop one's own valuable human nature) or other-regarding (holding that a certain kind of harmonious relationship between individuals could ground a basic moral reason for action) . (shrink)

Durante le celebrazioni per il centenario della nascita di Primo Levi del 2019 anche importanti riviste cattoliche, come "Civiltà Cattolica" e "Vita e Pensiero", sono tornate a riflettere sull'opera, il pensiero e la testimonianza dello scrittore torinese. Questo contributo cerca di ricostruire pertanto la ricezione di Primo Levi nel mondo cattolico . Dopo un breve inquadramento storico del complicato rapporto tra Chiesa e Shoah, si evidenzieranno le strutture interpretative che hanno caratterizzato la lettura delle opere di Levi in ambito cattolico (...) in un arco temporale che va dal 1963 al 2019. Letture che operano un'interessante movimento di appropriazione non privo tuttavia di importanti problematicità che meritano di essere evidenziate e meditate. La parte finale del saggio ricostruirà l'ateismo di Primo Levi, mettendo in luce come il rapporto tra Primo Levi e la cultura cattolica sia caratterizzato tanto da comunanze fondamentali, quanto da una distanza irriducibile. (shrink)

En On the Origin of Species Darwin distingue explícitamente entre tres tipos de selección: la selección natural, la artificial y la sexual. En este trabajo, a partir de un estudio más sistemático que historiográfico, se intenta encontrar la relación entre estos tres tipos de selección en la obra de Darwin. Si bien la distinción entre estos distintos mecanismos es de suma importancia en la obra de Darwin, la tesis de este trabajo es que tanto la selección artificial como la (...) sexual no son mecanismos distintos de la selección natural. Particularmente se sostiene que la selección artificial y la sexual son casos de la natural, y por esto sirven para su contrastación. (shrink)

El republicanismo, tanto como el liberalismo y el comunitarismo, comprende un amplio espectro de enfoques y concepciones en constante evolución. Por lo que al referirnos a estas corrientes teóricas decidimos adoptar algunas teorías o enfoques como puntos de referencia para luego indagar sobre las diferencias específicas de cada enfoque y sus respectivos debates internos. Así, si quisiéramos presentar el liberalismo igualitario lo haríamos a través del estudio de la teoría de la justicia rawlsiana y los debates subsecuentes que la (...) toman como referencia. Del mismo modo, si quisiéramos averiguar qué propone el neorepublicanismo, haríamos bien en acercarnos a él a través de la teoría republicana de Philip Pettit. (shrink)

Selection against embryos that are predisposed to develop disabilities is one of the less controversial uses of embryo selection technologies. Many bio-conservatives argue that while the use of ESTs to select for non-disease-related traits, such as height and eye-colour, should be banned, their use to avoid disease and disability should be permitted. Nevertheless, there remains significant opposition, particularly from the disability rights movement, to the use of ESTs to select against disability. In this article we examine whether and why the (...) state could be justified in restricting the use of ESTs to select against disability. We first outline the challenge posed by proponents of ‘liberal eugenics’. Liberal eugenicists challenge those who defend restrictions on the use of ESTs to show why the use of these technologies would create a harm of the type and magnitude required to justify coercive measures. We argue that this challenge could be met by adverting to the risk of harms to future persons that would result from a loss of certain forms of cognitive diversity. We suggest that this risk establishes a pro tanto case for restricting selection against some disabilities, including dyslexia and Asperger's syndrome. (shrink)

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug (...) into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts. (shrink)

En este artículo se desarrolla una reflexión acerca del suicidio hetero-referido o no-personal. Se lo analiza en tanto forma de voluntad e instrumento de presión política que tensiona críticamente los modos en que se organiza la vida en nuestras sociedades. Se indaga en el potencial de contra-soberanía que supone en tanto intenta desactivar el poder al que se enfrenta. Se tematiza cierta ética de la pasividad que surge en esta acción y se examina la lógica que recorre el (...) acto de darse muerte. Finalmente, el artículo contribuye a complejizar el debate en torno al suicidio hetero-referido en tanto se destacan sus límites y potencialidades, así como las paradojas que plantean a nuestras democracias liberales las diversas demandas de grupos minorizados. (shrink)

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo uma apresentação da proposta de Charles Kielkopf, de tradução da lógica deôntica standard em uma lógica normal alética e de seusresultados quanto à construção de um sistema de lógica deôntica que capture conceitos eprincípios kantianos como necessidade causal e as formulações do Imperativo Categórico acerca do Reino da Natureza e do Reino dos Fins. Uma vez que este processo resulta em uma interpretação de aspectos da filosofia kantiana, optou-se inicialmente por uma apresentação em linhas (...) gerais destas concepções e, tendo em vista as dificuldades referentes a aplicabilidade de um processo de tradução entre princípios deônticos e ônticos,fez-se necessária também uma exposição acerca do problema das barreiras inferenciais, bem como de sua conseqüência mais imediata, a saber, o Dilema de Jörgensen. Num segundo momento, também foi feita uma caracterização dos sistemas modais normais, tanto deônticos quanto aléticos, bem como da noção de tradução entre lógicas e dos modelos de Dawson. O capítulo final consiste justamente num exame crítico da proposta de Kielkopf, o qual faz uso dos modelos de Dawson para desenvolver uma lógica deôntica a partir do sistema lógico K1. Tais modelos de Dawson permitem a definição de uma lógica deôntica em termos de modalidades aléticas iteradas, com o que este modelo constitui-se em uma maneira de evitar os problemas referentes às barreiras inferenciais. O desenvolvimento de uma alternativa para a atribuição de um status lógico a concepções deônticas não constitui,contudo, o aspecto inovador desta proposta, tal aspecto encontra-se justamente na utilização por Kielkopf, de seu modelo formal como uma ferramenta para a investigação de concepções filosóficas, no caso, as concepções kantianas já citadas. -/- The current dissertation has as its main objective an exposition and critical analysis of Charles Kielkopf's translation of the Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) into a normal alethic logic, and the resulting construction of a system of deontic logic that captures Kantian fundamental concepts and principles such as the concept of causal necessity and the formulations of the Categorical Imperative concerning Kingdom of Nature and Kingdom of Ends. Since this process results in an interpretation of aspects of the Kantian philosophy, it has been chosen,initially, a presentation in general lines of these concepts and, considering the difficulties regarding the applicability of a translation process between deontic and ontic principles, it was done necessary also an exhibition concerning the problem of the inferential barriers, as well as of his more immediate consequence, i. e., Jörgensen's Dilemma. In a secon dmoment, it was also made a characterization of normal modal systems, deontic ones andalethic ones, as well as of the notions of translation between logics and of Dawson modelling. The final chapter consists of a critical examination of Kielkopf's proposal, which uses Dawson modelling to develop a deontic logic based on the alethic system K1. Such Dawson modelling allows the definition of a deontic modalities in terms of iterated alethic modalities,therefore this model constitutes a way of avoiding the problems regarding inferential barriers. The development of an alternative for attribution of logical status to deontic concepts doesn't constitute, however, in an innovative aspect of this proposal, such aspect can be founded inthe use made by Kielkopf of his formal model as a tool for the investigation of philosophical concepts, such as the Kantian concepts already mentioned. (shrink)

Este artigo discute o uso de simulações de computador em Epistemologia(Epistemologia Computacional). O objetivo o artigo é fundamentar e discu-tir a ideia de uma Epistemologia Computacional, além de apresentar umexemplo de estudo nesse campo. Na Introdução, discuto as objeções maiscomuns aos métodos da Epistemologia Tradicional e à proposta de Quine deuma Epistemologia Naturalizada. Argumento que a Epistemologia Compu-tacional não está sujeita a nenhuma destas objeções. Na Seção 1, apresentouma revisão bibliográfica dos estudos em Epistemologia Computacional(tanto em Epistemologia individualista quanto (...) em Epistemologia Social) ediscuto a estrutura geral destes estudos. Na Seção 2, apresento alguns resul-tados de um estudo em Epistemologia Computacional que realizei em minha tese de doutorado. -/- ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology. (shrink)

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot (...) have these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory. (shrink)

There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one’s mental states, independently of whether those attitudes are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive (...) set of requirements that mandate or prohibit certain combinations of attitudes, and it’s in virtue of violating these requirements that incoherent agents are irrational. I think the standard view is mistaken. The goal of this paper is to explain why, and to motivate an alternative account: rather than corresponding to a set of law-like requirements, structural rationality should be seen as corresponding to a distinctive kind of pro tanto rational pressure—i.e. something that comes in degrees, having both magnitude and direction. Something similar is standardly assumed to be true of substantive rationality. On the resulting picture, each dimension of rational evaluation is associated with a distinct kind of rational pressure—substantive rationality with (what I call) justificatory pressure and structural rationality with attitudinal pressure. The former is generated by one’s reasons while the latter is generated by one’s attitudes. Requirements turn out to be at best a footnote in the theory of rationality. (shrink)

El principio de seguridad jurídica tiene, como una de sus manifestaciones características, dentro del Estado de Derecho, la fuerza de cosa juzgada (res iudicata) que se atribuye a las sentencias o resoluciones judiciales equivalentes firmes, y que implica tanto su impugnabilidad como su potencial influencia en litigios posteriores que guarden una conexión con el asunto ya resuelto en firme. Sin embargo, es posible que estas decisiones judiciales firmes de jueces nacionales, por diversas causas (error, omisión, interpretación manifiestamente contraria, etc.) (...) vulneren el Derecho de la Unión Europea y, por tanto, afecten tanto a su primacía como a su efectividad en sus relaciones con los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales. El Tribunal de Justicia ha tenido oportunidad de enfrentarse al dilema de ponderar el principio de fuerza de cosa juzgada con las primacía y efectividad del Derecho de la Unión en diversas sentencias. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar una aproximación y revisar la jurisprudencia más importante al respecto hasta la actualidad. (shrink)

Recently, Jardas _et al_ have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas _et al_. I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as powerful as the ones discussed by Jardas _et al._.

Advances in science and technology have added to our insights into the vulnerabilities of human agency as well as to the methods of exploiting them. This has raised the stakes for efforts to clarify the concept and ethics of manipulation. Among these efforts, Robert Noggle’s influencer-centered account of manipulation has been most significant. He defines manipulative acts as those whereby an agent intentionally influences a recipient’s attitudes so that they do not conform as closely as they otherwise would to the (...) pertinent norms and ideals endorsed by the influencer. This provides a relatively simple and in many ways clear definition of manipulation. It sidesteps thorny debates about autonomy, freedom, or practical rationality. It also promises to reveal a conceptual parallel between manipulating and lying, and thus to explain why manipulation is pro tanto wrong. In one respect, however, the account remains ambiguous: It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, it requires that influencers’ beliefs about what is ideal for their recipients to be grounded in some effort on the part of the influencer to identify with or take on the role of her recipient. This paper explains this ambiguity. It argues that influencer-centrism cannot remain indifferent to the validity of an agent’s beliefs about the ideal state of the recipient and provide an identification requirement that would render the whole account plausible and sufficiently determinate. (shrink)

O presente trabalho apresenta um breve panorama dos resultados parciais de pesquisa acerca de experiências de leitura, iniciadas no curso de Mestrado em Educação e desenvolvida no doutorado em Letras. A partir do estudo de aspectos específicos do mito literário de Don Juan, discute-se a experiência de leitura, enquanto categoria de referência para o processo de formação de leitores. Para tanto, evidenciam-se sentidos nos textos literários selecionados norteadores de outras aberturas para o entendimento tanto do mito literário, em (...) contextos diferenciados, como de experiências de leitura e escrita. A representação do não-leitor pelo mito através da categoria construída com a análise dos dados fornecidos pelo trabalho de campo, “experiências donjuanescas de leitura”, permitiu a reavaliação do valor negativo normalmente dado pela escola aos jovens que não apresentam experiências de leitura de acordo com as expectativas do tipo de leitor idealizado. Acrescente-se ainda que a análise do comportamento de busca no mito sugeriu tomá-lo como uma das possibilidades de tradução de um modo de se relacionar com o conhecimento, evidenciando a vitalidade desse mito literário e do seu estudo para a formação que lida com a Internet na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the non-coercive ways in which researchers can use knowledge about the decision-making tendencies of potential participants in order to motivate them to consent to research enrollment. We identify which modes of influence preserve respect for participants’ autonomy and which disrespect autonomy, and apply the umbrella term of manipulation to the latter. We then apply our analysis to a series of cases adapted from the experiences of clinical researchers in order to develop a framework for thinking (...) through the ethics of manipulating people into research participation. All manipulation disrespects autonomy and is therefore pro tanto wrong. However, only deceptive manipulation invalidates the consent that results from it. Use of the other forms of manipulation can be permissible, but only if the outcome of using manipulation is sufficiently good and if the research cannot be carried out using ethically preferable means to obtain consent. (shrink)

A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience. However, this view entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also justified. Thus, either a) civil disobedience is never justified or b) uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified. Since a) is implausible, we should accept b). I respond to the objection that this ignores the fact (...) that civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: nonviolence, publicity, the acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I then show that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility and that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is justifiable in but only in unfavorable conditions. (shrink)

This chapter investigates different ways that pro tanto reasons bearing on our options can compete with one another in order to determine the overall normative status of those options. It argues for two key claims: (i) any theory of this competition must include a distinct role for reasons against, in addition to reasons for, and (ii) any theory must allow for comparative verdicts about how strongly supported the options are by the reasons, rather than simply which options are permissible (...) or required. A simple balancing account and an account based on a distinction between requiring and justifying reasons are rejected, and a new account giving a distinct role for reasons against is introduced. (shrink)

Laura Valentini’s novel theory, the Agency-Respect View, says that we have a fundamental moral duty to honor other people’s convictions, at least pro tanto and under certain conditions. I raise doubts that such a duty exists indeed and that informative conditions have been specified. The questions that Valentini faces here have a parallel in Kant’s moral philosophy, viz. the question of why one has a duty to value the other’s humanity and the question of how to specify the maxim (...) of one’s action. Additionally, I discuss the concept of a social convention and Valentini’s use of it. (shrink)

Con el método de las letras numeradas se podrá construir un robot con inteligencia artificial que pueda tener infinitos conocimientos. Pero no podrá tener libre albedrío, ya que éste solo se puede tener si se posee vida. Como las máquinas con inteligencia artificial no pueden poseer vida nunca podrán por su propia cuenta ser un peligro para la humanidad, solo podrán actuar según lo programado por los programadores. La vida nos obliga a vivir, a tener necesidades vivientes que nos hacen (...) poder actuar por nuestra propia cuenta, por eso tenemos libre albedrío. Gracias a que necesitamos vivir, tanto para lo bueno como para lo malo, podemos amar, odiar, desear, ambicionar, etc., y por eso podemos poseer libre albedrío. El lenguaje de las letras numeradas será el medio que se utilizará para que las máquinas puedan pensar y adquirir información sin fin, informaciones que la podrán adquirir por medio de los sentidos artificiales y de los programas que se les instalen. Las informaciones que obtenemos con nuestros sentidos se obtienen de manera cuántica binaria, aunque cada sentido tenga su propio lenguaje. Estas informaciones cuánticas binarias se llevarán al pensamiento a velocidades cuánticas, el cual se encargará de buscar los significados de las informaciones, como si buscara en un diccionario cuántico, para así poder saber en forma de números binarios qué significa cada información obtenida. Eso es pensar. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. (...) Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

The issue of whether biological and psychological properties associated with disability can be harmful, beneficial, or neutral brings up an important philosophical question about how we evaluate disability, and disability’s impact on well-being. The debate is usually characterized as between those who argue disability is intrinsically harmful, and disability rights advocates who argue that disability is just another way of being different, in part, because disability can also provide important benefits. I argue that this debate is a false one, as (...) neither view can capture the more complicated relationship between disability and well-being. I argue that many disabilities are best understood as a kind of pro-tanto extrinsic harm that is characterized in counterfactual terms. This means that our judgments concerning disability and harm must be context-sensitive. (shrink)

As democracias ocidentais contemporâneas caracterizam-se pelo consenso a respeito da defesa dos direitos individuais fundamentais. O princípio da igualdade, tanto em sua formulação jurídica quanto em sua expressão social, tem por objetivo fazer com que fatores como poder econômico, influência política, origem familiar e preferências pessoais não possam promover desigualdades que não possuem justificativa moral. O princípio da liberdade tem por objetivo garantir espaço para a autonomia e a livre expressão individual. O conflito entre esses dois princípios, como se (...) sabe, define o contexto tanto das conquistas e dos impasses dos regimes democráticos quanto o contexto do debate filosófico a respeito da fundamentação da democracia. -/- Minha tese é a de que a instauração do individualismo nas democracias ocidentais é o resultado de um longo processo de desenvolvimento histórico que estabeleceu a igualdade – e não a liberdade – como o princípio organizador fundamental da ordem social democrática. Essa reavaliação permite superar os impasses gerados por teorias que colocam a autonomia e a racionalidade como fundamento das sociedades democráticas, inflacionando, assim, o conceito de liberdade, restringindo a política a processos de deliberação que deveriam se aproximar de condições idealizadas que não encontram correspondência na prática social e, quase sempre, pressupondo definições para o que seria a natureza humana, a escolha racional ou uma verdadeira autenticidade ou esclarecimento que permitiria escapar de todos os tipos de determinações heterônomas. -/- Para indicar em que sentido proponho essa reavaliação, inicio retomando a obra de Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Proveniente de uma família aristocrata em plena época pós-revolucionária na França, Tocqueville analisa a formação dos Estados Unidos da América mostrando que, na instauração da democracia americana, o ideal de igualdade ocupa um lugar anterior ao ideal de liberdade não só historicamente, mas também na justificação e na prática do sistema democrático. Subverte-se, assim, tanto a leitura da modernidade enquanto tentativa de efetivar conjuntamente os ideais de igualdade e liberdade, quanto a leitura de que o traço essencial da modernidade seria a instauração de uma racionalidade que acabou tornando-se instrumental ou técnica. Na primeira metade do século XIX, com uma interpretação que evita o unilateralismo, Tocqueville constata que a característica principal das democracias é o fato de que os homens, colocados em situação de igualdade, isolados e entregues a si mesmos, são indivíduos frágeis que, desprovidos de tradições, só possuem a razão para tentar justificar as leis que devem se auto-impor. -/- Essa leitura tocquevilleana negativa da democracia moderna permite compreender fenômenos contemporâneos aparentemente tão incompatíveis quanto, por exemplo, o isolamento social e o amplo consenso em relação aos direitos humanos ou as instituições jurídicas como instância última de mediação dos conflitos sociais e a falência praticamente completa da lei e de quaisquer instrumentos de poder para lidar com questões humanas e, mais recentemente, tecnológicas. -/- O individualismo democrático é, fundamentalmente, a consequência da efetivação cada vez maior do ideal moderno de igualdade. A filosofia política precisa levar a sério o fato de que, ao mesmo tempo em que corrói o ideal de uma racionalidade autofundante, essa condição democrática abre espaço, como nunca antes na história humana, para a responsabilidade individual. Essa responsabilidade é que nos permite, enquanto seres limitados e contingentes, chegar mais perto do ideal moderno de autonomia e autodeterminação. (shrink)

Political theorists have recently sought to replace the liberal, contractual theory of the firm with a political view that models the authority relation of employee to firm, and its appropriate regulation, on that of subject to state. This view is liable to serious difficulties, however, given existing discontinuities between corporate and civil authority as to their coerciveness, entry and exit conditions, scope, legal standing, and efficiency constraints. I here inspect these, and argue that, albeit in some cases significant, such discontinuities (...) fail to undermine the firm/state analogy, either because they are not significant enough to do so or because the particular trait on which they hinge is not decisive for how authority, in the state and in the firm, should be regulated to be legitimate. A pro tanto requirement exists, I thus argue, that corporate authority be held to regulatory norms comparable to those legitimate states abide by, including civil liberties, rule-of-law constraints, and accountability to subjects. (shrink)

En el presente texto se defenderá la idea según la cual, la filosofía y el filosofar están intrínsecamente ligados. Se partirá de un caso paradigmático, el caso de la filosofía analítica. A partir de su definición,se pretenderá mostrar que las características más sobresalientes de dicha corriente están fundamentalmente ligadas al acto de filosofar.Por medio de dicho ejemplo, se desea mostrar que enseñar la filosofía consiste en enseñar a filosofar, y que por lo tanto una no puede ser separada de (...) la otra. Aprender a filosofar es entonces, aprender a ver un problema detrás de cada página de un texto filosófico, una argumentación detrás de cada problema y finalmente, una verdad detrás de cada argumentación. El precio a pagar por dicha separación es bastante alto, se podría hablar de épocas de decadencia intelectual. (shrink)

Principles of procreative beneficence (PPBs) hold that parents have good reasons to select the child with the best life prospects. Sparrow (2010) claims that PPBs imply that we should select only female children, unlesswe attach normative significance to “normal” human capacities. We argue that this claim fails on both empirical and logical grounds. Empirically, Sparrow’s argument for greater female wellbeing rests on a selective reading of the evidence and the incorrect assumption that an advantage for females would persist even when (...) a serious gender imbalance is obtained. Logically, PPBs cite only pro tanto reasons and allow that the good of an individual child could be outweighed by other morally relevant considerations, such as those which take collectively suboptimal outcomes into account. There is thus no need to attach value to the “normal.”. (shrink)

The idea of coercion is one that has played, and continues to play, at least two importantly distinct moral-theoretic roles in our thinking. One, which has been the focus of a number of recent influential treatments, is a primarily deontic role in which claims of coercion serve to indicate relatively weighty prima facie wrongs and excuses. The other, by contrast, is a primarily axiological or eudaimonic role in which claims of coercion serve to pick out instances of some distinctive kind (...) of pro tanto human bad (such as unfreedom or interpersonal subjection). I argue that this turns out not to be a simple case of one idea put to two different uses, but rather a case of two subtly distinct ideas in need of separate philosophical treatment. Moreover, although often relatively neglected, the primarily eudaimonic idea of coercion is of enduring importance to both liberal-perfectionist and socialist political moralities, as well as to personal ethics. This paper aims to elucidate it and to examine its relationship to its better-theorised deontic cousin. In addition, the paper seeks to show how a better understanding of these aspects of the concept can enable us to resolve certain important and long-standing theoretical disagreements, such as the dispute over whether coercion is an ‘essentially moralised’ concept and the dispute over whether (genuine) offers can be coercive. (shrink)

Slurs such as spic, slut, wetback, and whore are linguistic expressions that are primarily understood to derogate certain group members on the basis of their descriptive attributes and expressions of this kind have been considered to pack some of the nastiest punches natural language affords. Although prior scholarship on slurs has uncovered several important facts concerning their meaning and use –including that slurs are potentially offensive, are felicitously applied towards some targets yet not others, and are often flexibly used not (...) only derogatorily to convey offense towards out-group members but also non-derogatorily to convey affiliation with in-group members– the literature remains largely focused on slurs that typically target African Americans, male homosexuals, and sexually active females. Since no account of slurs that typically target Hispanics or Mexican-Americans has so far been proposed, here I offer the first systematic and empirically informed analysis of these that accounts for both their derogatory and appropriative use. Importantly, this article reviews over a dozen Spanish stereotypes and slurs and explains how the descriptive attributes involved in a stereotype associated with a slur can contribute to the predication of certain content in the application of that slur toward its target in context. This article further explains how the psychological effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift can be initiated through the application of a relevant slur towards its target in context as well. -/- ----- -/- Las expresiones peyorativas tales como spic (‘spic’), slut (‘zorra’), wetback (‘espalda mojada’) y whore (‘puta’) son expresiones lingüísticas que se entienden principalmente para minusvalorar ciertos miembros de un grupo sobre la base de sus atributos descriptivos (como la raza o el sexo). Se ha considerado que las expresiones de este tipo conllevan algunos de los puñetazos más desagradables que el lenguaje natural puede proporcionar. Aunque la literatura especializada sobre expresiones peyorativas ha descubierto varios hechos importantes en cuanto a significado y uso –entre los que se incluyen que tales expresiones son potencialmente ofensivas, apuntan efectivamente hacia unos objetivos pero no hacia otros, y con frecuencia se utilizan con flexibilidad no sólo despectivamente para ofender a miembros por fuera de un grupo, sino que también de forma no despectiva para afiliar con miembros dentro de un mismo grupo–, tal literatura sigue centrada en gran medida en las expresiones peyorativas que típicamente apuntan contra los afroamericanos (nigger ‘negro’), los homosexuales varones (fagot ‘maricón’), y las mujeres sexualmente activas (slut ‘zorra’). En tanto que no se ha propuesto al momento dar cuenta de expresiones peyorativas dirigidas contra hispanos o mexicano-americanos, en este trabajo se ofrece el primer análisis sistemático y empíricamente informado de tales expresiones, tanto en sus usos despectivos y de apropiación. Es importante destacar que en este artículo se revisan más de una docena de estereotipos y expresiones peyorativas en español, además de explicar cómo los atributos descriptivos que participan de un estereotipo asociado con una difamación pueden contribuir a la predicación de determinados contenidos en la aplicación de esa expresión hacia su objetivo en contexto. Asimismo, en este artículo se explica cómo comienzan los efectos psicológicos de la amenaza estereotipada y el realce estereotipado cuando se emplea una expresión peyorativa relevante contra un objetivo en contexto. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer una revisión y reinterpretación al problema teórico en la teoría de Darwin en el que se pone en relación el principio de divergencia y la competencia entre los seres vivos. Respecto a este asunto ha habido dos interpretaciones fundamentales. La primera de ellas es la de aquellos que defienden que la divergencia se ve favorecida porque implica una reducción de la competencia a la que se enfrentan los seres vivos que se desplazan de nicho (...) ecológico. Por otro lado, algunos abogan — aunque es una posición menos extendida— por una interpretación en la que la reducción de la competencia no es la ventaja, sino que lo es la especialización y, por tanto, el incremento en la competitividad, es decir, el tener mejores herramientas o capacidades para competir. En este artículo se defiende esta última tesis, fundamentalmente sostenida por William Tammone, pero desde otra perspectiva y sustentada en otros argumentos que se nutren de la propuesta de Trevor Pearce acerca de la noción de economía natural de Darwin. (shrink)

On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is (...) one of holding ourselves accountable, thus putting us under to a pro tanto obligation to ourselves. The second-personal account implies that there is an interesting link between commitment and morality. (shrink)

Aunque parece una teoría relativamente simple, la teoría de la selección natural ha traído muchas discusiones al respecto de su reconstrucción. En particular, los autores han tenido dificultades a la hora de elucidar el concepto de aptitud (fitness) adecuadamente. El punto de vista de este trabajo consiste en que para entender adecuadamente esta cuestión, y además, para dar cuenta de manera adecuada de las explicaciones seleccionistas, tanto las dadas por Darwin como sus aplicaciones más actuales, es necesario a la (...) hora de reconstruir la teoría utilizar más conceptos de los que habitualmente se utilizan. En este trabajo se explayará sobre este punto y se presentará una reconstrucción de la teoría en cuestión con las herramientas del estructuralismo metateórico. -/- Title: Structuralist Reconstruction of Natural Selection Theory Abstract: Despite seeming relatively simple Natural Selection Theory has brought up many discussions regarding its reconstruction. In particular, many authors have had difficulties in explicating the concept of fitness. The point of view of this paper is that more concepts are needed in order to, on the one hand, understand more adequately this issue, and on the other hand, to account for selectionist explanations, both Darwin’s and current applications, in an adequate way. Having this in mind, I will offer a reconstruction of Natural Selection Theory using the tools of metatheoretical structuralism. (shrink)

This paper proposes an argumentation-based procedure for legal interpretation, by reinterpreting the traditional canons of textual interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes, which are then classified, formalized, and represented through argument visualization and evaluation tools. The problem of statutory interpretation is framed as one of weighing contested interpretations as pro and con arguments. The paper builds an interpretation procedure by formulating a set of argumentation schemes that can be used to comparatively evaluate the types of arguments used in cases of (...) contested statutory interpretation in law. A simplified version of the Carneades Argumentation System is applied in a case analysis showing how the procedure works. A logical model for statutory interpretation is finally presented, covering pro-tanto and all-things-considered interpretive conclusions. (shrink)

The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for fake news. Specifically, (...) we begin with Satz’s argument that restricting a market may be required when i) that market inhibits citizens from being able to stand in an equal relationship with one another, and ii) this problem cannot be solved without such direct restrictions. Our own argument then proceeds in three parts: first, we argue that the market for fake news fits Satz’s description of a noxious market; second, we argue against explanations of the proliferation of fake news that are couched in terms of “epistemic vice”, and likewise argue against prescribing critical thinking education as a solution to the problem; finally, we conclude that, in the absence of other solutions to mitigate the noxious effects of the fake news market, we have a pro tanto moral reason to impose restrictions on this market. At the end of the paper, we consider one proposal to regulate the fake news market, which involves making social media outlets potentially liable in civil court for damages caused by the fake news hosted on their websites. (shrink)

This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own (...) belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them. (shrink)