- The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge: A Human Interest Story.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Resource Rationality.Thomas F. Icard - manuscriptdetails
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Reasoning Simplifying Attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):722-735.details
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Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self.Robert D. Rupert - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):947-972.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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#MeToo & the role of Outright Belief.Alexandra Lloyd - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):181-197.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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A New Hope.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (1):5-32.details
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Human Foreknowledge.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscriptdetails
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Assertion and Certainty.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):169-186.details
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Headaches for epistemologists.Brian Talbot - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):408-433.details
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Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
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Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Ernest Sosa - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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