- Reverse-Engineering Risk.Angela O’Sullivan & Lilith Mace - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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Closure and the Lottery.Simon Dierig - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):405-419.details
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Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (1):26-54.details
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The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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The rationality of epistemic akrasia.John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):206-228.details
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Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
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Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-14.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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(1 other version)Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):235-252.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.details
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K ⊈ E.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):540-557.details
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Risk, doubt, and transmission.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2803-2821.details
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(2 other versions)Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-34.details
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(1 other version)Assessing Lives, Giving Supernaturalism Its Due, and Capturing Naturalism: Reply to 13 Critics of Meaning in Life (repr.).Thaddeus Metz - 2015 - In Masahiro Morioka (ed.), Reconsidering Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue with Thaddeus Metz. Journal of Philosophy of Life, Waseda University. pp. 228-278.details
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Reconsidering Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue with Thaddeus Metz.Masahiro Morioka (ed.) - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life, Waseda University.details
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Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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(1 other version)Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk.Lilith Newton - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Replies to Fratantonio and Lasonen-Aarnio; Goldberg; Greco; Kelp, Carter and Simion; Littlejohn; and Williamson.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3169-3181.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.details
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Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
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In defence of single-premise closure.Weng Hong Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.details
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Cretan Deductions.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & John Hawthorne - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.details
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Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.details
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(1 other version)Safety’s coordination problems.Julien Dutant & Sven Rosenkranz - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1317-1343.details
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I Know I am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.details
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Two Notions of Epistemic Risk.Martin Smith - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1069-1079.details
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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No safe Haven for the virtuous.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):48-63.details
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Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.details
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Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
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A Case for Weak Safety.Niklaas Tepelmann - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):545-569.details
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(1 other version)Reliable deduction.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725.details
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(1 other version)Reliable deduction.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725-747.details
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