Results for 'token-reflexivity'

449 found
Order:
  1. Token-Reflexivity and Repetition.Alexandru Radulescu - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:745-763.
    The classical rule of Repetition says that if you take any sentence as a premise, and repeat it as a conclusion, you have a valid argument. It's a very basic rule of logic, and many other rules depend on the guarantee that repeating a sentence, or really, any expression, guarantees sameness of referent, or semantic value. However, Repetition fails for token-reflexive expressions. In this paper, I offer three ways that one might replace Repetition, and still keep an interesting notion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Indexicals as Token-Reflexives.Manuel Garc'ıa-Carpintero - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):529-564.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  3. Synonymy Between Token-Reflexive Expressions.Alexandru Radulescu - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):381–399.
    Synonymy, at its most basic, is sameness of meaning. A token-reflexive expression is an expression whose meaning assigns a referent to its tokens by relating each particular token of that particular expression to its referent. In doing so, the formulation of its meaning mentions the particular expression whose meaning it is. This seems to entail that no two token-reflexive expressions are synonymous, which would constitute a strong objection against token-reflexive semantics. In this paper, I propose and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Guarantee and Reflexivity.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500.
    The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. A Presuppositional Account of Reference Fixing.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):109-147.
    The paper defends a version of Direct Reference for indexicals on which reference-fixing material (token-reflexive conditions) plays the role of an ancillary presupposition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  6. Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 73--99.
    Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7.  89
    Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Cross-Modality and the Self.Jonardon Ganeri - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):639-658.
    The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one’s perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In §2 I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality. According to the ‘unification’ version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the ‘recognition’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity, having once (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10. Searle on Perception.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1999 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):19-41.
    In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Imperative Transparency.Manolo Martínez - forthcoming - Mind.
    I respond to an objection recently formulated by Barlassina and Hayward against first-order imperativism about pain, according to which it cannot account for the self-directed motivational force of pain. I am going to agree with them: it cannot. This is because pain does not have self-directed motivational force. I will argue that the alternative view (that pain is about dealing with extramental, bodily threats; not about dealing with itself) makes better sense of introspection, and of empirical research on pain avoidance. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Reflexivity and Bracketing in Sociological Phenomenological Research: Researching the Competitive Swimming Lifeworld.Gareth McNarry, Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson & Adam Evans - 2019 - Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health 11 (1):38-51.
    In this article, following on from earlier debates in the journal regarding the ‘thorny issue’ of epochē and bracketing in sociological phenomenological research, we consider more generally the challenges of engaging in reflexivity and bracketing when undertaking ethnographic ‘insider’ research, or research in familiar settings. We ground our discussion and illustrate some of the key challenges by drawing on the experience of undertaking this research approach with a group of competitive swimmers, who were participating in a British university performance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference.Steven James Bartlett (ed.) - 1992 - Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
    From the Editor’s Introduction: "The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding." We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- The limitations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17. The Reflexive Theory of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  18. A Reflexive Dispositional Analysis of Mechanistic Perception.John Dilworth - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493.
    The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits Between Dreyfus and Descartes.John Sutton, Doris McIlwain, Wayne Christensen & Andrew Geeves - 2011 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1):78-103.
    ‘There is no place in the phenomenology of fully absorbed coping’, writes Hubert Dreyfus, ‘for mindfulness. In flow, as Sartre sees, there are only attractive and repulsive forces drawing appropriate activity out of an active body’1. Among the many ways in which history animates dynamical systems at a range of distinctive timescales, the phenomena of embodied human habit, skilful movement, and absorbed coping are among the most pervasive and mundane, and the most philosophically puzzling. In this essay we examine both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  21. Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved.John Dilworth - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
    Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  22. Beyond Good and Bad: Reflexive Imperativism, Not Evaluativism, Explains Valence.Luca Barlassina - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):274-284.
    Evaluativism (Carruthers 2018) and reflexive imperativism (Barlassina and Hayward 2019) agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its worldly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers’s own standards. He maintains that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.
    According to the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT ? Language of Thought Hypothesis, or LOTH), propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, and the like, are triadic relations among subjects, propositions, and internal mental representations. These representations form a representational _system_ physically realized in the brain of sufficiently sophisticated cognitive organisms. Further, this system of representations has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, but the processes that operate on the representations are causally sensitive only to their syntax, not to their semantics. On (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  24.  6
    TORC3: Token-Ring Clearing Heuristic for Currency Circulation.Julio Michael Stern, Carlos Humes, Marcelo de Souza Lauretto, Fabio Nakano, Carlos Alberto de Braganca Pereira & Guilherme Frederico Gazineu Rafare - 2012 - AIP Conference Proceedings 1490:179-188.
    Clearing algorithms are at the core of modern payment systems, facilitating the settling of multilateral credit messages with (near) minimum transfers of currency. Traditional clearing procedures use batch processing based on MILP - mixed-integer linear programming algorithms. The MILP approach demands intensive computational resources; moreover, it is also vulnerable to operational risks generated by possible defaults during the inter-batch period. This paper presents TORC3 - the Token-Ring Clearing Algorithm for Currency Circulation. In contrast to the MILP approach, TORC3 is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Conscious Thoughts From Reflex-Like Processes: A New Experimental Paradigm for Consciousness Research.Allison K. Allen, Kevin Wilkins, Adam Gazzaley & Ezequiel Morsella - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1318-1331.
    The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  26. A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
    This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  27. Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm.Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó - 2017 - In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 319-341.
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. On Sense and Reflexivity.John Justice - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):351.
    Frege’s claim that proper names have senses has come to seem untenable following Kripke’s argument that names are rigid designators. It is commonly thought that if names had senses, their referents would vary with circumstances of evaluation. The article defends Frege’s claim by arguing that names have word-reflexive senses. This analysis of names’ senses does not violate Kripke’s noncircularity condition, and it differs crucially from related views of Bach and Katz. That names have reflexive senses confirms Frege’s own solution to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  29. Indexicals and the Metaphysics of Semantic Tokens: When Shapes and Sounds Become Utterances.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):71-79.
    To avoid difficulties facing intention-based accounts of indexicals, Cohen () recently defends a conventionalist account that focuses on the context of tokening. On this view, a token of ‘here’ or ‘now’ refers to the place or time at which it tokens. However, although promising, such an account faces a serious problem: in many speech acts, multiple apparent tokens are produced. If I call Alaska from Paris and say ‘I'm here now’, an apparent token of my utterance will be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  93
    On the Type-Token Relationships.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 1986 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 15 (4):164-168.
    The two-fold ontological character of linguistic objects revealed due to the distinction between “type” and “token” introduced by Ch. S. Peirce can be a base of the two-fold, both theoretical and axiomatic, approach to the language. Referring to some ideas included in A. A. Markov’s work [1954] (in Russian) on Theory of Algorithms and in some earlier papers of the author, the problem of formalization of the concrete and abstract words theories raised by J. Słupecki was solved. The construction (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. The Role of Reflexivity in Understanding Human Understanding.Steven James Bartlett - 1992 - In Steven J. Bartlett (ed.), Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co.. pp. 3--18.
    The Introduction to the collection of papers, _Reflexivity: A Source-book in Self-reference_. The Introduction studies the limits of our understanding that we carry unavoidably with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. When Shapes and Sounds Become Words: Indexicals and the Metaphysics of Semantic Tokens.Cathal O'Madagain - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    To avoid difficulties that arise when we appeal to speaker intentions or multiple rules to determine the meaning of indexicals, Cohen (2013) recently defends a conventionalist account of these terms that focuses on their context of tokening. Apart from some tricky cases already discussed in the literature, however, such an account faces a serious difficulty: in many speech acts, multiple apparent tokens are produced – for example when a speaker speaks on a telephone, and her utterance is heard both where (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. More of Me! Less of Me!: Reflexive Imperativism About Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.
    Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  34. Relativism and Reflexivity.Robert Lockie - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):319 – 339.
    This paper develops a version of the self-refutation argument against relativism in the teeth of the prevailing response by relativists: that this argument begs the question against them. It is maintained that although weaker varieties of relativism are not self-refuting, strong varieties are faced by this argument with a choice between making themselves absolute (one thing is absolutely true - relativism); or reflexive (relativism is 'true for' the relativist). These positions are in direct conflict. The commonest response, Reflexive Relativism, is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Meanings of Word: Type-Occurrence-Token.John Corcoran - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):117.
    Corcoran, John. 2005. Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11(2005) 117. -/- Once we are aware of the various senses of ‘word’, we realize that self-referential statements use ambiguous sentences. If a statement is made using the sentence ‘this is a pronoun’, is the speaker referring to an interpreted string, a string-type, a string-occurrence, a string-token, or what? The listeners can wonder “this what?”. -/- John Corcoran, Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36.  99
    The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride, Self-Sufficiency, and Modesty.Jeremy Fischer - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):365-399.
    This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Orders of Consciousness and Forms of Reflexivity in Descartes.Vili Lähteenmäki - 2007 - In Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes (eds.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 177-201.
    Descartes affords several notions of consciousness as he explains the characteristics of the diverse features of human thought from infancy to adulthood and from dreaming to attentive wakefulness. The paper argues that Descartes has a rich and coherent view of conscious mentality from rudimentary consciousness through reflexive consciousness to consciousness achieved by deliberate, attentive reflection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  38. On a Reflexive Case for Human Rights.Thomas M. Besch - 2013 - Journal of East-West Thought 3 (4):51-64.
    Can there be a "reflexive" or presuppositional, reasonably non-rejectable grounding of a Forst-type right to justification, or of a meaningful form of constitutive discursive standing? The paper argues that this is not so, and this for reasons that reflect more general limitations of presuppositional arguments for relevantly contested conclusions. To this end, the paper critically engages Forst's "reflexive" argument for human rights. It also considers O'Neill's presuppositional attempt to defend a form of cosmopolitanism, as well as the attempt to anchor (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):545-554.
    John Perry has urged that a semantic theory for natural languages ought to be concerned with the issue of cognitive significance—of how true identity statements containing different (utterances of) indexicals and proper names can be informative, held to be unaccountable by the referentialist view. The informativeness that he has in mind—one that has puzzled Frege, Kaplan and Wettstein—concerns knowledge about the world. In trying to solve this puzzle on referentialist terms, he comes up with the notion of cognitive significance as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  96
    Self-Reflexive Videogames: Observations and Corollaries on Virtual Worlds as Philosophical Artifacts.Stefano Gualeni - 2016 - G.A.M.E. - The Italian Journal of Game Studies 5 (1).
    Self-reflexive videogames are videogames designed to materialize critical and/or satirical perspectives on the ways in which videogames themselves are designed, played, sold, manipulated, experienced, and understood as social objects. This essay focuses on the use of virtual worlds as mediators, and in particular on the use of videogames to guide and encourage reflections on technical, interactive, and thematic conventions in videogame design and development. Structurally, it is composed of two interconnected parts: -/- 1) In the first part of this essay, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  60
    On the Theory of Labels-Tokens.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 1981 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 10 (1):30-33.
    This note is based on a lecture delivered at the Conference on the Scien- tic Research of the Mathematical Center of Opole, Turawa, May 10-11th, 1980. A somewhat extended version will be published in the Proceedings of the Conference. At the same time it is an abstract of a part of a planned larger paper, which will involve the theory of label-tokens. The theory is included into the author's monograph in Polish "Teorie Językow Syntaktycznie Kategorialnych", PWN, Warszawa-Wrocław 1985 and into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. Token Worries.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - The Forum.
    There are many grounds to object to tokenism, but that doesn’t mean we should always avoid being the token woman, argues Anca Gheaus.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Reflexivity Imagined as Art Practise.Donald Brierley - 2015 - Dissertation, Usyd
    A consideration of the relationship between conscious self-aware systems and art. I introduce my art practice and demonstrate the connections language has to self-conscious reflexivity. The document of research can be considered part of a creative practice that also uses language as a material. The specialist use and subversive manipulation of information in science and art as practiced in the service of culture are discussed to show how this informed the creation of Access Restricted-Operational Reasons as a response to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Defining Mind-Brain Token Identity.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. A Refutation of Goodman's Type‐Token Theory of Notation.John Dilworth - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (3):330-336.
    In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman presents a general theory of symbolic notation. However, I show that his theory could not adequately explain possible cases of natural language notational uses, and argue that this outcome undermines, not only Goodman's own theory, but any broadly type versus token based account of notational structure.Given this failure, an alternative representational theory is proposed, in which different visual or perceptual aspects of a given physical inscription each represent a different letter, word, or other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. Slurs and the Type-Token Distinction of Their Derogatory Force.Chang Liu - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (2):63-72.
    Slurs are derogatory, and theories of slurs aim at explaining their “derogatory force”. This paper draws a distinction between the type derogatory force and the token derogatory force of slurs. To explain the type derogatory force is to explain why a slur is a derogatory word. By contrast, to explain the token derogatory force is to explain why an utterance of a slur is derogatory. This distinction will be defended by examples in which the type and the (...) derogatory force come apart. Because of the distinction, an adequate theory of slurs must be plausible for both the type and the token derogatory force. However, I will argue that many theories fail to be plausible for both. In particular, Hom’s combinatorial externalism and the conventional implicature theory offer implausible accounts of the token derogatory force, whereas the prohibitionist theory is insufficient to explain the type derogatory force. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. On the Concept of a Token Generator.Takashi Iida - 2013 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 21:37-55.
    There is a widely shared account of the distinction between types and tokens, which might be termed the standard account. However, it has some surprising consequences that are not always realized. According to the standard account, a type is a contingent abstract object that can be created by us, but it does not allow any change and can never be destroyed once it is created, because it is an abstract object. I would like to present an alternative account of types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Grounds, Convention, and the Metaphysics of Linguistic Tokens.Brian Epstein - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):45-67.
    My aim in this paper is to discuss a metaphysical framework within which to understand “standard linguistic entities” (SLEs), such as words, sentences, phonemes, and other entities routinely employed in linguistic theory. In doing so, I aim to defuse certain kinds of skepticism, challenge convention-based accounts of SLEs, and present a series of distinctions for better understanding what the various accounts of SLEs do and do not accomplish.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. Language or Experience? – That’s Not the Question: A Case for Reflexivity.Jörg Volbers - 2014 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2):175-199.
    Analytic philosophy of language has often criticized classical pragmatism for holding to an unwarranted notion of experience which lapses into epistemological foundationalism; defenders of the classics have denied such a consequence. The paper tries to move this debate forward by pointing out that the criticism of the empiricist “given” is not wedded to a specific philosophical method, be it linguistic or pragmatist. From a broader historical perspective drawing in particular on Kant, antifoundationalism turns out to be deeply rooted in modern (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions.Matthew Kopec - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1249-1259.
    Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an improved way to understand reflexive predictions (framed in probabilistic terms) and show that, once such predictions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 449