- Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.details
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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details
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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.details
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Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
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Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):624-656.details
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Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
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Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition.Thomas Lockhart - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):535-557.details
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Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Self‐Knowing Agents, by Lucy O'Brien. [REVIEW]Conor McHugh - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):153-158.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge for Nothing.Patrick Greenough - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.details
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On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.details
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Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.details
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Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details
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Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80.details
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Problems for Wright's entitlement theory.Luca Moretti - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 121-138.details
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Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
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A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.details
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On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):647-665.details
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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Boghossian's Implicit Definition Template.Ben Baker - 2011 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos. pp. 15.details
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Entitlement and Evidence.Martin Smith - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.details
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The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure.Geoff Pynn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1519-1531.details
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Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.details
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Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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(1 other version)Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives : is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The paradox of Moore's proof of.Annalisa Coliva - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2).details
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Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Mark McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 228 pp., £16.95 , ISBN 978‐1‐78374‐283‐7. [REVIEW]Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):280-285.details
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How to Formulate Arguments from Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.details
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(1 other version)Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):501-522.details
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Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.details
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Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.details
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Dragging and Confirming.Matthew Kotzen - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):55-93.details
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Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Moore’s Proof, Warrant Transmission and Skepticism.Simon Dierig - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):487-502.details
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Agential thinking.Walter Veit - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):13393-13419.details
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Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
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Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?Milena Ivanova - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Cham: Synthese Library. pp. 207-226.details
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(1 other version)Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):797-817.details
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Epistemic Entitlements and the Practice of Computer Simulation.John Symons & Ramón Alvarado - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (1):37-60.details
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Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.details
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