Results for 'value tradeoffs'

992 found
Order:
  1.  72
    Tradeoffs, Self-Promotion, and Epistemic Teleology.Chase Wrenn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 249-276.
    Epistemic teleology is the view that (a) some states have fundamental epistemic value, and (b) all other epistemic value and obligation are to be understood in terms of promotion of or conduciveness to such fundamentally valuable states. Veritistic reliabilism is a paradigm case: It assigns fundamental value to true belief, and it makes all other assessments of epistemic value or justification in terms of the reliable acquisition of beliefs that are true rather than false. Teleology faces (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  60
    Conceptualizing Policy in Value Sensitive Design: A Machine Ethics Approach.Steven Umbrello - 2021 - In Steven John Thompson (ed.), Machine Law, Ethics, and Morality in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. Hershey, PA, USA: pp. 108-125.
    The value sensitive design (VSD) approach to designing transformative technologies for human values is taken as the object of study in this chapter. VSD has traditionally been conceptualized as another type of technology or instrumentally as a tool. The various parts of VSD’s principled approach would then aim to discern the various policy requirements that any given technological artifact under consideration would implicate. Yet, little to no consideration has been given to how laws, regulations, policies and social norms engage (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. In Defence of Fanaticism.Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Consider a decision between: 1) a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved; 2) a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of blissful lives created). Which is morally better? By expected value theory (with a plausible axiology), no matter how tiny that probability of the better outcome, (2) will be better than (1) as long that better outcome is good enough. But (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. The Role of Mental Accounting in Everyday Economic Decision Making.Tommy Gärling, Niklas Karlsson & Marcus Selart - 1999 - In Peter Juslin & Henry Montgomery (eds.), Judgment and decision making. Erlbaum. pp. 199-218.
    Mental accounting is a concept associated with the work of Richard Thaler. According to Thaler, people think of value in relative rather than absolute terms. They derive pleasure not just from an object’s value, but also the quality of the deal – its transaction utility (Thaler, 1985). In addition, humans often fail to fully consider opportunity costs (tradeoffs) and are susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy. Why are people willing to spend more when they pay with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5.  72
    The Accuracy-Coherence Tradeoff in Cognition.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
    I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition. Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence or accuracy. I illustrate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff by showing how it arises out of at least two component tradeoffs: a coherence-complexity tradeoff between coherence and cognitive complexity, and a coherence-variety tradeoff between coherence and strategic variety. These tradeoffs give rise to an accuracy-coherence tradeoff because privileging coherence over complexity or strategic variety often (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
    The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the subjective probability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: Using Moral Imagination Theory to Inform Responsible Technology Design.Steven Umbrello - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (2):575-595.
    Safe-by-Design (SBD) frameworks for the development of emerging technologies have become an ever more popular means by which scholars argue that transformative emerging technologies can safely incorporate human values. One such popular SBD methodology is called Value Sensitive Design (VSD). A central tenet of this design methodology is to investigate stakeholder values and design those values into technologies during early stage research and development (R&D). To accomplish this, the VSD framework mandates that designers consult the philosophical and ethical literature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. Aesthetic Values in Science.Milena Ivanova - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12433.
    Scientists often use aesthetic values in the evaluation and choice of theories. Aesthetic values are not only regarded as leading to practically more useful theories but are often taken to stand in a special epistemic relation to the truth of a theory such that the aesthetic merit of a theory is evidence of its truth. This paper explores what aesthetic considerations influence scientists' reasoning, how such aesthetic values relate to the utility of a scientific theory, and how one can justify (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  9. Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
    This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  10. Personal Values as A Catalyst for Corporate Social Entrepreneurship.Christine A. Hemingway - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 60 (3):233-249.
    The literature acknowledges a distinction between immoral, amoral and moral management. This paper makes a case for the employee (at any level) as a moral agent, even though the paper begins by highlighting a body of evidence which suggests that individual moral agency is sacrificed at work and is compromised in deference to other pressures. This leads to a discussion about the notion of discretion and an examination of a separate, contrary body of literature which indicates that some individuals in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  11. Architectural Values, Political Affordances and Selective Permeability.Matthew Crippen & Vladan Klement - 2020 - Open Philosophy 3 (1):462–477.
    This article connects value-sensitive design to Gibson’s affordance theory: the view that we perceive in terms of the ease or difficulty with which we can negotiate space. Gibson’s ideas offer a nonsubjectivist way of grasping culturally relative values, out of which we develop a concept of political affordances, here understood as openings or closures for social action, often implicit. Political affordances are equally about environments and capacities to act in them. Capacities and hence the severity of affordances vary with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Value Sensitive Design to Achieve the UN SDGs with AI: A Case of Elderly Care Robots.Steven Umbrello, Marianna Capasso, Maurizio Balistreri, Alberto Pirni & Federica Merenda - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (3):395-419.
    Healthcare is becoming increasingly automated with the development and deployment of care robots. There are many benefits to care robots but they also pose many challenging ethical issues. This paper takes care robots for the elderly as the subject of analysis, building on previous literature in the domain of the ethics and design of care robots. Using the value sensitive design approach to technology design, this paper extends its application to care robots by integrating the values of care, values (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Value and the Right Kind of Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of philosophers’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  14. Mapping Value Sensitive Design Onto AI for Social Good Principles.Steven Umbrello & Ibo van de Poel - 2021 - AI and Ethics 1 (3):283–296.
    Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges specific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  77
    Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  17. Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  18. A Value-Sensitive Design Approach to Intelligent Agents.Steven Umbrello & Angelo Frank De Bellis - 2018 - In Roman Yampolskiy (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security. New York, NY, USA: CRC Press. pp. 395-410.
    This chapter proposed a novel design methodology called Value-Sensitive Design and its potential application to the field of artificial intelligence research and design. It discusses the imperatives in adopting a design philosophy that embeds values into the design of artificial agents at the early stages of AI development. Because of the high risk stakes in the unmitigated design of artificial agents, this chapter proposes that even though VSD may turn out to be a less-than-optimal design methodology, it currently provides (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  19. Value Receptacles.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):322-332.
    Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  20. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21. The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
    Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of perception, theories of well-being, animal and medical ethics, the philosophy of consciousness, and theories of understanding in philosophy of science and epistemology has featured disconnected discussions of what is arguably a single underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this paper is to review some of this work and place it within a unified theoretical framework that makes contributions (and contributors) from these disparate areas (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. It is argued that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. Its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of normative reasons, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  23. Valuing Anger.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Myisha Cherry & Owen Flanagan (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Anger. Rowman & Littlefield.
    It is widely acknowledged that susceptibility to suitable emotional responses is part of what it is to value something. Indeed, the value of at least some things calls for such emotional responses – if we lack them, we don’t respond appropriately to their value. In this paper, I argue that susceptibility to anger is an essential component of valuing other people, ourselves, and our relationships. The main reason is that various modes of valuing, such as respect, self-respect, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. Functional Analyses, Mechanistic Explanations, and Explanatory Tradeoffs.Sergio Daniel Barberis - 2013 - Journal of Cognitive Science 14:229-251.
    Recently, Piccinini and Craver have stated three theses concerning the relations between functional analysis and mechanistic explanation in cognitive sciences: No Distinctness: functional analysis and mechanistic explanation are explanations of the same kind; Integration: functional analysis is a kind of mechanistic explanation; and Subordination: functional analyses are unsatisfactory sketches of mechanisms. In this paper, I argue, first, that functional analysis and mechanistic explanations are sub-kinds of explanation by scientific (idealized) models. From that point of view, we must take into account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Which Values Should Be Built Into Economic Measures?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):521-536.
    Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):324-344.
    In the growing literature on decision-making under moral uncertainty, a number of skeptics have argued that there is an insuperable barrier to rational "hedging" for the risk of moral error, namely the apparent incomparability of moral reasons given by rival theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism. Various general theories of intertheoretic value comparison have been proposed to meet this objection, but each suffers from apparently fatal flaws. In this paper, I propose a more modest approach that aims to identify classes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  27. Weaving Value Judgment Into the Tapestry of Science.Matthew J. Brown - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (10).
    I critically analyze Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values in order to tease out his views on the nature and status of values or value judgments in the text. I show there is a tension in Elliott’s view that is closely connected to a major lacuna in the philosophical literature on values in science: the need for a better theory of values.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28. Value-Oriented and Ethical Technology Engineering in Industry 5.0: A Human-Centric Perspective for the Design of the Factory of the Future.Francesco Longo, Antonio Padovano & Steven Umbrello - 2020 - Applied Sciences 10 (12):4182.
    Manufacturing and industry practices are undergoing an unprecedented revolution as a consequence of the convergence of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, cloud computing, virtual and augmented reality, among others. This fourth industrial revolution is similarly changing the practices and capabilities of operators in their industrial environments. This paper introduces and explores the notion of the Operator 4.0 as well as how this novel way of conceptualizing the human operator necessarily implicates human values in the technologies that constitute it. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Impersonal Value, Universal Value, and the Scope of Cultural Heritage.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):999-1027.
    Philosophers have used the terms 'impersonal' and 'personal value' to refer to, among others things, whether something's value is universal or particular to an individual. In this paper, I propose an account of impersonal value that, I argue, better captures the intuitive distinction than potential alternatives, while providing conceptual resources for moving beyond the traditional stark dichotomy. I illustrate the practical importance of my theoretical account with reference to debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  30. Many-Valued Logics. A Mathematical and Computational Introduction.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - London: College Publications.
    2nd edition. Many-valued logics are those logics that have more than the two classical truth values, to wit, true and false; in fact, they can have from three to infinitely many truth values. This property, together with truth-functionality, provides a powerful formalism to reason in settings where classical logic—as well as other non-classical logics—is of no avail. Indeed, originally motivated by philosophical concerns, these logics soon proved relevant for a plethora of applications ranging from switching theory to cognitive modeling, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. The Division of Labour in Science: The Tradeoff Between Specialisation and Diversity.Rogier De Langhe - 2010 - Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (1):37-51.
    Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is a common theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the present paper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) and Hull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended is different. Mäki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.
    In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Valuing Blame.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.
    Blaming (construed broadly to include both blaming-attitudes and blaming-actions) is a puzzling phenomenon. Even when we grant that someone is blameworthy, we can still sensibly wonder whether we ought to blame him. We sometimes choose to forgive and show mercy, even when it is not asked for. We are naturally led to wonder why we shouldn’t always do this. Wouldn’t it be a better to wholly reject the punitive practices of blame, especially in light of their often undesirable effects, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  34. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. History, Value, and Irreplaceability.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):35-64.
    It is often assumed that there is a necessary relationship between historical value and irreplaceability, and that this is an essential feature of historical value’s distinctive character. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that it is a merely contingent fact that some historically valuable things are irreplaceable, and that irreplaceability is not a distinctive feature of historical value at all. Rather, historically significant objects, from heirlooms to artifacts, offer us an otherwise impossible connection with the past, a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  36. Twist-Valued Models for Three-Valued Paraconsistent Set Theory.Walter Carnielli & Marcelo E. Coniglio - manuscript
    Boolean-valued models of set theory were independently introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopěnka in 1965, offering a natural and rich alternative for describing forcing. The original method was adapted by Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to lattice-valued models of set theory. After this, Löwe and Tarafder proposed a class of algebras based on a certain kind of implication which satisfy several axioms of ZF. From this class, they found a specific 3-valued model called PS3 which satisfies all the axioms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2017 - In Jeffrey Dunn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue that epistemic consequentialism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  38. Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):545-562.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39. Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics.Philippe Mongin - 2006 - Economica 73 (290):257-286.
    The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  40. The Value of Epistemic Disagreement in Scientific Practice. The Case of Homo Floresiensis.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):169-177.
    Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  41. Value Incomparability and Incommensurability.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  42. Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.
    ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  43. Fact/Value Holism, Feminist Philosophy, and Nazi Cancer Research.Sharyn Clough - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-12.
    Fact/value holism has become commonplace in philosophy of science, especially in feminist literature. However, that facts are bearers of empirical content, while values are not, remains a firmly-held distinction. I support a more thorough-going holism: both facts and values can function as empirical claims, related in a seamless, semantic web. I address a counterexample from Kourany where facts and values seem importantly discontinuous, namely, the simultaneous support by the Nazis of scientifically sound cancer research and morally unsound political policies. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.
    According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  45. Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Boaz Miller - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
    Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46. Personal Value, Biographical Identity, and Retrospective Attitudes.Camil Golub - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):72-85.
    We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa003.
    In this essay, I cast doubt on an apparent truism: namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it's always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this thesis Value of Information. I show that Value of Information conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent's evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Desires, Values and Norms.Olivier Massin - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49. Value in Very Long Lives.Preston Greene - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):416-434.
    As things currently stand, our deaths are unavoidable and our lifespans short. It might be thought that these qualities leave room for improvement. According to a prominent line of argument in philosophy, however, this thought is mistaken. Against the idea that a longer life would be better, it is claimed that negative psychological states, such as boredom, would be unavoidable if our lives were significantly longer. Against the idea that a deathless life would be better, it is claimed that such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. Values-Based Practice and Phenomenological Psychopathology: Implications of Existential Changes in Depression.Anthony Vincent Fernandez & Sarah Wieten - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):508-513.
    Values-based practice (VBP), developed as a partner theory to evidence-based medicine (EBM), takes into explicit consideration patients’ and clinicians’ values, preferences, concerns and expectations during the clinical encounter in order to make decisions about proper interventions. VBP takes seriously the importance of life narratives, as well as how such narratives fundamentally shape patients’ and clinicians’ values. It also helps to explain difficulties in the clinical encounter as conflicts of values. While we believe that VBP adds an important dimension to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 992