- Two types of epistemic instrumentalism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5455-5475.details
|
|
What Makes Us Human? Evolution, Intentionality and Moral Progress.Claudio Corradetti - 2021 - Jus Cogens 3 (1):1-10.details
|
|
Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View.Josep E. Corbí - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.details
|
|
Distinctive substantial self-knowledge and the possibility of self-improvement.Josep E. Corbí - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-22.details
|
|
Varieties of Moral Naturalism.David Copp - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
|
|
Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.details
|
|
Realist-expressivism and the fundamental role of normative belief.David Copp - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1333-1356.details
|
|
Just too different: normative properties and natural properties.David Copp - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):263-286.details
|
|
Transformative Choice, Practical Reasons and Trust.Rob Compaijen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):275-292.details
|
|
Directions of fit and the Humean theory of motivation.Mary Clayton Coleman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):127 – 139.details
|
|
Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation.Jonathan Cohen & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):103-118.details
|
|
A debunking explanation for moral progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
|
|
The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.details
|
|
Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation.Allen Coates - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315.details
|
|
What’s Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?Patrick Clipsham - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):137-151.details
|
|
The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.details
|
|
Contingent Parasites and Exotic Amoralists: Dual-Process Cognitivism Undermines the Case for Deferred Internalism.Brendan Cline - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1005-1033.details
|
|
Kantian morals and Humean motives.Philip Clark - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.details
|
|
Functionalism and the role of psychology in economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.details
|
|
Mózg z moralnego punktu widzenia. Postulat neurobiologicznej „rekalibracji etyki”.Barbara Chyrowicz - 2020 - Diametros 17 (63):1-33.details
|
|
Non-relative reasons and Humean thought: If what is a reason for you is a reason for me, where does that leave the Humean?Chrisoula Andreou - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):654-668.details
|
|
Mental Illness, Metaphysics, Facts and Values.Chris Megone - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):399-426.details
|
|
Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):331-353.details
|
|
Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.details
|
|
Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.details
|
|
Moral belief attribution: A reply to Roskies.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.details
|
|
Belief attribution and the falsification of motive internalism.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):607 – 616.details
|
|
The Right Wrong‐Makers.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):426-440.details
|
|
The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.details
|
|
Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
|
|
Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134.details
|
|
Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1):1-20.details
|
|
Assessor Teaching and the Evolution of Human Morality.Laureano Castro, Miguel Ángel Castro-Nogueira, Morris Villarroel & Miguel Ángel Toro - 2020 - Biological Theory 16 (1):5-15.details
|
|
Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.details
|
|
On the moral value of physical activity: Body and soul in Plato's account of virtue.David Carr - 2010 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (1):3 – 15.details
|
|
De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.details
|
|
Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism.Douglas I. Campbell - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1139-1161.details
|
|
Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
|
|
Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
|
|
Why Hunger is not a Desire.Patrick Butlin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):617-635.details
|
|
Self-validation and internalism in Velleman’s constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.details
|
|
Expressivism, Moral Fallibility, and the Approved Change Strategy.Michael Bukoski - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):115-129.details
|
|
Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.details
|
|
In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
|
|
Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.details
|
|
The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
|
|
Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons.John Brunero - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):99-118.details
|
|
Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.details
|
|
Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.details
|
|
Motivation.John Broome - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):79-99.details
|
|