- An Opinionated Guide to “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best”.Chris Heathwood - 2020 - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 94-113.details
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An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.details
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On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.details
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The experience requirement on well-being.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):867-886.details
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Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism: Action Guidance and Moral intuitions.Simon Rosenqvist - 2020 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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The unpleasantness of pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7309-7349.details
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Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False.Travis Timmerman & Felipe Pereira - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:697-705.details
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Plaisir (Entrée académique).Antonin Broi - 2020 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.details
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Do Fitting Emotions Tell Us Anything About Well-Being?James Fanciullo - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):118-125.details
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Virtual Consumption, Sustainability & Human Well-Being.Kenneth R. Pike & C. Tyler Desroches - 2020 - Environmental Values 29 (3):361-378.details
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The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. London: Routledge.details
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CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value.Walter Horn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):191-215.details
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Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Unknown pleasures.Ben Bramble - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1333-1344.details
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Happiness and the Good Life: A Classical Confucian Perspective.Shirong Luo - 2019 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (1):41-58.details
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Expanding Global Justice: The International Protection of Animals.Oscar Horta - 2013 - Global Policy 4:371-380.details
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Pulling Apart Well-Being at a Time and the Goodness of a Life.Owen C. King - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:349-370.details
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The unpleasantness of pain.Abraham Sapién-Córdoba - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails
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The Narrowed Domain of Disagreement for Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2018 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (1):1-19.details
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Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance.Oscar Horta - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (3):369-388.details
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Aquinas and Gregory the Great on the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer.Scott Hill - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.details
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The Irreducibility of Pleasure to Desire.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.details
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Intuitive Biases in Judgements about Thought Experiments: The Experience Machine Revisited.Dan Weijers - 2013 - Philosophical Writings 41 (1):17-31.details
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Hedonism.Alex Gregory - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge.details
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"The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Genevadetails
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Effort and Achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):27-51.details
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Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.details
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Empathy as the Moral Sense?Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):867-879.details
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Autonomy and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):500-520.details
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Irrationality and Happiness: A (Neo-)Shopenhauerian argument for rational pessimism.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1):1-26.details
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The Passing of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Health-care needs and shared decision-making in priority-setting.Erik Gustavsson & Lars Sandman - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (1):13-22.details
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Rossian totalism about intrinsic value.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.details
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The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.details
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Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-157.details
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Why Be Moral? Can the Psychological Literature on Well-Being Shed any Light?Valerie Tiberius - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (3):347-364.details
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The Unity and Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains.Ole Martin Moen - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):527-543.details
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On the Objectivity of Welfare.Alexander F. Sarch - unknowndetails
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Emotion Experience and its Varieties.Nico H. Frijda - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):264-271.details
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Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others.Aaron Smuts - manuscriptdetails
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Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.details
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An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value.Scott Hill - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.details
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William David Ross.Anthony Skelton - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):239 - 261.details
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Hedonism.Andrew Moore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Timmermann's new paradox of hedonism: Neither new nor paradoxical.Fred Feldman - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):76–82.details
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Feldman on the Nature and Value of Pleasure.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):425-437.details
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