- A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.details
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Models, models, models: a deflationary view.Jay Odenbaugh - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 21):1-16.details
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Elme és evolúció.Bence Nanay - 2000 - Kávé..details
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Dretske on Introspection.Charles Nussbaum - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):327-.details
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Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument?Paul Noordhof - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):48-56.details
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The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.details
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Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness.Takuya Niikawa, Yoshiyuki Hayashi, Joshua Shepherd & Tsutomu Sawai - 2022 - Neuroethics 15 (1):1-16.details
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Self-awareness as conscious meta-representation.Sam Nicholson - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):172-187.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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What Subjectivity Is Not.Joseph Neisser - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):41-53.details
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Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).details
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Representation.Gabriel Motzkin - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):201-212.details
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The Phenomenal Representation of Size.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):716-729.details
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Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.details
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What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.details
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Is there a future for AI without representation?Vincent C. Müller - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115.details
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Peacocke’s trees.Boyd Millar - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):445-461.details
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Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap.Jakub Mihálik - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1423-1445.details
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Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.details
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Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be.Eliot Michaelson & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):833-843.details
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Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's Cognitive Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):601-604.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
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Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis.Neil Mehta - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):567-591.details
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Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.details
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The Representational vs. the Relational View of Visual Experience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:239-262.details
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Hill on phenomenal consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):851-860.details
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A limited defense of moral perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.details
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You can see what 'I' means.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.details
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Our Knowledge of Colour.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):215-246.details
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The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.details
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Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.details
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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Setting Things before the Mind: M.G.F. Martin.M. G. F. Martin - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:157-179.details
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Pain signals are predominantly imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.details
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Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks.Pete Mandik - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.details
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The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit.Riccardo Manzotti - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (3):225-241.details
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Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.details
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Qualia, space, and control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Materialism and the First Person.Geoffrey Madell - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:123-139.details
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Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.details
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Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'.Cynthia Macdonald - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.details
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Novel colours and the content of experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.details
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Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.details
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‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).details
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Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.details
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Semantics for Subjective Measures of Perceptual Experience.Pessi Lyyra - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.details
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