A Série Investigação Filosófica é uma série de livros de traduções de verbetes da Enciclopédia de Filosofia da Stanford (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), que intenciona servir tanto como material didático para os professores das diferentes subáreas e níveis da Filosofia quanto como material de estudo para a pesquisa e para concursos da área. Nós, professores, sabemos o quão difícil é encontrar bom material em português para indicarmos. E há uma certa deficiência na graduação brasileira de filosofia, principalmente em localizações menos (...) favorecidas, com relação ao conhecimento de outras línguas, como o inglês e o francês. Tentamos, então, suprir essa deficiência, ao introduzirmos essas traduções ao público de língua portuguesa, sem nenhuma finalidade comercial e meramente pela glória da filosofia. (shrink)

Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been (...) much ink spilled in the mystical aspects of his philosophy. Although there are hints of his Christian leanings, patent parallelisms have yet to be drawn properly. Exploring Christian faith and rule-following, this paper asserts that the former is how the latter is characterized in the Philosophical Investigations. Faith and rule-following both provide a way of seeing and are sufficient for action. (shrink)

The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to closely explore the nature of Einstein’s block universe and to tease out its implications for the nature of time and human freedom. Four questions, in particular, are central to this dissertation, and set out the four dimensions of this philosophical investigation: (1) Does the block universe view of time follow inevitably from the theory of special relativity? (2) Is there room for the passage of time in the block universe? (3) Can (...) we distinguish past from future in the block universe? (4) Is there room for human freedom in the block universe? Although the answer of most philosophers would be yes, triple no, my own answer, controversially, is no, triple yes. -/- I thereby challenge the status quo with respect to each of these metaphysical questions, and argue that none of these questions can be answered from looking at physics alone. Physics may constrain our metaphysics, but it certainly does not settle it. What is needed in order to answer these questions, are additional metaphysical assumptions that fall outside the scope of modern physics. My primary goal in this dissertation, therefore, is not to settle the debates on the nature of time and human freedom, but to clarify them by expliciting the metaphysical assumptions that are otherwise left implicit. (shrink)

open journal of Philosophical Investigations (PI) is an international journal dedicated to the latest advancements in philosophy. The goal of this journal is to provide a platform for academicians all over the world to promote, share, and discuss various new issues and developments in different areas of philosophy. -/- All manuscripts to be prepared in English or Persian and are subject to a rigorous and fair peer-review process. Generally, accepted papers will appear online. The journal publishes papers including (...) the following fields: -/- · Analytic Philosophy · Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy · Art Aesthetics · Comparative Philosophy West and Chinese · Eastern Philosophy . Islamic philosophy · Epistemology · Ethics · Hermeneutics · History of Religious Thought · History of Western Philosophy · Language Logic . (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is organized in short paragraphs or "remarks." Most of these are numbered consecutively, but some are not – including his remarks on "aspect-seeing" that are the focus of Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. This appendix to that volume is an indexed catalog of the unnumbered remarks, cross-referenced to four different editions, including the latest (4th) edition. -/- Note: There is a missing remark that should be inserted on p. 363 of the concordance, after the "A sensation can" (...) line, thus: What is the 185e 158e PPF §60. (shrink)

Este livro marca o início da Série Investigação Filosófica. Uma série de livros de traduções de textos de plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, que possa servir tanto como material didático para os professores das diferentes subáreas e níveis da Filosofia quanto como material de estudo para o desenvolvimento pesquisas relevantes na área. Nós, professores, sabemos o quão difícil é encontrar bons materiais em português para indicarmos. E há uma certa deficiência na graduação brasileira de filosofia, principalmente em localizações menos favorecidas, com relação (...) ao conhecimento de outras línguas, como o inglês e o francês. Tentamos, então, suprir essa deficiência, ao introduzirmos traduções de textos importantes ao público de língua portuguesa, sem nenhuma finalidade comercial e meramente pela glória da filosofia. O presente volume é constituído de três traduções de verbetes importantes sobre lógica, da Enciclopédia de Filosofia da Stanford: (1) A Lógica de Aristóteles, (2) Lógica Clássica, (3) Lógica Modal. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to examine the validity of the justification commonly offered for a coercive(1) psychiatric intervention, namely that the intervention was in the ‘best interests’ of the subject and/or that the subject posed a danger to others. As a first step,it was decided to analyse justifications based on ‘best interests’ [the ‘Stage 1’ argument] separately from those based on dangerousness [the ‘Stage 2’ argument]. Justifications based on both were the focus of the ‘Stage 3’ argument. Legal and philosophical (...) analyses of coercive psychiatric interventions generally regard such interventions as embodying a benign paternalism occasioning slight, if any, ethical concern. Whilst there are some dissenting voices even at the very heart of academic and professional psychiatry, the majority of psychiatrists also appear to share such views. The aim of this dissertation is to show that such a perspective is mistaken and that such interventions raise philosophical and ethical questions of the profoundest importance.(2) The philosophical well-spring of the Stage 1 dissertation argument lay in an observation made by Philippa Foot (3) that the “… right to be let free from unwanted interference” is one of the most fundamental and distinctive rights of persons, a right which takes precedence over any “… action we would dearly like to take for his sake.” This – in conjunction with the recognition that some coercive psychiatric interventions are of a gravity as to result in the personhood of the subject being severely damaged if not destroyed – suggested that the concept of personhood play a central role in the formulation of the dissertation argument. For ease of analysis it was presumed that the term ‘person’ could be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions of which ‘minimum levels of rationality’ and ‘ability to communicate’ were the only conditions relevant to the formulation of justifications for coercive psychiatric interventions. This presumption was explicated into a number of postulates which enabled the construction of a rigorous foundation on which to develop the dissertation argument. This argument then sought to determine whether psychiatric assessments of irrationality were accurate and reliable. In furtherance of this analysis it was necessary to examine the reliability of psychiatric determinations in other areas of claimed expertise namely diagnosis, treatment and assessment of dangerousness. This ‘crossing of the disciplinary threshold’ brought to light the dearth of studies on psychiatric misdiagnosis and iatrogenic harm. A variant of the Precautionary Principle was developed to enable the extent of such harms to be estimated. The not insignificant levels of psychiatric misdiagnosis and iatrogenic harm and erroneous assessments of dangerousness which were thus found are of considerable relevance to any ethical analysis of the justification for coercive psychiatric intervention and serve to undermine simple paternalistic justifications. ---- (1)The term ‘coercive’ (rather than ‘non-consensual’) is used to indicate an intervention carried out against the explicit and contemporaneous objections of the subject (2)Not least because the number of individuals detained in Irish psychiatric hospitals is of a comparable order of magnitude to the number detained in Irish prisons subsequent to a criminal conviction. (3) See Foot (1977), p.102. (shrink)

The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain (...) why it fails; in part three I suggest why commentators might have been motivated to offer it; and in part four I claim that two commentators who have offered it also imply otherwise. (shrink)

In this book, Rupert Read offers the first outline of a resolute reading, following the highly influential New Wittgenstein 'school', of the Philosophical Investigations. He argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to understand its liberatory purport. Read contends that a resolute reading coincides in its fundaments with what, building on ideas in the later Gordon Baker, he calls a liberatory reading. Liberatory philosophy is philosophy that can liberate the user from compulsive patterns of thought, (...) freeing one for possibilities that were previously obscured. Such liberation is our prime goal in philosophy. This book consists in a sequential reading, along these lines, of what Read considers the most important and controversial passages in the Philosophical Investigations 1, 16, 43, 95 & 116 & 122, 130-3, 149-151, 186, 198-201, 217, and 284-6. Read claims that this liberatory conception is simultaneously an ethical conception. The PI should be considered a work of ethics in that its central concern becomes our relation with others. Wittgensteinian liberations challenge widespread assumptions about how we allegedly are independent of and separate from others. Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, and to scholars of the political philosophy of liberation and the ethics of relation. (shrink)

Nossa seleção de verbetes parte do interesse de cada pesquisador e os dispomos de maneira histórico-cronológica e, ao mesmo tempo, temática. O verbete de Melissa Lane, “Filosofia Política Antiga” vai da abrangência da política entre os gregos até a república e o império, às portas da cristianização. A “Filosofia Política Medieval”, de John Kilcullen e Jonathan Robinson, é o tópico que mais demanda espaço na nossa seleção em virtude das disputas intrínsecas ao período, da recepção de Aristóteles pelo medievo e (...) da tensão entre poder Papal e Civil. No verbete “Liberalismo”, de Gerald Gaus, Shane Courtland e David Schmidtz, vemos as fontes fundantes da Filosofia Política da modernidade. As ideias de liberdade negativa e positiva se coadunam com a Ética Liberal e sua influência sobre a abrangência do valor fundamental da liberdade individual diante das políticas públicas. O texto de Ian Carter, “Liberdade Positiva e Liberdade Negativa”, expõe o paradoxo da liberdade em suas concepções valorativas e neutra, muito úteis para compreender os problemas políticos que enfrentamos hoje. Por fim, Bas Van Der Vossen no texto “Libertarianismo” trata das noções tensas entre Estado e indivíduos. A concepção de “liberdade de si”, genuinamente negativa, ganha destaque justificatório. Jackie Scully, no verbete Bioética Feminista, exemplifica o valor da influência dessas correntes no âmago de todos os contemporâneos. Sua escrita homenageia postumamente Anne Donchin com um apanhado histórico da luta de inserção de políticas feministas na pesquisa acadêmica global. No verbete “Democracia”, os professores brasileiros Gustavo Dalaqua e Alberto Ribeiro Barros acrescentaram tópicos importantes ao tema geral, respectivamente: “Construtivismo Representativo vs. Representação Descritiva” e “Democracia Contestatória de Philip Pettit”. O texto de Thomas Christiano perpassa os principais argumentos de justificação política contra e a favor da democracia ocidental, com foco central nas concepções de liberdade e igualdade. Os verbetes dispostos nessa seleção de textos são tendenciosos na medida que expressam o interesse genuíno de cada pesquisador com os assuntos relevantes em suas pesquisas. Em virtude disso, a escolha “adota um lado” em detrimento de outros – mais especificamente: de outro que poderia ser mais “progressista”. Por si só, o livro já nasce reclamando um segundo volume, que será providenciado. Colocamos de lado qualquer exigência de “imparcialidade”, algo que não existe na Filosofia, muito menos na Filosofia Política. Sobressai, nesse aspecto, o caráter reflexivo que o assunto exige e a importância do assunto, sem o qual não teríamos a modernas concepções de representatividade, as teorias da justiça ou mesmo as ciências sociais. Um outro volume, portanto, se faz imperativo, por conta da abrangência da própria SEP e do respeito a seu projeto inicial, genuinamente um plano plural. (shrink)

I critically respond to Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation. I attack his Contrastive Reasons Account of what it takes for a request to be answered and provide an alternative account on which a request is answered as long as it has deliberative weight for the person asked. I also raise issues with Davison’s dismissive treatment of direct divine communication. I then emphasize the importance of value theory for addressing the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Whether a defense (...) of petitionary prayer is successful depends on whether it can support the sort of requests that are central to the theological practices of the religion in question, explaining how they could be known to be effective, and this depends on the value theory of the theology in question. As an example, I show the relevance the traditional distinction between temporal and spiritual goods could have for knowing whether one’s prayers have been answered. How prayers could make a difference also depends on the theology in question, raising issues of ecclesiology and collective action that demand further attention. (shrink)

Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.

It is widely thought that, in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reveals himself to oppose a definite view or theory of rule-following. I argue that, due to the self-undermining character of that section, no such interpretation should be accepted. Then I sketch a reading of Wittgenstein’s method that accounts for the paradoxical nature of §201, and I show how this methodology is realized in his remarks on following a rule.

In Philosophical Investigations §§185–201, Wittgenstein addresses an oscillation in our thinking about the nature of rules. He seems to introduce a problem—how do we follow rules?—, and a “paradox” in which it is rooted, in order to find a solution to them; only to then call the whole puzzle a “misunderstanding” after all. My contention is that this apparent friction can best be understood and resolved when we view it in light of Wittgenstein’s engagement with limits and limitations, (...) and how easy it is to confuse one with the other when thinking about human thought and language. This central bit of the frequently discussed “rule-following considerations,” then, is concerned not simply with matters of semantics, convention, or community, but rather with the question of a proper philosophical method for thinking about our life with language in general. When traced out, these few remarks elucidate a bifurcation in interpreting one of the central methodological themes in Wittgenstein. (shrink)

We sometimes feel the presence of a person-like something on a non-biological object, such as a memento from a deceased family member or a well-engineered, human-shaped robot. This feeling—the sense of someone appearing there—has not been extensively investigated by philosophers. In this paper, I employ examples from previous studies, my own experiences, and thought experiments to conduct a philosophical analysis of the mechanism of the emergence of this person-like something by using the concept of an animated persona. This animation (...) process works not only in cases of deceased people and non-biological objects but also in cases of a living, conscious human being. This suggests that the appearance of the other mind on a human body is not necessarily a reflection of that human’s inner self-consciousness but can be considered a personhood that appears, animated by various surrounding factors. I also propose the concept of “the supremacy of surface-ness over behind-ness”. Finally, I categorize the appearance of an animated persona on a human body or an object into eight patterns and compare their characteristics. (shrink)

Painless civilization is a term I coined in my Japanese book of the same title, which was published in 2003. Contemporary civilization aims to provide pleasure and comfort and eliminate pain and suffering as much as possible. This is especially evident in advanced countries. Contemporary civilization is moving toward a painless civilization. However, in a painless civilization, we are deprived of the joy of life, which is considered a fundamental source of meaning in life, and we are led toward the (...) situation of drowning in a sea of pleasure. This is a kind of dystopia, and we cannot find an easy way to escape from it. It is important to pay special attention to this aspect of contemporary civilization when we think about the future of our planet. (shrink)

This research examines ethical issues in computational linguistics that can be applied to national defense by analyzing philosophical and security language. The increasing use of language contexts, such as intelligence and communication data analysis, raises ethical and philosophical challenges related to privacy, control, and accuracy. This research aims to identify and analyze ethical issues, especially in the use of computational linguistics in defense applications, as well as their implications for the protection of individual rights and privacy. This method (...) involves reviewing ethical technology references and analyzing the philosophical design of language and security. Deontological and utilitarian ethical theories are applied to evaluate the moral impacts and consequences of using the language of technology in a defense context. The results demonstrate that using linguistics in defense can pose privacy risks, misuse of data, and the potential for significant bias in decision-making. This often involves collecting data from multiple sources, creating challenges to ensure data is managed ethically and responsibly. Conclusion: This shows the need for a solid ethical and regulatory framework to ensure technology's fair and responsible use in context defense. Implications of the findings include the need for ongoing dialogue between technology developers, policymakers, and the public to mitigate ethical risks and ensure that application technologies comply with critical and security principles. With a comprehensive and responsible approach, technological linguistics can improve military safety and effectiveness without compromising individual rights and privacy. (shrink)

This thesis is a philosophical examination of the explanatory roles of diagnoses in psychiatry. In medicine, diagnoses normally serve as causal explanations of patients’ symptoms. Given that psychiatry is a discipline whose practice is shaped by medical traditions, it is often implied that its diagnoses also serve such explanatory functions. This is evident in clinical texts that portray psychiatric diagnoses as referring to diseases that cause symptoms. However, there are problems which cast doubt on whether such portrayals are justified. (...) I address these problems and examine whether psychiatric diagnoses provide explanations of symptoms. The first problem is conceptual. In diagnostic manuals, psychiatric diagnoses are defined by their symptoms. This suggests that invoking them as explanations of the symptoms amounts to circularity. I argue that this can be resolved with an appropriate conceptual framework that captures the complex semantic values of diagnostic terms and their different uses in clinical discourse. I put forward such a framework based on two-dimensional semantics. The second problem is ontological. Empirical research suggests that diagnostic categories in psychiatry do not correspond to invariant causal types, but are associated with variable combinations of diverse causes that interact across biological, psychological, and social levels. Given this heterogeneity, I argue that psychiatric diagnoses fall short of paradigmatic cases of causal explanation, but that some can still provide other sorts of useful causal explanatory information. The original contribution of this thesis is the illumination of the conceptual relations between diagnoses and symptoms. This philosophical work is important, because it can be brought to valuable application in modifying psychiatric practice. (shrink)

Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W scholars, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). (...) In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- As Stern is aware, throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly rendered as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years ago”. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

There is an unexamined use of words and language in writing and speaking. Philosophy always stresses on argumentation that carries meaning. Wittgenstein even draws pictures of language to relate it to its idea, usage and meaning. This paper, therefore, intends to highlight the relevance of use theory of meaning in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

The philosophical interest of mystery is that something may well fall under a distinctive ontological concept of mystery. Such a thing would be explicable with reference to intention, but not uniquely determined by its explicans. This is the "properly mysterious," which is essentially mysterious in virtue of what it is, not just of our epistemic limitations. The richer uses of 'mystery', and defects in recent literature, suggest this line of inquiry. ;Part I rebuts the main arguments against the possibility (...) that something is properly mysterious. First, if something's existence is completely explicable it need not thus be exhaustively explicable . Second, event-determinism is not establishable empirically and nothing establishes general determinism a priori . So there is no reason to think every existent is uniquely determined to exist. But there is good reason to think everything is completely explicable in principle. ;Part II shows there is better reason to think the world's existence properly mysterious than not. The world asked about in the question "Why does the world exist?" should be defined as the totality comprising all that really changes and what is ontologically parasitic thereon . The World's existence is both logically contingent and contingent in one or the other of two de re senses , and thus is either inexplicable for any knower or explicable as intentionally produced. The producer would be extramundane, de re necessary, and could not uniquely determine the existence of The World. Defending classical theism against charges of conceptual incoherence, I conclude that the existence of The World is best thought completely explicable as intentionally created, though not exhaustively explicable by the existence of its creator. ;In conclusion, I expound and adopt Aquinas' account of creation, on which God creates for a reason and freely. Thus there is good reason for the world's existence, but no reason why this world exists rather than some other. (shrink)

A Série Investigação Filosófica, uma iniciativa do Núcleo de Ensino e Pesquisa em Filosofia do Departamento de Filosofia da UFPel e do Grupo de Pesquisa Investigação Filosófica do Departamento de Filosofia da UNIFAP, sob o selo editorial do NEPFil online e da Editora da Universidade Federal de Pelotas, com auxílio financeiro da John Templeton Foundation, tem por objetivo precípuo a publicação da tradução para a língua portuguesa de textos selecionados a partir de diversas plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, tal como a Stanford (...) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, por exemplo. O objetivo geral da série é disponibilizar materiais bibliográficos relevantes tanto para a utilização enquanto material didático quanto para a própria investigação filosófica. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use as a philosophical method for investigating the emotions. The paper defends such conceptual analysis against the critique that it is short of empirical grounding and at best reflects current “common-sense beliefs.” Such critique harks back to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of “linguistic philosophy” as sanctifying our ordinary use (...) of words, as empirically naïve, unscientific and founded on outmoded theories of meaning. This paper is an attempt to show why such critique is misplaced. Conceptual analysis, properly construed, need not depend on empirical considerations. On the contrary, conceptual analysis of emotions is often a prerequisite to empirical investigations. Furthermore, conceptual analysis need not make ordinary language sacred and need not rely on a theory of meaning or on an analytic/synthetic distinction. (shrink)

Daeley wrote good book. I wrote a tolerable review.

In an attempt to contribute to the discussion of the philosophy of agriculture, this paper introduces a preliminary philosophical discourse on the views of the farmers of the Municipality of San Francisco, Southern Leyte. It seeks to philosophize from the vantage point of the farmers. It uses thematic analysis from the face-to-face interview with the selected farmers. Then, it purposefully integrates a method, which I call, "Philosophizing from"-a process of philosophical discourse that proceeds from the views of the (...) participants. The result of inquiry leads to the recognition of the condition, challenges, and continuity in the life of the farmers. Thus, this preliminary investigation acknowledges the reality of agricultural life expressed from the farmer's perspective. (shrink)

Imaginative resistance refers to a phenomenon in which people resist engaging in particular prompted imaginative activities. Philosophers have primarily theorized about this phenomenon from the armchair. In this paper, we demonstrate the utility of empirical methods for investigating imaginative resistance. We present two studies that help to establish the psychological reality of imaginative resistance, and to uncover one factor that is significant for explaining this phenomenon but low in psychological salience: genre. Furthermore, our studies have the methodological upshot of showing (...) how empirical tools can complement the predominant armchair approach to philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

Thirteen essays in this volume explore and investigate diverse contemporary philosophicla themes and issues...

Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, continually expands its discourse by introducing novel philosophical ideas and different traditions. Nevertheless, a conspicuous silence persists regarding the introduction of African philosophies in its discourse. This issue becomes apparent when the question “How might one live?”—a fundamental question that the philosophical counsellor deals with—is adequately investigated. However, its current formulation suffers greatly from a much-needed nuance concerning temporal and contextual awareness. To address and transcend this shortcoming, I turn (...) to two distinct African philosophies, namely, the hermeneutic philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan and the conversational method of philosophising advocated by Jonathan O. Chimakonam. By incorporating these philosophies, my aim is twofold: first, to promote an interpretative actualisation situated within a conversational framework that might lead to the creation of new concepts and/or the disclosing of different ways of being/becoming, and second, to draw attention to an underlying assumption that might maintain the neglect of philosophical traditions beyond Western philosophy. (shrink)

Book Information The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. By Gerhard Schurz. Kluwer. Dordrecht. 1997. Pp. x + 332. £92.25.

The influence of Spengler on Wittgenstein's philosophical development is considered. The point of interest is in a significant methodological restructuring which it appears to have produced. After an initial over-enthusiastic reception, Wittgenstein is seen to object on some points which he attempted to emend in his own philosophy. Spengler's name disappeared inreworked manuscripts but traces persist in the Philosophical Investigations and an important section (§89-133) is found to be connected with it.

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface (...) by Sir Michael Dummett. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of five chapters, each written as independent research papers that are unified by an overarching concern regarding information privacy and machine learning-based artificial intelligence (AI). This dissertation addresses the issues concerning privacy and AI by responding to the following three main research questions (RQs): RQ1. ‘How does an AI system affect privacy?’; RQ2. ‘How effectively does the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) assess and address privacy issues concerning both individuals and groups?’; and RQ3. ‘How can the value (...) of privacy be embedded into systems?’ -/- To respond to the RQs, this dissertation adopts the privacy impact assessment (PIA) as the overall methodology. A PIA encompasses three distinct stages; the first, the analytical stage, concerns the analysis of how AI (particularly focusing on inference as a process that includes inferred information, AI models’ performance, and accessing information uncovered by AI models) impacts privacy. Second, the legal assessment stage concerns whether AI that processes personal information and develops models complies with the GDPR. Finally, the design requirements stage features proposals for design requirements for systems aimed at protecting privacy. Accordingly, this dissertation is structured in three parts, each corresponding to a specific stage of a PIA and responding to one of the RQs. -/- Part I, which addresses the first stage of the PIA, comprises three chapters that altogether respond to RQ1. Chapter 2 analyses how AI impacts the descriptive aspect of privacy; this part argues that AI challenges the current definitions of privacy and that the ‘source control’ and ‘actual access’ definitions of privacy, once revised in the face of counter-examples involving inferred information, converge. Chapter 3, which considers how AI impacts the normative aspect of privacy, particularly the value of privacy, argues that AI affects the social value of privacy, which depends on trust, as this dimension of privacy is constituted when AI models perform accurately. Chapter 4 examines how AI impacts the normative aspect of privacy, particularly the right to privacy, and it argues that, although accessing information uncovered by AI models raises concerns about the privacy of algorithmically designed groups, the right to privacy cannot be recognised for such groups. This is the disruptive feature of AI that has led to consideration of new approaches other than the traditional one, which involves recognising the right to privacy, to protect the privacy of these groups. Instead of recognising the right to privacy for algorithmically designed groups, this chapter suggests taking a moral principle for the moral obligation of protecting vulnerable groups within an ethics of vulnerability. -/- Part II concerns the second stage of the PIA and consists of one chapter that responds to RQ2. Chapter 5, in addition to evaluating whether AI that processes personal information and develops models complies with the GDPR, also assesses whether the GDPR adequately addresses the privacy issues raised by AI. It specifically focuses on group privacy and argues that GDPR has limitations in protecting the privacy of algorithmically designed groups and that the privacy of such vulnerable entities must be considered in the context of privacy and data protection. -/- Part III, which is related to the third stage of the PIA, also consists of one chapter that responds to RQ3. Chapter 6 proposes design requirements to protect privacy by integrating privacy into systems and argues that privacy is instrumentally valuable for the sake of autonomy. Accordingly, to embed the value of privacy into systems, design requirements are articulated through the translation of norms that promote and protect autonomy. (shrink)

Ludwig's contribution to the discipline of philosophy of language cannot be overemphasized. This article addresses his contribution to resolving problems in philosophy by the use of language, in two of his most famous works: Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations.

Memory is a set of cognitive capacities by which humans and other animals retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes. Philosophical investigation into memory is in part continuous with the development of cognitive scientific theories, but includes related inquiries into metaphysics and personal identity.

In this paper, we explicate the method of Investigative Ordinary Language Philosophy (IOLP). The term was coined by John Cook to describe the unique philosophical approach of Frank Ebersole. We argue that (i) IOLP is an overlooked yet valuable philosophical method grounded in our everyday experiences and concerns; and (ii) as such, Frank Ebersole is an important but neglected figure in the history of ordinary language philosophy.

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what (...) class='Hi'>philosophical phenomenology has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the (...) notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence. (shrink)

If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are (...) false, either (a) the average philosopher’s true commonsensical beliefs are epistemically impoverished, or (b) a good portion of philosophy is bunk and philosophers should give up most of their error theories despite the fact that their supporting arguments are generally as good as or even better than other philosophical arguments. (shrink)

Di Francesco and Marraffa performed a well-organized exploration of the literature concerned with consciousness. They described how interest in the issue dates back to ancient Greek philosophers, and continues to be of interest. Researchers invest impressive amounts of resources into investigating the issue. My goal is to question whether this is optimal.

In this paper, I expand my upon earlier linguistic research (Lian, 2023), which delved into the genre of abstracts from Western philosophical papers. I engage with the philosophical ramifications emanating from the guidelines established for crafting philosophy paper abstracts (Lian, 2023) and underscore their significance in the domain of academic philosophical writing. A pivotal focus of this research is to navigate the intricate philosophical challenges posed by cross-disciplinary investigations bridging applied linguistic statistics with philosophical (...) paper composition, specifically, the nuanced interpretation of linguistic findings in a manner palatable to philosophers. My exploration probes into the dynamics of various concepts within Inter-Disciplinary Research (IDR), highlighting the complexities in reconciling semantic intuitions related to the notions of "Method (M)" and "Conclusion (C)". I delineate three philosophical stances: (1) deferring to scientific authority, (2) recognizing domain-specific terminologies, and (3) interrogating peripheral scientific theories. I posit that these stances significantly influence the ways philosophers engage with and resolve the cross-disciplinary semantic and theoretical contentions stemming from the rhetorical structures of "Method (M)" and "Conclusion (C)". This work proposes avenues to attain either "theoretical coherence" or "disciplinary synthesis", thereby fostering enhanced cross-disciplinary collaboration and fortifying academic discourse across diverse fields. -/- Keywords: Inter-Disciplinary Research (IDR), Applied linguistics, Philosophical writing, Genre Analysis, Rhetorical Moves . (shrink)

Philosophers have long been fascinated by the stream of consciousness––thoughts, images, and bits of inner speech that dance across the inner stage. Yet for centuries, such “mind-wandering” was deemed private and thus resistant to empirical investigation. Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience have reinvigorated scientific interest in the stream of thought, leading some researchers to dub this “the era of the wandering mind”. Despite this flurry of progress, scientists have stressed that mind-wandering research requires firmer philosophical foundations. The time (...) is therefore ripe for the philosophy of mind-wandering. Our review begins with a foundational question: what is mind-wandering? We then investigate the significance of mind-wandering for general philosophical topics, namely mental action, introspection, and the norms of thinking and attention. (shrink)

Shame’s conceptualization is one of the most challenging discussions in psychological studies. This challenge creates many ambiguities for both psychologists and theologians in Eastern cultures especially Iranian-Islamic culture. This paper discusses the dominant psychological researches about shame and tries to compare the outcome of these researches with Abdulkarim Soroush’s theological-moral view about shame. This comparison, we believe, helps us to understand their different approaches for further psychological and theological studies. We used descriptive-analytical method for the current research and our resources (...) were mostly psychological books, article and set of Soroush’s lectures. Also use the soroush books of Gods ethics for showing the soroush views in moral epistemology We conclude that although psychologists and theologians are talking about the same terminology, i.e. shame, they are coming from totally different planet in different paradigms with different philosophical-psychological assumptions. The different assumptions is showed for example about type of problem representation, innate view about shame, attention to ontological component of shame, truthful of shame, attention to virtue ethics of shame and methodology of investigation of concept and function of shame. This philosophical and psychological assumptions is discussed. (shrink)

The concept of 'authenticity' is highly valued on social media sites (SMSes), despite its ambiguous nature and definition. One interpretation of 'authenticity' by media scholars is a human's congruence with online portrayals of themselves (e.g. posting spontaneous photographs from their lives, or using real biodata online). For marketers and 'influencers', these patterns of behaviour can achieve certain gains: sales for a business, or success of a campaign. For existentialist philosophers, using 'authenticity' as a means to an end is against its (...) very definition. In this paper, I investigate what SMS users are looking for by their supposed 'authentic' portrayal online. My experimental approach draws upon empirical data from the Instagram social media site. Using machine learning techniques, descriptions and features of posts - including subjects, captions, and contexts - will be categorised and aggregated. I will then interpret these findings, drawing upon work by Taylor, Golomb, and Guignon, whose works on authenticity are based on mid-20th century existentalists. I argue that the existentialist ideals on authenticity are not necessarily present in contemporary SMS use. I will also argue that the popular interpretation of authenticity on SMSes can be self-defeating, when it seeks to turn the 'for-itself' into an 'in-itself'. (shrink)

Portraits of Wittgenstein and Hume are used as test cases in some preliminary investigations of a new kind of philosophical picture. Such pictures are produced via a variety of visual transformations of the original portraits, with a final selection for display and discussion being based on the few results that seem to have some interesting relevance to the character or philosophical views of the philosopher in question.

Information was a frequently used concept in many fields of investigation. However, this concept is still not really understood, when it is referred for instance to consciousness and its informational structure. In this paper it is followed the concept of information from philosophical to physics perspective, showing especially how this concept could be extended to matter in general and to the living in particular, as a result of the intimate interaction between matter and information, the human body appearing as (...) a bipolar informed-matter structure. It is detailed on this way how this concept could be referred to consciousness, and an informational modeling of consciousness as an informational system of the human body is presented. Based on the anatomic architecture of the organism and on the inference of the specific information concepts, it is shown that the informational system of the human body could be described by seven informational subsystems, which are reflected in consciousness as corresponding cognitive centers. These results are able to explain the main properties of consciousness, both the cognitive and extra-cognitive properties of the mind, like that observed during the near-death experiences and other similar phenomena. Moreover, the results of such a modeling are compared with the existing empirical concepts and models on the energetic architecture of the organism, showing their relevance for the understanding of consciousness. (shrink)