- The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Why explain visual experience in terms of content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.details
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The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.details
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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Is there a persuasive argument for an inner awareness theory of consciousness?Daniel Stoljar - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1555-1575.details
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Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.details
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The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.details
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Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.details
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Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
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Blur and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.details
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Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:307-338.details
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The point of assertion is to transmit knowledge.John Turri - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):130-136.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3229-3246.details
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Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):853-874.details
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Two Theories of Transparency.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):553-573.details
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Blur and interoceptive vision.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3271-3289.details
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The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.details
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Representationalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Idiosyncratic Perception.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):391-399.details
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(1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?Davide Bordini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1105-1126.details
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Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.details
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If time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe.James Norton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):260-266.details
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The representational theory of consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Pictorial experience: not so special after all.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.details
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Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.details
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Selectionism and Diaphaneity.Paweł Jakub Zięba - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (Suppl 2):S361–S391.details
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The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.details
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Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.details
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Sensing mind-independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.details
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Transparency, olfaction and aesthetics.Thomas Baker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):121-130.details
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*Perception* (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.details
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Visual experience.Pär Sundström - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-65.details
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Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity.Rina Tzinman - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):22-42.details
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Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise.Joshua Gert - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6615-6629.details
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(1 other version)On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2539-2550.details
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Exploring Subjective Representationalism.Neil Mehta - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):570-594.details
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(1 other version)On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.details
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Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.details
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Correlative externalism about colour phenomenology.Adam Balmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Acquiring a Concept of Visual Experience.Austin Andrews - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):223-245.details
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Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.details
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Tye's ptolemaic revolution (review of consciousness revisited: Materialism without phenomenal concepts).Janet Levin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.details
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Defending Dispositionalism of Color:色の傾向性理論を擁護する.Yasushi Ogusa - 2018 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 45 (1-2):1-21.details
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