- Cryptonormative Judgments.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3-24.details
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Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind.Alex Madva & Michael Brownstein - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):611-644.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Belief, quasi-belief, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.Robert Noggle - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):654-668.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
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Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).details
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What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?Erin Beeghly - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):675-691.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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Fragmentation and information access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases.Cristina Borgoni - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.details
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1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.details
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Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.details
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Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.details
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Against Fragmentation.Aaron Norby - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):30-38.details
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Nondoxasticism about Self‐Deception.Sophie Archer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):265-282.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action.Michael Brownstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.details
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Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.details
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Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Ethical Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):68-98.details
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Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.details
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Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Hope and Optimism in Pediatric Deep Brain Stimulation: Key Stakeholder Perspectives.Natalie Dorfman, Lilly Snellman, Ynez Kerley, Kristin Kostick-Quenet, Gabriel Lazaro-Munoz, Eric A. Storch & Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby - 2023 - Neuroethics 16 (3):1-15.details
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Why beliefs are not dispositional stereotypes.Andrew Garford Moore & George Botterill - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):483-494.details
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Responding to Sanist Microaggressions with Acts of Epistemic Resistance.Abigail Gosselin - 2022 - Hypatia 37 (2):293-314.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 31:91-126.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad.J. S. Blumenthal-Barby & Peter A. Ubel - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9):4-15.details
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How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.details
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Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser.Neil Levy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):991-1006.details
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A Dispositional Account of Aversive Racism.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.details
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Enhancing Responsibility.Naomi Kloosterboer & Jan Willem Wieland - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):421-439.details
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