- The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1829-1847.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
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Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?Marcello Di Bello - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1269-1285.details
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Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):808-824.details
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n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford:details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.details
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Algorithmic Decision-making, Statistical Evidence and the Rule of Law.Vincent Chiao - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.details
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Demographic statistics in defensive decisions.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4833-4850.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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What should we believe about the future?Miloud Belkoniene - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2375-2386.details
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Normalcy, Understanding and the Problem of Statistical Evidence.Miloud Belkoniene - 2019 - Theoria 85 (3):202-218.details
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Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.details
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases.Marvin Backes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2759-2778.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief-Formation Methods.Bin Zhao - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):165-175.details
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The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?Rima Basu - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 191-210.details
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'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Carter Adam, Gordon Emma & Jarvis Benjamin (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.details
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Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Sensitivity Unmotivated.Haicheng Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):507-517.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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The Policy of Evidence.Giovanni Tuzet - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1418-1443.details
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Certainty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.Giovanni Tuzet - 2023 - Contemporary Pragmatism 20 (4):398-423.details
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Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes.Katie Steele & Mark Colyvan - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1927-1950.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof.Tim Smartt - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):303-318.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Belief.Stephanie Sheintul - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (1):97-114.details
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Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Specification.Frederick Schauer - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):367-376.details
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Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible.Cosim Sayid - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):261-276.details
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Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible.Cosim Sayid - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):261-276.details
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The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
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Can Self-determined Actions be Predictable?Amit Pundik - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):121-140.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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In defence of the modal account of legal risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-16.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.details
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Safety vs. sensitivity: Possible worlds and the law of evidence.Michael S. Pardo - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (1):50-75.details
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Grounding legal proof.Michael S. Pardo - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):280-298.details
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