- Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):82-117.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.details
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On the coherence of inversion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (2):127-137.details
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Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.details
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Tye's ptolemaic revolution (review of consciousness revisited: Materialism without phenomenal concepts).Janet Levin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.details
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Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.details
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In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge.Preston Lennon - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2391-2407.details
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.details
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The intuitive case for naïve realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.details
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Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
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A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic.Harold Langsam - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):43-59.details
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Metaphysics of Quantity and the Limit of Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Lam - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (3):1-20.details
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Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction.John Kulvicki - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Introspective Availability.John Kulvicki - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.details
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Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.details
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Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.details
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The phenomenologically manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.details
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The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.details
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Self-representationalism and phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.details
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PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.details
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Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher‐order theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):790-813.details
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A reliabilist solution to the problem of promiscuous bootstrapping.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):263-267.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Restrictions on representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.details
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Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
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Perspective and spatial experience.Alex Kerr - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Visual awareness of properties.Matthew J. Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.details
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Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.details
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Normative reasons: response-dependence and the problem of idealization.Marko Jurjako - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):261-275.details
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Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences.Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.details
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The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.details
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Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.details
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Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues.Zoltan Jakab - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.details
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Representationalism and the perspectival character of perceptual experience.René Jagnow - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.details
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Phenomenal consciousness, representational content and cognitive access: a missing link between two debates.Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035.details
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Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.details
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Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.details
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How to be an objectivist about colour.Frank Jackson - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):819-831.details
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Color and content.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-34.details
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Against Perceptual Conceptualism.Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):1-25.details
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Sensing mind-independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.details
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Cognitive ontology in flux: The possibility of protean brains.Daniel D. Hutto, Anco Peeters & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):209-223.details
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