Who is recognised as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy’s continuing demographic skew. The “philosophical who” and the “philosophical what” themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context (...) of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focuses on Charles Mills’ writings on race, Susan Babbitt’s on race and gender, and on more collaboratively-generated work on eugenics and disability. (shrink)

The surprising comment Wittgenstein makes at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even though the analysis of words is the proper method of doing philosophy, philosophy’s ultimate aim may be to experience silence. Whereas Wittgenstein never explains what he meant by his cryptic conclusion, Kant provides numerous clues as to how the same position can be understood in a more complete and systematic way. Distinguishing between the meanings of “silence,” “noise” and “sound” provides a helpful way of understanding how (...) philosophers can devote so much effort to analyzing words even though their quest is ultimately fulfilled only in a deep experience of reality that is most adequately expressed in silence. (shrink)

This open-access editorial discusses confronting silences in different disciplinary contexts, such as science and technology studies, cultural anthropology, and philosophy. It has a focus on race and concludes with thoughts about Indigenous expertise, the Australian referendum on the Indigenous Voice, to parliament, and racism.

Various philosophers discuss perlocutionary silencing, but none defend an account of perlocutionary silencing. This gap may exist because perlocutionary success depends on extralinguistic effects, whereas silencing interrupts speech, leaving theorists to rely on extemporary accounts when they discuss perlocutionary silencing. Consequently, scholars assume perlocutionary silencing occurs but neglect to explain how perlocutionary silencing harms speakers as speakers. In relation to that shortcoming, I defend a novel account of perlocutionary silencing. I argue that speakers experience perlocutionary silencing when they are illegitimately (...) deprived of perlocutionary influence on a conversation in which they are active participants, where perlocutionary influence on the conversation relates to speech-related perlocutionary goals meant to influence the conversation or conversational direction. Thus, this account grounds perlocutionary silencing in linguistic phenomena and characterizes perlocutionary silencing in a way that explains why those who experience perlocutionary silencing are harmed as speakers. Moreover, this account explains how perlocutionary silencing harms speakers as conversational participants in a way that cannot be captured by illocutionary or locutionary silencing, for a speaker may be perlocutionarily silenced despite illocutionary success. Consequently, the account explains why “All Lives Matter” silences Black Lives Matter and “Not All Men” silences women sharing experiences of sexual harassment. (shrink)

Silencing is usually explained in terms of conventionalism about the nature of speech acts. More recently, theorists have tried to develop intentionalist theories of the phenomenon. I argue, however, that if intentionalists are to accommodate the conventionalists' main insight, namely that silencing can be so extreme as to render certain types of speech act completely unavailable to victims, they must take two assumptions on board. First, it must be possible that speakers' communicative intentions are opaque to the speakers themselves. Secondly, (...) it needs to be assumed that structural oppression can have hidden psychological effects on its victims. Since both assumptions can be motivated independently, I argue that silencing can be fully understood without appealing to linguistic conventions. (shrink)

Silence often plays a significant role in Christian experience and practice. However, the varieties of silence and the effects of silence for good and. bad merit examination. It is important to distinguish between physical, auditory, and metaphorical silence, and bet- ween experiencing silence as "quiet" and experiencing silence as keeping quiet . Silence can be an instrumental good as well as an expressive good, a concomitant good, or a constitutive good. Christian monks, theologians, and other thinkers sometimes identify experiences of (...) silence, for example, as light or dark, as spatially vast or enclosed, and as temporal or atemporal. Practices of silence can bring persons closer to God, though a kenotic spirituality; of silence and a stress on solitude create perils for some members of religious orders, such as Carthusians. The chief aim of this article is to show, with philosophical techniques, how silence .can be good in manifold ways and even, perhaps, an ideal. (shrink)

Silence sometimes constitutes moral complicity. We see this when protestors take to the streets against racial injustice. Think of signs with the words: “Silence is complicity.” We see this in instances of sexual harassment, when we learn that many knew and said nothing. We see this in cases of wrongdoing within a company or organization, when it becomes clear that many were aware of the negligent or criminal activity and stayed silent. In cases like this we consider agents morally complicit (...) in virtue of their silence. Flagrant injustices cry out for action, and sometimes remaining silent amounts to complicity in those injustices. What philosophy owes us is an account of how it could be that silence constitutes complicity. In this paper I argue that one possibility is an account grounded in problematic deliberative contribution. The core idea of “deliberative complicity,” as I call it, is that agents have moral duties concerning the moral deliberation of other agents, and failures in these duties can amount to moral complicity. For example, an agent aware that a colleague is sexually harassing his students has a deliberative obligation to report the misconduct, and their silence in failing to report constitutes a failure to fulfill their deliberative obligation, a failure that grounds their moral complicity in the harassment. If my argument is successful, it provides a distinctive reason to prefer a deliberative account of moral complicity: it can capture cases of silent complicity that other views of moral complicity cannot. And further, by turning our attention toward our interpersonal deliberative obligations, a deliberative account of complicity can incorporate helpful resources from recent work in social epistemology and speech act theory as we set out to determine when and why silence amounts to complicity. And when it does, we cannot stay silent. We must speak. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the challenge of presenting the silenced voices of excluded groups in society by means of a philosophic community of inquiry composed primarily of children and young adults. It proposes a theoretical model named ‘enabling identity’ that presents the stages whereby, under the guiding role played by the community of philosophic inquiry, the hegemonic meta-narrative of the mainstream society makes room for the identity of members of marginalised groups. The model is based on the recognition (...) of diverse narratives within a web of communal narratives that does not favour the meta-narrative. It reports on the experiences of moderators and students from weak and excluded sectors of society in two countries whose participation in communities of philosophical inquiry gave them not only a “voice” but also a presence and identity. (shrink)

The twenty-first century will witness an unprecedented decline in the diversity of the world’s languages. While most philosophers will likely agree that this decline is lamentable, the question of what exactly is lost with a language has not been systematically explored in the philosophical literature. In this paper, I address this lacuna by arguing that language loss constitutes a problematic form of illocutionary silencing. When a language disappears, past and present speakers lose the ability to realize a range of (...) speech acts that can only be realized in that language. With that ability, speakers lose something in which they have a fundamental interest: their standing as fully empowered members of a linguistic community. (shrink)

This paper addresses a question that has sparked heated debate while mostly flying under the philosophical radar: Should people stop wearing merch of bands they don’t listen to? I respond affirmatively. People should stop wearing merch of bands they don’t listen to because (i) doing so can silence people who wear band merch to communicate their taste in music and (ii) this silencing threatens the valuable role that wearing band merch plays in the aesthetic lives of people who share (...) a taste in music: promoting aesthetic community between them. As will emerge throughout the paper, this argument is relevant to the debate on silencing as well as the debate on the value of aesthetic community. (shrink)

There are many ways to understand the meanings of the #MeToo movement. Analyses of its significance have proliferated in popular media; some academic analyses have also recently appeared. Commentary on the philosophical and epistemic significance of the #MeToo movement has been less plentiful. The specific moment of the #MeToo movement in which Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony garnered a widespread social media response from sexual violence survivors highlighted the power of a particular form of epistemic response, what I call (...) ‘epistemic refusal.’ In breaking our silence, those of us who are sexual violence survivors have used this strategy to refuse the dominant epistemic structures that have kept us tightly in check. Mass informal disclosure of survivor status represented in conjunction with hashtags such as #MeToo, #WhyIDidntReport, and #BelieveHer creates space for epistemic, ethical, and political community between survivors of sexual violence by denying hegemonic epistemic discourses of contemporary rape culture. Regarding Dr. Blasey Ford’s testimony and the social media response it garnered, analysis of three main elements proves particularly illuminating: the nature of mass informal disclosure of sexual violence, what the hashtag #WhyIDidntReport reveals about refusing silence, and what the hashtags #BelieveHer and #BelieveSurvivors can show us about what it takes to begin to overcome epistemic gaslighting. (shrink)

Plato’s Clitophon presents a confrontation between two alternative views of justice, one conventional and the other philosophical – and of Clitophon’s inability to move from the one to the other due to his confusion over the relationship between knowledge and virtue and his misconception of the path from ignorance to knowledge, which probably results from his ambition. The nature of this confusion is such that Clitophon can only overcome it by abandoning his submissive stance toward the authority of Socrates, (...) which fact, combined with the character of his appeal to Socrates for an answer to his difficulties makes any authentic verbal response from Socrates unlikely to help and to risk harm. Silence from Socrates at the conclusion of the dialogue would therefore exemplify the principle that it is not for the just to harm anyone. (shrink)

This essay explores the indispensable role of silence in the construction of meaning within language, arguing that silence is not just an absence of sound but a presence that shapes and defines communication. Drawing upon Jacques Derrida's concept of différance, the essay examines how silence functions as a foundational element that allows for the deferral and differentiation of meaning. Through a detailed analysis of silence in both spoken and written language, the essay demonstrates that silence is essential for structuring language, (...) creating space for reflection, and enabling the depth and nuance that language requires to convey complex ideas. The paradox of silence as both a presence and an absence is explored, showing how silence operates as a vital force in the ongoing process of meaning-making. By integrating Derrida’s philosophical insights with empirical observations on the role of silence, the essay provides a comprehensive understanding of silence as a key component of language, one that is crucial for communication, understanding, and the expression of being. (shrink)

History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony (...) and a mystery. The mystery consists of the persistence of a complete lack of interest in efforts to theorize historical explanation. Fundamental questions regarding why an historical account could have any rational influence remain not merely unanswered, but unasked. The irony arises from the fact that analytic philosophy of history went into an eclipse where it remains until this day just around the time that the influence of Kuhn’s great work began to make itself felt. This paper highlights puzzles long ignored regarding the challenges a work of history managed to pose to the epistemic authority of science, and what this might imply generally for the place of philosophy of history vis-à-vis the problems of philosophy. (shrink)

On chercherait en vain dans l’œuvre de Platon des développements explicites sur le silence. Mais le génie littéraire de Platon lui fait une place, et la mise en scène des dialogues, comme les interactions des personnages, mettent en jeu différentes figures du silence par lesquelles se dévoilent d’autres aspects des réflexions socratico-platoniciennes sur le langage. Les silences du philosophe s’opposent, en effet, à ceux de ses interlocuteurs, autant que la pratique philosophique du dialogue aux discours sophistiques. Car le silence (...) véritable n’est pas que l’absence de voix, ni même simplement l’attente d’une parole à venir, mais, en dernière analyse, un retour à la source du logos : la pensée et l’être même. (shrink)

Throughout history, many people, including Mother Teresa, have been troubled by God’s silence. In spite of the conflicting interpretations of the Bible, God has remained silent. What are the implications of divine hiddenness/silence for a meaning of life? Is there a good reason that explains God’s silence? If God created humanity to fulfill a purpose, then God would have clarified his purpose and our role by now, as I will argue. To help God carry out his purpose, we would need (...) to have a clear understanding of our role. Thus, by failing to clarify our role, God would be undermining himself in achieving the purpose he conceived, which would not make sense. Because God, if he exists, would not engage in this self-defeating behavior, this suggests that humanity was not created by God to fulfill a purpose. (shrink)

The “affirming” healthcare model for gender-distressed youth is endorsed by the medical establishment in the United States, but many European nations have retreated from it. This controversy would be expected to attract the interest of philosophers and bioethicists, with a diverse range of opinions appearing in academic articles. However, when philosophers and bioethicists have ventured into print, they have almost invariably endorsed the affirmative approach, which involves life-changing medical interventions on children with psychological problems. This is a sign that the (...) process of academic research and writing is not functioning as it should. -/- We recount the failure of philosophy and bioethics to address the issues raised by gender-affirming healthcare. We also offer an explanation of this failure, and in the final section make some recommendations for improving academic integrity. (shrink)

Emotions can be insensitive to certain attributes of a situation: Fear of flying is not always reduced by remembering air crash probabilities. A large body of evidence shows that information on probabilities, large numerical counts, and intentions is frequently disregarded in the elicitation and regulation of emotions. To date, no existing theory comprehensively accounts for the features that tend to be overlooked by emotion. In this paper, I call attention to the common denominator of such features: they do not contribute (...) to the iconic representation of events. For instance, the exceedingly low probability of a plane crash does not affect its imagistic representation (i.e., the iconic representation of the event is silent about the event’s probability). This paper introduces the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis, positing that the prioritization of input in the iconic format by emotions can explain the neglect of information that is representationally silent in this format. Delving into the causes of this format prioritization, I argue that emotion might favour iconicity as it is the format of immediate information about our surroundings (perception) and of stored first-hand evidence (episodic memory). Lastly, the hypothesis's compatibility with philosophical theories of emotion causation and its implications for experimental research are examined. (shrink)

Martin E. Rosenberg -/- The Gift of Silence: Towards an Anthropology of Jazz Improvisation as Neuro-Resistance. -/- ABSTRACT: -/- This essay addresses how the complex processes that occur during jazz improvisation enact behaviors that resemble the logic of gift exchange first described by Marcel Mauss. It is possible to bring to bear structural, sociological, political economical, deconstructive or even ethical approaches to what constitutes gift exchange during the performance of jazz. Yet, I would like to shift from focusing this analysis (...) of jazz improvisation with reference to the language of music as symbolic action (which all of these approaches require), to grounding improvisation in embodied and distributed cognition, the performance of which begins with a ritual gift of silence. By silence, I refer to the embodied, yet shared pure duration as felt synchrony within an individual performer, that extends to the members of an ensemble. Thus, I refer to both aesthetic and micro-political implications of embodied, yet also distributed musical cognition in real time. -/- For jazz musicians, embodied silence becomes the initial condition for processes of cognitive bifurcation. For it is bifurcation that attracts us to jazz in the first place. Here I expand my previous work establishing similarities in the behavior of bifurcating systems in physical and cognitive sciences to the unfolding of ambiguity in real time during improvisation with respect to polyphony, polytonality and polyrhythms in the history of jazz from Charlie Parker to Ornette Coleman. We can therefore re-conceptualize jazz improvisation as a subversive antidote for processes of determination identified in a sub-discipline of cultural studies called “cognitive capitalism.” By examining silence from this anthropological perspective, we can conceive of jazz performance as a ritualized resistance to top-down cognitive control immanent with social and digital networks. The ritual enactment that is jazz improvisation points towards an aesthetics of bifurcation that is simultaneously a micro-politics of neuro-resistance. In other words, I argue that freedom of thought requires freedom from thought as an initial condition. -/- Yet, I emphasize the empirical rather than mystical grounds to this gift of silence. The valorization of silence by jazz musicians is not simply etiquette, an ethics of reciprocity for performers exchanging “riffs,” but an initial condition that jazz performers (and, I would argue, listeners) experience in their bodies, thus linking embodied cognition to a collective field of cultural production that emerges from each embodied individual, and yet also pervades the ensemble in ways reminiscent of feedback loops in complex systems. The recent and remarkable research on music and the brain has demonstrated that it is now possible to describe jazz improvisation as possessing both embodied and distributed cognitive properties. The emergent neuronal ensemble behavior within the individual that is visible in jazz improvisors, discovered by the neuroscientists at Johns Hopkins led by Charles Limb, bears striking resemblance to the interactive behaviors of the jazz ensemble itself. Thus, it is by recourse to recent research by myself and others into the cognitive neuroscience of music generally, and jazz improvisation specifically, that the empirical grounds for an anthropology of neuro-resistance become visible. (shrink)

Stephen Davies taught philosophy at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. His research specialty is the philosophy of art. He is a former President of the American Society for Aesthetics. His books include Definitions of Art (Cornell UP, 1991), Musical Meaning and Expression (Cornell UP, 1994), Musical Works and Performances (Clarendon, 2001), Themes in the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2003), Philosophical Perspectives on Art (OUP, 2007), Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2011), The (...) Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution (OUP, 2012), The Philosophy of Art (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016 second ed.), and Adornment: What Self-decorations Tells Us about Who We Are, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). (shrink)

It is possible to write a Kelsenian ‘Legal-Philosophical Tractate’ – based on Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law – after the example of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The following main and sub-propositions analogous to the main and sub-propositions of the Tractatus are a proof thereof and give an initial impetus to it: “May others come and do it better”. Unlike Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that ends with the famous proposition 7 that one should be silent about what cannot be spoken, a Kelsenian Tractate (...) would not end with an analogous main proposition, but with two sub-propositions that show the (relative) value of both ‘the speaking’ and ‘the silence’ of positive law. (shrink)

Feminism has been a good movement with the noble aim of freeing the world from the shackles of an evil superiority of men over women. The principal of feminism as a movement was political equality between men and women. In itself, it was a fair and just course such that it was inclusive of men as well, men were also part of the movement with no insults, threats, and hate speech. But in this technological era some impurities have also crept (...) into it. From the third wave of feminism which is also known as GRRRL feminism which turned the offensive names into jokes and somehow normal to be pronounced in public, things became no longer about equality and respect of humanity. As feminism grew, it became less critical and became more sensitive towards emotions and uncritical amassment of followers. To some extent, being critical about feminism is unacceptable because someone becomes quickly accused of being patriarchal and antifeminism. Indeed, patriarchy is a negative and destructive idea perpetrated by those who were suffering from “testosterone-power-syndrome”. But, when some thinkers like Valenti, Arndt, and Harrow have identified the syndrome and implemented some medication to it, others inject the other side with similarly fatal ideas. I call those ideas “Oestrogen-power-syndrome” because they make their victims think that with collapse of patriarchy, men should be disgraced and be made to feel not existentially necessary. Symptoms of this syndrome start from no more knowing that hating the other sex is wrong and should not be promoted. Writers like Annapuranny and Jansen even perpetrate non progressive talks like “what’s wrong with hating men”, “the world would be better off without men” and many phrases of such destructive nature. But the issue which this paper seeks to address is that there is no philosopher who has critically tackled this matter. In fact, some African philosophers rather reject the whole feminism movement as non-African. Using analytical framework, this research ventures into critical analysis of this issue of feminist extremism coupled with the silence of African philosophers. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, continually expands its discourse by introducing novel philosophical ideas and different traditions. Nevertheless, a conspicuous silence persists regarding the introduction of African philosophies in its discourse. This issue becomes apparent when the question “How might one live?”—a fundamental question that the philosophical counsellor deals with—is adequately investigated. However, its current formulation suffers greatly from a much-needed nuance concerning temporal and contextual awareness. To address and transcend this shortcoming, I turn (...) to two distinct African philosophies, namely, the hermeneutic philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan and the conversational method of philosophising advocated by Jonathan O. Chimakonam. By incorporating these philosophies, my aim is twofold: first, to promote an interpretative actualisation situated within a conversational framework that might lead to the creation of new concepts and/or the disclosing of different ways of being/becoming, and second, to draw attention to an underlying assumption that might maintain the neglect of philosophical traditions beyond Western philosophy. (shrink)

On Oct. 24, 2019, French philosopher Sylviane Agacinski was scheduled to speak at the Université de Bordeaux-Montaigne on « l’être humain à l’époque de sa reproductibilité technique » [the human being in the era of its technological reproducibility]. Amidst “violent threats” and their purported inability to assure the safety of Agacinski, the organizers cancelled the event. Agacinski and other French intellectuals lament what they perceive to be part of a “drifting liberticide”, a form of censorship that forbids the exchange of (...) ideas and forecloses open space for debate. The story goes that Agacinski, notable for her staunch opposition to surrogacy and extending assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) to non- heterosexual couples, as well as her anthropological claim that the fabric of our social order relies on the heteronormative structure of sexual difference, has been silenced. In a communiqué to the university, student organizations such as Riposte Trans and Mauvais Genre-s pleaded “no platform”, indicating that Agacinski’s reactionary homophobic and transphobic positions run contrary to the university’s mission of safeguarding against discrimination. What to do when an incitement to (epistemic) violence masks itself as free speech? Bring Sara Ahmed’s hammer to France. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, a relatively new field in practical philosophy, offers to potentially edify the layperson’s everyday life with the help of philosophy. This lofty ideal is upheld by philosophical practitioners introducing various contemporary philosophies to its growing literature. However, many philosophical traditions beyond contemporary philosophy still somewhat suffer from an unwarranted neglect. Presently, African philosophy faces an almost complete absence in the philosophical counselling literature. It is thus a given that a prevalent lack of inquiry exists (...) regarding its use in philosophical counselling. Despite this silence, fertile grounds exist for innovative contributions to further advance the development of African philosophy in philosophical counselling. -/- In this talk, I will introduce a novel reading of African philosophy to the literature of philosophical counselling. This understanding of African philosophy is greatly inspired and influenced by the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Jonathan Chimakonam. More specifically, the notion of African philosophy gathered from these philosophers seek to advance the critical interpretation/hermeneutic actualised from a specific philosophical place or lifeworld through the method of conversationalism. Furthermore, the very rootedness of this notion of philosophy, stemming from a concrete lifeworld, actively problematises philosophies that reproduce a supposed and untenable value neutrality. -/- Developing this understanding of African philosophy in a philosophical counselling context, I offer an initial critique of uncritical applications of philosophies originating from distinct philosophical places under the guise of a value neutrality. In maintaining this unwarranted silence on different philosophical traditions, philosophical counsellors might promote the use of philosophies as if universally applicable. And secondly, I propose that following from this understanding of African philosophy, philosophical counselling as such can begin to foster an environment in which new concepts can be co-created. Consequently, and in conjunction with conversationalism, radically new ways of being/becoming can be explored which might hold greater contextual significance. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) banishes uncertainty from human life—via GPS, dating apps, diagnostics—replacing ambiguity with predictive certainty. This paper argues that this shift flattens humanity’s essence, eroding agency, creativity, and social bonds forged in the unknown. Engaging Sartre’s freedom, Heidegger’s enframing, and Kierkegaard’s leap of faith, it posits uncertainty as a vital condition of existence, not a flaw. AI’s triumph, embraced with adaptive ease, risks a shallower, scripted life—yet we rarely pause to weigh the loss. Historical parallels frame this as a (...) pivotal turn in humanity’s arc, raising the question: do we rise or fade in a certain world? Proposing defiance through reclaiming the unknown, this analysis challenges AI’s cost to our depth, offering a fresh lens on technology’s philosophical toll. (shrink)

In moving into the Roman world, the first Christians encountered a secular culture whose social, political and cultural characteristics bore a striking resemblance to the contemporary period. Yet these Christians did not feel constrained to present only those aspects of their message that would be acceptable. For most of its history, the presentation of a Christian message in the “public square” has entailed both theological and philosophical perspectives. Today, Catholics seem “self-limited” by an unspoken demand that they argue solely (...) from philosophical and scientific positions in public debates. This approach often fails to present a distinctively Christian viewpoint. As early as 1946, Henri de Lubac pointed out that this side-lining of the Christian view was not solely the result of secularist agitation. Since the sixteenth century, the generally accepted notion that human reality is composed of two separate dimensions – natural and a supernatural – has given the impression that one can speak of a discrete natural order which is unaffected by grace. While this approach still has its defenders, many Catholic intellectuals have pointed to its shortcomings, both theologically and philosophically. When Catholics confine themselves to naturalistic arguments, they deceive no one. Secularists – who argue from their own perspective of “belief ” – are able to accuse their Catholic opponents of having a hidden agenda, and of lacking the courage of their convictions by concealing what really motivates them. Any movement away from this situation is likely to be met with derision. Nevertheless, while neither Christians nor Secularists should impose their political views on others, Catholics should feel free to mount the full range of their arguments in public and should reject the notion that they are bound by rules of engagement set by their intellectual opponents. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is rarely appreciated for his contributions to public philosophy. This is unsurprising, given his dry, technical style, criticism of the popular German philosophy movement, and prolonged silence on religious topics following censorship threats from Frederick William II. Yet Kant’s underappreciation vis-à-vis public philosophy is curious: Not only was he a vocal supporter of the early French Revolution, but he also said much on the public and political value of enlightenment. These ideas come across indirectly in his systematic writings (...) and explicitly in writings for the learned public. This paper focuses on the question as to whether Kant should be viewed as a public philosopher, drawing from recent contributions in Kant scholarship to argue for the affirmative, though in an admittedly qualified sense. (shrink)

Silence is a multifaceted concept which is not merely as an absence of sound but a presence with significant ontological, existential, and phenomenological implications. Through a thematic analysis, this paper deconstructs silence into various dimensions—its ontology, linguistic universality, and its function as cessation of speech, a form of listening, an act of kenosis, a form of ascesis, and a way of life. The study employs philosophical discourse and mathematical notation to delve into these aspects, demonstrating that while each perspective (...) sheds light on certain facets of silence, none can comprehensively encapsulate its essence. The research underscores the paradoxical nature of silence. It is both a universal phenomenon recognised across cultures and an intimate, personal experience that resists definitive categorisation. The paper concludes that the true nature of silence, particularly when considering the state of "being silent," remains indefinable and elusive, inviting deeper contemplation on its role in human experience. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have recast feminist arguments against pornography in terms of Speech Act Theory. In particular, they have considered the ways in which the illocutionary force of pornographic speech serves to set the conventions of sexual discourse while simultaneously silencing the speech of women, especially during unwanted sexual encounters. Yet, this raises serious questions as to how pornographers could (i) be authorities in the language game of sex, and (ii) set the conventions for sexual discourse - questions which these (...) speech act-theoretic arguments against pornography have thus far failed to adequately answer. I fill in this gap of the argumentation by demonstrating that there are fairly weak standards for who counts as an authority or convention-setter in sexual discourse. With this analysis of the underpinnings of a speech act analysis of pornography in mind, I discuss a range of possible objections. I conclude that (i) the endorsement of censorship by a speech act analysis of pornography competes with its commitment to the conventionality of speech acts, and, more damningly, that (ii), recasting anti-pornography arguments in terms of linguistic conventions risks an unwitting defence of a rapist's lack of mens rea - an intolerable result; and yet resisting this conclusion requires that one back away from the original claim to women's voices being 'silenced'. (shrink)

Por todos es sabido la relación que el filósofo Martin Heidegger tuvo con el nacionalsocialismo en los años treinta, cuando comenzó el auge de lo que se denominó Tercer Reich. También es sabido que tras la derrota de Alemania en la II Guerra Mundial, Heidegger guardó silencio sobre el Holocausto. Paul Celan, poeta judío que sufrió en los campos de concentración nazis, tuvo una serie de encuentros y desencuentros con el pensador de Friburgo. Celan esperaba que Heidegger emitiera una palabra (...) de perdón, palabra que aunaría la grandeza filosófica de Heidegger con la grandeza "humanitaria". Pero Heidegger, como decíamos, guardo silencio. La cuestión que queremos tomar al hilo de estos encuentro y desencuentros entre Heidegger y Celan es si es posible pensar Auschwitz después de Auschwitz, si es una tarea necesaria o si el horror del campo de concentración ha dejarse a la voz del poeta, ya que es posible que la poesía expresé mejor lo que sucedió. O, si por el contrario, tras Auschwitz sólo debe quedar el silencio, silencio como aquel en el que Heidegger permaneció. Auschwitz supone el culmen de la Modernidad, una Modernidad tecnificada, donde no hay sitio para la poesía. Pero tras Auschwitz hay poesía, como la poesía de Celan, por lo que cabría preguntarnos si estamos ante una nueva Modernidad o estamos en otro tiempo, en el tiempo del silencio tras Auschwitz. ---- For all we know Heidegger had relationship with National-Socialism in the thirties, when the boom began what was called Third Reich. It´s also know that after the defeat of Germany in the II World War, Heidegger remained silent about the Holocaust. Paul Celan, jewish poet who suffered in Nazi concentration camps, had a series of meetings and disagreements with the thinker of Freiburg. Celan hope thar Heidegger give a word of forgiveness, a word that would combine Heidegger's philosophical greatness with "humanitarian" greatness. But Heidegger, as mentioned, remained silent. The question we want take the thread of these meetings and disagreements between Heidegger and Celan is whether it's possible think Auschwitz, if it's a necesary task or the horror of the concentratión camp is to be left to the voice of the poet, because it´s possible that the poetry expresses better what happened. Or, if instead, after Auschwitz shoul only be silence, silence as one in which Heidegger remained. Auschwitz represents the culmination of Modernity, a tech modernity, where there isn't place for poetry. But after Auschwitz there is poetry, as Celan poetry, so we would ask ourselves whether we have a new modernity or we are in other time, the time of silence after Auschwitz. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about (...) normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards. (shrink)

Testimony is of epistemic and practical significance. It is of epistemic significance because majority of what we know and believe comes from being told. It is of practical significance because our agency can be undermined, bypassed, or overridden owing to systemic prejudices sustained by oppressive social or cultural practices and subsequently our routes to knowledge are either hindered or distorted. Things get more complicated when we introduce and examine how groups and other collectives testify and are recipients of testimony. For (...) instance, group speakers are typically said to represent and reflect the view of the group they are speaking on behalf of. But sometimes because of these oppressive practices, a group speaker’s assertion may deprive or impair its members’ ability to perform certain actions through speech. This dissertation examines the intersection between testimony, collective phenomena, and epistemic harms. One aim is to argue for a view on the nature of testimony that can accommodate various ways collectives testify and are recipients of testimony. In particular, I argue and present a view of testimony as a norm-governed joint activity involving individual or collective participants that commit themselves to a common aim of collaboration. Another aim is to present an epistemology of testimony that tracks our ordinary testimonial practices. In this regard, I argue for a norm view where we have reason to believe what we’re told because of the rules or norms that govern our communicative exchanges. A final aim is to explore the mechanism by which collective speech ensues in an epistemic harm driven by social identity prejudices. I argue for a form of silencing that is distinctive of groups insofar as the silencing occurs because of group dynamics. I call the mechanism underlying this form of silencing “representational impairment”. This dissertation, I hope, will motivate and inspire others to pursue philosophical projects at these intersections and in this spirit, I end by offering suggestions on areas of further development and future direction. (shrink)

Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who (...) are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify. (shrink)

Universe silence … Why? TechnoSfera … Where does it move? BioSfera … Where is the ―non-return point? NooSfera … What to do? The deep mind looks for primordial senses of the ―LifeWorld(LebensWelt). Сonsciousness, matter, memory … Self-Consciousness… Сonsciousness is attracting senses vector magnitude, intentional effect of absolute complexity. The Vector of Сonsciousness - the Triune Vector of absolute forms of existence of matter (limit states), the Vector of the Absolute Existential Field of the Universe, a polyvalent sense phenomenon of Ontological (...) (structural, cosmic) Memory. Open Сonsciousness Vs. Closed Сonsciousness. Сonceptual and mathematical proto-Eidoses Absolute forms of existence of matter. On the basis of ontological and existential constracting method – method of a discretion and a reflection of existential repère-point, the Vector of Сonsciousness places milestones on ProtoGeometre's long way – the way of ―knowledge of good and evil, of rises and fallings, of births of ―absolutely another, from the point ―Alpha to the modern ―point of ultimate tension of the Absolute Existential Field of the Universe. Big waves of Consciousness. Existential risks of Humanity and Open Science. New Open Generation realizing all existential risks of Humanity passable way and risks of coming Information era creates the Self-Aware Universe, filling it with the most deep meanings of the ―LifeWorld, at the heart of which Axiom of an absolute freedom of choice is laid. The minimum Program to overcome existential risks. Great Integrative Paradigm. Creation of a common sense picture of the World for physicists and lyricist. The United Humanity raises up five Great Philosophers' Stones in memory of Protogeometre's rises and fallings on a long way of becoming of Humanity and frees the Horse. Humanity is on a threshold of an Era of Eonic thinking... Far from Perfect … I start the path... (shrink)

Is it appropriate to honor artists who have created great works but who have also acted immorally? In this article, after arguing that honoring involves identifying a person as someone we ought to admire, we present three moral reasons against honoring immoral artists. First, we argue that honoring can serve to condone their behavior, through the mediums of emotional prioritization and exemplar identification. Second, we argue that honoring immoral artists can generate undue epistemic credibility for the artists, which can lead (...) to an indirect form of testimonial injustice for the artists’ victims. Third, we argue, building on the first two reasons, that honoring immoral artists can also serve to silence their victims. We end by considering how we might respond to these reasons. (shrink)

Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren’t adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A (...) slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created. (shrink)

The ‘black box’ in Stoic axiology refers to the mysterious connection between the input of Stoic deliberation (reasons generated by the value of indifferents) and the output (appropriate actions). In this paper, I peer into the black box by drawing an analogy between Stoic and Kantian axiology. The value and disvalue of indifferents is intrinsic, but conditional. An extrinsic condition on the value of a token indifferent is that one's selection of that indifferent is sanctioned by context-relative ethical principles. The (...) value of an indifferent that does not meet this condition is normatively silenced, such that it fails to constitute a reason for action. (shrink)

Mahayana Buddhist philosophers’ attitude toward language is notoriously negative. The transcendental reality is often said to be ineffable. One’s obsession to apprehend the truth through words is an intellectual disease to be cured Attachment to verbal and conceptual proliferation enslaves oneself in the afflictive circle of life and death. Nevertheless, no Buddhist can afford to overlook the significance of language in preaching Buddhist dharmas as well as in day-to-day transactions. The point is not that of keeping silence. Rather, one should (...) understand and use language in such a way that one alludes to the unsayable reality and somehow escapes the bewitchment of language. Perhaps with this realization in mind, Mahayana Buddhist metaphysicians had fostered the penchant for using, at the sentential level, denials, negations and paradoxes to couch their views. In a similar vein but mainly at the word level, Dignaga (ca. 480-540 CE) the Yogacara epistemologist’ offered us a theory of language known as apoha doctrine in his landmark work Pramiinasamuccaya (henceforth PS). It is the purpose of this article to construe the doctrine. (shrink)

Albert Camus’ views contributed to the rise of the philosophy known as Absurdism, he defines the Absurd “as the conflict between the human tendency to seek inherent value and meaning in life, and the human inability to find any meaning in a purposeless, meaningless, and irrational universe, with the ‘unreasonable silence’ of the universe in response.” However, this world in itself is not absurd, what is absurd is our relationship with the universe, which is irrational. Camus is considered to be (...) an existentialist, even though he firmly rejected the term throughout his lifetime. He is properly categorised as an atheist existentialist. However, he would also disagree with this label. In his notebooks, he presents the following contradictory statement: -/- “I do not believe in God and I am not an atheist.” -/- This reflects the notion of the Absurd. The search of the possibility of the existence of God is humanly impossible, but this also entails that the proof that God does not exist is impossible too. He writes in The Myth of Sisyphus: “In a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.” The Myth of Sisyphus is a fierce expression of the Absurd. It starts off with a powerful and thought-provoking statement: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” . (shrink)

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...) the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility, and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents. (shrink)

Domestic violence and abuse (DVA) are at last coming to be recognised as serious global public health problems. Nevertheless, many women with personal histories of DVA decline to disclose them to healthcare practitioners. In the health sciences, recent empirical work has identified many factors that impede DVA disclosure, known as barriers to disclosure. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology on testimonial silencing, we might wonder why so many people withhold their testimony and whether there is some kind of epistemic (...) injustice afoot here. In this paper, I offer some philosophical reflections on DVA disclosure in clinical contexts and the associated barriers to disclosure. I argue that women with personal histories of DVA are vulnerable to a certain form of testimonial injustice in clinical contexts, namely, testimonial smothering, and that this may help to explain why they withhold that testimony. It is my contention that this can help explain the low rates of DVA disclosure by patients to healthcare practitioners. (shrink)

This monograph contributes to the scientific misconduct debate from an oblique perspective, by analysing seven novels devoted to this issue, namely: Arrowsmith by Sinclair Lewis (1925), The affair by C.P. Snow (1960), Cantor’s Dilemma by Carl Djerassi (1989), Perlmann’s Silence by Pascal Mercier (1995), Intuition by Allegra Goodman (2006), Solar by Ian McEwan (2010) and Derailment by Diederik Stapel (2012). Scientific misconduct, i.e. fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, but also other questionable research practices, have become a focus of concern for academic communities (...) worldwide, but also for managers, funders and publishers of research. The aforementioned novels offer intriguing windows into integrity challenges emerging in contemporary research practices. They are analysed from a continental philosophical perspective, providing a stage where various voices, positions and modes of discourse are mutually exposed to one another, so that they critically address and question one another. They force us to start from the admission that we do not really know what misconduct is. Subsequently, by providing case histories of misconduct, they address integrity challenges not only in terms of individual deviance but also in terms of systemic crisis, due to current transformations in the ways in which knowledge is produced. Rather than functioning as moral vignettes, the author argues that misconduct novels challenge us to reconsider some of the basic conceptual building blocks of integrity discourse. (shrink)

How ought we to evaluate and respond to expressions of anger and resentment? Can philosophical analysis of resentment as the emotional expression of a moral claim help us to distinguish which resentments ought to be taken seriously? Philosophers have tended to focus on what I call ‘reasonable’ resentments, presenting a technical, narrow account that limits resentment to the expression of recognizable moral claims. In the following paper, I defend three claims about the ethics and politics of resentment. First, if (...) we care about socially just processes of reconciliation, we have good reason to pay attention to the logic of resentments. Second, the account philosophers offer of resentment – its distinctive features, aims, rationality, and gratification – will affect the conclusions we draw about which actual resentments to take seriously, which aspects of resentful claims need addressing, and what it means to address and repair them. In contesting definitions of resentment, I argue, we do more than simply perform housekeeping in philosophical taxonomies of emotion. Restricting our understanding to essentially ‘moral’ cases may cause us to lose sight of expressly political resentments. Instead, I argue, a plausible account of resentment must acknowledge that we resent violations and threats that are not necessarily self-pertaining, may not be expressible as individual, discrete injuries, and cannot always be construed as moral threats. Second, given the dependence of moral judgments on a broader horizon of moral possibility, philosophical standards of ‘reasonable’ or ‘appropriate’ resentment cannot avoid being politically charged. Thus, the widely accepted account of ‘reasonable’ resentment cannot make philosophical sense of the most interesting and perplexing cases. Ironically, a theoretical measure designed to revalue emotional expressions of moral protest may result in the exclusion and silencing of those with the most reasons to protest. (shrink)

The question of whether or not art is essentially a representation of reality has long been a bone of contention among philosophers of art – especially in the major branch of that discipline called the analytic philosophy of art, or analytic aesthetics. This paper argues that art - visual art, literature or music - is never essentially representation. The argument is based on the thinking of André Malraux in "The Voices of Silence".

There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed (...) planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it. (shrink)

Seeing of emptiness and mystical experience — the case of Madhyamaka: The problem of Buddhist religiosity is one of the most classic problems of Buddhist studies. A particular version of this issue is the search for mystical experience in Buddhism. This is due to the conviction that mystical experience is the essence of religious experience itself. The discovery of such an alleged experience fuels comparative speculations between Buddhism and the philosophical and religious traditions of the Mediterranean area. Madhyamaka is (...) the Buddhist tradition which many researchers saw as the fulfillment of such mystical aspirations in Buddhism. In this paper I specify the standard parameters of mystical experience (non‑conceptuality, ineffability, paradoxicality, silence, oneness, fullness) and I conclude that they either cannot be applied to Madhyamaka or that the application is only illusory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affect Attunement in the Caregiver-Infant Relationship and Across SpeciesExpanding the Ethical Scope of ErosCynthia WillettCompelling glimpses into the ethical capacities of our animal kin reveal new possibilities for ethical relationships encompassing humans with other animal species. Consider the remarkable report of a female bonobo in a British zoo who assists a bird found in her cage by retrieving the fallen bird, and spreading its wings so that this fellow (...) creature might fly away to its freedom. Or the report of a cat in a nursing home who curls up around dying elderly patients, and remains steadily by their side as they, unbeknownst to the medical personnel, pass away.1 Or of a sacred moment of silence by a stream for baboons in East Africa.2 Or of the ethics that spontaneously emerges among wolves at play.3 On the basis of extensive studies, biologist Frans de Waal argues that such anecdotes are far from rare, and that some core elements of moral understanding and compassion occur among a significant range of nonhuman as well as the human animal species. Apes, monkeys, and perhaps all nonhuman animals fail to display a distinctly human capacity for abstract moral reasoning. As de Waal (2006) remarks, it is difficult to tell (173–75). But our furry and feathery kin do without a doubt demonstrate rich elements of ethical response, and they often enough extend their moral concern to creatures beyond their own species. Of course, they will also bite each other’s heads off or eat their own young as well. But this is just to say that animals are neither natural [End Page 111] innocents nor savage brutes. Like us, they belong to what post-Nietzschean philosophers might frame, somewhat ironically, as a postlapsarian world of good and evil.What kind of philosophical approach could account for these postlapsarian genealogies of ethics? Biologists, primatologists, and anthropologists are drawing upon investigations of prosocial behavior to remap the boundaries of ethics, as for example in Isabelle Stengers’s call for cosmopolitical ecologies of relationships (2010, 33). Such a cosmopolitics aims to encompass our kin and kind from diverse species within the ethical boundaries of common worlds. Donna Haraway discovers an opening for Stengers’s ecology of relationships in the intimate encounters among co-evolving species, especially those she calls companion species (2008, 83). She argues, following Derrida, that the abstract reasoning processes of Stoic and Kantian cosmopolitan ethics remain closed to the participation of nonhuman animals as anything more than dependents, failing to observe the ways in which they act as companions, if not moral subjects. But then, what normative force might bind together an ethically attuned biosocial sphere that we as humans co-inhabit with other animal species?To explore this question, this essay takes its cues from well-established research on the responsive, preverbal connection of the human infant and adult caregiver (Bateson 1979; Trevarthen 1984; Stern 1985, 2010; Gibbs 2001, 2010; Hansen 2004; Anderson 2006; Papoulias and Callard 2010; Willett 1995, 2001). To this research we can add new animal studies (Smuts 1999, 2001; Fudge 2002; de Waal 2006, 2009; Bekoff 2007; Molnar 2008; Haraway 2008). These animal studies provide a basis for extending an “ethics of eros” with roots in Luce Irigaray, Michel Foucault, Enrique Dussel, Africana feminism, Freudo-Marxist critical theory, and Plato (for discussions of this tradition, see Bergoffen 1997; Huffer 2009; Willett 2001)—but reconfigured in terms of social bonds across multiple animal species. In this tradition of ethics, the lack of a cognitive-based moral subjectivity that can translate into human terms does not consign nonhuman species to a mute moral status. On the contrary, some more primordial basis for relationship and meaning may weave thin but substantial threads of a postmoral ethics across regions of the biosphere.Given the diverse modes of subjectivity among animal species, and even the lack of what we call a moral subject altogether in many species, neither ordinary modes of empathy nor of moral understanding go very far in forging multispecies social bonds. For this reason, we turn to research on “the attunement of affects” in the infant-caregiver relationship (Stern 1985). As we shall see, this... (shrink)