A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some (...) of the complexities that arise when we link degrees of moral status to the weight of reasons to protect bundles and/or the content and size of these bundles, in particular regarding the attribution of moral status to nonparadigmatic entities (e.g. people with severe cognitive disabilities, children, embryos and foetuses, robots, non-human animals, ecosystems, and rivers). (shrink)

This article is a discursive examination of children’s status as knowledgeable moral agents within the Swedish child welfare system and in the widely used assessment framework BBIC. Departing from Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, three discursive positions of children’s moral status are identified: amoral, im/moral and dis/loyal. The findings show the undoubtedly moral child as largely missing and children’s agency as diminished, deviant or rendered ambiguous. Epistemic injustice applies particularly to disadvantaged (...) children with difficult experiences who run the risk of being othered, or positioned as reproducing or accommodating to the very same social problems they may be victimised by. (shrink)

Beliefs about the moral status of children have changed significantly in recent decades in the Western world. At the same time, knowledge about likely consequences for children of individual, parental, and societal choices has grown, as has the array of choices that (prospective) parents may have at their disposal. The intersection between these beliefs, this new knowledge, and these new choices has created a minefield of expectations from parents and a seemingly ever-expanding responsibility towards their (...) class='Hi'>children. Some of these new challenges have resulted from progress in genetics and neuroscience. It is these challenges that we focus on in this introduction and volume. (shrink)

Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life as it is a phase through which all adults have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of interests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a whole. Understanding what it is like to be a child, and what differences childhood makes, are essential for any broader understanding of the human condition. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is an outstanding reference (...) source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into five parts: ¿ Being a child ¿ Childhood and moral status ¿ Parents and children ¿ Children in society ¿ Children and the state. Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults¿ rights? What gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disabilility in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children, and what values should inform such practices? What is a good school? How are children¿s lives affected by being taken into social care? The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology. (shrink)

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: (...) DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics. (shrink)

The chief themes of this discussion are as follows. First, we need a theory of the grounds of moral status that could guide practical considerations regarding how to treat the wide range of potentially conscious entities with which we are acquainted – injured humans, cerebral organoids, chimeras, artificially intelligent machines, and non-human animals. I offer an account of phenomenal value that focuses on the structure and sophistication of phenomenally conscious states at a time and over time in the (...) mental lives of conscious subjects. Second, we need to map a theory of moral status onto practical considerations. I prefer the precautionary framework proposed by many, and fruitfully precisified recently by Birch. I have suggested that in addition to further discussion surrounding the evidential bar for attributing consciousness to different types of entities, more discussion is needed regarding how value and moral status may vary across different entity-types, and regarding the sources of value in an entity’s mental life. (shrink)

Internationally, there is considerable inconsistency in the recognition and regulation of children's genetic connections outside the family. In the context of gamete and embryo donation, challenges for regulation seem endless. In this paper, I review some of the paths that have been taken to manage children' being closely genetically related to people outside their families. I do so against the background of recognising the importance of children's interests as moral status holders. I look at recent (...) qualitative research involving donor-conceived people and borrow their own words to make sense of a purported interest to know (of) their close genetic ties. I also review ways in which gamete donation may have facilitated new kinds of kinship, which are at the same time genetic and chosen. In short, in this paper, I explore what meaning there could be in genetic connections that is not about parenthood. Further, I argue that the focus on parenthood in previous work in this area may be detrimental to appreciating some of the goods that can be derived from close genetic connections. (shrink)

Debates on the nature and justifiability of paternalism typically focus only on adults, sometimes presuming without argument that paternalism towards children is a non-issue or obviously justified. Debates on the moral and political status of children, in turn, rarely connect with the rich literature on paternalism. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap by exploring how issues that arise in the general debate on paternalism are relevant also for the benevolent interference with children. I survey (...) and discuss various views and argue for my own: that paternalism towards children is in most respects like paternalism towards adults and stands in the same need of justification, though such justification is more often forthcoming both because children are typically less prudent than adults and so benefit more from interference, and because, in some respects, interference is less harmful to them. (shrink)

Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or “type-B”) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept of phenomenal consciousness is radically indeterminate between (...) a neuronal-level property that is distinctive to mammals and a high-level functional property that is much more widely shared. This would leave many non-mammalian animals (such as birds, fish, insects and octopuses) with indeterminate moral status. There are ways to manage this radical moral indeterminacy, but all of these ways lead to profoundly troubling consequences. (shrink)

There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being (...) human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. (shrink)

This chapter is about micro-inequities and their connection to the problem of implicit bias. It begins by defining micro-inequities, goes on to discuss what makes them wrong and what solutions might be appropriate given the institutional context in which they occur.

According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to escape (...) the problem (arguably, the only way) is if the robot can be shown to be a moral patient – to deserve a particular moral status. If so, it isn’t clear how functional intentionality could remain plausible (something like “phenomenal intentionality” would be required). Finally, while it would have seemed that a reasonable strategy for establishing the moral status of intelligent machines would be to demonstrate that the machine possessed genuine intentionality, the composition argument suggests that the order of precedence is reversed: The machine must first be shown to possess a particular moral status before it is a candidate for having genuine intentionality. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal origins of the opposition between utilitarian and deontological judgments and the psychological underpinnings of people’s beliefs about the moral status of animals. One issue that remains underexplored in this research area is the relationship between people’s disposition to engage in utilitarian thinking and their attitudes towards animals. This gap is unfortunate considering the tight philosophical connection between (...) utilitarianism and the claim that animals have the same moral status as humans. Indeed, the principle of utility leads naturally enough to the view that animals count every bit as much as human beings. In this paper, we report two empirical studies dedicated to bridging this gap. In Study 1, we looked at the relationship between attitudes towards animals and utilitarian judgments in the context of sacrificial dilemmas. In Study 2, we bypassed the problems raised by the use of such dilemmas as a measure of utilitarianism by relying on other types of thought experiments. Overall, our results suggest no strong correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals. Rather, the existence of a correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals very much depends on how both are measured. (shrink)

Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human (...) nature. I conclude that a cryopreserved human embryo counts, both metaphysically and morally, as a person; and thus the utilization of such embryos for inherently destructive research purposes is impermissible. (shrink)

Cognitive incompetence cannot adequately explain the special character of children's moral status. It is, in fact, because children lack preference structures that are sufficiently stable over time that they are not ’temporally extended agents’. They are best viewed as 'special agents’, and parents have the responsibility of fostering the development of temporally extended agency and other necessary related moral capacities. Parental authority should be exercised with the view to assisting children to acquire the capacities (...) that facilitate their transition from 'special agents’ to full and functioning members of the moral community. (shrink)

Artificial Cognition (AC) has provoked a great deal of controversy in recent years. Concerns over its development have revolved around the questions of whether or not a moral status may be ascribed to AC and, if so, how could it be characterized? This paper provides an analysis of consciousness as a means to query the moral status of AC. This method suggests that the question of moral status of artificial cognition depends upon the level (...) of development of consciousness achieved. As a means by which to distinguish among different levels of technological capabilities, we propose a scale of AC statuses in the relationship with natural cognition of humans: no status, low status, equal status and high status. This research draws from classical theories of ethics, in particular utilitarianism and deontology, to explain the differences and shortcomings of the four propositions. The philosophical arguments presented serve to challenge common assumptions about natural cognition of human relationships with AC as well as to suggest that future technological advances should be directed toward the achievement of a position of equality in those relationships. This shows that artificial cognition has no moral status at present, but could have the same moral status as natural cognition of human beings in the future. (shrink)

Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice (...) different agents have toward children. In addition, while philosophers have extensively written about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed. This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory. Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to conceptualize capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and questions concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Furthermore, justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly interdisciplinary topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge. In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives. (shrink)

According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers :277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28:11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30:37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the (...) Argument from Consciousness. This short paper defends the Argument from Consciousness by providing two simple responses to Hsiao’s criticism. (shrink)

Moral judgments about an action are influenced by the action’s intentionality. The reverse is also true: judgments of intentionality can be influenced by an action’s moral valence. For example, respondents judge a harmful side-effect of an intended outcome to be more intentional than a helpful side-effect. Debate continues regarding the mechanisms underlying this “side-effect effect” and the conditions under which it will persist. The research behind this chapter tested whether the side-effect effect is intact in adolescents with psychopathic (...) traits, who are characterized by persistent immoral behavior, deficient moral emotions, and impairments in some forms of moral judgment. Results showed no differences between healthy adolescents and those with psychopathic traits: both groups judged harmful side-effects to be more intentional than helpful side-effects by an approximately 2:1 ratio. The chapter discusses these results in light of hypothesized mechanisms underlying the side-effect effect, and in light of our current understanding of moral reasoning deficits in psychopathy. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) are generative AI systems capable of producing original texts based on inputs about topic and style provided in the form of prompts or questions. The introduction of the outputs of these systems into human discursive practices poses unprecedented moral and political questions. The article articulates an analysis of the moral status of these systems and their interactions with human interlocutors based on the Habermasian theory of communicative action. The analysis explores, among other things, (...) Habermas's inquiries into the analogy between human minds and computers, and into the status of atypical participants in the linguistic community such as genetically modified subjects and animals. Major conclusions are the LLMs seem to qualify as authors that originally participate in discursive practices but do display only a structurally derivative form of communicative competence and fail to meet the status of communicative agents. In this sense, while the contribution of AI writing systems in public discourse and deliberation can support the process of mutual understanding within the community of speakers, the human actors involved in the development, use, and diffusion of these systems share a collective responsibility for the disclosure of AI authorship and verification and adjudication of validity claims. (shrink)

Forthy years after the issue of Animal Liberation (1975), this essay tries to make a critical assessment of the theses of Peter Singer on the moral status of animals, showing their historical evolution. Notwithstanding the limits of his utilitarian theoretical view, a good part of Singer’s moral reflection about animals reveals itself convincing and is finding some achievements in the positive legislation of a lot of countries. Following David DeGrazia, the author develops Singer’s theses in a gradualist (...) direction, pointing out that the problems of utilitarianism do not compromise the validity of the principle of equal consideration of interests, nor the main practical out-comes that the Australian philosopher draws from it. (shrink)

Although there is now a large and sophisticated literature on ethical or moral matters relating to family immigration and immigration enforcement, the intersection of these topics has not been greatly explored. This is unfortunate, as particular and difficult normative issues arise in relation to immigration enforcement when applied to children and to families where some members are unauthorized migrants and others are citizens or authorized migrants (“mixed-status” families). This chapter addresses this deficit, explaining some of these special (...) difficulties and providing suggestions as to how they may be addressed. (the file below is a final pre-publication version. Please cite to the published version.). (shrink)

The Future of Human Reproduction and Family Structure -/- Introduction -/- The future of human reproduction and family structure is set to undergo profound transformations due to advancements in science, technology, and shifting societal values. Breakthroughs in artificial reproduction, gene editing, AI-assisted parenting, and new family models are poised to redefine what it means to conceive, raise children, and form families. As these changes unfold, they will challenge traditional concepts of marriage, parenthood, and biological reproduction. This essay explores the (...) potential future of human reproduction and family structure, examining the scientific, ethical, and social implications. -/- 1. The Future of Human Reproduction -/- A. Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) and Genetic Engineering -/- Scientific advancements are making reproduction more accessible and customizable, allowing individuals to control fertility and genetic traits like never before. -/- 1. Artificial Wombs (Ectogenesis) -/- Artificial wombs, or ectogenesis, could enable embryos to develop outside the human body. This technology would: -/- Help individuals unable to carry pregnancies. -/- Reduce health risks associated with childbirth. -/- Offer reproductive freedom to same-sex couples and single individuals. -/- However, artificial wombs may raise ethical concerns about the emotional and psychological impact on maternal bonding and child development. Additionally, they may lead to commercialized pregnancy, where companies provide “womb services” for those who can afford them. -/- 2. Gene Editing & Designer Babies -/- Gene-editing tools like CRISPR allow parents to modify embryos to: -/- Eliminate genetic diseases. -/- Enhance intelligence, physical abilities, and even personality traits. -/- While this technology offers great potential for eradicating inherited disorders, it could also create genetic inequality between those who can afford enhancements and those who cannot, leading to the emergence of a genetic upper class. Governments may implement strict regulations, but underground markets for genetic enhancements could emerge. -/- 3. Lab-Grown Gametes -/- Scientists are developing methods to create sperm and eggs from stem cells, which could enable: -/- Infertile individuals to have biological children. -/- Single individuals to conceive without a partner. -/- While this could redefine reproduction by making parenthood accessible to all, it also raises ethical questions about whether parenthood should be solely based on biological connection or expanded to include other forms of caregiving. -/- B. Cloning and Synthetic Biology -/- 1. Human Cloning -/- While human cloning is currently illegal in most countries, advances in genetic engineering may eventually make it possible. Cloning could: -/- Allow individuals to reproduce without a partner. -/- Be used for medical purposes, such as replacing lost children. -/- Raise existential concerns about individuality and identity. -/- However, human cloning raises profound ethical concerns, including human rights, consent, and the potential exploitation of cloned individuals for labor or military purposes. -/- 2. Synthetic Embryos & Artificial Life -/- Scientists are developing synthetic embryos without using sperm or eggs, which could: -/- Enable reproduction without biological parents. -/- Help infertile individuals conceive. -/- Lead to new ethical dilemmas regarding the moral status of artificially created life forms. -/- If synthetic embryos become a reality, society may need to redefine what it means to be “human” and whether artificial life forms deserve legal rights. -/- C. Population & Environmental Considerations -/- 1. Controlled Population Growth -/- As overpopulation threatens global resources, some governments may: -/- Regulate reproduction using artificial reproductive technologies. -/- Implement birth quotas to maintain ecological balance. -/- Encourage reproduction in aging societies facing workforce decline. -/- These policies would raise ethical questions about personal freedom versus societal needs. -/- 2. Reproduction in Space -/- If humans colonize planets like Mars, reproduction in space will require: -/- Artificial wombs to protect embryos from cosmic radiation. -/- Genetic modifications to help humans adapt to low gravity. -/- New family structures, as space-born humans may develop unique physical traits. -/- This could lead to divergent human evolution, with space-born individuals differing from Earth-born humans over generations. -/- 3. The Future of Family Structure -/- A. Non-Traditional Family Models -/- 1. Multi-Parent Families -/- Technologies like three-parent IVF already exist, and in the future, more than two people may be able to contribute genetic material to a child. This could: -/- Redefine legal parenthood. -/- Enable new forms of family structures. -/- Challenge traditional parenting norms. -/- Laws will need to adapt to recognize multi-parent families and their rights. -/- 2. Single-Parent by Choice -/- With advanced reproductive technologies, more individuals will choose to have children without a partner. This will: -/- Normalize single parenthood. -/- Reduce societal pressure to marry for reproductive purposes. -/- Create new legal structures for co-parenting agreements. -/- B. Changes in Marriage & Parenting Norms -/- 1. Declining Marriage Rates -/- With reproduction becoming independent of relationships, marriage may decline, as people prioritize: -/- Career advancement. -/- Personal fulfillment. -/- Alternative forms of companionship. -/- 2. Co-Parenting Arrangements -/- People may legally agree to co-parent a child without being romantically involved. This would: -/- Offer a stable upbringing without traditional marriage. -/- Encourage partnership-based parenting. -/- Reduce legal disputes over custody. -/- 3. Extended Family Networks -/- Due to economic pressures, multi-generational households may become more common, with grandparents playing a bigger role in raising children. -/- C. AI & Robotics in Parenting -/- 1. AI Parenting Assistants -/- AI-driven robots may assist in: -/- Childcare and education. -/- Emotional development and mentorship. -/- Reducing parental stress. -/- However, heavy reliance on AI could impact traditional parent-child bonding. -/- 2. AI-Generated Children (Digital Offspring) -/- In the future, some people may choose to raise AI-based virtual children in digital environments instead of having biological kids. These “children” could: -/- Simulate real human relationships. -/- Reduce the need for biological reproduction. -/- Raise ethical questions: If AI children learn and grow, are they “alive”? -/- 3. Key Ethical and Social Questions -/- As these technologies reshape reproduction and family life, several ethical concerns arise: -/- 1. Genetic Inequality: Will access to genetic enhancements create a class divide? -/- 2. State vs. Individual Rights: Should governments regulate reproduction? -/- 3. Redefining Parenthood: Who qualifies as a parent in multi-parent or AI-assisted families? -/- 4. Traditional vs. Technological Families: Will humans still value biological reproduction, or will artificial and digital life forms become part of the family? -/- Conclusion -/- The future of human reproduction and family structure will be radically transformed by scientific advancements, shifting social norms, and ethical dilemmas. While artificial wombs, gene editing, and AI parenting promise greater reproductive freedom and inclusivity, they also pose existential challenges about human identity, societal structures, and the ethics of life creation. As these technologies advance, societies must carefully navigate their implications to ensure that progress benefits all of humanity while safeguarding fundamental rights and values. -/- . (shrink)

According to a widely shared intuition, normal adult humans require greater moral concern than normal, adult animals in at least some circumstances. Even the most steadfast defenders of animals' moral status attempt to accommodate this intuition, often by holding that humans' higher-level capacities (intellect, linguistic ability, and so on) give rise to a greater number of interests, and thus the likelihood of greater satisfaction, thereby making their lives more valuable. However, the moves from capacities to interests, and (...) from interests to the likelihood of satisfaction, have up to now gone unexamined and undefended. I argue that context plays a morally significant role both in the formation of an individual's capacities, and in the determination of the individual's interests and potential for satisfaction based on those capacities. Claims about an individual's capacities and interests are typically presented as unconditional; but on closer examination, they are revealed to be contingent on tacit assumptions about context. Until we develop an understanding of how to account for the role of context within our moral theories, attempts to defend special moral concern for human beings based on their superior capacities are less firmly grounded than is commonly thought. (shrink)

Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, (...) however, that no relevant ethical implications can be drawn from the thought experiment. It demonstrates neither that one always ought to let the embryos die, nor does it allow for any general conclusion concerning the moral status of human embryos. (shrink)

Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral (...) class='Hi'>status that can explain that difference. I argue that we can have or lack relational obligations to early fetuses in light of our own activities or choices, independent of the fetus’s own features or properties. Those relational obligations make the early fetus morally considerable to the persons who stand in a moral relation to it. Pregnant persons (and other participants in the procreative process) can come to have relational obligations to an early fetus just in virtue of their own decision to create a person, either by intentionally getting pregnant or by deciding to continue a pregnancy. That decision not only makes it appropriate for them to care about the fetus, but it also generates obligations to the fetus that they didn’t have before that decision. (shrink)

I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any moral obligation should be the (...) "functional morality" of Wallach and Allen [20], while the upper limit of our obligations should not exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and other environmental entities. (shrink)

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage (...) foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way. (shrink)

This article examines the possibility of determining the ontological status of the embryo and the moral foundation of the framework on which this status is based. Discussions on the ontological status of the embryo are analyzed within the frameworks of substance and continuity theories. Substance theory posits that the embryo possesses an immutable essence in ontological terms. This theory, being metaphysical in nature, aligns with theistic perspectives, which hold that God grants humans a soul from His (...) own spirit. Consequently, humans are perceived as possessing an unchanging essence or nature. This perspective entails a metaphysical view consistent with substance ontology. Furthermore, in theistic thought, humans are regarded as beings deserving of dignity because they are created by God. Examples supporting this view are presented from Christian and Islamic thought, expressed as the concept of imago Dei and the notion of humanity being elevated above all other creations, respectively. The concept of human dignity found in theistic thought provides a metaphysical foundation supporting substance theory and endows humans with moral status. This notion leads to the conclusion that the thesis of human dignity, which attributes an ontological status to the embryo (viewing it as a potential human), also confers moral status upon the embryo. The idea that humans are ontologically dignified beings implies that every stage of human development, from the earliest biological moment of the embryonic phase to infancy and beyond, holds value in relation to the previous stage, further supporting this concept. The dignity thesis appears closely tied to the species, nature, and potentiality of the embryo. Initially, the relationship between dignity and the speciesist approach is emphasized. However, anti-speciesist perspectives argue for the equality of humans with other living beings, advancing secular critiques of the concept of human dignity. In response, this study seeks to establish a consistent position on the concept of dignity by addressing the points of contention between theistic and secular interpretations. The substance ontology adopted for the discussion of the embryo’s personal identity is further supported by the metaphysical thesis of essentialism. Essentialism asserts that every species has its own immutable essence. It is argued that the essential qualities of natural species emerge at specific stages of embryonic development. In contrast, advocates of continuity theory reject the idea that the embryo possesses an unchanging essence or that there exists a definitive threshold distinguishing one stage of human development from another. They claim that the moral status of the embryo can only be established on a conventional basis, which provides a precarious foundation rather than a robust one for its protection. Therefore, this study argues that providing an ontological foundation of a substantial nature for the embryo is more coherent. In addition, the article addresses criticisms of substance ontology and the thesis of human dignity, offering reasoned responses. While explaining the ontological status of the embryo within the framework of substance theory, it is demonstrated that this theory aligns with concepts such as human dignity, speciesism, and essentialism. The argument from potentiality concerning the embryo's ontology is highlighted as particularly significant. This argument resonates with the theistic notion that the soul or essence given to humans by God bestows dignity by virtue of its potential state. Through these approaches, the article concludes that the ontological status of the embryo determines its moral status. Analytical methods from the field of bioethics are employed to examine metaphysical issues. The significance of this study lies in addressing discussions about the ontological status of the embryo, a topic extensively explored in Western literature from a secular perspective but less frequently analyzed on a metaphysical basis. (shrink)

Many instances of parental enhancement are objectionable on egalitarian grounds because they unnecessarily amplify one kind of asymmetry of power between parents and children. Because children have full moral status, we ought to seek egalitarian relationships with them. Such relationships are compatible with asymmetries of power only to the extent to which the asymmetry is necessary for (1) advancing the child's level of advantage up to what justice requires or (2) instilling in the child morally required (...) features. This is a ground to oppose parental enhancements whose purpose is either to merely satisfy parents' preferences or to confer on the child advantages above and beyond what the child is owed by justice. (shrink)

I argue that Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda differed in their conclusions regarding the status of Indigenous persons at least partly because las Casas had significant, yet incomplete, understanding of Indigenous persons, culture and societies and Sepúlveda had mere knowledge of them. To this end, I show that the epistemic state of understanding explains why Las Casas properly concluded that Indigenous persons deserve the same moral status afforded to Europeans. And I show how (...) las Casas’ understanding of Indigenous persons, culture and societies related to what he got wrong about Indigenous persons. (shrink)

Research ethics committees must sometimes deliberate about objects that do not fit nicely into any existing category. This is currently the case with the “gastruloid,” which is a self-assembling blob of cells that resembles a human embryo. The resemblance makes it tempting to group it with other members of that kind, and thus to ask whether gastruloids really are embryos. But fitting an ambiguous object into an existing category with well-worn pathways in research ethics, like the embryo, is only a (...) temporary fix. The bigger problem is that we no longer know what an embryo is. We haven’t had a non-absurd definition of ‘embryo’ for several decades and without a well-defined comparison class, asking whether gastruloids belong to the morally relevant class of things we call embryos is to ask a question without an answer. What’s the alternative? A better approach needs to avoid what I’ll refer to as “the potentiality trap” and, instead, rely on the emergence of morally salient facts about gastruloids and other synthetic embryos. (shrink)

If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though (...) not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. (shrink)

Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that it is morally worse for a human being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower animal (such as a dog or a cow) to suffer a harm that is equally severe (ceteris paribus). In this paper, I argue that this view receives rather less support from our intuitions than one might at first suppose. According to Kagan, moreover, an individual’s moral status depends partly upon her ‘modal capacities.’ (...) In this paper, I argue that the most natural strategy for justifying Kagan’s theory faces some important challenges. More generally, I argue that philosophers who wish to defend the view that human beings have a higher moral status than that of the lower animals face a dilemma. Either their theory of moral status will imply (unacceptably) that some severely cognitively impaired human beings have a significantly lower moral status than that of typical human beings, or these philosophers will be forced to ground moral status in a set of properties so far removed from a subject’s actual capacities that it will become difficult to see why these kinds of properties should have such moral importance. (shrink)

Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for (...) moral status. Further, I illustrate some practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question. (shrink)

Shortly after the bus and subway bombings in London on July 7, 2005, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon world leaders to reach consensus on a definition of terrorism, one that would facilitate 'moral clarity' and underwrite the United Nations convention against terrorism. The Secretary General's plea to world leaders help to highlight the practical significance and urgency of having a workable definition of terrorism. For the task of defining terrorism is not only theoretically or academically important; (...) it is important for far-reaching practical, moral, and political purposes as well. For without at least some semblance of a workable definition of terrorism, it is impossible to identify and collect data on acts of terrorism throughout the world; to understand and address the root causes of terrorism; and to reach international agreement and undertake collective action in addressing terrorism. And yet in spite of practical and moral urgency of the task at hand, consensus on an acceptable definition of terrorism has been notoriously elusive. (shrink)

This article is concerned with "all-or-nothing" approaches to female genital cosmetic surgeries, those that overemphasize either women's autonomy to defend total accessibility or the oppressive social context affecting women to defend the total banning of the procedures. By contrast, the author takes both phenomena into consideration. The author argues identifying patterns of false consciousness and weighing those against harm done to a patient provides a moral basis for a doctor to possibly deny their consent at face value. This also (...) requires a shift in understanding the doctor–patient relationship as a first step toward a feminist model for women's healthcare. (shrink)

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts (...) about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and those with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his (...) “physical basis of moral agency” account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional “speciesist” view. (shrink)

Organizations have neither a right to the vote nor a weighty right to life. We need not enfranchise Goldman Sachs. We should feel few scruples in dissolving Standard Oil. But they are not without rights altogether. We can owe it to them to keep our promises. We can owe them debts of gratitude. Thus, we can owe some things to organizations. But we cannot owe them everything we can owe to people. They seem to have a peculiar, fragmented moral (...) status. What explains this? Individualistic views explain this in terms of individualistic notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke any distinctive features of organizations. They just invoke the features of individual members of organizations. Collectivistic views, instead, explain this in terms of collective notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke the features of individual members of organizations. They just invoke the features of those organizations. We argue that neither approach works. Instead, one needs to synthesize the two approaches. Some individual interests, we think, are distinctively collective. We, as individuals, have a distinctive interest in playing a part in successful collective action. From this, so we argue, flows the apparently peculiar, fragmented moral status of organizations. (shrink)

Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum recently developed the ingenious and novel person‐rearing account of moral status, which preserves the commonsense judgment that humans have a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. It aims to vindicate speciesist judgments while avoiding the problems typically associated with speciesist views. We argue, however, that there is good reason to reject person‐rearing views. Person‐rearing views have to be coupled with an account of flourishing, which will (according to Jaworska and Tannenbaum) be (...) either a species norm or an intrinsic potential account of flourishing. As we show, however, person‐rearing accounts generate extremely implausible consequences when combined with the accounts of flourishing Jaworska and Tannenbaum need for the purposes of their view. (shrink)

Which beings have moral status? I argue that moral status requires some capacity for hedonic feelings of pleasure or displeasure. David Chalmers rejects this view on the grounds that it denies moral status to Vulcans, which are defined as conscious creatures with no capacity for hedonic feelings. On his more inclusive view, all conscious beings have moral status. We agree that only conscious beings have moral status, but we disagree about (...) how to explain this. I argue that we cannot explain why consciousness is necessary for moral status without denying that it is sufficient for moral status. Hence, we cannot exclude unconscious zombies without excluding conscious Vulcans too. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for (...) agency, entail the possession of sentience. Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will (...) probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons. (shrink)

Dignity is traditionally thought to apply to almost all and almost only humans. However, I argue that an account of a distinctly human dignity cannot achieve a coherent and non-arbitrary justification; either it must exclude some humans or include some nonhumans. This conclusion is not as worrying as might be first thought. Rather than attempting to vindicate human dignity, dignity should extend beyond the human, to include a range of nonhuman animals. Not only can we develop a widely inclusive account (...) of dignity by pursuing this route, but we can still defend the three core principles that lie at the heart of contemporary thinking about dignity: that bearers of dignity possess dignity to an equal degree, in virtue of possessing the same intrinsic worth, and that this generates direct and claimable rights. I thus develop an account of dignity that includes nonhuman animals. I argue that the capacity to value most plausibly grounds dignity. This capacity arises from valenced sentience: a being values insofar as they have experiences that matter to them. I then characterise what follows from this. First, I contend that it is only the capacity to value grounds dignity because this produces the most plausible, simplest, and most explanatorily powerful account of dignity. We ought to reject pluralist accounts which assert a sharp distinction between bearers and non-bearers of rational agency, and biocentric accounts which include non-sentient organic entities. Second, I argue this property grounds an account of dignity that is non-hierarchical. There are no degrees of dignity. Instead, all possessors of the capacity to value have the same kind of intrinsic value, and the same equal fundamental right: to consideration of their interest in leading a life of value. Finally, I argue that since the fundamental right is to consideration, moral agents have claimable duties to engage in a deliberative procedure with actionable requirements. Specific rights are instantiations of this general procedure. Certain revisionist conclusions follow on my view, for instance, that nonhumans should be given greater weight and inclusion in a far wider range of cases, but my account is sensitive to the range of different things different beings value, so it does not generate counterintuitive implications. I conclude that dignity extends beyond the human. (shrink)

Religious experiences come in a variety of types, leading to multiple taxonomies. One sort that has not received much attention as a distinct topic is what I will call ‘evidentially compelling religious experience’ (ECRE). The nature of an ECRE is such that if it actually occurs, its occurrence plausibly entails the falsity of metaphysical naturalism. Examples of ECREs might include visions / auditions / near-death experiences conveying information the hearer could not have known through natural means, later verified; unambiguously miraculous (...) healings; fulfilled prophecy; supernatural rescues; inter-subjective religious experiences (e.g., multiple people simultaneously having the same vision of the Virgin Mary), etc. After presenting a representative set of published case studies of ECREs, I argue that for most settled metaphysical naturalists (though not all), the combination of a settled metaphysical naturalism with an awareness of the relative commonality of testimony to ECREs is either irrational or immoral. This is because that conjunction entails either an unjust and uncharitable judgement on a great many of those testifying to ECREs (namely that they are liars), or an irrational refusal to acknowledge this entailment. (shrink)

Why Governments Become Corrupt: The Role of Power, Education, and Moral Values -/- Corruption is one of the most persistent problems in governance, affecting societies across different political and economic systems. It undermines democracy, weakens institutions, and diverts resources meant for public welfare into private hands. While corruption is often associated with greed and abuse of power, its roots go much deeper, extending to failures in the educational system and the erosion of family moral values. This essay explores (...) the reasons behind government corruption and how systemic failures in education and morality contribute to its persistence. -/- 1. Power Without Accountability -/- One of the primary reasons governments become corrupt is the unchecked power held by officials. When political leaders and bureaucrats operate without sufficient oversight, they are more likely to misuse public funds, manipulate policies, and engage in bribery or favoritism. In many countries, weak democratic institutions fail to impose consequences on corrupt individuals, allowing them to act with impunity. The absence of transparency in decision-making processes further enables corruption to thrive, as citizens are kept in the dark about how their governments operate. -/- 2. Weak Legal and Political Institutions -/- Corruption flourishes in environments where legal frameworks exist but are not enforced. Many countries have anti-corruption laws, yet enforcement is selective or non-existent. This failure is often due to political interference in the judiciary, where corrupt leaders appoint judges who will protect them from prosecution. Furthermore, when law enforcement agencies themselves are corrupt, they fail to investigate and punish those in power. This creates a vicious cycle where corruption becomes the norm rather than the exception. -/- 3. The Role of Greed and Self-Interest -/- Human nature, particularly the pursuit of wealth and status, plays a significant role in government corruption. Many officials prioritize their personal and political interests over the welfare of the people they serve. Bribery, embezzlement, and fraud become tempting options for those seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of society. Additionally, political patronage—where politicians use their power to reward loyal supporters with government positions or contracts—further entrenches corruption. -/- 4. The Failure of the Educational System -/- One of the overlooked causes of corruption is the failure of the educational system to instill ethical values and critical thinking. Education is supposed to shape responsible citizens, but in many countries, the system is focused on rote learning rather than teaching morality, civic responsibility, and ethical leadership. Schools and universities often do not provide students with the tools to question authority, recognize corruption, or demand transparency from their leaders. -/- Moreover, when the education system itself is corrupt—through bribery in admissions, fake diplomas, or unqualified teachers—it sets a dangerous precedent. Students grow up believing that success can be achieved through dishonest means, reinforcing the idea that corruption is an acceptable part of life. Without a strong moral foundation in education, future generations are more likely to participate in or tolerate corrupt practices. -/- 5. The Decline of Family Moral Values -/- Family plays a crucial role in shaping an individual’s ethical beliefs and behaviors. However, in many societies, traditional moral values that emphasize honesty, integrity, and accountability are declining. Parents, preoccupied with economic survival, may fail to teach their children the importance of moral principles. In some cases, families themselves engage in corrupt behaviors—such as paying bribes to secure jobs or influencing government officials for personal gain—sending the message that corruption is a necessary survival strategy. -/- Religious and cultural institutions, which once played a significant role in promoting ethical behavior, have also lost influence in many societies. As materialism and individualism grow stronger, the collective responsibility for upholding moral values weakens. When individuals lack strong moral guidance from their families and communities, they are more likely to justify corrupt actions when they gain positions of power. -/- 6. Economic Pressures and Low Salaries -/- Economic hardship can also drive corruption, especially in developing nations where government employees are underpaid. When officials struggle to meet their basic needs, they may resort to accepting bribes, embezzling funds, or engaging in illicit activities to supplement their income. In such environments, corruption becomes a survival mechanism rather than just a moral failure. -/- 7. Corporate Influence and Political Lobbying -/- The influence of powerful corporations over government policies is another major driver of corruption. Large businesses often fund political campaigns, expecting favorable policies in return. This results in leaders prioritizing corporate interests over public welfare. When governments are captured by private interests, policies that should benefit the majority are distorted to serve a wealthy elite. -/- 8. The Lack of Civic Engagement and Public Awareness -/- When citizens do not actively participate in governance or demand accountability, corrupt leaders face little resistance. A disengaged population allows corruption to thrive because there is no pressure for change. In many cases, people feel powerless or fear retaliation for speaking out against corrupt officials. Strengthening civic awareness through education, media, and public activism is essential in the fight against corruption. -/- Solutions: Restoring Integrity Through Education and Morality -/- To combat corruption effectively, reforms must address not only political and legal structures but also educational and moral foundations: -/- Strengthening the Educational System: Schools must incorporate ethics, civic responsibility, and critical thinking into their curriculum. Teachers should emphasize honesty and accountability, ensuring that students understand the long-term consequences of corruption. -/- Rebuilding Family Moral Values: Families must take a more active role in teaching children about integrity and social responsibility. Parents should set examples by refusing to participate in corrupt practices. -/- Enforcing Strong Anti-Corruption Laws: Governments must ensure that laws against corruption are applied equally, regardless of political or economic status. Independent judicial bodies should oversee investigations and prosecutions. -/- Improving Transparency in Governance: Public access to government transactions and decision-making processes must be expanded to reduce opportunities for corruption. Digital tools, such as open data platforms, can help track government spending and prevent misuse of funds. -/- Encouraging Citizen Participation: People must be empowered to hold their leaders accountable. This includes supporting investigative journalism, encouraging whistleblowers, and engaging in peaceful protests or advocacy movements. -/- Conclusion -/- Government corruption is a complex issue rooted in systemic failures, economic pressures, and ethical erosion. While power, greed, and weak institutions contribute to corruption, the failure of the educational system and the decline of moral values play an equally significant role. Addressing corruption requires a multi-faceted approach that not only strengthens laws and institutions but also reforms education and restores ethical foundations within families. Only through a collective effort to instill integrity at all levels of society can corruption be effectively minimized, paving the way for just and accountable governance. -/- . (shrink)

-/- The Role of a Holistic Educational System in Shaping Future Generations -/- Introduction -/- Throughout history, human behavior has been influenced by powerful social forces such as organized religion, criminal organizations, and political ideologies. These systems shape the way people think, act, and make decisions. Given this, it is reasonable to ask: If people can be strongly influenced by these forces, why not by a holistic educational system designed to promote knowledge, balance, and ethical decision-making? This essay argues that (...) the key to transforming society lies in producing a next generation of high-quality parents while minimizing the influence of low-quality parenting. Through a well-structured holistic educational system, societies can break negative cycles and create a foundation for a more balanced future. -/- The Power of Influence: Religion, Crime, and Education -/- Organized religion and criminal organizations have long demonstrated the ability to shape human behavior. Religion provides people with a sense of purpose, morality, and community, while criminal organizations use fear, loyalty, and material incentives to maintain their influence. If such systems can strongly shape human decision-making, then a well-designed educational system should be able to do the same—but in a way that leads to societal improvement rather than division or harm. -/- The challenge, however, Is that education often takes time and patience, while other forms of influence can provide immediate emotional or material rewards. Religion promises spiritual fulfillment and an afterlife; criminal organizations promise wealth and protection. To compete with these powerful forces, a holistic educational system must offer not only knowledge but also emotional fulfillment, a sense of purpose, and real-world benefits. -/- The Need for High-Quality Parents -/- One of the fundamental pillars of a holistic educational system must be the creation of high-quality parents—individuals who are knowledgeable, responsible, and capable of raising children with strong values and critical thinking. Since parents are the first educators of their children, their level of education and worldview will shape the next generation. -/- High-quality parents are those who: -/- Understand the universal law of balance and apply it in decision-making. -/- Raise children with critical thinking skills and the ability to question misinformation. -/- Provide emotional stability and ethical guidance. -/- Promote responsible behavior, ensuring that their children become constructive members of society. -/- In contrast, low-quality parenting—which may result from ignorance, lack of education, or harmful belief systems—tends to perpetuate cycles of poverty, violence, and misinformation. If left unaddressed, these negative cycles will continue to spread, making societal progress difficult. -/- Strategies for Producing High-Quality Parents -/- To achieve this transformation, several key strategies must be implemented: -/- 1. Holistic Education for All – A foundational education system that not only teaches academic subjects but also ethical reasoning, emotional intelligence, and critical thinking. This would ensure that all children are exposed to knowledge that helps them break free from ignorance. -/- 2. Parental Education Programs – Providing training for existing parents on responsible parenting, balanced decision-making, and child psychology. Even those who did not receive a strong education in their youth can still learn to become better role models for their children. -/- 3. Incentives for Responsible Parenting – Governments and institutions can introduce policies that encourage responsible parenting, such as better access to education for families, financial incentives for those who pursue parenting education, and social support programs that help parents apply their knowledge. -/- 4. Gradual Cultural Shift – Society must begin to view parenting as a vital responsibility, not just a personal choice. By elevating the status of good parenting through media, public discourse, and education, we can make quality parenting a social expectation rather than an afterthought. -/- The Long-Term Vision -/- By implementing these strategies, future generations will be raised by parents who are better equipped to guide their children toward a balanced and knowledgeable life. This will gradually reduce the number of individuals raised in ignorance or influenced by destructive ideologies. -/- While this approach does not provide immediate results, its long-term impact could be the most effective and sustainable solution to many of society’s problems. Instead of fighting ignorance and imbalance at the adult level—when minds are often rigid—it is more effective to prevent these issues at their root: childhood and parenting. -/- Conclusion -/- If society is serious about progress, it must recognize that education is the most powerful force for change. If organized religion and criminal organizations can strongly shape human behavior, then a well-structured holistic educational system should be capable of the same—but in a way that leads to knowledge, balance, and human flourishing. The key to long-term societal transformation is to produce a next generation of high-quality parents while reducing the influence of low-quality parenting. By prioritizing education, responsible decision-making, and ethical leadership, society can ensure a future where balance and progress replace ignorance and suffering. -/- . (shrink)

My paper builds on the conceptual tools from three interrelated philosophical debates that—as I believe—may help structure important if chaotic discussions about surrogates for living human brains and resolve some practical issues related to regulatory matters. In particular, I refer to the discussions about the “moral precautionary principle” in research ethics (Koplin and Wilkinson 2019); about normative uncertainty in ethics (MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020), and about the inductive risk problem for animal welfare scientists (Birch 2018). I elucidate upon (...) the possible meanings of the phrase “a too good human brain surrogate” used by Henry T. Greely (2021), and I demonstrate that the evaluation of the practical and regulatory implications of the “goodness” of such surrogates created for research purposes should be sensitive to the possible consequences of two types of errors: the under-attribution and over-attribution of moral status to such beings. Many authors writing about this topic (including Greely 2021, but see also, e.g., Koplin and Savulescu 2019) concentrate only on the first type of error, neglecting the negative consequences of the second type, i.e., over-attribution. (shrink)