BackgroundViral pandemics present a range of ethical challenges for policy makers, not the least among which are difficult decisions about how to allocate scarce healthcare resources. One important question is whether healthcare workers should receive priority access to a vaccine in the event that an effective vaccine becomes available. This question is especially relevant in the coronavirus pandemic with governments and health authorities currently facing questions of distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.Main textIn this article, we critically evaluate the most common ethical (...) arguments for granting healthcare workers priority access to a vaccine. We review the existing literature on this topic, and analyse both deontological and utilitarian arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation. For illustrative purposes, we focus in particular on the distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine. We also explore some practical complexities attendant on arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation.ConclusionsWe argue that there are deontological and utilitarian cases for prioritising HCWs. Indeed, the widely held view that we should prioritise HCWs represents an example of ethical convergence. Complexities arise, however, when considering who should be included in the category of HCW, and who else should receive priority in addition to HCWs. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

This article examines the British colonial theft of Indigenous sovereignty and the particular obstacles that it presents to establishing just social relations between the colonizer and the colonized in settler states. In the first half, I argue that the particular nature of the crime of sovereign theft makes apologies and reparations unsuitable policy tools for reconciliation because Settler societies owe their very existence to the abrogation of Indigenous sovereignties. Instead, Settler states ought to return sovereignty to the land’s Indigenous peoples. (...) In the second half of this paper, I take up some of the practical questions of how this might be done and anticipate a number of objections. Giving up sovereignty would not mean dispossessing the millions of colonists who currently reside in these countries of their homes and property – but it does mean rethinking the constitutional makeup of a country and how that serves to benefit the different peoples who make their homes there. (shrink)

The present work consists of a discussion about the concept of real number in Frege. It is intended to explain how Frege tries to define the real numbers, highlighting the importance that the notion of “magnitude-ratio” plays in this definition. In Part III, in Volume II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903) (from now on only: Grundgesetze), Frege presents his theory of real numbers, which is followed by a long criticism of the real number theories in force at that time, (...) such as by Cantor, Dedekind, Thomae and Weierstrass. In view of this, to fulfill our purpose, we will examine the text only where Frege presents his own theory of real numbers (the informal presentation) (§§156-164). Frege's criticisms of previous theories will not be examined in detail, unless an introduction to his criticism of formalism, in order to elucidate such criticism. Thus, only the part in which the philosopher presents his own conception of real numbers will be analyzed. To support the discussion, authors Peter Simons, Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro will be used. (shrink)

This thesis is a sceptical investigation into the notion that the metaphorical wave-particle binary of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse is related to quantum physics. Indeed, the field of literature and science has employed conceptual similarities as the main means of connecting quantum concepts to novels, however, this has led to a host of scholarly difficulties, prompting the need for a re-examination of analogical linkages. Woolf is the model candidate for such a re-examination, given her historical and philosophical proximity with (...) the developments of quantum mechanics. To the Lighthouse, in particular, was written between 1925 and 1927: precisely when quantum physicists were attempting to resolve the wave-particle duality, leading to Niels Bohr's complementarity. This parallel has been noted by researchers as relevant to the novel, as it too displays a general binary that can be read as wave-particle-like, which the author also attempts to resolve along similar philosophical lines. Nevertheless, other than proximity and similarity, there are no reasons to affirm that the science is related to the novel; hence, it is an ideal case study to examine in order to ascertain the value of conceptual similarities in literature and science. To do so, To the Lighthouse's binary and its resolution are interpreted in a thesis-long close reading, in order to compare aspects of it firstly to Woolf's personal thought, and secondly to various non-quantum intellectual contexts that preceded and surrounded her. In doing so, it becomes clear not only that invoking quantum physics serves no clear purpose in better understanding the novel, but also that the notion of resolving wave- particle-like binaries was a widespread philosophical procedure at the turn of the century, decades before Bohr's concept. This negative conclusion interrogates what the scholarly value of interpreting similarities is, though a hypothetical solution can be found in conceptual metaphor theory. (shrink)

The Pastoral Constitution, Gaudium et Spes, is a key document for fundamental theology. In it, for the first time, the Church openly discusses the anthropological question as a specific theme. It explains what Christian anthropology is and in what way the mystery of Christ sheds light on the mystery of man. From the point of view of fundamental theology, the document shows how theological reason is closely related to anthropological meaning. It takes note of the potential mediatory role of anthropology (...) in a dialogue between faith and reason in the modern world. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard’s libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can conceivably hurt the borrowers’ interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case only in (...) some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit and Mariano of recent government interventions in and around CDS markets. (shrink)

L’article introduit au rôle de l’efficience dans la génération d’avantages ou de désavantages enregistrés par les minorités. L’objectif est de démontrer que l’efficience devrait jouer un rôle plus important dans le domaine de la justice ethnoculturelle. Pour ce faire, une brève présentation de la place du nombre dans la littérature sur le sujet est offerte, ce qui permet de saisir le fond de l’argument consistant à faire des déséquilibres numériques une source certaine des injustices subies par les minorités, notamment dans (...) une perspective inspirée par l’égalitarisme de la chance. De ce point de vue, l’asymétrie numérique peut toutefois constituer une source d’avantages pour ces groupes. Dès lors, une telle asymétrie, qui est l’un des constituants de la définition de la minorité, prend une autre dimension. Plus que cette asymétrie, il apparaît que c’est l’efficience (la manière dont les groupes gèrent cette asymétrie) qui détermine les conditions et succès matériels des membres d’un groupe donné. Après une discussion des minorités efficientes et dominantes, l’article se conclut par la mise en lumière de quelques pistes de recherche rendues visibles par l’efficience et qui sont pertinentes pour la théorie de la justice en contexte multiculturel. (shrink)

In most jurisdictions where euthanasia is legal, patients seeking euthanasia need to seek out the approval of their request from two clinicians (one of who is a psychiatrist). These doctors are required to assess whether euthanasia is ‘appropriate’ for the patient in question. In this paper I claim that doctors qua doctors are not qualified (or, at least, not typically) to evaluate suffering of an existential kind, and consequently they are not qualified to 'evaluate' the requests of patients seeking euthanasia. (...) Importantly, this argument is only focused on patients who are seeking euthanasia on account of acute suffering. To defend my central thesis, I discuss the limits of the professional expertise of clinicians, in addition to considering the nature of suffering experienced by patients requesting euthanasia (which is, typically, a combination of physiological, psychological and existential suffering). (shrink)

The radical mean suggested by Socrates in order to carry out the program of the Republic - the relegation to the fields of all inhabitants over the age of 10 - has perplexed modern commentators who have seen in it an ironical remark, a reductio ad absurdum presented in order to establish the very impossibility of Kallipolis or, on the contrary, a sign of the totalitarian and criminal character of the Platonic city. But it is far from evident, in view (...) of political or military events prior and contemporary with the redaction of the Republic, that this solution could offend the moral conscience of fourth-century Greeks. This practice even seems to be the logical consequence of a certain oligarchic or aristocratic ideology, common by the end of the 5th c. and at the beginning of the 4th c., which associated, on the one hand, rural organization with the ‘best regime’ and, on the other, urban centralisation with democracy. The actual practices of the Lacedaemonian city, which maintained its primitive organization in komai, and even tried to impose it to other cities, could also serve as a model for the opponents of Athenian democracy. All of Plato's political models, from the Republic to the Laws, present cities whose essential, if not exclusive, productive activity is agriculture. The displacement of the population to the countryside seems, from this perspective, a rather serious proposal of the philosopher. * * Agradezco a Héctor Zagal y a María-Elena García-Peláez por sus observaciones y sugerencias al texto en español. (shrink)

Culture as a dynamic system of meaningful relations can naturally accommodate a hermeneutic analysis. In this essay, the notion of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as involving interpretable meaning throughout experiential reality permits a natural concordance with an understanding of culture as meaningful. The Gadamerian idea that prejudices inform the horizons that make our experiences intelligible is applied to the view that culture is both a self-enclosed structure that is given by one’s horizon and one that continuously points past this horizon in genuine (...) dialogue. Nevertheless, in seeing culture as a coherent system that transcends itself, we are consequently faced with a dilemma regarding the evolution of one’s cultural horizons: whether past horizons can survive the creation of novel ones through dialogue. However, this may be resolved through Gadamer’s understanding of the functions of sameness and difference within horizonal evolution, and how these functions feature in the distinction between a shared ontological ground and the horizons through which the ground is interpreted. Ultimately, we showcase how it is noncontradictory to suppose that culture is both self- and other-referential. (shrink)

Why is space 3-dimensional? The fi rst answer to this question, entirely based on Physics, was given by Ehrenfest, in 1917, who showed that the stability requirement for n-dimensional two-body planetary system very strongly constrains space dimensionality, favouring 3-d. This kind of approach will be generically called "stability postulate" throughout this paper and was shown by Tangherlini, in 1963, to be still valid in the framework of general relativity as well as for quantum mechanical hydrogen atom, giving the same constraint (...) for space{dimensionality. In the present work, before criticizing this methodology, a brief discussion has been introduced, aimed at stressing and clarifying some general physical aspects of the problem of how to determine the number of space dimensions. Then, the epistemological consequences of Ehrenfest's methodology are critically reviewed. An alternative procedure to get at the proper number of dimensions, in which the stability postulate - and the implicit singularities in three-dimensional physics - are not an essential part of the argument, is proposed. In this way, the main epistemological problems contained in Ehrenfest's original idea are avoided. The alternative methodology proposed in this paper is realized by obtaining and discussing the n-dimensional quantum theory as expressed in Planck's law, de Broglie relation and the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. As a consequence, it is possible to propose an experiment, based on thermal neutron di raction by crystals, to directly measure space dimensionality. Finally the distinguished role of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory in the determination of space dimensionality is stressed. (shrink)

Cet article évalue, du point de vue moral, les justifications possibles pour le recours à la taxation en vue de promouvoir des comportements « sains ». L’objectif est de démontrer qu’un tel instrument recevrait une meilleure justification, c’est-à-dire plus en accord avec des principes égalitariens respectueux de la liberté individuelle, s’ils s’inscrivaient dans une logique de mutualisation. Pour ce faire, les arguments du bien-être individuel et de l’efficience sociale sont discutés afin d’en pointer les fécondités et limites. Au travers de (...) leurs limites, ces arguments introduisent naturellement à une troisième manière d’appréhender le problème, sous l’angle de la mutualisation. Ce principe représente moins une remise en cause radicale des arguments précédents qu’une reformulation du recours à l’efficience sociale et une limitation du champ d’application des appels au bien-être individuel. Il repose sur deux idées. La première est que la référence à une notion de responsabilité, même affadie, est nécessaire. De plus, celle-ci doit être conçue comme partagée entre producteurs et consommateurs ainsi que limitée au domaine financier. La seconde est que la mutualisation ne peut être déconnectée d’intuitions égalitariennes formulées de manière générale. (shrink)

In this essay, I look at the significant portion of vegans who are vegan because they care about harm to animals. I investigate what lifestyle is in fact consistent with caring about harm to animals, which I begin by calling consistent veganism. I argue that the lifestyle that consistently follows from this underlying conviction behind many people’s veganism is in fact distinct from a vegan lifestyle.

In this article it is shown that a careful analysis of Kant 's Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise leads to a conclusion that does not match the usually accepted interpretation of Kant 's reasoning in 1747, according to which the young Kant supposedly establishes a relationship between the tridimensionality of space and Newton's law of gravitation. Indeed, it is argued that this text does not yield a satisfactory explanation of space dimensionality, and actually (...) restricts itself to justifying the tridimensionality of extension. (shrink)

Metascientific criteria used for explaining or constraining physical space dimensionality and their historical relationship to prevailing causal systems are discussed. The important contributions by Aristotle, Kant and Ehrenfest to the dimensionality of space problem are considered and shown to be grounded on different causal explanations: causa materialis for Aristotle, causa efficiens for young Kant and an ingenious combination of causa efficiens and causa formalis for Ehrenfest. The prominent and growing rôle played by causa formalis in modern physical approaches to this (...) problem is emphasized. (shrink)

Defences of Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument (ALA) that employ doxastic propagation principles—i.e., rules by which cases of beliefs and/or dispositions to believe are inferred from other such cases—risk running into sorites. Since these principles are explainable by an ineffective capacity to phenomenally discriminate between two adjacent cases, luminist rejections of the ALA can halt sorites by denying doxastic propagation, thereby reaffirming these discriminative capacities as appropriately effective. One potent method of resisting the luminist involves recharacterizing discriminative capacities in terms of a (...) distinction between beliefs and their underlying dispositions to reinstate the plausibility of doxastic propagation. To this effect, I propose a novel coarse-grained approach favouring the ALA that leverages a modal analysis of the belief/ disposition distinction. This motivates a sharp threshold between belief and absent belief that neither succumbs to sorites nor begs the question against the luminist. The upshot of this approach is substantial: by conferring a dialectical advantage to the anti-luminist, the luminist is held to highly problematic positions, regarding the trivialisation of safety and the relationship between beliefs and dispositions, if they deny the coarse-grained approach at many of its components. (shrink)

Istvan Hont’s classic work on the theoretical links between the seventeenth-century natural jurists Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists remains a popular trope among intellectual and economic historians of various stamps. Despite this, a common criticism levelled at Hont remains his relative lack of engagement with the relationship between religion and economics in the early modern period. This paper challenges this aspect of Hont’s narrative by drawing attention to an alternative, albeit complementary, assessment of the (...) natural jurisprudential heritage of eighteenth-century British political economy. Specifically, the article attempts to map on to Hont’s thesis the Christian Stoic interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf which has gained greater currency in recent years. In doing so, the paper argues that Grotius and Pufendorf’s contributions to the ‘unsocial sociability’ debate do not necessarily lead directly to the Scottish school of political economists, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it contends that a reconsideration of Grotius and Pufendorf as neo-Stoic theorists, particularly via scrutiny of their respective adaptations of the traditional Stoic theory of oikeiosis, steers us towards the heart of the early English ‘clerical’ Enlightenment. (shrink)

Epistemological contrastivism can model how infallible knowledge functions by employing the explanatory resource of structural differences between contrastive propositions, e.g., “P rather than Q”, and orthodox propositions, e.g., “P”. In doing so we notice that how this difference factors into our conception of infallible knowledge depends on two aspects: one, whether belief acts as a necessary condition for knowledge, and two, whether epistemic justification is construed as consciously internalist or non-consciously externalist. We further leverage the notion of phenomenal resolution, conceived (...) as an outcome of one’s discriminative capacities in accessing their evidence, to clarify in what sense it becomes reasonable to say that the truth of P mutually excludes the truth of Q when the latter is contrasted to the former. Importantly then, there is a way of infallibly knowing that P that is indistinguishable from infallibly knowing that P rather than Q, and a way that is not. (shrink)

According to Kuhn’s account of the nature of scientific paradigms, how one experiences the world varies drastically from one context to another depending on the accepted paradigm of the context in question. In other words, one’s pre-existing conceptual structure concerning the world not only acts as an epistemological framework for its possible understanding, but also fundamentally affects the phenomenological observations of the world as something; this latter function of the conceptual structure motivates the view that mature scientific paradigms/theories and the (...) data of scientific observation/experimentation are essentially two sides of the same coin. What is interesting, then, is that even between different historical eras that generally regarded the world in clearly incompatible ways, albeit still informed by paradigms, Kuhn still attributes scientific knowledge to each. To make sense of this, the explanatory resources of epistemological contextualism are used to specify potentially one way in which epistemic standards for knowledge must change between different historical eras for one to justifiably claim scientific knowledge within these different contexts. As we shall see, the argument for Kuhn’s account of paradigm being contextualist in character is apparently best made through the notion of doubt-driven context-shifts as actualising change in the form of P between different contexts in which “S knows that P” is asserted. As such, this paper first explores Kuhn’s account of scientific knowledge and paradigms before considering how the account can be considered contextualist in nature. Moreover, other context-concerned systems, such as Traditional, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, are briefly investigated to substantiate claims of what cannot be accurately ascribed to Kuhn’s epistemology. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Las Piñas Bamboo Organ as a cultural treasure. By interviewing four key individuals related to the bamboo organ, the paper discusses the history, present condition, and activities related to the preservation and sustenance of the bamboo organ. Interview, a method of oral history, was chosen to let the people involved share their own memories and experiences that are not usually featured in written documents about the bamboo organ. The following themes emerged from the interviews: (1) the (...) introduction of Father Diego Cera as an organ builder, (2) the motivations in using bamboo as the main material of the bamboo organ, (3) the quality of the sound produced by the bamboo organ, (4) the restoration of the bamboo organ, (5) the beginnings, objectives, and activities of the Bamboo Organ Foundation, Inc., (6) the beginnings and objectives of the International Bamboo Organ Festival and the activities related to it, (7) the problems that the bamboo organ faces, and (8) the importance of training organists. The researchers also identified the implications of the conservation of the bamboo organ in the economic, social, ecological, and cultural aspects of the city’s social life based on its potentials for development. This paper can be a useful primary source for future researchers of the bamboo organ and the local history of Las Piñas. (shrink)

This essay explores the relation between nature and culture and analyses it from the perspective of contemporary evolutionary theory. Both animals and humans are conceived of as attaining both natural and cultural features that interact with each other on a number of levels of varying complexity: nature as cultural, nature as influenced by culture, culture as natural, and culture as influenced by nature. “Nature as cultural” is meant to express a decoupling of behavioral/phenotypic changes of an organism from its genetic (...) determination. “Nature as influenced by culture” is the idea of niche construction, wherein such decoupled changes can causally feedback to genetic reality, thereby influencing the evolutionary features of downstream species. “Culture as natural” portrays how cultural structures of humans and animals persist through the generations, accumulate incurred changes, and evolve in analogous ways to biological natural selection. “Culture as influenced by nature” is the notion that the cultural/linguistic capacities of animals and humans have evolutionarily emerged from precultural history. All this is meant to evaluate the viability of constructing a nature/culture divide. The conclusion is made that the divide seems arbitrary within and between human and animal life when considering how the differences between the natural and cultural dynamics of humans and animals are modelled as differences of degree, not kind. A potential approach in using the concept of consciousness to recontextualize a nature/culture divide in terms of the possession of consciousness is proposed at the end. (shrink)

Kantian Deontological Ethics concerns itself with the will as grounded in universalisable maxims. Such maxims are in turn based on rationally conceived laws that, in a professional setting, find expression in the autonomously made agreements constituting professional protocols and regulations. When applied to a case-study wherein public safety has been possibly jeopardised by company products, we can argue for priority in the agreed-to responsibility towards the good of professional autonomy, expressed as a rational mandate of nondisclosure of confidential product information, (...) over that of the good of public safety. This priority persists regardless of whether the good of truth, such as the disclosure of confidential product information, has its value grounded in itself or the good of safety. Nevertheless, company and individual professional responsibility may prioritise safety over autonomy, but how this prioritisation is made must be sensitive to the autonomously willed choice of the employed professional. (shrink)

Arguments concerning the nature of natural evil vary in their conclusions depending on the particular approach with which they commence inquiry; one of the most contested conclusions regards evil as privation, sourcing its justification primarily from Aquinas’ metaphysical conception of good as being and evil as non-being. It should be of no surprise, then, that the dismissal of natural evil’s privative nature comes about when the understanding of natural evil favours a phenomenological approach rather than a metaphysical one. Proponents of (...) said dismissal generally centre their claims around the notion of pain and suffering as substantially contentful – as in, non-privative – experiences of evil. On the other hand, theorists espousing the privation account generally argue that characterisations of pain and suffering as necessarily evil do not consider the context of orientation towards individual wellbeing within which pain/suffering experiences naturally function. Furthermore, some of the arguments for the privation account’s dismissal seem to disregard completely the Thomistic sense of the form and hierarchy of the good, which ends up straw-manning the privation account to a point where it can no longer reconcile the awfulness of experienced pain and suffering with these experiences not being necessarily evil. The importance of understanding this Thomistic sense is further emphasised in its capacity to explain why a divine and fully good Creator would involve the world with such evil. Thus, this paper first considers the account of evil given in question one of Aquinas’ De malo, along with contemporary arguments for the nature and purpose of evil as privation; second, these are then used as resources to help make sense of, one, the general nature of pain and suffering, and two, some of their specific expressions as found in disease and depression, and throughout evolutionary history. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that consciousness not only historically constrains experience but also allows strangeness to intelligibly speak to it. This historically effected and effective consciousness features in Gadamer’s idea that a common language is unearthed for the interpretive horizons of those involved in dialogue with each other through a logic of question and answer. I argue, however, that this reveals a conceptual uncertainty about evaluating progress in interpretive understanding. Gadamer’s failure to escape from this uncertainty risks the possibility of a (...) problematic relativism. Effectively, even if sufficient interpretation occurs when horizons are infinitely structured, this does not preclude incoherence between a horizon’s elements. (shrink)

La investigación clínica, entendida como la búsqueda de soluciones para los problemas que acechan a la salud es, por su objetivo, una de las actividades de mayor trascendencia para el ser humano. Esta obra colectiva, como su propio título indica, explora no solo lo mucho que de positivo (las luces) tiene la investigación clínica, cómo se realiza, qué problemas encuentra y qué soluciones se plantean, sino también algunos aspectos negativos (las sombras) que la comunidad científica ha sido, hasta la fecha, (...) incapaz de impedir que se produzcan. (shrink)

Popper's account of science is an endeavour in establishing the relationship between universality and truth. The idea is that the more an empirical law is universal, by precluding certain realities from obtaining in an evidentially falsifiable way, the more the law is supported by instances of its predictions being evidentially verified. The logical structure of this dynamic is captured by Popper's notion of 'corroboration'. However, this notion is suspect, for, depending on one's interpretation of evidential givenness, the relation between a (...) law's degree of universality and evidential corroborability could instead invert, thereby contradicting Popper. This paper also explores how a conceptualization of universality in terms of necessary simplicity-i.e., a measure of simplicity that is also sensitive to the evidence at hand-can better recontextualize evidential givenness to be about evidential support for a theory's predictive truth conduciveness, against Popper's understanding of evidential support for a theory's veracity concerning the evidence at hand. However, it is argued that employing necessary simplicity to attain truth conduciveness in a theory's predictions must appeal to specific background assumptions concerning the state of affairs the evidence is supposed to be about. When these background assumptions are denied as being necessarily instantiated, then a relation between necessary simplicity and truth conduciveness becomes contingently uncertain. (shrink)

In order to re-contextualize the otherwise ontologically privileged meaning of metaphysical debates into a more insubstantial form, metaphysical deflationism runs the risk of having to adopt potentially unwanted anti-realist tendencies. This tension between deflationism and anti-realism can be expressed as follows: in order to claim truthfully that something exists, how can deflationism avoid the anti-realist feature of construing such claims singularly in an analytical fashion? One may choose to adopt a Yablovian fallibilism about existential claims, but other approaches can be (...) appealed to as well. Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology is one such approach, whereby the interaction of empirical as well as analytic features within the construction of its ontological theory affords a role for analytical rules without forsaking a link with empirical reality. The development of these analytical and empirical features has resulted in significant critiques regarding, one, potential reference failure of easy-ontological claims, and two, a circularity in how easy ontology explains the relation between its analytical rules and existential claims. This essay offers a response by showcasing how an easy ontological deflationism can reject these criticisms without succumbing to, one, the anti-realism of pure analyticism, and two, a further critique of wholesale referential indeterminacy in its referring terms. (shrink)

Generally, an epistemic fallibilist considers it reasonable to claim, “I know that P, but I may be wrong.” An epistemic infallibilist, on the other hand, would consider this claim absurd. I argue initially that infallibilism presents more advantages in its assertion of the claim’s absurdity than fallibilism does in making the claim. One, infallibilism is not faulted with the propensity for violations of epistemic closure that beleaguers some fallibilist accounts, due in part to the latter’s problematic shunting of fallible epistemic (...) standards across inferential chains. Two, infallibilism is more easily modelled doxastically than fallibilism, as the former’s understanding of certainty is more tractable than the latter’s idea of what counts as a viable standard of fallibility. A rectification of these fallibilist issues may then be called upon to motivate gradualist variants of fallibilism. For epistemic gradualism, the problematic modellability and shunting of standards is curtailed via an awareness that the standard for knowledge is just one out of many along a gradient that includes, at one extreme, the infallibilist standard of certainty. Specifically, first, gradualism, along with infallibilism, can be modelled doxastically through elucidating upon an obtaining relation between doubt and knowledge; next, the problem with violating closure, although not generally applicable to infallibilism, can be answered by gradualism with a reasonable denial of closure altogether that makes precise which epistemic standard is relevant for which part of an inferential chain; lastly, these modelling resources can be appropriated, by both gradualism and infallibilism, to successfully address a doxastically pertinent form of closure violation called rational self-doubt. (shrink)

Reading, even when silent and individual, is a social phenomenon and has often been studied as such. Complementary to this view, research has begun to explore how reading is embodied beyond simply being ‘wired’ in the brain. This article brings the social and embodied perspectives together in a very literal sense. Reporting a qualitative study of reading practices across student focus groups from six European countries, it identifies an underexplored factor in reading behaviour and experience. This factor is the sheer (...) physical presence, and concurrent activity, of other people in the environment where one engages in individual silent reading. The primary goal of the study was to explore the role and possible associations of a number of variables (text type, purpose, device) in selecting generic (e.g. indoors vs outdoors) as well as specific (e.g. home vs library) reading environments. Across all six samples included in the study, participants spontaneously attested to varied, and partly surprising, forms of sensitivity to company and social space in their daily efforts to align body with mind for reading. The article reports these emergent trends and discusses their potential implications for research and practice. (shrink)

Revelación y religiones es el título del libro editado por Xavier Morlans i Molina, publicado en el 2016 por la editorial Herder. De manera sencilla y sin recargar los capítulos de información sobre las religiones tratadas, los autores se abocan a la misión de buscaranalogías y diferencias de la idea de revelación en dichas tradiciones. El orden que tiene el libro es cronológico, es decir, según la aparición histórica de cada tradición religiosa.

A deep research in the philosophical (between phenomenology and new metaphysics) anthropology of Zubiri looking for how the human person connects and grows with others from metaphysical root until social development, studying love as personalist connection. Origin, embryo ontological status and death are also studied.

In this article, Zubiri’s concept of history is expounded. We may view this concept, along with the rest of his philosophy, from a naturalistic perspective which contemplates history as a social dynamism grounded in nature, and not as an essentially spiritual phenomenon or a rational one endowed with teleological progress separate from nature. By means of fundamental concepts in Zubirian philosophy, such as “possibility”, “tradition”, “reality in a condition”, “capacitation”, and others, our philosopher distinguishes himselffrom other idealistic visions which analyze (...) history in virtue of a teleological ideal external to the dynamism proper to the real. This is the case with Kant, who structures history starting from an ideal of ethical-political progress, which is for him already inscribed within human nature. And it is also the case with Hegel, for whom history is a rational process, which is supposed to reach the Absolute Spirit by means of the prominence of the State as the locus of Reason’s revelation. -/- En este artículo se expone la concepción de la historia de Xavier Zubiri. Tal concepción la podemos situar, al igual que el resto de su filosofía, en el marco de una perspectiva naturalista que contempla la historia como un dinamismo social fundamentado en la naturaleza, y no como un fenómeno esencialmente espiritual o racional de progreso teleológico ajeno a lo natural. Mediante conceptos fundamentales en la filosofía zubiriana como sonlos de “posibilidad”, “tradición”, “realidad en condición”, “capacitación”, ..., nuestro filósofo se desmarca de otras visiones idealistas que analizan la historia en virtud de un ideal teleológico externo al propio dinamismo de lo real. Es este el caso de Kant, el cual vertebra la historia a partir de un ideal de progreso ético-político que estaba inscrito ya en la misma naturaleza humana. O es también el caso de Hegel, para quien la historia es un proceso racional que ha de alcanzar el Espíritu Absoluto a través del protagonismo del Estado como lugar de desvelación de la Razón. (shrink)

El artículo comienza destacando cómo la filosofía y la religión han procurado desbordar la contingencia y la finitud de la vida individual tratando de engullir a la muerte en la noche una y universal de la nada mediante el pensamiento del Todo (Franz Rosenzweig). Hegel simboliza el relevo más sobresaliente en esta dilatada carrera de la filosofía como fuga mortis. Nuestra época se presenta, en cambio, como el período histórico que ha preferido vivir el miedo antes que evanescerse en nada. (...) La idea central que defiende este trabajo es la conexión, aparentemente inconciliable, entre muerte y metafísica. Analizar dicha unidad y sus implicaciones para la realidad sustantiva humana en el núcleo mismo de la filosofía de Zubiri constituye el objetivo principal de este artículo. PALABRAS CLAVE Zubiri, Heidegger, Scheler, Levinas, muerte, metafísica, fenomenología. ABSTRACT The article starts by emphasizing how philosophy and religion have tried to exceed the contingency and the finitud of the individual life trying to devour the death in the night one and universally of nothing ness by means of the thought completely (Franz Rosenzweig). Hegel symbolizes the most brilliant relief in this extensive race of the philosophy as fuga mortis. Our time appears, on the other hand, as the historical period that has preferred living through the fear before dissappearing in to nothing ness. The main idea that defends this work is the connection, seemingly irreconcilably, between death and metaphysics. To analyze this mentioned unit and its implications for the substantival human reality in the core itself of Zubiri's philosophy constitutes the principal aim of this article. KEY WORDS Zubiri, Heidegger, Scheler, Levinas, death, metaphysics, phenomenology. (shrink)

There are two fundamental questions that this paper tries to answer: how Zubiri knows God, and whether we can consider his philosophy to be mysticism. The greatest part of the analysis considers the last ten years of his philosophical activity. The first part of the paper analyzes the mature form of his method, which Zubiri revealed in his Trilogy. A brief presentation is made of primordial apprehension, logos and reason. Zubiri’s method goes beyond orthodox phenomenology, because he finds a need (...) also to include metaphysics. The second part of the article applies this method in order to know God. It begins with an analysis of the person in the process of construction of its I. Zubiri analyzes this mostly in Man and God. We can access God only on the metaphysical level of knowledge. On this path he rejects logic and speculation. On our way to know God we must confront the presumed sketch of God with human personal life. We can discover human life only by following strictly the sui generis phenomenological method. The conclusion that Zubiri reaches is that there is a personal absolute God, who influences humans in the construction of the I through the reality of things. On certain conditions, we can call Zubiri’s approach to philosophy a mystical one. This is due to the constant action of God creating a certain tension between the person and reality and a need for a personal answer to the divine action. (shrink)

In 1893, three young men in their early twenties, Xavier Léon, Élie Halévy and Léon Brunschvicg, founded the Revue de métaphysique et de morale. This article explores the motives of this endeavour, and how they made the journal the centre of three great scientific enterprises: in 1894 they promoted the edition of Descartes’s Œuvres completes; in 1900, they organized the first international congress of philosophy in Paris; in 1901, they founded the Societé française de philosophie.

Sumário: 1. O conceito de revolução, Amélia de Jesus Oliveira; 2. Mudanças de concepção de mundo, Artur Bezzi Günther; 3. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento, Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos; 4. El realismo interno de Putnam y sus implicaciones en la filosofía de la ciencia y para el realismo científico, Marcos Antonio da Silva; 5.O papel da observação na atividade científica segundo Peirce, Max Rogério Vicentini; 6.Fact and Value entanglement: a collapse of objective reality?, Oswaldo (...) Melo Souza Filho; 7.Realismo interno e o paradoxo de Putnam, Renato Mendes Rocha; 8.Uma informação, dois formatos, dois destinos, Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso; 9.O Mentiroso e as intuições acerca da noção de verdade na perspectiva de Saul Kripke, Ederson Safra Melo; 10.A conceptual difficulty with some definitions of behavior, Filipe Lazzeri; 11.A faceta epistêmica do problema da referência, Saulo Moraes de Assis; 12.Princípios metafísicos do método newtoniano, Bruno Camilo de Oliveira; 13.A resposta aristotélica para a aporia do regresso ao infinito nas demonstrações, Daniel Lourenço; 14.O uso da doutrina da ponderação aplicado ao principialismo, Cinthia Berwanger Pereira; 15.A fenomenologia da vida interior em Hannah Arendt, Elizabete Olinda Guerra; 16.Por que achar que o direito é formado por ordens é um fracasso?, ria Alice da Silva; 17 Por que ainda há poucas mulheres na filosofia? Uma versão modificada do modelo das “vozes diferentes”, Tânia A. Kuhnen; 18.Algumas considerações sobre Substância, Forma e Matéria na Metafísica de Aristóteles, Gabriel Geller Xavier. (shrink)

Let’s say that an act requires Person-Affecting Justification if and only if some alternative would have been better for someone. So, Lucifer breaking Xavier’s back requires Person-Affecting Justification because the alternative would have been better for Xavier. But the story continues: While Lucifer evades justice, Xavier moves on and founds a school for gifted children. Xavier’s deepest values become identified with the school and its community. When authorities catch Lucifer, he claims no Person-Affecting Justification is needed: (...) because the attack set Xavier on his life’s path, it’s no longer true that the alternative would have been better by the standard of what Xavier now values most. An unappealingly paternalistic way to hold Lucifer to account is to discount Xavier’s preferences as merely adaptive. Instead, I propose understanding the persons of Person-Affecting Justification to be not persons but person stages. This allows us to hold Lucifer to account without having to discount Xavier’s actual preferences, and has interesting implications for compensatory justice, including making sense of reparations for historical wrongs. (shrink)