Results for 'Value first'

971 found
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  1. Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
    It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do, and the attitudes that it is fitting for us to have, derives from what is valuable. But value-first approaches to normativity have fallen out of favour as the virtues of reasons- and fittingness-first approaches to normativity have become clear. On these views, value is not explanatorily prior to reasons and fit; rather the value of things (...)
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  2. Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’.Keren Gorodeisky - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):79-84.
    While I welcome Mohan Matthen’s insistence that art is connected to aesthetic pleasure, I worry about his commitment to viewing pleasure as prior to, and constitutive of, the value of art. I raise my reservations by (i) dispelling his criticism of the reversed explanatory direction, and (ii) showing problems for his commitment. As an alternative, I offer an account of pleasure that explains it in terms of the independent value of art—an account that is free of the problems (...)
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  3. (1 other version)Against the First Views: Why None of Reasons, Fittingness, or Values are First.Andrew Reisner - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 383-402.
    This paper argues against the correctness of the more popular -first views (fittingness first, reasons first, and value first). The aim of this paper is to argue that there are at least two categories of normative properties that are basic and that one of those categories is value. Although the emphasis of this paper is on reductionist -first accounts, most of the arguments work equally well against weaker views that are only committed to (...)
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  4. The first bibliometric finding concerning a missing environment-nurturing cultural value.Minh-Hoang Nguyen & Quan-Hoang Vuong - manuscript
    This short piece of communication has the sole purpose of identifying some evidence, supporting our view regarding a possible missing environment-nurturing cultural value. Here, we attempt to examine the presence of cultural studies within the boundary of climate change research.
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  5. Elimination of Cuts in First-order Finite-valued Logics.Matthias Baaz, Christian G. Fermüller & Richard Zach - 1993 - Journal of Information Processing and Cybernetics EIK 29 (6):333-355.
    A uniform construction for sequent calculi for finite-valued first-order logics with distribution quantifiers is exhibited. Completeness, cut-elimination and midsequent theorems are established. As an application, an analog of Herbrand’s theorem for the four-valued knowledge-representation logic of Belnap and Ginsberg is presented. It is indicated how this theorem can be used for reasoning about knowledge bases with incomplete and inconsistent information.
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  6. Autonomy, Value and the First Person.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
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  7. Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
    This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
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  8. Mapping Value Sensitive Design onto AI for Social Good Principles.Steven Umbrello & Ibo van de Poel - 2021 - AI and Ethics 1 (3):283–296.
    Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges specific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. (...)
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  9. The Value of Evidence in Decision-Making.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    The Value of Evidence thesis (VE) tells us to gather evidence before deciding in any decision problem, if the evidence is free. This appar- ently plausible principle faces two problems. First, it fails on evidence externalism or nonclassical decision theories. Second, it’s not general enough: it tells us to prefer gaining free evidence to gaining no evi- dence, but it doesn’t tell us to prefer gaining more informative evidence to gaining less informative evidence when both are free. This (...)
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  10. Autonomy and aesthetic valuing.Nick Riggle - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (I):391-409.
    Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good (...)
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  11. Proof Theory of Finite-valued Logics.Richard Zach - 1993 - Dissertation, Technische Universität Wien
    The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of finite-valued first (...)
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  12. Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):545-562.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of (...)
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  13. Traditional Morality and Sacred Values.David McPherson - 2017 - Analyse & Kritik 39 (1):41-62.
    This essay gives an account of how traditional morality is best understood and also why it is worth defending (even if some reform is needed) and how this might be done. Traditional morality is first contrasted with supposedly more enlightened forms of morality, such as utilitarianism and liberal Kantianism (i.e., autonomy-centered ethics). The focus here is on certain sacred values that are central to traditional morality and which highlight this contrast and bring out the attractions of traditional morality. Next, (...)
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  14. Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy.Maya J. Goldenberg - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):404-424.
    With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of (...)
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  15. Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it (...)
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  16. Who’s on first?Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.
    “X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we (...)
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  17. Dimensions of Value.Brian Hedden & Daniel Muñoz - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):291-305.
    Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on (...)
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  18. (1 other version)Twist-Valued Models for Three-valued Paraconsistent Set Theory.Walter Carnielli & Marcelo E. Coniglio - 2021 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 30 (2):187-226.
    Boolean-valued models of set theory were independently introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopěnka in 1965, offering a natural and rich alternative for describing forcing. The original method was adapted by Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to lattice-valued models of set theory. After this, Löwe and Tarafder proposed a class of algebras based on a certain kind of implication which satisfy several axioms of ZF. From this class, they found a specific 3-valued model called PS3 which satisfies all the axioms of (...)
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  19. Morality First?Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-13.
    The Morality First strategy for developing AI systems that can represent and respond to human values aims to first develop systems that can represent and respond to moral values. I argue that Morality First and other X-First views are unmotivated. Moreover, according to some widely accepted philosophical views about value, these strategies are positively distorting. The natural alternative, according to which no domain of value comes “first” introduces a new set of challenges and (...)
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  20. Putting Flourishing First: Applying Democratic Values to Technology.Kinney E. Zalesne & Nick Pyati - 2023 - Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Ethics.
    When product design teams gather at the whiteboard in big-tech office parks and startup garages around the world, they ask themselves: How will customers use our technology? Is it better than our competitors’? How much money can we make? But one question that’s rarely asked: does our technology advance human flourishing? -/- In a new white paper by Harvard professor Danielle Allen and her colleagues Eli Frankel, Woojin Lim, Divya Siddarth, Josh Simons, and Glen Weyl entitled “The Ethics of Decentralized (...)
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  21. Existence Value, Preference Satisfaction, and the Ethics of Species Extinction.Espen Dyrnes Stabell - 2019 - Environmental Ethics 41 (2):165-180.
    Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good (...)
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  22. The Value of Sleeping.Sara Protasi - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
    Should you take a pill that gives you all the health benefits of sleep and allows you to stay awake? I argue that you shouldn’t. I propose three reasons why sleeping, conceived of as a socially and culturally embedded human activity, is valuable. First, there is aesthetic value in the rituals that typically precede sleeping; second, there is interpersonal value in the intimacy that stems from sleeping with other people; third, there is ethical value in mere (...)
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  23. A Completenesss Theorem for a 3-Valued Semantics for a First-order Language.Christopher Gauker - manuscript
    This document presents a Gentzen-style deductive calculus and proves that it is complete with respect to a 3-valued semantics for a language with quantifiers. The semantics resembles the strong Kleene semantics with respect to conjunction, disjunction and negation. The completeness proof for the sentential fragment fills in the details of a proof sketched in Arnon Avron (2003). The extension to quantifiers is original but uses standard techniques.
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  24. Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.
    ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers (...)
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  25. The Value of Time Matters for Temporal Justice.Jens Jørund Tyssedal - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):183-196.
    There has recently been a revived interest in temporal justice among political philosophers. For example, lone mothers have, on average, 30 h less free time per week than people in couples without children. Recent work has focussed on free time as a distinct distributive good, but this paper argues that it would be a mistake for a theory of temporal justice to focus only on shares of free time. First, I argue that the concept of free time does not (...)
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  26. The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.
    In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view (...)
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  27. Aesthetic Values Are Distal Versions of Practical Values.Tom Cochrane - 2022 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81 (1):83-84.
    I believe the first thing to say about value is that it is something that we do. We value things. There is no value out there independent of valuing beings. Thi.
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  28. The Value of Philosophical Scepticism.Martin Nuhlicek - 2016 - Filosoficky Casopis 64 (5):675-690.
    The aim of the first part of the article is to elucidate the nature of (modern) philosophical scepticism. The author defends the view that scepticism is not a homogenous doctrine, but a general label for heterogenous ways of sceptical argumentation. Sceptical argumentation is, in turn, understood to include any kind of philosophically relevant argument which aims at calling into doubt epistemically-valued qualities, especially knowledge. In the second part of the article the author focuses on the question of what constitutes (...)
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  29. Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.
    According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons are explained in terms of the (instrumental or final) value of the action supported by the reason. I argue that this theory is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights, including the right to a promised action and the right to an exclusive use of one’s property. The argument is an explanatory rather than extensional one: while the actions supported by the (...)
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  30. Towards Tractable Approximations to Many-Valued Logics: the Case of First Degree Entailment.Alejandro Solares-Rojas & Marcello D’Agostino - 2022 - In Igor Sedlár (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2021. College Publications. pp. 57-76.
    FDE is a logic that captures relevant entailment between implication-free formulae and admits of an intuitive informational interpretation as a 4-valued logic in which “a computer should think”. However, the logic is co-NP complete, and so an idealized model of how an agent can think. We address this issue by shifting to signed formulae where the signs express imprecise values associated with two distinct bipartitions of the set of standard 4 values. Thus, we present a proof system which consists of (...)
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  31. Childhood: Value and duties.Anca Gheaus - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (12):e12793.
    In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views (...)
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  32. Reasons or Fittingness First?Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
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  33. The semiconducting principle of monetary and environmental values exchange.Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2021 - Economics and Business Letters 10 (3):284-290.
    This short article represents the first attempt to define a new core cultural value that will enable engaging the business sector in humankind’s mission to heal nature. First, I start with defining the problem of the current business culture and the extant thinking on how to solve environmental problems, which I called “the eco-deficit culture.” Then, I present a solution to this problem by formulating the “semiconducting principle” of monetary and environmental values exchange, which I believe can (...)
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  34. Future value change: identifying realistic possibilities and risks.Jeroen Hopster - forthcoming - Prometheus.
    The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of “axiological futurism”. However, this investigation faces a challenge: “axiological possibility space” is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change over time should exclude farfetched possibilities and be (...)
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  35. Value-Based Protest Slogans: An Argument for Reorientation.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - In Michael Cholbi, Brandon Hogan, Alex Madva & Benjamin S. Yost (eds.), The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 13.
    When bringing philosophical attention to bear on social movement slogans in general, philosophers have often focused on their communicative nature—particularly the hermeneutical failures that arise in discourse. Some of the most popular of these failures are illustrated in ‘all lives matter’ retorts to ‘black lives matter’ pronouncements. Although highlighting and criticizing these failures provides much needed insight into social movement slogans as a communicative practice, I claim that in doing so, philosophers and slogans’ users risk placing too much importance on (...)
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  36. The value of information and the epistemology of inquiry.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    In the recent philosophical literature on inquiry, epistemologists point out that their subject has often begun at the point at which you already have your evidence and then focussed on identifying the beliefs for which that evidence provides justification. But we are not mere passive recipients of evidence. While some comes to us unbidden, we often actively collect it. This has long been recognised, but typically epistemologists have taken the norms that govern inquiry to be practical, not epistemic. The recent (...)
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  37. First-order swap structures semantics for some Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Marcelo E. Coniglio, Aldo Figallo-Orellano & Ana Claudia Golzio - 2020 - Journal of Logic and Computation 30 (6):1257-1290.
    The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of (...)
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  38. Are values related to culture, identity, community cohesion and sense of place the values most vulnerable to climate change?Kristina Blennow, Erik Persson & Johannes Persson - 2019 - PLoS ONE 14 (1):e0210426.
    Values related to culture, identity, community cohesion and sense of place have sometimes been downplayed in the climate change discourse. However, they have been suggested to be not only important to citizens but the values most vulnerable to climate change. Here we test four empirical consequences of the suggestion: at least 50% of the locations citizens' consider to be the most important locations in their municipality are chosen because they represent these values, locations representing these values have a high probability (...)
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  39. The conversational practicality of value judgement.Stephen Finlay - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent (...)
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  40.  97
    Value in Marx: A Reading of the Grundrisse.K. Tuncel - 2024 - Felsefe Arkivi 1 (61):64-72.
    Marx’s concept of value has been subject to significant criticism. Robinson argues that the concept is awkward and obscure, as it is meant to explain the prices of commodities and thus must be a kind of price, but it is not. Consequently, Robinson holds that the concept of value makes no sense. Furthermore, according to Harvey, Marx in the Grundrisse confuses value with price. It seems to me that both Robinson’s criticism and Harvey’s exegesis are based on (...)
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  41. Misrelating values and empirical matters in conservation: A problem and solutions.Matthew J. Barker & Dylan J. Fraser - 2023 - Biological Conservation 281.
    We uncover a largely unnoticed and unaddressed problem in conservation research: arguments built within studies are sometimes defective in more fundamental and specific ways than appreciated, because they misrelate values and empirical matters. We call this the unraveled rope problem because just as strands of rope must be properly and intricately wound with each other so the rope supports its load, empirical aspects and value aspects of an argument must be related intricately and properly if the argument is to (...)
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  42. What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests.Dean Spears & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (3):673-684.
    Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefore imply conclusions that should seem (...)
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  43. Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):333-346.
    I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind (...)
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  44. First Steps Towards an Ethics of Robots and Artificial Intelligence.John Tasioulas - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (1):61-95.
    This article offers an overview of the main first-order ethical questions raised by robots and Artificial Intelligence (RAIs) under five broad rubrics: functionality, inherent significance, rights and responsibilities, side-effects, and threats. The first letter of each rubric taken together conveniently generates the acronym FIRST. Special attention is given to the rubrics of functionality and inherent significance given the centrality of the former and the tendency to neglect the latter in virtue of its somewhat nebulous and contested character. (...)
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  45. Value-free paradise is lost. Economists could learn from artists.Aleksander Ostapiuk - 2020 - Annales. Ethics in Economic Life 23 (4):7-33.
    Despite the conclusions from the contemporary philosophy of science, many economists cherish the ideal of positive science. Therefore, value-free economics is still the central paradigm in economics. The first aim of the paper is to investigate economics' axiomatic assumptions from an epistemological perspective. The critical analysis of the literature shows that the positive-normative dichotomy is exaggerated. Moreover, value-free economics is based on normative foundations that have a negative impact on individuals and society. The paper's second aim is (...)
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  46. Irreplaceable Value.Gwen Bradford - 2024 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies of Metaethics 19. Oxford University Press USA.
    If the Mona Lisa, the Sistine Chapel, the sarcophagus of Tutankhamun, or the Sword of Goujian were destroyed, nothing could replace them. New works of art that are even more impressive may be created, which may replenish the value in the world in quantity, but they would not fully replace the loss. Works of art and historical artifacts have irreplaceable value. But just what is irreplaceable value? This paper presents perhaps the first analysis. Irreplaceable value (...)
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  47. Valuing life as necessary for moral status: a noteon depression and personhood.Joshua Stein - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):45-51.
    Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual's status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one's own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health (...)
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  48. Distinguishing value-neutrality from value-independence: toward a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2022 - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter outlines a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology. It builds on the fundamental distinction between value-neutrality and value-independence as two separate aspects of methodological austerity introduced by Matthew Kramer. This type of conceptual analysis is then applied to two major challenges in moral epistemology: globalised scepticism and debate fragmentation. Both challenges arise from collapsing the fact/value dichotomy. They can be addressed by comprehensive disentangling that runs along both dimensions – value neutrality vs. value (...)
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  49. Values in Science: Should we say goodbye to impartiality?Claudio Ricardo Martins Reis - 2021 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (25):199-218.
    In the first half of the 20 th century, philosophers of science used to sustain that the correct theory acceptance in science derived from their conforming to certain rules. However, from the historicist and practical turn in the philosophy of science, the theory acceptance started to be analyzed based on values rather than on a priori established rules. In this article, I will present four paradigmatic positions on the role of values in science. The first position, articulated by (...)
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  50. The Value of Knowledge and its Problems.Kevin Patton - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
    This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These three problems require an answer as to how knowledge is more valuable 1) than mere true belief, 2) any of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) in kind than that which falls short of knowledge. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as (...)
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