Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

This paper demarcates a theoretically interesting class of "evaluational adjectives." This class includes predicates expressing various kinds of normative and epistemic evaluation, such as predicates of personal taste, aesthetic adjectives, moral adjectives, and epistemic adjectives, among others. Evaluational adjectives are distinguished, empirically, in exhibiting phenomena such as discourse-oriented use, felicitous embedding under the attitude verb `find', and sorites-susceptibility in the comparative form. A unified degree-based semantics is developed: What distinguishes evaluational adjectives, semantically, is that they denote context-dependent measure functions (...) ("evaluational perspectives")—context-dependent mappings to degrees of taste, beauty, probability, etc., depending on the adjective. This perspective-sensitivity characterizing the class of evaluational adjectives cannot be assimilated to vagueness, sensitivity to an experiencer argument, or multidimensionality; and it cannot be demarcated in terms of pretheoretic notions of subjectivity, common in the literature. I propose that certain diagnostics for "subjective" expressions be analyzed instead in terms of a precisely specified kind of discourse-oriented use of context-sensitive language. I close by applying the account to `find x PRED' ascriptions. (shrink)

The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly suggest that emotions can be reduced to evaluative beliefs or judgments. Specifically, evaluative beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for evaluative judgments. And reducing emotions to evaluative judgments requires the subject’s conceptualizing ability. However, the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion has many problems, including that evaluative beliefs are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions; the evaluative judgment theory of emotion presupposes the subject’s conceptual content, but conceptual content is not a necessary and (...) sufficient condition for emotions; the requirement of conceptualization ability for evaluative judgments is too high, which makes emotions overintellectualize; and the add-on strategy of emotions cannot save the evaluative judgment theory of emotions as well. (shrink)

Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticisable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticisable for retaining beliefs in the face (...) of paradigm kinds of putatively defeating higher-order evidence: they manifest dispositions that are bad relative to a range of candidate epistemic successes such as true belief and knowledge. In particular, giving up belief in response to higher-order evidence only when that evidence is not misleading would require subjects to have dispositions that discriminate between cases in which their original cognitive processes is fine, and cases in which they merely seemed to be fine. But, I argue, such dispositions are not normally humanly feasible. I show that retaining belief in putative cases of defeat by higher-order evidence is problematic irrespective of whether veritism or some form of gnosticism is true. In the end I contrast my account of dispositional evaluations with similar-sounding ideas that have been put forth in the literature, such as consequentialist views that focus on instrumental means to success. (shrink)

The field of AI has undergone a series of transformations, each marking a new phase of development. The initial phase emphasized curation of symbolic models which excelled in capturing reasoning but were fragile and not scalable. The next phase was characterized by machine learning models—most recently large language models (LLMs)—which were more robust and easier to scale but struggled with reasoning. Now, we are witnessing a return to symbolic models as complementing machine learning. Successes of LLMs contrast with their inscrutability, (...) inaccuracy, and hallucinations, which underwrite concerns over the reliability and trustworthiness of these systems, motivating investigations into commonsense reasoning, AI explainability, and formal verification techniques. Moreover, proper assessments of hybrid machine learning/symbolic systems require novel strategies to facilitate comparisons of performance and guide future AI progress. The EDGeS AAAI 2023 Spring symposium brought together researchers focusing on novel assessments and benchmarks for evaluating hybrid and artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems. This symposium revealed what was already suspected: research concerning evaluation of machine learning/symbolic hybrids and AGI is, unfortunately, lacking. Even so, the discussion was fruitful. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in (...) the corresponding belief state famously gives rise to Moorean infelicity:?? It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining. If expressivists are right, then conjoining evaluative statements with the denial of being in the relevant non-cognitive state of mind should give rise to similar infelicity. However, as several theorists have pointed out, this does not seem to be the case. Statements like the following are not infelicitous: Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it. In this paper, I argue that evaluative statements express the kind of states that are attributed by ‘find’-constructions in English and that these states are non-cognitive in nature. This addresses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity and, more generally, goes to show that there are linguistic facts which support expressivism about evaluative discourse. (shrink)

The descriptions 'good' and 'bad' are examples of thin concepts, as opposed to 'kind' or 'cruel' which are thick concepts. Simon Kirchin provides one of the first full-length studies of the crucial distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' concepts, which is fundamental to many debates in ethics, aesthetics and epistemology.

ABSTRACTEvaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view and argues for (...) an alternative view, according to which aesthetic discourse expresses affective states of mind, analogously to how assertions express beliefs. It is because these affective states require first-hand experience that aesthetic discourse communicates that such acquaintance is at hand. The paper furthermore argues that the lack of an experience requirement for aesthetic belief ascriptions constitutes a problem for the kind of expressivist who claims that evaluative belief states are covert non-cognitive states. (shrink)

Gelman and Loken (2013, 2014) proposed that when researchers base their statistical analyses on the idiosyncratic characteristics of a specific sample (e.g., a nonlinear transformation of a variable because it is skewed), they open up alternative analysis paths in potential replications of their study that are based on different samples (i.e., no transformation of the variable because it is not skewed). These alternative analysis paths count as additional (multiple) tests and, consequently, they increase the probability of making a Type I (...) error during hypothesis testing. The present article considers this forking paths problem and evaluates four potential solutions that might be used in psychology and other fields: (a) adjusting the prespecified alpha level, (b) preregistration, (c) sensitivity analyses, and (d) abandoning the Neyman-Pearson approach. It is concluded that although preregistration and sensitivity analyses are effective solutions to p-hacking, they are ineffective against result-neutral forking paths, such as those caused by transforming data. Conversely, although adjusting the alpha level cannot address p-hacking, it can be effective for result-neutral forking paths. Finally, abandoning the Neyman-Pearson approach represents a further solution to the forking paths problem. (shrink)

On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...) of things that cry out for explanation; that we evaluate not only ‘empirical' concepts, but also mathematical and perhaps moral concepts from an epistemic perspective; and that there is much more complexity to the concept/property relation than the natural thought seems to presuppose. These observations, it is argued, rule out giving a theory of conceptual evaluation that is a corollary of a metaphysical ranking of the relevant properties. -/- conceptual ethics, explanation, naturalness, epistemic value, concept/property, semantic internalism. (shrink)

The central problem of the dissertation concerns the possibility of a distinction between truth-evaluable and non-truth-evaluable utterances of a natural language. The class of truth-evaluable utterances includes assertions, con. ectures and other kinds of speech act susceptible of truth evaluation. The class of non-truth-evaluable utterances includes commands, exhortations, wishes i.e. utterances not evaluated as being true or false. The problem is placed in the context of radical interpretation theory and it shown that it is a substantial problem of Davidson‘s (...) early theory of radical interpret at ion. I consider the possibility of distinguishing between locutionary and illocutionary act in uttering a sentence and its significance in the present project. I discuss the suggestion that the mood of the verb of the sentence signifies the required distinction between truth-evaluable utterances and non-truth-evaluable ones. I argue that no criterion for the distinction based on the mood of the verb is adequate. The solution that I propose to the problem of classifylng truth-evaluable utterances appeals to mental states. The view that grounds this line of inquiry is that the truth-evaluability of an utterance is a characteristic of it exclusively relevant to the doxastic dimension of the speaker’s mind. I discuss the constraints that the nature of radical interpretation puts upon the way we construe the notion of belief. I propose that a possible classification of mental states into doxastic and non-doxastic that would result in a classification of utterances into truth-evaluable and non-truthevaluable ones can be given by an elaborated version of a decision theoretic scheme. I suggest that a decision theoretic scheme based on a decision theory that, like Savage’s theory, grants independence axioms is a better candidate to offer a solution to the central problem of the dissertation than a scheme based on a non- standard decision theory such as Richard Jeffrey’s. I conclude by showing that the proposal I make satisfies the constraints I have considered and that it can be accommodated by a radical interpretation theory. (shrink)

Against those who identify genealogy with reductive genealogical debunking or deny it any evaluative and action-guiding significance, I argue for the following three claims: that although genealogies, true to their Enlightenment origins, tend to trace the higher to the lower, they need not reduce the higher to the lower, but can elucidate the relation between them and put us in a position to think more realistically about both relata; that if we think of genealogy’s normative significance in terms of a (...) triadic model that includes the genealogy’s addressee, we can see that in tracing the higher to the lower, a genealogy can facilitate an evaluation of the higher element, and where the lower element is some important practical need rather than some sinister motive, the genealogy can even be vindicatory; and finally, that vindicatory genealogies can offer positive guidance on how to engineer better concepts. (shrink)

It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and permeate our current (...) political, economic, and personal lives) against the threats to that equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement. (shrink)

-/- This essay discusses the relation between ideal theory and two forms of political moralism identified by Bernard Williams, structural and enactment views. It argues that ideal theory, at least in the sense Rawls used that term, only makes sense for structural forms of moralism. These theories see their task as describing the constraints that properly apply to political agents and institutions. As a result, they are primarily concerned with norms that govern action. In contrast, many critiques of ideal theory (...) are structured and motivated by their commitment to an enactment model of political theorizing. This instead sees political agents and institutions as instruments for producing or promoting better states of affairs. Enactment models treat the evaluations that rank different states of affairs as justificatorily basic, rather than norms governing action on which structural models focus. This reveals an important feature of debates about ideal theory. Whether ideal theory is capable of appropriately guiding action will depend on what the criteria for appropriately guiding action are, about which different theorists have importantly different views. For example, some popular strategies for defending ideal theory fail, while it may be much less clear that some alternatives to ideal theory can provide action guidance than their advocates claim. (shrink)

Recent years have seen rapid progress in the development of ontologies as semantic models intended to capture and represent aspects of the real world. There is, however, great variation in the quality of ontologies. If ontologies are to become progressively better in the future, more rigorously developed, and more appropriately compared, then a systematic discipline of ontology evaluation must be created to ensure quality of content and methodology. Systematic methods for ontology evaluation will take into account representation of (...) individual ontologies, performance (in terms of accuracy, domain coverage and the efficiency and quality of automated reasoning using the ontologies) on tasks for which the ontology is designed and used, degree of alignment with other ontologies and their compatibility with automated reasoning. A sound and systematic approach to ontology evaluation is required to transform ontology engineering into a true scientific and engineering discipline. This chapter discusses issues and problems in ontology evaluation, describes some current strategies, and suggests some approaches that might be useful in the future. (shrink)

This paper presents an impact evaluation of the policies for teacher education programs within the framework of the National Development Plan 2014-2018. The programs were compelled to obtain high-quality accreditation, increase the credits in school practices, and the English level, among other requirements. Relying on multivariable regression, it shows that, for the year 2021, there is no association between high-quality accreditation in most modules of the Saber Pro tests, or it is negative in the global score and quantitative reasoning. (...) In a second step, using Differences–in–Differences, it evidences how the changes made by the programs had positive effects on the performance of students compared to other professional programs. The results show significant improvement in most modules of the Saber Pro test, except for the English module. The effects were homogeneous by characteristics of the students and institutions, but heterogeneous by area of knowledge, indicating that the effect is mainly due to the curricular changes of the programs. (shrink)

Abstract: This study aims to evaluate the utilization of ICT in education administration and management in a Pakistan context during the pandemic outbreak. Adoption of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has digitalized the learning process where education organizations were administrated by means of wireless-based instructions, electronic pedagogy, and online assessment in order to continue the educational activities while the government halted the physical appearance in education institutions. Data collection has been carried by three public universities in which teachers and general (...) administration of these institutions participated to discover their intention to use the assigned technology to administrate organizations’ policies in the way to disseminate the respective service delivery. Survey questionnaires were used, and 178 respondents’ feedback was secured to analyze the study that was carried out via SPSS version 24 and validation OF hypotheses measured by means of regressions and correlations. Moreover, proposed factors like intention to use, perceived ease of ease, perceived usefulness, social influence, and Users’ expectations were used. A theoretical approach was inculcated to encircle the UTAUT and TAM model to determine the adoption of the innovative system education management during the pandemic outbreak in the country. (shrink)

Evaluative and normative terms and concepts are often said to be "essentially contestable". This notion has been used in political and legal theory and applied ethics to analyse disputes concerning the proper usage of terms like democracy, freedom, genocide, rape, coercion, and the rule of law. Many philosophers have also thought that essential contestability tells us something important about the evaluative in particular. Gallie (who coined the term), for instance, argues that the central structural features of essentially contestable concepts secure (...) their evaluativeness. I'll argue that these (widely held) central features are exemplified by many evaluative and non-evaluative terms alike, owing to more general factors (such as multidimensionality) which have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. The role of these factors in semantic interpretation is subject to a certain kind of "metasemantic" disputes which have the features of the disputes characteristically admitted by essentially contestable concepts (whether evaluative or not) and which can be similarly substantive and worthwhile. In closing I'll discuss how my argument shows that our understanding of evaluative disagreement needs refinement. The overall upshot is that essential contestability shows nothing deep or distinctive about the evaluative in particular. (shrink)

Due to the innovative nature of the world economy and the continuity of scientific and technological progress, intellectualization becomes one of the world's leading trends. The article is aimed to evaluate the state of intellectualization of the national economy of Ukraine in the context of globalization. In the article the existing approaches are considered, which are used by international organizations and expert agencies to evaluate the intellectualization level of the countries around the world. The indicators of the state of intellectualization, (...) available in the publications of the State statistics service of Ukraine have been researched. The author's deductive description of the intellectualization state of the regions (on the basis of twenty four indicators) and of types of economic activity (three indicators) of the national economy has been presented. It has been determined, that in the today's circumstances, an increasing of intellectualization level of the Ukrainian economy could happen, on the one hand, by means of getting balanced the status of intellectualization of the regions, given their natural resource potential, the socio-economic situation and the international human resources movement. On the other hand, this can happen due to introduction of new forms of national economic policies for human resources development in the fields of IT-technologies, information services, sports, education, space industry, tourism. The scientific novelty and practical importance, as well as originality of the obtained results is represented by an elaborated methodological framework for evaluating the state of the intellectualization of the national economy plus a further projecting of mechanisms of intellectualization of Ukraine in the worldwide context. (shrink)

The growth in neoliberal or market-driven higher education has challenged traditional approaches to evaluating faculty members. The involvement of multiple stakeholders (i.e., accreditation bodies, quality assurance officers, administrators, teaching faculty, and students) has led to different and sometimes conflicting needs in faculty evaluation. While extant literature generally suggests that faculty evaluation in contemporary higher education is strongly associated with accountability purposes, little is known about how key agents at the institutional level use evaluation for learning and improvement. (...) Thus, this study attempts to identify the approaches to faculty evaluation that promote learning and improvement in higher education. This study is a qualitative case study of Vietnamese higher education student evaluation of teaching (SET) and voting evaluation practices. It adopts the problem-based methodology (Robinson, 1993; Robinson & Lai, 2006) to investigate the theories of action of some key stakeholders of these faculty evaluation practices in Vietnam. The theories of action comprise the stakeholders’ approaches to faculty evaluation, together with the constraints (that rule in or rule out specific approaches) and the consequences of the approaches. Participants included four quality assurance officers, 18 administrators, and 20 faculty members from seven public higher education institutions in Vietnam. The theories of action about faculty evaluation were constructed based on interviews and key evaluation documents. Overall, the participants took three main approaches to faculty evaluation: (i) complying with the expected evaluation procedures and roles, (ii) taking a harmony-oriented and unilateral approach to problem solving, and (iii) disengaging from evaluation for learning and improvement. The participants generally fulfilled the evaluation policy requirements, but their approaches had a limited impact on learning and improvement at the institutional level. The constraint analysis suggests that the participants’ approaches were not completely passive but were mainly oriented to managerial accountability demands (Røiseland et al., 2015). The participants’ collectivist Confucian harmony-oriented norms hindered their approaches to problem solving and using evaluation for learning and improvement. However, there were a few participants who acted on their own values rather than being confined by political and cultural constraints. In spite of its scarcity, these participants’ self-reliant approach suggests a potential influence of Buddhist principles of self-transformation, contextuality and reflexivity on improving practices (Chu & Vu, 2021; Thich Nhat Hanh, 1987). The study has two key implications. First, it suggests the improvement of faculty evaluation policymaking and implementation by revising several existing constraints and by adding some cultural and individual constraints to the current theories of action. The faculty evaluation problems could be solved by improving the quality of evaluation processes and data, reconceptualising SET and voting evaluation, and treating faculty members’ underperformance as a collective problem. Second, the study suggests a framework to predict the likely success of future intervention on faculty evaluation. For instance, faculty evaluation for learning and improvement will be more feasible if policymakers and implementers prioritise transformational purposes and make joint efforts to foster dialogues and collaboration among individuals and groups. My study also highlights the need to understand faculty evaluation, and possibly other higher education practices in Vietnam, in religious contexts and from individual participants’ spiritual values or philosophical backgrounds. The study implications are applicable to Vietnamese higher education and potentially to other educational settings with similar characteristics. (shrink)

We seem to be able to acquire evaluative knowledge by mere reflection, or “from the armchair.” But how? This question is especially pressing for proponents of sentimental perceptualism, which is the view that our evaluative knowledge is rooted in affective experiences in much the way that everyday empirical knowledge is rooted in perception. While such empirical knowledge seems partially explained by causal relations between perceptions and properties in the world, in armchair evaluative inquiry, the relevant evaluative properties are typically not (...) even present. The paper shows how sentimental perceptualists can ultimately provide a broadly causal explanation of our reflective evaluative knowledge. (shrink)

In this essay I identify a type of linguistic phenomenon new to feminist philosophy of language: biased evaluative descriptions. Biased evaluative descriptions are descriptions whose well-intended positive surface meanings are inflected with implicitly biased content. Biased evaluative descriptions are characterized by three main features: (1) they have roots in implicit bias or benevolent sexism, (2) their application is counterfactually unstable across dominant and subordinate social groups, and (3) they encode stereotypes. After giving several different kinds of examples of biased evaluative (...) descriptions, I distinguish them from similar linguistic concepts, including backhanded compliments, slurs, insults, epithets, pejoratives, and dog whistles. I suggest that the traditional framework of Gricean implicature cannot account for biased evaluative descriptions. I discuss some challenges to the distinctiveness and evaluability of biased evaluative descriptions, including intersectional social identities. I conclude by discussing their social significance and moral status. Identifying biased evaluative descriptions is important for a variety of social contexts, from the very general and broad (political speeches) to the very particular and small (bias in academic hiring). (shrink)

Consistent evaluation of speakers is an integral part of any training program. Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy imparts training primarily for newly recruited administrative civil servants. Depending on both primary and secondary data, this study examines various issues related to the lack of credibility of the speaker-evaluation by the participants to provide deep insights and potential solutions. Secondary data was collected from 300 evaluation forms and the academic backgrounds of 20 regular speakers. A questionnaire-led survey was conducted (...) among 36 participants of a training program to obtain primary data. Although the regular speakers are usually highly educated and professionally experienced, the one-sided subjective feedback remains critical to this evaluation process. The statistical analysis of both primary and secondary data shows that the participants do not invest enough time and thought for completing the evaluation. A reluctance to put descriptive observations makes the outcome of the evaluation lose some of its credibility. Participants have also pointed out a few critical limitations of the form. Findings suggest that adding qualitative measures to the form can be useful to provoke qualitative views from the participants and to obtain constructive suggestions for the speakers. Further insights from the speakers can be valuable to complement the outcome of this study. This study concludes that the Academy must combine planned and incidental evaluations to revitalize the effectiveness of the process. (shrink)

I propose that the successes and contributions of reinforcement learning urge us to see the mind in a new light, namely, to recognise that the mind is fundamentally evaluative in nature.

A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.

Student evaluations of teaching (SETs) have been used, researched, and debated for many decades. It is a common practice in higher education institutions, with the supposed purpose of improving course quality and effectiveness, but with unintended consequences of encouraging and motivating poor teaching and causing grade inflation. There is strong evidence that SET “effectiveness” does not measure teaching effectiveness. This paper reviews empirical research examining common concerns about the usefulness (positive and negative) and accuracy of SETs. The findings reveal that (...) student satisfaction relates to their anticipated/expected grades in their courses; hence, they want to get good grades and their instructors want to get a good rating of SET, and this results in grade inflation. The key points are that SETs (1) allow students to speak their “mind”, (2) have no compelling correlation between quality of teaching and learning effectiveness, (3) reward easy, less demanding, and lazy teachers with a positive rating, (4) are biased against gender, attractiveness, ethnicity, race, etc., (5) are weaponized against “some” faculty members, and (6) are like asking convicts awaiting sentencing to evaluate the judge or jurors who convicted them. (shrink)

Healthcare insurance plays a pivotal role in shaping public health equity and social justice by influencing access to services, financial protection, and health outcomes. This study evaluates integrative frameworks for analyzing the impact of healthcare insurance on public health equity and explores its role in achieving social justice. We synthesize data from multidisciplinary sources to highlight disparities, challenges, and policy implications. The findings underscore the need for equitable insurance models, robust policy reforms, and inclusive evaluation methods.

The human dimensions involved in the operational objectives of Restorative Justice demand the highest quality of program design and staff training. In this paper, I argue that this desideratum has yet to be fully realized in existing Restorative Justice programs, in particular, with regard to the facilitation of reconciliation. I begin by presenting the chief problems associated with the concentration on reparation in Restorative Justice programs, to the neglect of reconciliation. I then argue that this phenomenon is, in part, a (...) consequence of (i) the almost universal use of service-delivery criteria in the evaluation of Restorative Justice programs, and (ii) the absence of research on the interactional processes involved within the victim-offender encounter itself, using suitably designed methodological tools. (shrink)

In the last decade there has been a torrent of work at the intersection of philosophy and linguistics on predicates of personal taste, subjective expressions like fun and tasty that are used to express opinions rather than matters of fact. In each section of this paper I discuss a phenomenon that has been largely overlooked in the literature on PPTs. In Section 1, I identify a neglected experiential reading of these adjectives. All other theories of expressions like fun take them (...) to express some standing property, but distributional and compositional considerations suggest that the basic meaning of fun adjectives is experiential. In Section 2, I discuss the relation between fun claims relativized to particular experiencers and their unrelativized counterparts, arguing that previous theories fail to capture the evaluativity unique to the latter. Finally, I argue... (shrink)

A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses instead (...) on the character of certain kinds of imaginings, arguing that we resist in such cases given the rich evaluative character of the imaginings prescribed, and the agent-dependent constraints on imagining in such ways. (shrink)

How should the fact of state consent to international agreements affect their moral evaluation? Political criticism of the content of international agreements is often answered by invoking the voluntary nature of those agreements: if states did not wish to accept their terms then they were free to reject them; the fact of their having voluntarily accepted them limits the scope for subsequent criticism. This is the “Voluntarist Reply”. This paper examines the Voluntarist Reply to understand the specific moral work (...) that it claims to do, the sense of voluntariness that it requires, and the limits on the capacity of voluntary consent to answer substantive political and moral criticism . It maps those limits across four prominent and plausible accounts of international economic justice to understand the different ways that consent does or does not alter the moral situation. (shrink)

According to the philosophical tradition, translation is successful when one has substituted words and sentences from one language with those from another by cross-linguistic synonymy. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, the meaning of expressions and sentences of languages are determined by their basic or systematic role in a language. This makes translating normative and evaluative discourse puzzling for two reasons. First, as languages are syntactically and semantically different because of their peculiar cultural and historical influences, and as values and (...) norms differ across cultures, it is unlikely that languages will have synonymous evaluative and normative expressions. If translation is only successful by cross-linguistic synonymy, it would seem that we will not be able to translate the value theoretic claims of persons from radically different cultures. But it is with such persons that dialogue on evaluative matters is imperative, to resolve ethical and axiological differences that could be the root of conflict. Second, as the orthodox account of meaning renders it linguistically relative, it is unlikely that expressions across languages will be cross-linguistically synonymous. Thus, on the Orthodox account of translation, translation is indeterminate (as W.V.O. Quine has argued) or impossible (as Jacques Derrida has argued). In this dissertation I argue for a novel theory of meaning and translation based on innovations in the translation studies literature and my prior work in cross cultural research, which I call Text-Type Semantics or TTS. TTS explains how translation is successful while affirming radical cultural and linguistic diversity. It treats disciplinary concerns as the neutral criteria to calibrate translation. On the basis of TTS I argue that we need what I call the “Quasi-Indexical” account of thick and thin concepts (or QI) to translate normative and evaluative discourse. I argue that QI and TTS succeed where competing accounts in the moral semantics literature (such as Non-Analytic Naturalism and Expressivism) fail. The argument also shows that the relativization of truth (in philosophy and beyond) to languages and cultures is mistaken. (shrink)

This paper proposes the notion of evaluative injustice as a distinct kind of injustice. Evaluative injustice occurs when someone is evaluated with regard to whether one satisfies the ideal associated with a social role one occupies, and the evaluation is characterized by an unjust failure of appraisal respect. This kind of injustice is importantly distinct from other kinds of injustice recently theorized, in particular epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) and ontological injustice (Jenkins 2023). It is distinct insofar as it is (...) how one is evaluated with respect to a given ideal that accounts for the injustice in question. After analyzing the nature of the phenomenon of evaluative injustice (section 2), this paper discusses the multiple different forms it can take (section 3) and argues that the wrong of all instances of evaluative injustice can be understood in terms of appraisal respect (Darwall 1977) (section 4). Throughout, the paper highlights various theoretical benefits the notion of evaluative injustice affords us. (shrink)

Academic institutions migrated to modular teaching-learning amid the COVID-19 pandemic. To ensure the quality of the pedagogical innovations employed, the study determined the students’ evaluation of the faculty prepared instructional modules for the courses they enrolled in during the first and second semesters of Academic Year 2020-2021. Employing a descriptive-correlational research design, the study was participated by 644 students from three colleges who were then available during the data gathering. Data gathered through online surveys were then analyzed using descriptive (...) statistics and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient utilizing jamovi software. Results revealed that the faculty-prepared instructional modules were acceptable and satisfactory to the students. Besides, the students' evaluation of the instructional modules was positively related to their level of satisfaction. Still, the students recommended that a review of the modules be done before sending the modules; a more extended time allotment is considered, and sufficient concrete examples are given in the modules. With this, the faculty concerned are encouraged to review the phases involved in the design, development, and distribution of the instructional modules to make them highly acceptable and very satisfactory to the students while maintaining the quality of both the content and aesthetics of the learning materials. Considering the study’s limitations, further endeavors may be carried out to validate this pedagogical innovation. (shrink)

The evaluative categories (goodness, badness, betterness, and the like) and the deontic categories (requiredness, permittedness, forbiddenness, and the like) are separate families of normative categories, each with its own distinctive logic, structure, and basis. The aim of this chapter is to argue that there is a third family of normative categories beyond these familiar two, with its own special logic, structure, and basis, namely the fitting. This family includes properties and relations picked out by terms such as ‘fitting’, ‘apt’, ‘merited’, (...) ‘warranted’, and ‘justified’, as well as certain adjectives ending in ‘-able’ (e.g. ‘admirable’), ‘-ing’ (e.g. ‘annoying’), ‘-ive’ (e.g. ‘persuasive’), ‘-some’ (e.g. ‘fearsome’), and ‘-worthy’ (e.g. ‘blameworthy’). Acknowledging the distinctiveness of fittingness as a type of normative category changes how we think about the foundations of ethics and other normative disciplines. Instead of asking, “Is the good prior to the right, or the right prior to the good?” we should be asking, “What are the priority relations among the right, the good, and the fitting?”. (shrink)

Along with discussing bibliometric analyses’ limitations and potential biases, this paper addresses the growing need for comprehensive guidelines in evaluating bibliometric research by providing systematic frameworks for both peer reviewers and readers. While numerous publications provide guidance on implementing bibliometric methods, there is a notable lack of frameworks for assessing such research, particularly regarding performance analysis and science mapping. Drawing from an extensive review of bibliometric practices and methodological literature, this paper develops structured evaluation frameworks that address the complexity (...) of modern bibliometric analysis, introducing the VALOR framework (Verification, Alignment, Logging, Overview, Reproducibility) for assessing multi-source bibliometric studies. The paper's key contributions include comprehensive guidelines for evaluating data selection, cleaning, and analysis processes; specific criteria for assessing conceptual, intellectual, and social structure analyses; and practical guidance for integrating performance analysis with science mapping results. By providing structured frameworks for reviewers and practical guidelines for readers to interpret and apply bibliometric insights, this work enhances the rigor of bibliometric research evaluation while supporting more effective peer review processes and research planning. The paper also discusses potential areas for further development, including the integration of qualitative analysis with bibliometric data and the advancement of field-normalized metrics, ultimately aiming to support authors, reviewers, and readers in navigating the complexities of bibliometrics and enhancing the meaningfulness of bibliometric research. (shrink)

Business intelligence (BI) and data visualization tools play a pivotal role in today's businesses by facilitating data-driven decision-making. Amazon's AWS, Microsoft's Azure, and Google's GCP are the three foremost cloud service providers, providing extensive solutions encompassing computing, storage, databases, and advanced cloud services. This paper delivers a thorough comparative analysis of three top BI platforms: Amazon Studio, Microsoft Power BI, and Google Looker. It evaluates their features, user-friendliness, integration options, pricing structures, and customer support. By comparing specific features and examining (...) real-world applications, this paper offers bits of knowledge that will assist organizations with picking the best tool to meet their particular requirements. The objective is to aid businesses and professionals in comprehending the strengths and weaknesses of each platform, thereby enabling them to make informed choices tailored to their unique needs. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the differentiated learning training program at the mathematics subject teachers' meeting (MGMP). A descriptive quantitative approach was used to identify the successes of the program and areas that require improvement. The sample included 21 mathematics teachers in Sub Rayon 2 of Lebak District. The instruments used were questionnaires in which data on participants' responses to resource persons, materials, and suggestions for future activities were collected, and the results of direct observations. Data analysis (...) was carried out using descriptive statistical methods to describe the overall evaluation results. Based on the findings, it is expected to provide an in-depth view of the differentiated learning program, contribute to the development of the program in the future, and become a guideline for improving the quality of mathematics learning in the Lebak district. The results of this training program evaluation show that the differentiated learning training activities have been well implemented in MGMP Mathematics Sub Rayon 2 Lebak District. This is evidenced by the level of teacher satisfaction in participating in the training, the majority of which were at scores 4 and 5, namely agreeing and strongly agreeing. This was also the case with the resource persons, materials, and training facilities, and organization. It is hoped that in the future continue to carry out ongoing training related to differentiated learning by current needs and to improve the competence of mathematics teachers in particular, as well as teachers of other subjects in general. (shrink)

Land art requires careful evaluation when assessing its aesthetic and ethical value. Critics of land art charge that it is unethical in that it uses nature without such use being justified by some future good. Other critics charge that land art harms nature aesthetically. In this essay, the author canvasses these charges and argues that some land art is ethically and aesthetically defensible, and that some has great and rare potential in both realms.

Thick terms and concepts, such as honesty and cruelty, are at the heart of a variety of debates in philosophy of language and metaethics. Central to these debates is the question of how the descriptive and evaluative components of thick concepts are related and whether they can be separated from each other. So far, no empirical data on how thick terms are used in ordinary language has been collected to inform these debates. In this paper, we present the first empirical (...) study, designed to investigate whether the evaluative component of thick concepts is communicated as part of the semantic meaning or by means of conversational implicatures. While neither the semantic nor the pragmatic view can fully account for the use of thick terms in ordinary language, our results do favour the semanticist interpretation: the evaluation of a thick concept is only slightly easier to cancel than semantically entailed content. We further discovered a polarity effect, demonstrating that how easily an evaluation can be cancelled depends on whether the thick term is of positive or negative polarity. (shrink)

In some severely uncertain situations, exemplified by climate change and novel pandemics, policymakers lack a reasoned basis for assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of the policies they must choose between. I outline and defend an uncertainty averse, egalitarian approach to policy evaluation in these contexts. The upshot is a theory of distributive justice which offers especially strong reasons to guard against individual and collective misfortune.

In Algorithms & Autonomy, Rubel, Castro, and Pham (hereafter RCP), argue that the concept of autonomy is especially central to understanding important moral problems about algorithms. In particular, autonomy plays a role in analyzing the version of social contract theory that they endorse. I argue that although RCP are largely correct in their diagnosis of what is wrong with the algorithms they consider, those diagnoses can be appropriated by moral theories RCP see as in competition with their autonomy based theory. (...) Most notably, proponents of consequentialism and virtue ethics can appropriate RCPs insights. This is good news because RCP’s social contract theory is vulnerable to a well known class of counterexamples. The most significant contribution of RCP, if I am right, is in their identification, presentation, and evaluation of concrete cases involving algorithms and not in the more controversial claims about theoretical ethics that RCP themselves see as central to what they are doing. (shrink)

In “Value Ascriptions: Rethinking Cognitivism,” Sigrún Svavarsdóttir offers a novel account of the semantic function of evaluative predication, according to which such predicates function as “linguistically encoded classificatory devices.” This short paper raises three questions about Svavarsdóttir’s account: how it relates to familiar sorts of projects in and about semantics, how to understand the nature of “linguistic encoding,” and how to understand the significance of the account’s central use of sets.

This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...) rethinking the functional relationship between desire and belief. (shrink)

How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further process the possibility (...) of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: who is capable of intentionally omitting, when and where intentional omissions unfold, and what are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to negative agency, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions. (shrink)

The pandemic disrupted educational systems globally, prompting the need for alternative learning modalities like online, modular, and blended learning. The SLCP, particularly within the context of a school in Region 8, integrates these modalities to address essential learning competencies. This research paper aimed to evaluate the school Learning Continuity Plan (LCP) through its School Continuity Learning Plan Program using (CIPP) model of evaluation. Employing a qualitative design, data were gathered through purposive interviews with 1 non-teaching personnel, 1 department head, (...) and 3 teachers and an analysis of the approved LCP road-map. Findings revealed comprehensive alignment with the evaluation model domains, though certain areas required revisiting for improvement. The study advocated for the administration's holistic consideration, especially recognizing teachers as front line contributors to the LCP. Their pivotal role in the design and planning phases was emphasized for the effective mechanization of the school LCP. Hence, it was concluded that educational administrators should prioritize collaboration with teachers and consider their perspectives to enhance the overall quality and functionality of the LCP. Moreover, the study recommended organizational consideration, valued teachers in school LCP, prioritized health, integrated modalities, and emphasized quality learning with metrics in LCP. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the (...) main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the paper turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other. (shrink)

In this article I propose to reframe debates about ideals of emotion in medicine, abandoning the current binary setup of this debate as one between ‘clinical detachment’ and empathy. Inspired by observations from my own field work and drawing on Sky Gross’ anthropological work on rituals of practice as well as Henri Lefebvre’s notion of rhythm, I propose that the normative drive of clinical practice can be better understood through the notion of attunement. In this framework individual types of emotions (...) are not, as such, appropriate or inappropriate, but are evaluated depending on their synchronicity with the specific rhythms of the practice. To set up this proposal, I show how typical arguments about emotions in medicine—what I call emotion-entity focused frameworks—are insufficient. I then draw on ethnographic observations from two orthopaedic departments and interviews with medical practitioners to show (1) how clinical practice is driven by rhythmicity, shaped in the case of orthopaedic surgery by a clinical aim of efficient, controlled intervention, and (2) how clinicians continuously refer to this drive and the flow of rhythms when evaluating inappropriate or problematic emotion. I argue that the use of a rhythm framework rather than ideals of detachment or empathy allows for a sensitivity to the complexity and situation-dependent elements of emotional ideals in clinical practice; and I end by proposing the term ‘attuned concern’—which stresses the importance of regulation and adjustment to circumstances rather than of maintaining a constant distance/involvement—as a more fitting alternative to ‘clinical detachment’. (shrink)

Understanding the nature of faith has always been a concern for believers, theologians, and philosophers of religion; and therefore, we have a long history of it. One of the ways to explain the nature of faith is to offer various models of it. In this article, based on John Bishop's categorization of faith models as 1) knowledge, 2) belief, 3) trust, 4) doxastic venture, 5) non-doxastic venture, and 6) hope in the "faith" entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an (...) effort has been made to first explain each of these models. Subsequently, relying on the degree of attention these models pay to three components: 1) cognitive, 2) affective, and 3) volitional, as criteria for evaluating them, it has been demonstrated which of these models have undergone reductionism. According to these criteria, the model of faith as knowledge has undergone reductionism, as it fails to adequately address the affective component in its definition of faith. The models of faith as trust, non-doxastic venture, and hope have not been subject to reductionism as they have considered all three of the aforementioned criteria. However, given the various interpretations of faith models as belief and doxastic venture, the assessment of reductionism or non-reductionism for each interpretation varies accordingly. (shrink)