- A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - In Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 66-89.details
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Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - In Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.details
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Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems.Rogier De Langhe - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2547-2556.details
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A puzzle about belief updating.Carlo Martini - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.details
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Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect.Carlo Martini, Jan Sprenger & Mark Colyvan - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):881-898.details
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The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2007 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.details
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The procedural epistemic value of deliberation.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.details
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Disagreeing with the (religious) skeptic.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting.Yann Allard-Tremblay - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (3):207-223.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.details
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Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
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Possible disagreements and defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.details
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Knowledge and Moral Relativism.N. Ángel Pinillos - unknowndetails
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Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.details
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(1 other version)Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement.Barry Lam - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1079-1098.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Parfit über Intuitionismus und die Herausforderung moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Education: What’s the Problem?Balg Dominik - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):5-24.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(3 other versions)Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Disagreeing about disagreement.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):267-285.details
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(8 other versions)بررسی دیدگاه راجر تریگ درباب التزام دینی و عقلانیت.فاطمه سعیدی & عبدالرسول کشفی - 2018 - دانشگاه امام صادق 15 (2):47-67.details
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Are scrutability conditionals rationally deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.details
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Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1107-1141.details
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Gender, race, and group disagreement.Martin Miragoli & Mona Simion - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 125-138.details
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Reply to Machery: Against the Argument from Citation.Jordan David Thomas Walters - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):181-184.details
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Perceptual variation and ignorance.John Morrison - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5145-5173.details
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Prospects for Successful Proofs of Theism or Atheism.Graham Oppy - 2011 - In Joachim Bromand & Guido Kreis (eds.), Gottesbeweise: von Anselm bis Gödel. Berlin: Suhrkamp. pp. 599-642.details
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Ansia epistemica e diversità religiosa.Daniele Bertini - 2020 - Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia Della Religione 14:2-10.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):7-18.details
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(1 other version)Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
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Modesty and Humility.Nicolas Bommarito - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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When is mindreading accurate? A commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Evan Westra - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):868-882.details
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Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3183-3202.details
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Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1811-1828.details
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