- Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridgedetails
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The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
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Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
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How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.details
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Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism: Stephen P. Turner: Explaining the Normative. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pbk. $24.95, hbk. $69.95, 228 pp + index.Maksymilian Del Mar - 2010 - Human Studies 33 (2-3):305-323.details
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A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions.Michael Deigan & Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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Rationalization, Evidence, and Pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2014 - Ratio 28 (3):318-331.details
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The value of autonomy and autonomy of the will.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):263-284.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Decisions, Reasons and Rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):57-95.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
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Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship.Lindsay Crawford - 2017 - Synthese 196 (4):1575-1593.details
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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
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Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.details
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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
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Companions in guilt arguments.Christopher Cowie - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12528.details
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Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.details
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Blameworthiness and Time.Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.details
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Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.details
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The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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Openmindedness and truth.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
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Doxastic transparency and prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.details
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Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.details
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Acceptance and Managerial Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):359-378.details
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Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief.Patrick Bondy - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1761-1781.details
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Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.Mark Boespflug - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):617-636.details
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Epistemic Temperance.Paul Bloomfield - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):109-124.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases.Marvin Backes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2759-2778.details
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