How do the pictures Wittgenstein and his relatives took during his life relate to his philosophical work? The exhibition at the Leopold Museum in Vienna in 2021 demonstrated a complex network of resemblances, overlaps, and cross-references between Wittgenstein’s way of working and the pictures he collected. In this essay, the network is used as an example to argue that a combination of philosophy and artistic sensibility might be a fruitful enrichment for a philosophical practise.

What do we mean by ‘reality’? Merging philosophical insights with contemporary art, Tine Wilde lets us consider and contemplate who and what we ‘really’ are. Working on artists’ book Zero Point, the article presents a brief overview of her thoughts, relating a spatial-geometrical perspective to the quest for self-knowledge, and subsequently extrapolating the findings to the notion of unknown knowledge.

How does a coloured bird end up on a TUGboat? This is the story of an artist who studied philosophy and combined her skills in a PhD at the University of Amsterdam (NL). In order to write her dissertation, she had to learn the LaTeX typesetting programme. Many years later, she still makes art and still writes down her thoughts in LaTeX, with the Memoir class and XeLaTeX as first choice. Always trying to stretch the limits of the programme to (...) her convenience. -/- This essay is not a technical article written by a developer conjuring up ingenious innovations to the LaTeX programme. By contrast, it discusses the relationship between LaTeX, art (photography) and the concept of 'measurability' from the perspective of a philosophising artist. (shrink)

In this paper I first discuss the colour-octahedron and the position of this model as an idealized system with respect to the remarks on colour-concepts in Remarks on Colour (RC). The next part examines the notion of aspect seeing in the light of the colour-octahedron and RC. From there a connection is made with On Certainty (OC). By linking the remarks on colour, seeing aspects and certainty, it may become clear that the investigations of Wittgenstein concerning colour and certainty direct (...) us towards a reflective dynamics and an anthropological interpretation of his ideas. (shrink)

The point of Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour concerns, not so much colours as such, as well as our ability to see [that implies both seeing ánd thinking] and our capacity to imagine something. This can be seen from the fact that Wittgenstein relates the notion of ‘seeing aspects’ on the one hand to the colour octahedron in PB, and on the other hand to the colour puzzles as discussed in ROC. This connection between Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour, on seeing aspects (...) and on certainty makes clear that these investigations of Wittgenstein direct us towards a reflective dynamics of his ideas. (shrink)

We are living in an increasingly complex world. How are we able to cope with this complexity and the difficulties that arise from it? Can philosophy and art, classified as the two utmost useless and pointless disciplines, have any (positive) influence on the urgent and pressing problems at hand? And, related to this, if the two have more than just their uselessness in common, how, then, are philosophy and art related? In this article, I will argue that although ‘useless’ disciplines (...) such as philosophy and art have no direct influence on our complex world, they are nonetheless the most important ones, because those working within them practice their insights in an indirect way. Indirect influence may take a little longer, but the impact is much stronger, affecting our thinking and our attitudes from within, as it were. This indirect approach has everything to do with the sort of questions philosophers and artists occupy themselves with. I will show how both address, albeit each in their own way, fundamental questions, and thereby make use of thought experiments. Intuition and imagination play a decisive part in the creative processes that are involved in thought experiments and thinking. It is argued that we all are able to learn a ‘delayed unconscious thinking’ that leads to an artistic attitude; one that will activate an artistic turn. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the notion of aspect seeing is a substantial tool to shed light on the question whether rule-following is something necessary individual or social and on how this issue is connected to novelty. Bloor's (1997) insights will be used as representative of the social primacy of rule-following and Luntley (2003) will be taken up in order to examine an example of the individual stance. Weighing pros and cons and taking the notion of aspect seeing into (...) account, these insights will lead us to the conclusion not only that the individual and the social are merely constructs, created by us for practical purposes, but also that we tend to overlook our most basic ties with the world, exactly because of these constructs and conventions. If we adopt an artistic meta-view and make use of the philosopher’s reflection, Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of ‘everyday life’, also in philosophy, takes on a new meaning. (shrink)

Violence turns hope and expectation into guilt and shame. This publication discusses the outcome of a philosophical and artistic investigation into complex patterns of behaviour. Negative connotations and positive aspects of guilt and shame are connected convincingly to the artistic process which is used by the artist to produce new work. As a consequence, a different light is shed on the concepts of guilt and shame. The author shows in an intriguing way how adapting an artistic attitude can help us (...) think in a more peaceful and independent manner. Over Schuld en Schaamte (On Guilt and Shame) thus offers a new surprising insight how violence can be transformed into hope and more rewarding practices. (shrink)

Remodel[l]ing Reality is an inquiry into Wittgenstein's notion of übersichtliche Darstellung and the phenomenon of installation in visual art. In a sense, both provide a perspicuous overview of a particular part of our complex world, but the nature of the overview differs. Although both generate knowledge, philosophy via the übersichtliche Darstellung gives us a view of how things stand for us, while the installation shows an unexpected, exiting point of view. The obvious we tend to forget and the ambiguity of (...) reality are related to each other in a dynamic way. It is in this reflexive dynamics that we constantly remodel our reality. Tools we use are our creative abilities and our powers of imagination. In our choices and solutions we show which aspects of reality we find important and how we communicate these values. The outcome of this investigation is a new perspective on the art of installation and a new insight in Wittgenstein's notion of übersichtliche Darstellung. Because of this combination, the book is itself an artwork: an InstallationPackage. The book is distributed by Ideabooks Amsterdam, Isbn 978 90 804240 3 6. Remodel[l]ing Reality is included in Special Collections, Allard Pierson Museum Amsterdam. (shrink)

Publication Zero Point shows the results of a four-years inquiry into the concept of 'measurability'. The book encompasses thirty-eight pictureworks and a philosophical thought experiment. It invites the reader to contemplate and compile their personal 'zero point' as a portrait of God. -/- Measurability appears to be a problematic concept. The boundaries between fixed and fluid; between sharp and vague; between coloured and non-coloured; between love and hate. When does one state of affairs turn into the other? When is something (...) still measurable? And: is it essential for something to be measurable at all? -/- A single drinking glass was the starting point for transformational processes of photographic images into multi-layered pictureworks. Pictorial spaces that are variable and subject to chance in an experimental, unconscious method of choice, chance, inspiration, and demolition. The results of split, remodel, and repeat invite you to explore and contemplate the notions of space and time as a dimension, in which meaning remains something definitely unfinished, but in which measurability is crucial. After all, when there is nothing to hold on to, you have to choose a point of departure from which you can reorganise your life. -/- There are several ways to leaf through the book and engage in its content. Each of the thirty-eight pictureworks is accompanied by a philosophical caption. These captions are part of a larger philosophical deliberation of three countenances which together make a portrait of God. Each caption can be read separately next to the picturework. Each picturework can be enjoyed next to a specific caption. Another way to work with the captions is to read them within their larger con text: unfold the last page of the book, reflect, and search for cross-references next to any particular picturework. (shrink)

Een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen filosofie en installatiekunst met betrekking tot de vraag naar betekenis.

Phenomenology gives rise to certain ontological considerations that have far-reaching implications for standard conceptions of patient autonomy in medical ethics, and, as a result, the obligations of and to patients in clinical decision-making contexts. One such consideration is the phenomenological reduction in classical phenomenology, a core feature of which is the characterisation of our primary experiences as immediately and inherently meaningful. This paper builds on and extends the analyses of the phenomenological reduction in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (...) in order to identify and explain its implications for our current understanding of the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the norms of clinical decision making. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

“Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper (...) is aligned with traditional theories that conceive autonomy in terms of an individual’s capacities for, and exercises of rational reflection. However, at the same time, this paper extends these accounts by arguing that autonomy is, in part, embodied. Specifically, by drawing on phenomenological conceptions of the experience of autonomy, we argue that, in principle, the body is a necessary component of the capacity for autonomy. Secondly, through the presentation of two different cases, we highlight ways in which a patient’s body can contribute to the autonomy of treatment choices. Ultimately, we hope to encourage others to explore additional conditions under which a concept of embodied autonomy should be employed in medical decision making, how its underlying principles might be operationalised in clinical situations, and its consequences for approaches to patient autonomy in healthcare practice, policy, and law. (shrink)

Smajdor argues that “recognition” is the solution to the “reifying attitude” that results from “the urge to protect ‘vulnerable’ people through exclusion from research”. Drawing on theories of reification, we argue that it is the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability themselves that have been reified, resulting in the impoverishment of approaches to autonomy at law and in research ethics. Overcoming such reification demands a deeper consideration of the grounds on which vulnerable individuals are owed recognition and thereby the forms such (...) recognition should take. Smajdor argues for a recognition that appeals to autonomy and that manifests in providing vulnerable individuals with the opportunity to assent. The problem is that this kind of recognition is dependent on a more fundamental kind. It is this second form of recognition that would need to do the heavy lifting for assent-based frameworks to avoid the same problems we find with consent. (shrink)

At the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. (...) Second, RUP is Knight’s only effort in this area. His subsequent career led elsewhere, so he did not engage with subsequent interpretations of this work. Third, much of the current literature emphasizes that decisions must be different under the two states of nature with a consequent misunderstanding of entrepreneurial agency. This paper addresses each challenge in sequence. First, we explicate Knight’s (1921) approach and explain why that approach is murky. Second, as a complement to Knight’s interpretation, we examine Frank P. Ramsey’s approach to subjective probabilities to help clarify Knight’s murky approach. What links Knight and Ramsey is a shared pragmatism about entrepreneurial agency under uncertainty that depends upon the beliefs about, and confidence in, their judgments of possible outcomes. This Knight-Ramsey approach does not require actor’s behaviors to be determined by the class of uncertain environment (whether risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity) they face. We focus on the response by the entrepreneur to the existence of uncertainty in all its forms. We argue that this reductive account provides a foundation to examine common problems in management, including managerial hubris, the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the need for experimentation (such as prototyping and market research) in advance of new product and venture launches. Third, we critique current literature that favors epistemic purism about the ontology of risk and uncertainty and ignores Knight-Ramsey pragmatism in meeting uncertainty, such as using formal and informal institutions for uncertainty mitigation. Our account locates Frank Knight’s subtleties in entrepreneurial behavior firmly in the literature on entrepreneurial agency a century later. (shrink)

What constitutes a scientific discovery? What role do discoveries play in science, its dynamics and social practices? Must every discovery be attributed to an individual discoverer (or a small number of discoverers)? The paper explores these questions by first critically examining extant philosophical explications of scientific discovery—the models of scientific discovery, propounded by Kuhn, McArthur, Hudson, and Schindler. As a simple, natural and powerful alternative, we proffer the “change-driver model”: in a nutshell, it takes discoveries to be cognitive scientific results (...) that have epistemically advanced science. The model overcomes the shortcomings of its precursors, whilst preserving their insights. We demonstrate its intensional and extensional superiority, especially with respect to the link between scientific discoveries and the dynamics of science, as well as the award system of science. Both as an illustration, and as an application to a recent scientific and political controversy, we apply the considered models of discovery to one of the most momentous discoveries of science: the expansion of the universe. We oppose the 2018 proposal of the International Astronomers’ Union as too simplistic vis-`a-vis the historical complexity of the episode. The change- driver model yields a more nuanced and circumspect verdict: (i) The redshift-distance relation shouldn’t be named the “Hubble-Lemaître Law”, but “Slipher-Lundmark-Hubble-Humason Law”; (ii) Its interpretation in terms of an expanding universe, however, Lemaître ought to be given credit for; but (iii) The establishment of the expansion of the universe, as an evidentially sufficiently warranted result, is a communal achievement, emerging in the 1950s or 1960s. (shrink)

Research ethics committees and institutional review boards spend considerable time developing, scrutinising, and revising specific consent processes and materials for survey-based studies conducted on crowdsourcing and online recruitment platforms such as MTurk and Prolific. However, there is evidence to suggest that many users of ICT services do not read the information provided as part of the consent process and they habitually provide or refuse their consent without adequate reflection. In principle, these practices call into question the validity of their consent. (...) In this paper we argue that although the ‘no read problem’ and the routinisation of consent may apply to research participants’ consent practices for studies on crowdsourcing platforms, this is not a serious problem. Furthermore, given that the informational requirements for informed consent in these contexts are minimal, we argue that these participants are, nevertheless, sufficiently informed to give valid consent. We conclude that research ethics committees and institutional review boards should only agonise over the precise details of the informed consent process and materials in those rare cases where appreciable risks to research participants need to be managed. (shrink)

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

Abortion remains a highly controversial issue in many countries and subject to intense public debate. The aim of this chapter is to summarize the most prominent assumptions and arguments concerning the moral and legal dimensions of abortion on which this debate rests. Where the moral justifiability of abortion is concerned, this chapter focuses on arguments relating to the moral status of the fetus or embryo, the notion of personhood, the biological development of the embryo or fetus, and the moral relevance (...) of specific points in the developmental process. In terms of the legal aspects, we consider concepts and principles invoked at law, principally, the rights of pregnant women and the medical concept of viability. For each moral and legal position in the abortion debate, we provide an overview of the principal assumptions and arguments and acknowledge the main criticisms. (shrink)

Background There has been debate on whether a global or unified field of bioethics exists. If bioethics is a unified global field, or at the very least a closely shared way of thinking, then we should expect bioethicists to behave the same way in their academic activities anywhere in the world. This paper investigates whether there is a 'global bioethics' in the sense of a unified academic community. Methods To address this question, we study the web-linking patterns of bioethics institutions, (...) the citation patterns of bioethics papers and the buying patterns of bioethics books. Results All three analyses indicate that there are geographical and institutional differences in the academic behavior of bioethicists and bioethics institutions. Conclusion These exploratory studies support the position that there is no unified global field of bioethics. This is a problem if the only reason is parochialism. But these regional differences are probably of less concern if one notices that bioethics comes in many not always mutually understandable dialects. (shrink)

This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces such thought back to Schopenhauer, whose work is then critically analysed. This analysis focuses primarily on happiness and meaning. This essay accepts some of Schopenhauer’s premises, but rejects his conclusions. Instead, it considers Nietzsche’s alternatives and the role of suffering in life. It posits that suffering may help people acquire meaning and escape absurdity. It (...) then analyses the role of compassion in absurdity, in reference to Nietzsche’s work and Buddhist teachings. Lastly, it examines absurdity in relation to death, rejecting the notion that death exacerbates absurdity. This paper understands absurdity to be a natural part of the human condition, as characterised by suffering, death and an absence of meaning. It concludes that although human life is absurd by nature, it need not remain so. (shrink)

In this introduction to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism special issue on the aesthetics of creative activism, we canvas influential scholarship of political aesthetics to sculpt a broad typology of six interconnected mechanisms by which art might intervene in the world. We label these: Documentation, Disruption, Recognition, Participation, Imagination, and Beauty. Each has a compelling tradition of theory and application, augmented, extended, and sometimes challenged by the thirteen fresh and provocative contributions in the special issue. Yet, we ask, (...) if both politically minded artists and culturally minded activists are convinced of the power of art to provoke social change, and if we live a world that by almost all measures is now saturated with politically inclined, aesthetically informed practices, interfaces, objects, and texts, why does art not seem to be making a difference? Clearly, we need to think harder about the relationships between art and action, a task the articles assembled here call upon us to take seriously. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale research and pharmaceutical regulatory processes have proceeded at a dramatically increased pace with new and effective, evidence-based COVID-19 interventions rapidly making their way into the clinic. However, the swift generation of high-quality evidence and the efficient processing of regulatory authorisation have given rise to more specific and complex versions of well-known research ethics issues. In this paper, we identify three such issues by focusing on the authorisation of Molnupiravir, a novel antiviral medicine aimed (...) at reducing the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to multiply in the body, for clinical use by the National Health Service in England and the concomitant testing of Molnupiravir through the large-scale PANORAMIC randomised control trial. By analysing the ways in which the authorisation and clinical use of Molnupiravir complicate standard approaches to clinical equipoise, standard of care, and participant consent in the PANORAMIC randomised control trial we will explain some of ethical implications for clinical trials that aim to study the efficacy and safety of new COVID-19 and other therapeutics when conditional authorisation has already been granted and when such treatments have already been made available to patients by national health providers. (shrink)

The protection of rare species abounds with scientific and ethical considerations. An ethical dilemma can emerge when the life of one species is valued higher than that of another, and so we discuss the basis of ranking, protection, and valuation of plants and animals. A duty to protect rare species exists in this age of great losses to plant and animal life, but the scientific and public communities are not always in agreement regarding what species deserve protection. Using a case (...) study, we illustrate how the decision to kill beavers to protect a rare plant and rare animals found in a tidewater creek demanded an ecological ethic approach. We present the concept of a" conservation mediator" and how its use may help find a common ground between stakeholders and decision-makers in similar situations. (shrink)

SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this (...) hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. (shrink)

Holm (2022) argues that a class of algorithmic fairness measures, that he refers to as the ‘performance parity criteria’, can be understood as applications of John Broome’s Fairness Principle. We argue that the performance parity criteria cannot be read this way. This is because in the relevant context, the Fairness Principle requires the equalization of actual individuals’ individual-level chances of obtaining some good (such as an accurate prediction from a predictive system), but the performance parity criteria do not guarantee (...) any such thing: the measures merely ensure that certain population-level ratios hold. (shrink)

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that we understand scientific models in the same way as fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes. The biggest challenge for this approach concerns the ontology of fictional characters. I consider two responses to this challenge, given by Roman Frigg, Ronald Giere and Peter Godfrey-Smith, and argue that neither is successful. I then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels with fiction are useful, I argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to works (...) that portray real people, like the Emperor Claudius. This approach will allow us to avoid problems with fictional characters. (shrink)

Commentators of the judicial decisions of Justice Holmes have often situated the decisions inside the doctrines of freedom of expression and the rules and tests approach to legal analysis. This Paper situates his judgments in the context of a political theory. Drawing from his articles, lectures and correspondence, the Paper highlights Holmes’ reaction to the idealism and rationalism of the intellectual current before him. His view of human nature, conditioned by his war experience, is elaborated. The Paper especially examines his (...) theory of political struggle with the process-oriented view that the dominant social groups invariably become the political elite. The Paper then connects his theory of human nature to his legal doctrines, the role of the judiciary, the nature of the state, and a legal right. (shrink)

According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible individuals. Possibilist accounts of fiction do not only assign the intuitively correct truth-conditions to sentences in a fiction, but has the potential to provide powerful explanatory models for a wide range of phenomena associated with fiction (though these two aspects of possibilism are, I argue, crucially distinct). Apart from the classic defense by David Lewis the idea of modeling fiction in terms of possible worlds have been widely criticized. In this article, (...) I provide a defense of a possibilist account against some lines of criticism. To do so, I assume that names for fictional characters are directly referential and a possible-worlds model that accommodates transworld identity. On this background, I argue, it is possible to construct an elegant model of fictional discourse using familiar models of information exchange in ordinary discourse, and I sketch how this model can be used to i) make a natural distinction between fictional and counterfactual discourse, ii) account for creativity, and iii) sustain a natural definition of truth-in-fiction that avoids certain familiar objections to possibilism. Though I set aside questions about the metaphysical commitments of a possible-world interpretation here, there is accordingly reason to think that the battle over possibilist treatments of fiction will have to be fought over metaphysical foundations rather than technical shortcomings. (shrink)

Abstract: Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true. However, this attitude conflicts with the assignment of true to that sentence by natural language speakers. Furthermore, this process of assigning truth values to sentences like ‘Sherlock Holes smokes’ seems indistinguishable from the process that leads speakers to assign true to other sentences, those like ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’. I will explore the idea that when speakers assign the value true to the first sentence, (...) they are not mistaken or confused — that we ought to take these assignments at face value. I show how the most popular alternative to this idea is inadequate for explaining various sentences involving fictional names. In addition, I offer evidence that these truth value assignments to sentences are tracking semantic content rather than pragmatic effects. (shrink)

In recent years, apparently the Big Bang as described by the Lambda CDM-Standard Model Cosmology has become widely accepted by majority of physics and cosmology communities. Even some people have concluded that it has no serious alternative in horizon. Is that true? First, as we argued elsewhere, Big Bang story relies on singularity. In other words, when we are able to describe the observed data without invoking singularity, then Big Bang model is no longer required. Therefore, here we explore a (...) few alternative stories other than Big Bang story, which most cosmologists believe it is the nearest to Biblical account of creation. We would argue that re-reading of Genesis 1:2 will lead us to another viable story, albeit the alternative has not been developed rigorously as LCDM theories. We also briefly discuss a fluid Maxwell equations of Prof. Tsutomu Kambe based on vortex sound theory. (shrink)

In “Semantics of Fictional Terms,” Garcia-Carpintero critically surveys the most recent literature on the topic of fictional names. One of his targets is realism about fictional discourse. Realists about fictional discourse believe that: (a) it contains true sentences that have fictional names as their subjects; (b) sentences containing names can be true only if those names have referents; (c) fictional names have fictional characters – abstract objects – as their referents. The fundamental problem that arises for realists is that not (...) all true sentences containing fictional names are plausibly about abstract objects. This leads to the need to introduce disjunctive conceptions of property attribution that Garcia-Carpintero claims are implausible, and that realism should therefore be rejected. He also maintains, however, that (a) is correct. I agree. Furthermore, I am also committed to anti-realism about fictional discourse – that fictional names have no referents. Garcia-Carpintero claims that my view is simply a notational variant of realism. I argue that this is false – that my view could not possibly be a notational variant of any extant realist theory. (shrink)

Scattered skeptical remarks and a general austerity that infused his writings have given Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a reputation as some type of nihilist. Noted commentators such as Richard Posner and Albert Alschuler have claimed as much. This article seeks to correct this misunderstanding. Holmes was not a nihilist in the sense of being melancholy due to a belief that the world has no absolute moral values or gods. Instead, Holmes was a pragmatist in the spirit of William James and (...) John Dewey. While Holmes had doubts about moral truth and deities, he ultimately thought that their existence (or non-existence) should have no bearing on our behavior or the law. We must, through our collective efforts, find values that work for us. (shrink)

As a fan of Sherlock Holmes from a young age it occurred to me recently to wonder what the great detective would have made of the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Here is one possible scenario.

Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist differs in cognitive content (...) from, say, Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: even if Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late. (shrink)

This essay reexamines Holmes Rolston’s evocative notion of “storied residence” and evaluates it for its fitness for environmental virtue ethics. Environmental virtue ethics (or EVE) continues to garner attention among environmental philosophers, and recently Brian Treanor has argued for the indispensability of narrative approaches as part of that discourse. In this paper, I endorse this indispensability thesis generally, but I argue that narrative environmental virtue ethics must be supplemented either by “storied residence” or a similar environmentally, scientifically, culturally, and historically (...) rich concept of narrative. Rolston himself has criticized environmental virtue ethics for being too agent-centered. Fortunately, an adequate sense of storied-residence is precisely what is needed to avoid triggering the vicious anthropocentrism that concerns Rolston. More concretely, storied-residence makes place(s) central to environmental virtue ethics by giving expression to features of the more-than-human world that often become secondary considerations to agency in accounts of environmental virtue. (shrink)

Does Sherlock Holmes exist? Maybe we would answer, no, because Sherlock Holmes is a fictional entity. But, with the same logic, we can say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective and not a police. How do we believe and know the truth-value of Sherlock Holmes when Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist? Fictional objects underwent a various number of puzzles in their ontological and metaphysical resolutions. Philosophers have tried to solve this puzzle by inventing various theories. This article means to explore the (...) historical development of fictional objects and the puzzle surrounding it. This article finds that the theories in fictional objects include two big-streams of metaphysical assumptions that contradict each other which are(1) mind-dependent and (2) mind-independent. This article also means to invent a theory called theory-n to solve fictional objects puzzles that are assigned by Kripke (1979). This article solves the fictional objects mind-dependent and/or mind-independentpuzzleor belief puzzle with rather relational-semantic approaches instead of flat-semantics. Further, theory-n finds that new fictionalism with relational-semantic admits fictional objects as foundation to make sense of objects (any objects, including actual objects is reducible to fiction). (shrink)

This paper defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes' head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what's true in a work of fiction. We argue that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. We contrast our view with one of the dominant approaches (...) to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way we explore the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness. (shrink)

Nimeni nu ştie sigur dacă amintirea lui Newton despre măr a fost corectă, dar perspectiva lui aceasta este. Filosofii au crezut încă de la greci că mişcarea “naturală” a stelelor, planetelor, Soarelui şi Lunei este circulară. Kepler a stabilit că orbitele sunt de fapt eliptice, dar a crezut că mişcările planetelor este dictată de către o “forţă divină” emanată de la Soare, iar Newton şi-a dat seama că aceeaşi forţă care face ca o piatră aruncată să cadă înapoi pe Pământ, (...) ţine şi planetele pe orbita Soarelui, şi Luna pe orbita Pământului. În 1687, Isaac Newton a publicat Principia, în care face ipoteza legii pătratelor inverse a gravitației universale. Aplicarea legii gravitației lui Newton a permis obținerea multor informații detaliate pe care le avem despre planetele din Sistemul Solar, masa Soarelui și detalii despre quasari; chiar și existența unei materii întunecate se deduce din legea gravitației lui Newton. Deși nu am călătorit pe toate planetele și nici pe Soare, cunoaștem masele lor. Aceste mase se obțin prin aplicarea legilor gravitației la caracteristicile măsurate ale orbitei. În spațiu un obiect își menține orbita datorită forței gravitaționale care acționează asupra ei. Planeta orbitează stelele, stelele orbitează în centre galactice, galaxiile orbitează un centru de masă în grupuri și clusterele orbitează în superclustere. CUPRINS: Gravitația - Istoria teoriei gravitației - - Revoluția științifică - - Teoria lui Newton a gravitației - - Principiul echivalenței - - Relativitatea generală - - Gravitația și mecanica cuantică - Aspecte specifice - - Gravitația Pământului - - Ecuațiile pentru un corp care cade aproape de suprafața Pământului - - Gravitația și astronomia - - Radiații gravitaționale - - Viteza gravitației - Anomalii și discrepanțe Istoria teoriei gravitației - Antichitate - Era modernă - - Teoria lui Newton despre gravitație - - Explicații mecanice ale gravitației - - Relativitatea generală - - Gravitația și mecanica cuantică Isaac Newton - Ortodoxia creștină - Dumnezeu ca maestru creator - Alte credințe - Scrieri Legea gravitaţiei universale a lui Newton - Istorie - Forma modernă - - Forma vectorială - - Comparaţie cu forţa electromagnetică - - Reticenţele lui Newton - Aspecte problematice - - Preocupări teoretice privind expresia lui Newton - - Observații care contravin formulei lui Newton - - Reticențele lui Newton - - Soluția lui Einstein Isaac Newton vs. Robert Hooke - Opera și revendicările lui Hooke - Opera și revendicările lui Newton - Recunoașterea lui Newton - Controversa modernă a priorității - Schopenhauer despre Newton și Hooke Acțiunea la distanță - Ipotezele eterului - Corespondența cu Richard Bentley - Concluzii Explicarea gravitației prin eter - Curenți - Presiune statică Constanta gravitațională universală, G Legea inversului pătratului în gravitație - Formula - Justificare - Gravitația Gravitaţia Pământului - Ecuațiile pentru un corp în cădere în apropiere de suprafața Pământului Greutatea și imponderabilitatea - Greutatea în mecanica newtoniană - Istorie - - Newton - Relativitatea Mareele și gravitația - Caracteristici - Constituienți - Istoria fizicii mareelor - Forțe - Ecuațiile de maree ale lui Laplace - Mareele oceanelor - - Amplitudine și ciclu - - Batimetrie - Mareea Pământului - - Forța fluxului - - Mareea corporală - - Ceilalți contribuabili ai mareelor Pământului - Mareea atmosferei Pământului - - Caracteristici generale - Mareele lunare - - Componenta principală lunară semi-diurnă Câmpul gravitațional - Mecanica clasică Gravitația în interiroul unei planete (Teorema carcasei) - Dovezile lui Newton - - Forța pe un punct în interiorul unei sfere goale - Modelul preliminar de referință al pământului (PREM) Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional (...) attitudes that captures both empty and non-empty cases by properly locating the posited representations in the metaphysical structure of the attitudes. (shrink)

A Review of Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine’s Thought by Phillip Cary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xxiv + 344 pp. -/- Phillip Cary has written another highly significant book on Augustine, and his writing displays the art of a master stylist. A complement to his Inner Grace, Outward Signs extends Cary’s thesis in Augustine and the Invention of the Inner Self: that Augus- tine’s Trinitarian and semiotic theology, groundbreaking as it was, remains beholden to (...) a Platonist privileging of inner vs. outer and idea over sacramental performance. Outward Signs should be of special interest to readers of Modern Theology, because the inwardness Cary interrogates displays a dimension of Augustine’s work that receives significant attention from a number of Modern Theology authors. Once again, Cary has offered an appropriate warning about any uncritical embrace of Augustine as theologian for the church today: the embrace could bring with it a turn to spiritualism, subjectivism, intellectualism, and also supersessionism (since the Old Testament and Jewish “law” belong to the merely outward life of the Word). Like Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty before him, Cary captures the line of potential influence that moves from Plato to Augustine to Descartes and Kant. Here, knowledge tends to ocular knowing, and Cary shows how inadequate that model is to account for performative knowing in the church, of which sacramental life is one instance. But performative knowing would apply, as well, to the study of Augustine’s writ- ings. Read “outwardly,” Augustine’s corpus generates several possible vectors of theological practice. The stronger vectors may point “inward,” but readers should also attend to those (weak or strong) which point to that which is inward, outward, both, and neither. (shrink)

O ameninţare uriaşă planează asupra uneia dintre cele mai dezvoltate ţări ale lumii. Miracol economic şi sociala al secolului XX Japonia se confruntă cu o problemă gravă , îmbătrânirea populaţiei şi scăderea natalităţii. Populaţia este un factor de putere extrem de important în istoria unui stat. Fără o populaţie numeroasă un stat nu poate fi bine dezvoltat. O populaţiei mare este mărirea capacităţii economice a unui stat , într-o primă instanţă. Ulterior dezvoltarea economică ţine de un cumul de diverşi factori (...) cum ar fi diversificarea producţiei , forţa agricolă dar şi altele. Acest „câlcâi a lui Ahile” afectează Japonia , îmbătrânirea provoacă diverse consecinţe precum încetinirea economică , dezechlibrul balanţei între sexe şi chiar extincţia totală a populaţiei într-un viitor îndepărtat. (shrink)

In this paper I confront what I take to be the crucial challenge for fictional realism, i.e. the view that fictional characters exist. This is the problem of accounting for the intuition that corresponding negative existentials such as ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ are true (when, given fictional realism, taken literally they seem false). I advance a novel and detailed form of the response according to which we take them to mean variants of such claims as: there is no concrete (...) x such that x is Sherlock Holmes. (shrink)

Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. TakashiYagisawa has recently provided a (...) number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism. I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism. (shrink)