En su libro Una ética sin fundamentos, Nicolás Zavadivker sostiene que la teoría ética y metaética de Mario Bunge pretende fundamentar las normas morales en premisas fácticas, sin hacer uso de valores. El presente trabajo discute esa tesis y sostiene que la teoría de Bunge busca construir y evaluar un sistema de valores y de normas, de forma rigurosa y sin arbitrariedad, a partir de conocimientos fácticos y valores de los evaluadores. Dado que la teoría de Bunge incluye valores entre (...) sus premisas argumentativas, es incorrecto categorizarla como una posición fundacionista que prescinde de valores. (shrink)

The book intends to interpret how different religions articulate their territories and manage the relationship with other religions, understanding systems and multiple everyday spaces, in a dynamic that is not only a component of contemporary reality, but is central to living it. The underlying thesis is that religion is the great geopolitical issue of our time, but an interpretation is only possible in terms of religious plurality and how ideas, symbolism, subjectivities and practices are incorporated in the daily life of (...) those who share the religious times and spaces, producing territorial identities and imaginary concrete cartographies as world projects. The volume has articles that focus on the religious space being gestated, expanded, contracted, celebrated or represented as a foundation for common life, as well as inter-religious conflicts arising in a world of diverse and differential coexistence. It is not a debate about classical geopolitics, but how geopolitical relations cross cultural-religious experience. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to present Michel Foucault's perspective on the formation of moral subjectivity according to his text entitled “The use of pleasures and the techniques of self”. In the referred text, Foucault emphasizes that moral action should not be constituted in acts according to a rule of conduct supported by moral concepts, but in acts according to a pure relation of the subject with his internal wisdom (subjectivity), a relationship that should not be (...) understood as simply a “self-awareness” as a moral subject, but as a “constitution of the self” as a moral subject In this article, Foucault's position on the formation of moral subjectivity is considered to analyze the place of desire in the autonomy of oneself and of practical attitudes, especially if they are considered: the subject's experience as a process in which both subjectivity and desires are modified or annulled by specific norms or laws, established in certain societies and culture, almost always linked to norms of sexuality; the power of the strongest, insofar as it influences institutions to spread interests in society, corrupting the particular desires of individuals; the “techniques of self”, as rational and voluntary practices that curb desires, by which human beings determine for themselves rules of conduct that correspond to aesthetic values. (shrink)

James Doyle’s book interprets and defends the arguments of G. E. M. Anscombe’s essays “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person.” Though both essays are widely cited, Doyle argues that in each instance Anscombe’s readers have missed the force of her arguments, which, when properly understood, are able to withstand the common objections to them.Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” is commonly read as arguing that talk of moral obligation, permission etc., once had a legitimate place within conceptual frameworks (...) that included the existence of a divine legislator, and can be vindicated outside that framework by adopting the schema of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. But Doyle argues convincingly that this is... (shrink)

Definiciones de epistemología hay muchas, al igual que clases y estilos. Sin embargo, más allá de esta diversidad, es necesario contar con una definición básica que guíe nuestra comprensión del tema. Dos serán las preguntas que nos ayuden a ello en este artículo: a) ¿qué es la epistemología? y b) ¿para qué le sirve al científico?

En este artículo se debaten tres aspectos del concepto de la moral: el primero se refiere a la puesta en duda de la existencia misma, no sólo del concepto sino de la posible o imposible fundamentación de lo moral per se. En segundo lugar, la positivización del término llevado a lo normativo como una búsqueda de objetividad de lo moral y, el tercer aspecto, la crítica a la moral imperativa desde posturas dogmáticas. Se defiende que no (...) es suficiente la perfectibilidad de las leyes desde un punto de vista de la moralidad, sino que existe lo que podríamos llamar un fundamento personal, y al mismo tiempo, colectivo de comprensión del Derecho; entendido como el bienestar individual y colectivo para la realización de una vida plena en la polis. La moralidad, por tanto, si bien no es posible definirla en modo explicativo, racional, necesita de una base en valores compartidos con aspiraciones objetivistas y, al mismo tiempo, universalistas. (shrink)

Los autores hacen en este ensayo un análisis crítico del texto original de John Stuart Mill [1861/1863] titulado “El utilitarismo”, en el que el autor inglés busca hacer compatibles dos doctrinas: la doctrina del mayor bien para el mayor número de personas y, la doctrina del ius naturalismo que considera que existe un canon moral a priori que introduce conceptos absolutos como el bien intrínseco o el mal en sí como criterios para la toma de decisiones. En este trabajo, (...) se subraya la influencia que el pragmatismo clásico ejerció, y ejerce, como teoría de pensamiento jurídico y, sobre todo, para la acción y la decisión. El utilitarismo, interpreta al mundo desde diversos enfoques epistemológicos, especialmente desde el derecho, la economía y la política. Los autores concluyen que el utilitarismo queda justificado como precepto válido para la aplicación del derecho positivo, en el que debe juzgarse la acción no por su intencionalidad, sino por sus consecuencias evidentes. (shrink)

James Doyle’s book is provocative and timely. It is an important contribution to the current wave of Anscombe scholarship, and it offers valuable insights into general metaethical ques­tions, such as: In what senses might morality be “unintelligible”? Or: To what extent does a divine law ethics rest on practical reason? Here, I do not want to summarize the many ad­mirable features of Doyle’s book. I will instead focus on his two main theses, of which I re­main unconvinced.

Comenzamos este texto con una pregunta, por algo que podríamos llamar un signo propio de la época, a saber, la proliferación de aproximaciones espaciales a los más diversos problemas y desde las más diversas disciplinas. No podemos dejar de notar que eso, cuyos signos se dejan recoger a pesar de su dispersión, en algo que llamamos época, sobreviene después de un agotamiento de la radicalización del historicismo y de un pensamiento del tiempo.

Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...) debate unscathed. (shrink)

Ascribing moral responsibility in collective action cases is notoriously difficult. After all, if my individual actions make no difference with regard to the prevention of climate change, the alleviation of poverty, or the outcome of national elections, why ought I to stop driving, donate money, or cast my vote? Neither consequentialist nor non-consequentialist moral theories have straightforward responses ready at hand. In this contribution, I present a new suggestion which, based on thoughts about causal overdetermination along the lines (...) of Mackie’s INUS account, aims to show that causally overdetermined collective action cases are morally arbitrary in a way that makes it possible to ascribe moral responsibility even if individual actions make no difference. (shrink)

Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments (...) favorable to reflective deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. (shrink)

Definiciones de epistemología hay muchas, al igual que clases y estilos. Sin embargo, más allá de esta diversidad, es necesario contar con una definición básica que guíe nuestra comprensión del tema. Dos serán las preguntas que nos ayuden a ello en este artículo: a) ¿qué es la epistemología? y b) ¿para qué le sirve al científico?

Este ensayo tiene tres pilares sobre los que se asienta. En primer lugar tendremos que especificar y aclarar los conceptos de auctoritas y potestas (Capítulo II)-que se irán desarrollando a lo largo de la misma-en relación con el vocablo poder, ya que estos conceptos tienen una similitud tanto en su etimología como en la forma que posteriormente se han utilizado en el pensamiento político, de forma tal que ha originado equívocos y cambios a la hora de conformar una comunidad legitimante (...) constituida. Para ello se acudirá a pensadores clásicos y contemporáneos que se han preocupado por la exégesis del binomio auctoritas-potestas, en relación a la legitimación del poder. Ello nos permitirá abordar el segundo pilar (Capítulos III, IV), en referencia a la génesis de la época moderna, como cambio de paradigma que dará a los vocablos referenciados una nueva forma de ejercer el poder a la hora de configurar dicha época. Ello se debe al paulatino alejamiento de los sistemas filosóficos de nuestras sociedades occidentales de la religión, la ética y de la metafísica. Por tanto nos acercaremos al surgimiento del cuestionamiento de la época moderna, a partir del nacimiento de la Ilustración como movimiento que cuestiona todo prejuicio que proviene de la religión y de su carácter de autoridad, para desembocar en el surgimiento del Pacto Social, como idea de razón kantiana que alberga el orden político y social de la época moderna. Por último, como tercer pilar, que es trasversal a todos ellos y en continua relación con los dos anteriores estudiaremos las reflexiones de dos pensadores del siglo XX, como son Boaventura de Sousa y Richard Rorty-ya que la maduración y trayectorias intelectuales de sus obras así nos lo aconsejan-, pueden representar dos visiones diferentes de afrontar los retos que se nos presentan en nuestros tiempos, en cuanto a los principios, los valores y la estructura que debería tener una sociedad del siglo XXI, en la que se pueda articular la convivencia de la forma más justa en relación con la auctoritas y la potestas. La elección de los mismos para confrontar sus aportaciones, tanto en el campo epistemológico, ontológico e ideológico, así como en el modelo de sociedad que ellos defienden, se fundamenta en que ambos representan puentes de diálogo posibles tanto entre la filosofía analítica (positivismo) y continental-Richard Rorty-como entre la filosofía europea continental (La teoría crítica de la Escuela de Frankfurt) y la filosofía latinoamericana anticolonial de autores del siglo XX -Boaventura de Sousa-. Esto último nos permitirá adentrarnos en la discusión entre modernidad y postmodernidad (Capítulos V y VI), por considerar que es una discusión actual en el panorama del pensamiento filosófico, y en la cual se ven inmersos estos dos pensadores, en particular en el uso que hacen del vocablo antiautoritarismo (Richard Rorty) y nuevo fascismo social (Boaventura de Sousa). Por último en su Capítulo VII llegaremos a las conclusiones a la que nos ha llevado a nuestra investigación. Al plantear una cuestión como la auctoritas y la postestas en relación con el poder legítimamente constituido dentro del campo de la filosofía política, estamos demostrando un compromiso con la concepción que se tiene de la filosofía, pues en este sentido se entiende como un ejercicio formativo para la construcción del ser humano y no como una disciplina meramente teórica. Por tanto realizaremos una investigación basada en el procedimiento reflexivo, sistemático y crítico de las obras filosóficas, antropológicas, sociológicas…etc., tanto de Boaventura de Sousa como de Richard Rorty. Ya que deberemos tener en cuenta que cada periodo histórico de la filosofía ha tenido una tensión entre pensadores que defendían una estamos aportando un compromiso con la concepción que se tiene de la filosofía, pues en este sentido se entiende como un ejercicio formativo para la construcción del ser humano y no como una disciplina meramente teórica. Por tanto realizaremos una investigación basada en el procedimiento reflexivo, sistemático y crítico de las obras filosóficas, antropológicas, sociológicas…etc., tanto de Boaventura de Sousa como de Richard Rorty. Ya que deberemos tener en cuenta que cada periodo histórico de la filosofía ha tenido una tensión entre pensadores que defendían una estamos aportando un compromiso con la concepción que se tiene de la filosofía, pues en este sentido se entiende como un ejercicio formativo para la construcción del ser humano y no como una disciplina meramente teórica. Por tanto realizaremos una investigación basada en el procedimiento reflexivo, sistemático y crítico de las obras filosóficas, antropológicas, sociológicas…etc., tanto de Boaventura de Sousa como de Richard Rorty. Ya que deberemos tener en cuenta que cada periodo histórico de la filosofía ha tenido una tensión entre pensadores que defendían una sistemático y crítico de las obras filosóficas, antropológicas, sociológicas…etc., tanto de Boaventura de Sousa como de Richard Rorty. Ya que deberemos tener en cuenta que cada periodo histórico de la filosofía ha tenido una tensión entre pensadores que defendían una sistemático y crítico de las obras filosóficas, antropológicas, sociológicas…etc., tanto de Boaventura de Sousa como de Richard Rorty. Ya que deberemos tener en cuenta que cada periodo histórico de la filosofía ha tenido una tensión entre pensadores que defendían una. (shrink)

Second part of the translation into Spanish of David Lewis' "New Work for a Theory of Universals", corresponding to the last sections of the original paper. || Segunda parte de la traducción al español del trabajo de David Lewis "New Work for a Theory of Universals", correspondiente a últimas secciones del artículo original. Artículo original publicado en: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec. 1983, pp. 343-377.

First part of the translation into Spanish of David Lewis' "New Work for a Theory of Universals", corresponding to the introduction and the first two sections of the original paper. || Primera parte de la traducción al español del trabajo de David Lewis "New Work for a Theory of Universals", correspondiente a la introducción y las dos primeras secciones del artículo original. Artículo original publicado en: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec. 1983, pp. 343-377.

Resumen Hegel se aleja de la idea propia de la Ilustración sobre el progreso e introduce una concepción teleológica acerca de la historia a nivel mundial. En ese sentido, el pensamiento ilustrado abogaba por el futuro desde la idea del progreso, mientras que el Romanticismo trataba de comprender el pasado a través de una mirada histórica donde Oriente se consideraba como la niñez de la humanidad. Por lo tanto, se entendía como un pueblo con un elevado despotismo y una ausencia (...) de libertades que, desde la perspectiva occidental moderna, no favorecía la elevación del espíritu. Estos supuestos etnocéntricos son los que denuncia Boaventura de Sousa mediante una teoría Poscolonial de la Historia. (shrink)

Os autores góticos, desde sua origem, como se sabe, estão preocupados com uma recusa de certos ideais propostos pelo iluminismo e com um restabelecimento, em certa medida, de certas formas de lidar com a sociabilidade e a virtude moral. Para tornar isso evidente, será necessário, em um primeiro momento, situar o leitor acerca dos aspectos para a formação do novo gênero, ainda que tenham sido rejeitados por ele, e, no segundo momento, apresentar algumas noções comuns entre as obras que (...) compunham a primeira fase do gótico. Com isso, acreditamos que teremos um arcabouço suficiente para compreender o problema posto pela forma pela qual Lewis e Radcliffe lidam com o sublime de herança burkeana. Nosso objetivo maior consistirá em delinear de que maneira o prazer estético de herança burkeana tomou forma nos escritos góticos de Radcliffe e de Lewis, evidenciando uma possível tensão entre as interpretações propostas por ambos os autores no que diz respeito às implicações que promovem na sociabilidade, na concepção da virtude moral e nas críticas que pretendem promover contra o iluminismo. (shrink)

RESUMEN (ES): ¿Es posible una moral sin Dios (Jean-Paul Sartre) o con un dios que existe en una dimensión suprahumana (Viktor Frankl)? La famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski ("Si Dios no existe, todo está permitido") no fue escrita así por Dostoyevski. El Holocausto, como punto de inflexión e interrupción en la historia, la filosofía y la teología, abre nuevos interrogantes "después" de Auschwitz. En el presente artículo discuto la moral sartreana y la frankleana, analizando la famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski (...) y preguntándome si acaso una moral con un dios ausente es capaz de prevenir futuras barbaries. /// ABSTRACT (EN): Is it possible a morality without God (Jean-Paul Sartre) or with a God that exists in a suprahuman dimension (Viktor Frankl)? The famous «quote» by Dostoevsky («If God does not exist, everything is permitted») was not written like that by Dostoevsky. The Holocaust, as a turning point and as an interruption in history, philosophy, and theology, opens new questions «after» Auschwitz. In this paper, I discuss Sartrean and Franklean morality while analyzing the famous «quote» by Dostoevsky and wondering if a morality with an absent God can prevent future barbarities. (shrink)

Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not (...) found it. (shrink)

Pretende-se apresentar de que forma a considerada boa poesia do século XVIII britânico pode ser vista com o mesmo objetivo das morais práticas, isto é, o de refinar e polir os indivíduos. Para isso, seguiremos os seguintes passos: i. reconstruir o contexto que produziu essa concepção: a distinção entre civilização e barbárie, bem como a dificuldade de unificar o modo escrito e o oral e a preocupação com a supressão do ócio; ii. sublinhar a relevância de Milton, Shakespeare e Spenser (...) para a poesia britânica setecentista; iii. apresentar os ideais a esse respeito que permeavam os textos de importantes filósofos. (shrink)

En el presente escrito intentaré explorar la relación entre dos temas controvertidos: el daño y el problema de la no-identidad. Sostendré la idea de que ninguna tesis plausible del daño puede resolver completamente el problema de la no-identidad. Sin embargo, defenderé que una reformulación de la tesis comparativa contra-fáctica es superior a todas las otras tesis del daño y por tanto debería ser adoptada. | In this paper I tried to explore the relation between two controversial issues: harm and the (...) non-identity problem. I will defend the idea that any harm account cannot fully solve the nonidentity problem. However, I will defend that a reformulation of the counterfactual comparative account is better than all others harm accounts, and therefore should be adopted. (shrink)

An important question about moral progress is what causes it. One of the most popular proposed mechanisms is moral reasoning: moral progress often happens because lots of people reason their way to improved moral beliefs. Authors who defend moral reasoning as a cause of moral progress have relied on two broad lines of argument: the general and the specific line. The general line presents evidence that moral reasoning is in general a powerful mechanism (...) of moral belief change, while the specific line tries to establish that moral reasoning can explain specific historical examples of moral progress. In this paper, we examine these lines in detail, using Kumar and Campbell’s (2022, A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How It Made Us Human. Oxford University Press) model of rational moral progress to sharpen our focus. For each line, we explain the empirical assumptions it makes; we then argue that the available evidence supports none of these assumptions. We conclude that at this point, we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress. (shrink)

Most moral theories share certain features in common with other theories. They consist of a set of propositions that are universal, general, and hence impartial. The propositions that constitute a typical moral theory are (1) universal, in that they apply to all subjects designated as within their scope. They are (2) general, in that they include no proper names or definite descriptions. They are therefore (3) impartial, in that they accord no special privilege to any particular agent's situation (...) which cannot be justified under (2) and (3). These three features do not distinguish moral theories from other theories, nor indeed from most general categorical propositions we assert. Yet, in recent years, these features of moral theories have been the target of a certain concerted and sustained criticism, namely, that to be committed to such a moral theory, or to aspire to act in accordance with its requirements, results in what has come to be known as moral alienation. Moral alienation, according to this criticism, consists in (i) viewing one's ground projects from an impersonal, "moral point of view" engendered by one's acceptance of the theory; (ii) being prepared to sacrifice these projects to the requirements of moral principle; and (iii) making such a sacrifice specifically and self-consciously in order to conform to these requirements. Moral alienation is said to manifest itself in one (or both) of two ways, depending on the nature of the project thus susceptible to sacrifice. One may be alienated from oneself, if the project consists of tastes, convictions, or aspirations that are centrally definitive of one's self. In this case one's commitment to the project can be at best conditional on its congruence with one's moral theory. It is claimed that this must make for a rather tepid and unenthusiastic commitment indeed. Alternatively, one may be alienated from others, if the project is an interpersonal relationship such as a friendship, marriage, or collegial relationship. In this case one's responses to the other are motivated by one's awareness of what one's moral theory requires. It is claimed that this obstructs a genuine and unmediated emotional response to the other as such. My aim here will be to argue that this very compelling criticism - call it the moral-alienation criticism - is nevertheless misdirected. The real culprit is not any particular moral theory, but rather a certain familiar personality type that may or may not adopt it. (shrink)

Some research suggests that moral behavior can be strongly influenced by trivial features of the environment of which we are completely unaware. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have argued that these findings undermine our commonsense notions of agency and responsibility, both of which emphasize the role of practical reasoning and conscious deliberation in action. We present the results of four vignette-based studies (N = 1,437) designed to investigate how people think about the metaphysical and moral implications of scientific findings (...) that reveal our susceptibility to automaticity and situational influences. When presented with lightly fictionalized narratives about these findings, participants exhibit no tendency toward changing judgments of freedom and responsibility compared to control groups. This suggests that people seem unwilling to adopt skeptical attitudes about agency on the basis of these scientific findings. (shrink)

Baseado na perspectiva da geofilosofia de Deleuze e Guattari em um processo que se sobrepõe à relação envolvendo sujeito e objeto enquanto fronteira do pensamento e que implica o pensamento como desdobramento de uma violência e as formações genealógicas do saber, o artigo se detém na análise do paradoxal mundo do Instituto Benjamenta em uma construção fílmica adaptada do romance Jakob von Gunten, de Robert Walser, que encerra um movimento que traz como conteúdo a matéria que se impõe ao caos (...) imanente e converge para o horizonte que abrange Arte, Filosofia e Ciência. Dessa forma, convergindo para a questão que encerra a imagem ortodoxa, dogmática, pré-filosófica, natural e moral do pensamento, o artigo recorre ao filme Instituto Benjamenta enquanto construção que assinala a intersecção de séries infinitas de imagens de pensamento que escapam ao horizonte da circunscrição da visualidade através de inter-relações ilimitadas que emergem carregadas de complexidade em um processo que defende a superação das imagens dogmáticas do pensamento e da mera exposição do conteúdo do arcabouço histórico do pensamento enquanto objeto que tende à reprodução de ideias e noções e implica a “repetição” de interpretações na relação de ensino e aprendizagem, impedindo o exercício de criação de conceitos, característica da Filosofia, segundo Deleuze, convergindo para a necessidade da instauração de uma experiência capaz de viabilizar a emergência do “novo” através das possibilidades suscitadas no acontecimento da construção do conhecimento. (shrink)

Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing (...) sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds. (shrink)

The Morality First strategy for developing AI systems that can represent and respond to human values aims to first develop systems that can represent and respond to moral values. I argue that Morality First and other X-First views are unmotivated. Moreover, according to some widely accepted philosophical views about value, these strategies are positively distorting. The natural alternative, according to which no domain of value comes “first” introduces a new set of challenges and highlights an important but otherwise obscured (...) problem for e-AI developers. (shrink)

The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.

This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious (...) experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence. (shrink)

‘No-fault unbelief’ can be named the view that there are those who do not believe in God through no moral or intellectual fault of their own. This view opposes a more traditional one, which can be named ‘flawed unbelief’ view, according to which religious unbelief signals a cognitive or moral flaw in the non-believer. Since this charge of mental or moral flaw causes a certain uneasiness, I oppose the former view, i.e. ‘no-fault unbelief’, with a strategy that (...) has nothing to do with the latter. I assume that ‘no-fault unbelief’ is correct and show what consequences follow for both unbelievers and believers. I conclude that the assumption in question is superficially beneficial but deeply detrimental to unbelievers, and by contrast, it is superficially detrimental and deeply beneficial to believers. (shrink)

The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least (...) two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang’s suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren’t always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism. (shrink)

Introduction: This study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the “Trolley problem,” an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70. -/- Methods: Adapted from Joshua Greene’s trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants’ choices (...) and Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants’ inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies—Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach—in scenarios involving AVs -/- Results: Our findings revealed a significant disparity between participants’ preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an “egoism” algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner’s safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for “egoism” was similar to that of “utilitarianism,” which may necessitate self-sacrifice. -/- Discussion: The hybrid approach, integrating “Utilitarianism” and “Egoism,” garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study’s insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles. (shrink)

In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one (...) knows that they do not know everything. And it could not be the case that we do not know that there is thought when we believe that there is thought and that we do not know that we do not know everything. I address several objections to the claim that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief. It might seem that arguing against the error theory on the grounds that it entails that no one knows anything is just providing a Moorean argument against the moral error theory. I show that even if my argument against the error theory is indeed a Moorean one, it avoids Streumer's, McPherson's and Olson's objections to previous Moorean arguments against the error theory and is a more powerful argument against the error theory than Moore's argument against external world skepticism is against external world skepticism. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On (...) the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, seem to be committed to an epistemic symmetry between us and our moral aliens that forces us into rational suspension of our moral beliefs. Unless one disputes the very possibility of moral aliens, this poses a severe challenge to the moral realist. In the second section, I will address this problem. It will turn out that, on closer scrutiny, we cannot make any sense of the idea that moral aliens should be taken as our epistemic peers. Consequently, there is no way to argue that encountering moral aliens gives us any reason to revise our moral beliefs. If my argument is correct, the possibility of encountering moral aliens poses no real threat to moral realism. (shrink)

I argue that John Dewey’s analysis of imagination enables an account of learning from imaginary cases consistent with Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. Moreover, this account provides a more robust account of learning from cases than Dancy’s own. Particularism is the position that there are no, or at most few, true moral principles, and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. On a particularist framework, one cannot infer from an imaginary case that because a feature has a (...) particular moral importance there, that it must have that import in an actual case. Instead, for Dancy, cases can yield “reminders,” and a person with a lot of experience (real or imagined) brings a “checklist” of features that can matter to a situation. Using the Nathan-David exchange from 2 Samuel and Martha Nussbaum’s “Steerforth’s Arm” from Love’s Knowledge, I show that this account does not explain all instances of learning from cases. Drawing on recent work on cases, I argue that cases can be educative by serving an exploratory function, probing what one takes to be known and provoking change in the background one uses in evaluating a situation. I then argue that Dewey’s work on imagination in his comments on sympathy and in A Common Faith and Art as Experience enables such a role for cases on a particularist framework. Mark Johnson’s recent work on metaphor further illuminates how Dewey’s account of art can be exploratory. I contend that this account affords an exploratory role for cases consistent with Dancy’s particularism. (shrink)

Moral naturalists are often said to have trouble making sense of inter-communal moral disagreements. The culprit is typically thought to be the naturalist’s metasemantics and its implications for the sameness of meaning across communities. The most familiar incarnation of this metasemantic challenge is the Moral Twin Earth argument. We address the challenge from the perspective of analytic naturalism and argue that making sense of inter-communal moral disagreement creates no special issues for this view.

In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that (...) he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§ 9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view. (shrink)

Los sociobiólogos han defendido una posición "calvinista" que se resume en la siguiente fórmula: si la selección natural explica las actitudes morales, no hay altruismo genuino en la moral; si la moral es altruista, entonces la selección natural no puede explicarla. En este ensayo desenmascaro los presupuestos erróneos de esta posición y defiendo que el altruismo como equidad no es incompatible con la selección natural. Rechazo una concepción hobbesiana de la moral, pero sugiero su empleo en la (...) interpretación de la psicología de los primates no humanos y en un modelo de progresión evolutiva que habría llevado a la moralidad como adaptación pasando por la razón instrumental. /// Sociobiologists have endorsed a "Calvinist" position captured in the following formula: if natural selection explains moral attitudes, morality is not genuinely altruistic; if morality is altruistic, then natural selection cannot explain it. I expose the false presuppositions behind this claim and argüe that altruism as fairness is not incompatible with natural selection. I reject a Hobbesian view of morality as an instrumental endorsement of fairness norms, but suggest its use to interpret primate psychology and to model an evolutionary progression ending in moral capacities as adaptations. (shrink)

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as (...) varied as the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves (...) difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions. (shrink)

According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature of moral (...) responsibility. Secondly, Zimmerman questions the significance of the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility, according to the Strawsonian view. Thirdly, he argues that that view may be taken to suggest the wrong kind of priority relation between ‘P is morally responsible’ and ‘it is appropriate to adopt some reactive attitude toward P’. I discuss each of these problems in turn and conclude that Strawsonians can respond to all three problems raised by Zimmerman. The Strawsonian view supports a significant interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. (shrink)

Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there (...) is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists respond? The present chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could be answered). (shrink)

Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable (...) class='Hi'>moral content. Therefore, at least one type of moral motivation does not require mindreading. This means that, a priori, non-mindreading animals can be moral. (shrink)

In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to define, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. Besides, (...) grounding responsibility in desert seems to support ascriptions of pathological blame to agents trapped in moral dilemmas as well as of excess blame in cases of joint action. Desert is also notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to determine (at least with sufficient precision). And, finally, though not least important, recent empirical research on people’s responsibility judgments reveals our common-sense notion of responsibility to be hopelessly confused and easily manipulated. So it may be time to rethink our inherited theory and practice of moral responsibility. Our theoretical and practical needs may be better served by a less intractable, more forward-looking notion of responsibility. The aim of the paper is to contrast the predominant, desert-based accounts of moral responsibility with their rather unpopular rival, the consequence- based accounts, and then show that the latter deserve more consideration than usually granted by their opponents. In the course of doing so, I assess, and ultimately reject, a number of objections that have been raised against consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility: that it (i) doesn’t do justice to our common-sense theory and practice of responsibility; (ii) ties responsibility too closely to influenceability, thereby exposing itself to the charge of counter-intuitivity; (iii) assigns undeserved responsibility (praise, blame) to agents; (iv) confuses ‘being responsible’ with ‘holding responsible’‚ and (v) provides the wrong-kind-of-reason for praise and blame. My negative and positive case may not add up to a knockdown argument in favor of revising our ordinary notion of responsibility. As long as the considerations adduced succeed in presenting the consequentialist alternative as a serious contender to a pre-arranged marriage between moral responsibility and desert, however, I’m happy to rest my case. (shrink)

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman-style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman-style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden-shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why (...) class='Hi'>moral beliefs are vulnerable to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman-style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman-style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self-effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality. (shrink)

A strong moral reason for prohibiting doping in sport is to be found in the bad choices that would be faced by clean athletes in a sporting world that tolerated doping. The case against doping is not, however, to be grounded in the concept of coercion. Instead, it is grounded in a general duty of sport to afford fair opportunity to the goods that are distinctively within sport's sphere of control. The moral reason to prohibit doping need not (...) be balanced against any autonomy claim of athletes who would prefer to dope because, upon closer examination, such claims have no force. The moral reason to prohibit doping does, however, need to be balanced against the enforcement costs imposed on all athletes by effective prohibition. (shrink)

Robert Adams argues that often our moral commitment outstrips what we are epistemically entitled to believe; in these cases, the virtuous agent doxastic states are instances of “moral faith”. I argue against Adams’ views on the need for moral faith; at least in some cases, our moral “intuitions” provide us with certain moral knowledge. The appearance that there can be no certainty here is the result of dubious views about second-order or indirect doubts. Nonetheless, discussing (...) the phenomena that lead Adams to postulate moral faith brings to light the nature of the epistemic warrant underlying various kinds of moral commitments. (shrink)

According to The Moral Problem, there is so much metaethical disagreement because it is difficult to explain both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgments in the framework provided by the Humean picture of human psychology. Smith himself hoped to solve this problem by analysing the content of our moral judgments in terms of what our fully rational versions would want us to do. This paper first explains why this solution to the moral problem remains (...) problematic and why we therefore are no closer to solving the problem. It then outlines how the moral problem could perhaps be dissolved instead. The second half of the paper thus first reconstructs the moral problem in the framework of dispositionalism about belief. It then suggests that, if we think of moral beliefs in dispositionalist terms and take ‘believe’ to be a vague predicate, we can come to see why many of the most fundamental metaethical questions cannot be answered. The last section of the paper then extends this method of dissolving metaethical questions to other popular views about belief. (shrink)