Results for 'self-ignorance'

957 found
Order:
  1. Malice and the Ridiculous as Self-ignorance: A Dialectical Argument in Philebus 47d-50e.Rebecca Bensen Cain - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):83-94.
    Abstract: In the Philebus, Socrates constructs a dialectical argument in which he purports to explain to Protarchus why the pleasure that spectators feel when watching comedy is a mixture of pleasure and pain. To do this he brings in phthonos (malice or envy) as his prime example (47d-50e). I examine the argument and claim that Socrates implicitly challenges Protarchus’ beliefs about himself as moderate and self-knowing. I discuss two reasons to think that more is at stake in the argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice.Louise Richardson-Self - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4):1-24.
    In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. Willful ignorance and self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  4. Knowing Better: Motivated Ignorance and Willful Ignorance.Karyn L. Freedman - 2024 - Hypatia:1-18.
    Motivated ignorance is an incentivized absence of knowledge that arises in circumstances of unequal power relations, a self-protective non-knowing which frees individuals from having to reflect on the privileges they have in virtue of membership in a dominant social group. In philosophical discussions, the term “motivated ignorance” gets used interchangeably with “willful ignorance.” In the first half of this paper, using Charles Mills’ (2007) white ignorance as the defining case, I argue that this is a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Moral ignorance and the social nature of responsible agency.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):821-848.
    In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Ignorance, Humility and Vice.Fabre Cecile - 2016 - Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2):25-30.
    LaFollette argues that the greatest vice is not cruelty, immorality, or selfishness. Rather, it is a failure on our part to ‘engage in frequent, honest and rigorous self-reflection’. It is that failure which, on his view, explains the lion’s share of the wrongdoings we commit towards one another. In this short reply, I raise (in a sympathetic spirit) some questions about the task of identifying the greatest vice, and draw out some of the implications of LaFollette’s account of moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Affective ignorance.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  9. Respect, Self-respect, and Self-knowledge.Michael Cholbi - forthcoming - The Monist.
    Respect appears to generate a puzzling self-other asymmetry: Respect for others can demand that we avoid knowledge of others or ignore that knowledge in deciding how we treat others. This demand for epistemic distancing lies behind the imperatives not to violate others’ privacy or to treat them paternalistically. Self-respect, in contrast, mandates that we pursue knowledge of ourselves and that we choose and act light of that self-knowledge. Individual agents thus do not have a duty to epistemically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. The importance of self‐knowledge for free action.Joseph Gurrola - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):996-1013.
    Much has been made about the ways that implicit biases and other apparently unreflective attitudes can affect our actions and judgments in ways that negatively affect our ability to do right. What has been discussed less is that these attitudes negatively affect our freedom. In this paper, I argue that implicit biases pose a problem for free will. My analysis focuses on the compatibilist notion of free will according to which acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our reflectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Pseudo-visibility: A Game Mechanic Involving Willful Ignorance.Samuel Allen Alexander & Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2022 - FLAIRS-35.
    We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., a guard might accept (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  13. Rodin on Self-Defense and the "Myth" of National Self-Defense: A Refutation.Uwe Steinhoff - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1017-1036.
    David Rodin denies that defensive wars against unjust aggression can be justified if the unjust aggression limits itself, for example, to the annexation of territory, the robbery of resources or the restriction of political freedom, but would endanger the lives, bodily integrity or freedom from slavery of the citizens only if the unjustly attacked state actually resisted the aggression. I will argue that Rodin's position is not correct. First, Rodin's comments on the necessity condition and its relation to an alleged (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14. (1 other version)Imposter Syndrome and Self-Deception.Stephen Gadsby - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome as an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):23-36.
    In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Empirical consciousness explained: Self-affection, (self-)consciousness and perception in the B deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:29-54.
    Few of Kant’s doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected re-appearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the B edition of the first Critique. Kant’s commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  17. Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Kant Studien 104 (4):421-441.
    Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  18. On the naturalisation of teleology: self-organisation, autopoiesis and teleodynamics.Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2022 - Adaptive Behavior 30 (2):103-117.
    In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. "Calm down, dear": intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.
    In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  20. Self-measure and Self-moderation in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.Michael Baur - 2001 - In Daniel Breazeale & Tom Rockmore (eds.), New Studies in Fichte’s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. pp. 81-102.
    In the opening chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explains that the self-understanding or self-measure of the human mind includes an account of the mind’s limits, and so the mind’s self-understanding can provide adequate grounds for intellectual self-moderation or self-control: “If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Who Should Bear the Risk When Self-Driving Vehicles Crash?Antti Kauppinen - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4):630-645.
    The moral importance of liability to harm has so far been ignored in the lively debate about what self-driving vehicles should be programmed to do when an accident is inevitable. But liability matters a great deal to just distribution of risk of harm. While morality sometimes requires simply minimizing relevant harms, this is not so when one party is liable to harm in virtue of voluntarily engaging in activity that foreseeably creates a risky situation, while having reasonable alternatives. On (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  22. (1 other version)The Rise of the "Other" and the Fall of the "Self": from Hegel to Derrida.Asghari Muhammad & Karimi Bayan - 2021 - Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations 15 (36):228-244.
    Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the "other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of "self" ignoring the "other". Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of "alterity" and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):606-622.
    According to the Good True Self (GTS) theory, if an action is deemed good, its psychological source is typically viewed as more reflective of its agent’s true self, of who the agent really is ‘deep down inside’; if the action is deemed bad, its psychological source is typically viewed as more external to its agent’s true self. In previous work, we discovered a related asymmetry in judgments of blame- and praiseworthiness with respect to the mitigating effect of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. No Masters Above: Testing Five Arguments for Self-Employment.Inigo González-Ricoy & Jahel Queralt - 2021 - In Keith Breen (ed.), The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work: Whither Work? Routledge.
    Despite renewed interest in work, philosophers have largely ignored self-employment. This neglect is surprising, not just because self-employment was central to classic philosophizing about work, but also given that half of the global workforce today, including one in seven workers in OECD countries, are self-employed. We start off by offering a definition of self-employment, one that accounts for its various forms while avoiding misclassifying dependent self-employed workers as independent contractors, and by mapping the barriers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25.  89
    A Dilemma for Driver on Virtues of Ignorance.Josh Dolin - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):889-898.
    For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Beyond Rawls' Fiction: The Veil of Ignorance Is Real.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Huffington Post.
    Brief thoughts on why Rawls' "fictional" veil of ignorance is in fact real and why social morals and self-interest thus converge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. A Decaying Carcass? Mary Astell and the Embodied Self.Colin Chamberlain - manuscript
    Mary Astell (1666-1731) relies on a Cartesian account of the self to argue that both men and women are essentially thinking things and, hence, that both should perfect their minds or intellects. This account of the self might seem to ignore the inescapable fact that we have bodies. I argue that Astell accommodates the self’s embodiment along three dimensions. First, she tempers her sharp distinction between mind and body by insisting on their union. Second, she argues that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating.Michael A. Bishop - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):343 - 356.
    What factors are involved in the resolution of scientific disputes? What factors make the resolution of such disputes rational? The traditional view confers an important role on observation statements that are shared by proponents of competing theories. Rival theories make incompatible (sometimes contradictory) observational predictions about a particular situation, and the prediction made by one theory is borne out while the prediction made by the other is not. Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Churchland have called into question this account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. The Collision of Language and Metaphysics in the Search for Self-Identity: on ahaṃkāra and asmitā in Sāṃkhya-Yoga.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):37-48.
    The author of this paper discusses some major points vital for two classical Indian schools of philosophy: (1) a significant feature of linguistic analysis in the Yoga tradition; (2) the role of the religious practice (iśvara-pranidhana) in the search for true self-identity in Samkhya and Yoga darśanas with special reference to their gnoseological purposes; and (3) some possible readings of ‘ahamkara’ and ‘asmita’ displayed in the context of Samkhya-Yoga phenomenology and metaphysics. The collision of language and metaphysics refers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Affects, Images and Childlike Perception: Self-Other Difference in Merleau-Ponty’s Sorbonne Lectures.Shiloh Whitney - 2012 - PhaenEx 7 (2):185-211.
    I begin by reviewing recent research by Merleau-Ponty scholars opposing aspects of the critique of Merleau-Ponty made by Meltzoff and colleagues based on their studies of neonate imitation. I conclude the need for reopening the case for infant self-other indistinction, starting with a re-examination of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of indistinction in the Sorbonne lectures, and attending especially to the role of affect and to the non-exclusivity of self-other distinction and indistinction. In undertaking that study, I discover the importance of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31. Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness, Intentionality and Ignorance.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Revelatory Regret and the Standpoint of the Agent.Justin F. White - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):225-240.
    Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Backsliding and Bad Faith: Aspiration, Disavowal, and (Residual) Practical Identities.Justin White - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (1).
    Disavowals such as "That's not who I am" are one way to distance ourselves from unsavory actions in order to try to mitigate our responsibility for them. Although such disclaimers can be what Harry Frankfurt calls "shabbily insincere devices for obtaining unmerited indulgence," they can also be a way to renew our commitments to new values as part of the processes of aspiration and moral improvement. What, then, separates backsliding aspirants from those in denial who seek unmerited indulgence? Drawing on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Agency, Identity, and Alienation in The Sickness unto Death.Justin F. White - 2019 - In Patrick Stokes, Eleanor Helms & Adam Buben (eds.), The Kierkegaardian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 305-316.
    In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard describes selfhood as an achievement, specifically claiming that the self’s task ‘is to become itself’ (SUD, 29/SKS 11, 143). But how can one can become who or what one already is, and what sort of achievement is it? This chapter draws on the work of Christine Korsgaard, another philosopher who sees selfhood as an achievement, using her notion of practical identity to explore Kierkegaard’s accounts of the structure of the self and of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Agency, Identity, and Narrative: Making Sense of the Self in Same-Sex Divorce.Elizabeth Victor - 2013 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues 12 (2):16-19.
    I argue that same-sex divorce presents a different kind of potential constraint to the agency of persons pursuing the dissolution of their marriage; a constraint upon one’s counterstory and the reconstitution of one’s personal identity. The dialectic within the paper mirrors the movements that I have had to make as I have sought to constitute and reconstitute myself throughout my divorce process. Beginning from a juridical perspective, I examine how the constraints on same-sex divorce present constraints on one’s agency that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self.Nora Berenstain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:445-485.
    The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke: Self-Interest, Desire, and Divine Impassibility.John J. Tilley - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):315-330.
    In this article I address a puzzle about one of Francis Hutcheson’s objections to psychological egoism. The puzzle concerns his premise that God receives no benefit from rewarding the virtuous. Why, in the early editions of his Inquiry Concerning Virtue (1725, 1726), does Hutcheson leave this premise undefended? And why, in the later editions (1729, 1738), does he continue to do so, knowing that in 1726 John Clarke of Hull had subjected the premise to plausible criticism, geared to the very (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The Incognito of a Thief: Johannes Climacus and the Poetics of Self-Incrimination.Martijn Boven - 2019 - In Patrick Stokes, Eleanor Helms & Adam Buben (eds.), The Kierkegaardian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 409-420.
    In this essay, I advance a reading of Philosophical Crumbs or a Crumb of Philosophy, published by Søren Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. I argue that this book is animated by a poetics of self-incrimination. Climacus keeps accusing himself of having stolen his words from someone else. In this way, he deliberately adopts the identity of a thief as an incognito. To understand this poetics of self-incrimination, I analyze the hypothetical thought-project that Climacus develops in an attempt (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Loyalties, and why loyalty should be ignored.R. E. Ewin - 1993 - Criminal Justice Ethics 12 (1):36-42.
    Loyalty, by making us identify with others, takes us beyond the very limited self (roughly the self of the Hobbesian natural condition) that is involved in selfishness and that is usually involved when people consider that self-concern, that aspect of human nature that must be limited if we are to live peaceably, is the main stumbling block to morality. Loyalty can thus be thought of as a version of altruism, as an inclination to identify with others and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. Human Rights and Political Toleration in India: Multiplicity, Self, and Interconnectedness.Ashwani Kumar Peetush - 2015 - In Ashwani Kumar Peetush & Jay Drydyk (eds.), Human Rights: India and the West. Oxford University Press. pp. 205-228.
    I would argue that toleration is one of the cornerstones for a just social order in any pluralistic society. Yet, the ideal of toleration is usually thought to originate from within, and most often justified from a European historical and philosophical context. It is thought to be a response to societal conflict and the Wars of Religion in the West, which is then exported to the rest of the world, by colonialism (ironically), or globalization. The West, once again, calls upon (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Review of Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. [REVIEW]Bryan van Norden - 1996 - Journal of Asian Studies 55 (4):983-84.
    Self-cultivation is a topic that has been largely ignored by Western moral philosophers. In contrast, it is a central concern of philosophers in the Confucian tradition. In this brief and highly readable book, Ivanhoe introduces the theories of self-cultivation of some of the most important figures in the Confucian tradition. (See the table of contents, below.) Although Confucianism is sometimes presented as a monolithic movement, Ivanhoe stresses the diversity within the Confucian tradition over more than 2,000 years. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. (1 other version)The Inner Road to Freedom and Nature by Self-realization.Sonja Haugaard Christensen - manuscript
    Some of the most threatening perspectives of our time are related to climate changes with Global Warming, caused by the emission of greenhouse gasses , and the severe pollution of the environment causing destruction of ecosystems and the extension of species. Recent scientific research points to an unusual increase in temperatures on earth seen in Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient Truth ”. The climate changes are both natural and man-made; the topics here are the man-made problems among which consumer mentality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Choosing to be changed: Revelation, integrity and the ethics of self-transformation.Paddy McQueen - 2017 - Ethical Perspectives 24 (4):545-568.
    How should one decide whether to undergo an experience that changes who one is? In her discussion of ‘transformative experiences’, L.A. Paul argues that to choose rationally when deliberating first-personally, one should base one’s decision on ‘revelation’, i.e. to discover out what the experience will be like. If this solution is taken as the sole means by which a transformative choice is made, then I argue it is problematic. This is because (i) it overlooks the role that one’s practical identity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  45. The Pleasures of the Comic and of Socratic Inquiry.Mitchell Miller - 2008 - Arethusa 41 (2):263-289.
    At Apology 33c Socrates explains that "some people enjoy … my company" because "they … enjoy hearing those questioned who think they are wise but are not." At Philebus 48a-50b he makes central to his account of the pleasure of laughing at comedy the exposé of the self-ignorance of those who presume themselves wise. Does the latter passage explain the pleasure of watching Socrates at work? I explore this by tracing the admixture of pain, the causes, and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46. The Red Mist.Maxime Charles Lepoutre - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (1).
    An influential critique of anger holds that anger comes at an important epistemic cost. In particular, feeling angry typically makes risk less visible to us. This is anger’s ‘red mist.’ These epistemic costs, critics suggest, arguably outweigh the epistemic benefits commonly ascribed to anger. This essay argues that the epistemic critique of anger is importantly misleading. This is not because it underestimates anger’s epistemic benefits, but rather because it overlooks the fact that anger’s red mist performs a crucial moral function. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Towards Knowing Ourselves: Classical Yoga Perspective.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2004 - Journal of Human Values 10 (2):111-116.
    Self-knowledge, at first glance, seems to be naturally and easily accessible to each of us. We commonly believe that we need much less effort to understand ourselves than to understand the world. The authoress of the paper uncovers the fallacy of this popular view referring to the fundamental conceptions and philosophical ideas of the classical Yoga. She tries to demystify our deceptive self-understanding explaining the definitions of ignorance (avidya), I-am-ness (asmita), desire (raga), aversion (dvesha) and fear of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions.Matthew Kopec - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1249-1259.
    Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an improved way to understand reflexive predictions (framed in probabilistic terms) and show that, once (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  49. Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The social disvalue of premature deaths.Hilary Greaves - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    Much public policy analysis requires us to place a monetary value on the bad- ness of a premature human death. Currently dominant approaches to determining this ‘value of a life’ focus exclusively on the ‘self-regarding’ value of life — that is, the value of a person’s life to the person whose death is in question — and altogether ignore effects on other people. This procedure would be justified if, as seems intuitively plausible, other-regarding effects were negligible in comparison with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 957