Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.
    This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go beyond the common ground and consider competing accounts of the reason relation. Robust and quietist versions of non-naturalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • In Search of Common Values Amongst Competing Universals: An Argument for the Return to Value’s Original Meaning.Andra le Roux-Kemp - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (4):877-903.
    This article presents an argument for the return to the original meaning of the concept value. This is achieved by revisiting the genealogy of the concept and by placing in perspective and questioning the common parlance thereof in contemporary legal discourse. The approach is decidedly against the often casual way in which courts and commentators treat the concept, seemingly as concretisation, validation, exegesis or reinforcement of fundamental norms, but without paying attention to its original meaning and use. It is submitted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Phenomenology (2nd edition).Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Moral phenomenology is the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of our moral inner life – of the phenomenal character of moral mental states. Many different questions arise within moral phenomenology, but three stand out. The first concerns the scope of moral experience: How much of our moral mental life is experienced by us? The second concerns the nature of moral experience: What is it like to undergo the various kinds of moral experience we have? The third concerns the theoretical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice.Michael Slote - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):419-436.
    ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • ‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.
    Despite increasing prominence, ‘ought’-contextualism is regarded with suspicion by most metaethicists. As I’ll argue, however, contextualism is a very weak claim, that every metaethicist can sign up to. The real controversy concerns how contextualism is developed. I then draw an oft-overlooked distinction between “parochial” contextualism—on which the contextually-relevant standards are those that the speaker, or others in her environment, subscribe to—and “aspirational” contextualism—on which the contextually-relevant standards are the objective standards for the relevant domain. However, I argue that neither view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davis
    What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good? According to the orthodox answer, at least in some cases when we judge that something is good we are attributing to it a monadic property. That is, good things are “just plain good.” I reject the orthodox view. In arguing against it, I begin with the idea that a plausible account of goodness must take seriously the intuitive claim that there is something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world.David Macarthur - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):565-585.
    ABSTRACTThis paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image and the practical scientific image. The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):699-717.
    A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment.Florian Cova, Christopher Y. Olivola, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles E. Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro V. del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):317-338.
    Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Cognition in Practice: Conceptual Development and Disagreement in Cognitive Science.Mikio Akagi - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity.Joseph Jebari - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2429-2453.
    Moral rationalism has long been an attractive position within moral philosophy. However, among empirical-minded philosophers, it is widely dismissed as scientifically untenable. In this essay, I argue that moral rationalism’s lack of uptake in the empirical domain is due to the widespread supposition that moral rationalists must hold that moral judgments and actions are produced by rational capacities. But this construal is mistaken: moral rationalism’s primary concern is not with the relationship between moral judgments and rational capacities per se, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Adorno, Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised.Craig Reeves - 2016 - Law and Critique 27 (3):323-348.
    This article argues—against the present compatibilist orthodoxy in the philosophy of criminal law—for the contemporary relevance of a kind of critique of criminal law known as the ‘determinist challenge’, through a reconstruction of Theodor Adorno’s thought on freedom and determinism. The article begins by considering traditional forms of the determinist challenge, which expressed a widespread intuition that it is irrational or inappropriate for the criminal law to hold people responsible for actions that are causally determined by social and psychological forces (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Can humanoid robots be moral?Sanjit Chakraborty - 2018 - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 18:49-60.
    The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output’, in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated extensive debate, i.e. ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the normative outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity interplay with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Constructivism in metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. -/- Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while others claim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • A Critique of Metaphysical Thinking.T. Parent - manuscript
    Draft of March 2022. This is a draft of the front matter and ch. 1, for a new book manuscript on metametaphysics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.
    There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • A Priorism in Moral Epistemology.Amelia Hicks & Michael R. DePaul - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)?Patrick Clipsham - 2018 - Philosophia 51 (1):53-68.
    Companions in guilt arguments are widespread in defenses of moral realism and criticisms of error theory. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the companions in guilt argument fails because it makes untenable assumptions about the existence of categorical epistemic reasons. In this article, I develop an alternative version of the companions in guilt argument that does not succumb to this criticism, as it begins with the claim that there is a presumptive case in favor of attributing a belief (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • How to Measure Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):647-670.
    In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on folk moral realism. G1 and G2 require (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 15-54.
    This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Meaning of Life.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A 3,500 word overview of 21st century Anglo-American philosophical books devoted to the question of what, if anything, would make life meaningful.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (1):349–366.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sellars’ metaethical quasi-realism.Griffin Klemick - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2215-2243.
    In this article, I expound and defend an interpretation of Sellars as a metaethical quasi-realist. Sellars analyzes moral discourse in non-cognitivist terms: in particular, he analyzes “ought”-statements as expressions of collective intentions deriving from a collective commitment to provide for the general welfare. But he also endorses a functional-role theory of meaning, on which a statement’s meaning is grounded in its being governed by semantical rules concerning language entry, intra-linguistic, and language departure transitions, and a theory of truth as correct (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Values in Climate Ethics.Hein Berdinesen - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (3):389-403.
    The aim of the article is to give an outline of a value theory suitable for climate ethics, based on a perfectionist account on the convergence between prudential values and moral responsibility. I claim that such a convergence may generate a system of values that specify norms and obligations and attribute responsibility towards future generations, and thereby provides us with a measure of acceptable political action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.
    This paper raises an objection to two important arguments for reductive ethical naturalism. Reductive ethical naturalism is the view that ethical properties reduce to the properties countenanced by the natural and social sciences. The main arguments for reductionism in the literature hold that ethical properties reduce to natural properties by supervening on them, either because supervenience is alleged to guarantee identity via mutual entailment, or because non-reductive supervenience relations render the supervenient properties superfluous. After carefully characterizing naturalism and reductionism, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.
    I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory (section 1) and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow (section 2). I suggest there may be a view which can allow for the existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Gripped by authority.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):313-336.
    Moral judgments are typically experienced as being categorically authoritative – i.e. as having a prescriptive force that is motivationally gripping independently of both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires, and justificationally trumps both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires. We argue that this key feature is best accommodated by the meta-ethical position we call ‘cognitivist expressivism’, which construes moral judgments as sui generis psychological states whose distinctive phenomenological character includes categorical authoritativeness. Traditional versions of expressivism cannot easily accommodate the justificationally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Not quite neo-sentimentalism.Tristram Oliver-Skuse - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):877-899.
    The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Possible worlds and ideology.Constant Thomas - 2017 - Dissertation, Cardiff University
    The broad aim of this thesis is to explore fruitful connections between ideology theory and the philosophy of possible worlds. Ideologies are full of modal concepts, such as possibility, potential, necessity, essence, contingency and accident. Typically, PWs are articulated for the analysis and illumination of modal concepts. That naturally suggests a method for theorising ideological modality, utilising PW theory. The specific conclusions of the thesis proffer a number of original contributions to knowledge: 1) PWs should only be used for explication (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • An Examination of Ethical Influences on the Work of Tax Practitioners.Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Peter Moizer, Elaine Doyle & Barbara Summers - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 146 (4):729-745.
    As a contribution to the continuing debate about tax practitioner ethics, this paper explores the main streams of Western ethical thought that are relevant to tax practitioners’ work, most typically deontology and consequentialism. It then goes on to consider the impact of such ethical influences on the professional ethical codes of conduct that govern tax practitioners’ work, and attempts to unravel the complex work and ethical environment of the practice of tax in terms of tax compliance and tax avoidance. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Evolutionary Skepticism about Morality and Prudential Normativity.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):911-928.
    Debunking arguments aim at defeating the justification of a belief by revealing the belief to have a dubious genealogy. One prominent example of such a debunking argument is Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking explanation of morality. Joyce’s argument targets only our belief in moral facts, while our belief in prudential facts is exempt from his evolutionary critique. In this paper, I suggest that our belief in prudential facts falls victim to evolutionary debunking, too. Just as our moral sense can be explained (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intuitionism and Nihilism.David Kaspar - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):319-336.
    Intuitionism and nihilism, according to nihilists, have key features in common: the same semantics and the same phenomenology. Intuitionism is the object of nihilism’s attack. The central charge nihilism lodges against intuitionism is that its nonnatural moral properties are queer. Here I’ll examine what ‘queer’ might mean in relation to the doctrines nihilism uses to support this charge. My investigation reveals that nihilism’s queerness charge lacks substance and resembles a tautology served with a frown. There’s really nothing to it. After (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Normativity in Comparative Religious Ethics.Kevin Jung - 2017 - Journal of Religious Ethics 45 (4):642-665.
    This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Error Theory in Metaethics.Jonas Olson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-71.
    Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation, but not those concerning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Pluralism and unity in education : on education for democratic citizenship and personal autonomy in a pluralist society.Rosenquist Joachim - unknown
    The overarching theme of this thesis concerns the possibility of balancing the values of unity and pluralism in education in developed nation states characterized by an increasing pluralism when it comes to the beliefs and values of its citizens. The author suggests that democracy has a normative basis in the principle of reciprocity which can be supported in an overlapping consensus by reasonable persons who differ in their moral, religious and philosophical beliefs. It is argued that this basis mandates a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.
    The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Look of Silence and the Problem of Monstrosity.Mathew Abbott - 2017 - Film-Philosophy 21 (3):392-409.
    In Beyond Moral Judgment, Alice Crary defends a version of moral objectivism which turns on the idea that participation in moral life involves acquired affective proclivities: subjective capacities which nevertheless allow us to be receptive to objective features of the world. In this article, I draw out key aspects and implications of her account with reference to Joshua Oppenheimer's 2014 film The Look of Silence, a companion piece to 2012's The Act of Killing. The film depicts a series of confrontations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2279-2303.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • II—Objectivity and Idolatry.Yonatan Shemmer - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):191-216.
    The attempt to vindicate the objectivity of morality tops the list of philosophical obsessions. In this paper I consider the rationality of searching for such a vindication. I argue that the only justification of our efforts lies in our belief in moral objectivity; that this belief can be as well, if not better, explained by wishful thinking and other cognitive biases; that as a research community we have failed to take precautions against such biases; and that as a result we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • XI- Naturalism and Placement, or, What Should a Good Quinean Say about Mathematical and Moral Truth?Mary Leng - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):237-260.
    What should a Quinean naturalist say about moral and mathematical truth? If Quine’s naturalism is understood as the view that we should look to natural science as the ultimate ‘arbiter of truth’, this leads rather quickly to what Huw Price has called ‘placement problems’ of placing moral and mathematical truth in an empirical scientific world-view. Against this understanding of the demands of naturalism, I argue that a proper understanding of the reasons Quine gives for privileging ‘natural science’ as authoritative when (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Epistemological motivations for anti-realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.
    Anti-realism is often claimed to be preferable to realism on epistemological grounds: while realists have difficulty explaining how we can ever know claims if we are realists about it, anti-realism faces no analogous problem. This paper focuses on anti-realism about normativity to investigate this alleged advantage to anti-realism in detail. I set up a framework in which a version of anti-realism explains a type of modal reliability that appears to be epistemologically promising, and plausibly explains the appearance of an epistemological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • XV-The Limits of Normative Detachment.Nishi Shah - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):347-371.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Contextualism, skepticism, and invariantism.Stephen Jacobson - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):375–392.
    Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist positions which fall outside the scope (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Realism, inferential semantics, and the truth norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):955-973.
    Characteristic of neo-pragmatism is a commitment to deflationism about semantic properties, and inferentialism about conceptual content. It is usually thought that deflationism undermines the distinction between realistic discourses and others, and that the neo-pragmatists, unlike the classical pragmatists, cannot recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. I argue, however, that the distinction between realistic discourses and others can be maintained even in the face of a commitment to deflationism, and that deflationists can recognize that truth is a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Ontology via semantics? Introduction to the special issue on the semantics of cardinals.Craige Roberts & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):321-329.
    As introduction to the special issue on the semantics of cardinals, we offer some background on the relevant literature, and an overview of the contributions to this volume. Most of these papers were presented in earlier form at an interdisciplinary workshop on the topic at The Ohio State University, and the contributions to this issue reflect that interdisciplinary character: the authors represent both fields in the title of this journal.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2019 - In Kelly Becker & Iain D. Thomson (eds.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    A brief explanation and overview of constitutivism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character: Engaging Joel J. Kupperman.Chenyang Li & Peimin Ni (eds.) - 2014 - Albany: State University of New York Press.
    In this volume, leading scholars in Asian and comparative philosophy take the work of Joel J. Kupperman as a point of departure to consider new perspectives on Confucian ethics. Kupperman is one of the few eminent Western philosophers to have integrated Asian philosophical traditions into his thought, developing a character-based ethics synthesizing Western, Chinese, and Indian philosophies. With their focus on Confucian ethics, contributors respond, expand, and engage in critical dialogue with Kupperman’s views. Kupperman joins the conversation with responses and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Education, Despair and Morality: A Reply to Roberts.Christopher Cowley - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (1):298-309.
    In a recent thought-provoking piece, Peter Roberts argues against the central role of happiness as a guiding concept in education, and argues for more attention to be paid to despair. This does not mean cultivating despair in young people, but allowing them to make sense of their own natural occasional despair, as well as the despair of others. I agree with Roberts about happiness, and about the need for more attention to despair, but I argue that focusing too much on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations