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  1. Mental kinematics: dynamics and mechanics of neurocognitive systems.David L. Barack - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1091-1123.
    Dynamical systems play a central role in explanations in cognitive neuroscience. The grounds for these explanations are hotly debated and generally fall under two approaches: non-mechanistic and mechanistic. In this paper, I first outline a neurodynamical explanatory schema that highlights the role of dynamical systems in cognitive phenomena. I next explore the mechanistic status of such neurodynamical explanations. I argue that these explanations satisfy only some of the constraints on mechanistic explanation and should be considered pseudomechanistic explanations. I defend this (...)
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  • Mental machines.David L. Barack - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (6):63.
    Cognitive neuroscientists are turning to an increasingly rich array of neurodynamical systems to explain mental phenomena. In these explanations, cognitive capacities are decomposed into a set of functions, each of which is described mathematically, and then these descriptions are mapped on to corresponding mathematical descriptions of the dynamics of neural systems. In this paper, I outline a novel explanatory schema based on these explanations. I then argue that these explanations present a novel type of dynamicism for the philosophy of mind (...)
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  • Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”.Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira, Vicente Raja & Anthony Chemero - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):115-136.
    A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear (...)
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  • Accounting for the Specious Present: A Defense of Enactivism.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2018 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 39 (3):181-204.
    I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. (...)
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  • Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...)
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  • What’s behind meaning?Alberto Peruzzi - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 11 (21):119-145.
    The paper addresses the main questions to be dealt with by any semantic theory which is committed to provide an explanation of how meaning is possible. On one side the paper argues that the resources provided by the development of mathematical logic, theoretical computer science, cognitive psychology, and general linguistics in the 20th Century, however indispensable to investigate the structure of language, rely on the existence of end products in the morphogenesis of meaning. On the other, the paper argues that (...)
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  • The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2018 - Synthese (11):4527-4553.
    The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...)
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  • The Causal Map and Moral Psychology.Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):347-369.
    Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the relevance of neuroscience to such questions and argues that neither (...)
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  • Situatedness and Embodiment of Computational Systems.Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - Entropy 19 (4):162.
    In this paper, the role of the environment and physical embodiment of computational systems for explanatory purposes will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on cognitive computational systems, understood in terms of mechanisms that manipulate semantic information. It will be argued that the role of the environment has long been appreciated, in particular in the work of Herbert A. Simon, which has inspired the mechanistic view on explanation. From Simon’s perspective, the embodied view on cognition seems natural but (...)
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  • Questions For The Dynamicist: The Use of Dynamical Systems Theory in the Philosophy of Cognition.Marco Van Leeuwen - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3):271-333.
    The concepts and powerful mathematical tools of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) yield illuminating methods of studying cognitive processes, and are even claimed by some to enable us to bridge the notorious explanatory gap separating mind and matter. This article includes an analysis of some of the conceptual and empirical progress Dynamical Systems Theory is claimed to accomodate. While sympathetic to the dynamicist program in principle, this article will attempt to formulate a series of problems the proponents of the approach in (...)
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  • The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective.Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6).
    In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian (...)
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  • A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Cognitive Computation 1 (3):221-233.
    The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various important aspects of cognition (memory, observational learning, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have been made into gaining a better understanding of the many components of (...)
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  • Cognition, Computing and Dynamic Systems.Mario Villalobos & Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 1.
    Traditionally, computational theory (CT) and dynamical systems theory (DST) have presented themselves as opposed and incompatible paradigms in cognitive science. There have been some efforts to reconcile these paradigms, mainly, by assimilating DST to CT at the expenses of its anti-representationalist commitments. In this paper, building on Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation and the notion of functional closure, we explore an alternative conciliatory strategy. We try to assimilate CT to DST by dropping its representationalist commitments, and by inviting CT to (...)
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  • You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought.Edouard Machery - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.
    The question, ‘Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):93-132.
    In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind who mistakenly associate phenomenological method with untrained psychological introspection (e.g., Dennett 1991). For very different reasons, resistance is also found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who are not willing to (...)
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  • (2 other versions)What Computations (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):407-425.
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...)
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  • Time scales in motor learning and development.Karl M. Newell, Yeou-Teh Liu & Gottfried Mayer-Kress - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (1):57-82.
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  • 'Cognitive Science and its Discontents: Review of Two Sciences of Mind by S. O' Nuallain, P. McKevitt and E. Mac Aogain. [REVIEW]Massimo Marraffa - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
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  • Know-How, procedural knowledge, and choking under pressure.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...)
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  • Connecting Conscious and Unconscious Processing.Axel Cleeremans - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (6):1286-1315.
    Consciousness remains a mystery—“a phenomenon that people do not know how to think about—yet” (Dennett, , p. 21). Here, I consider how the connectionist perspective on information processing may help us progress toward the goal of understanding the computational principles through which conscious and unconscious processing differ. I begin by delineating the conceptual challenges associated with classical approaches to cognition insofar as understanding unconscious information processing is concerned, and to highlight several contrasting computational principles that are constitutive of the connectionist (...)
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  • Embodying Social Practice: Dynamically Co-Constituting Social Agency.Brian W. Dunst - unknown
    Theories of cognition and theories of social practices and institutions have often each separately acknowledged the relevance of the other; but seldom have there been consistent and sustained attempts to synthesize these two areas within one explanatory framework. This is precisely what my dissertation aims to remedy. I propose that certain recent developments and themes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, when understood in the right way, can explain the emergence and dynamics of social practices and institutions. Likewise, the (...)
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  • Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis.Symons John - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):521-541.
    This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My suggestion is that we treat linguistic and representational structures as providing complex multi-dimensional targets for the development of individual brains. This approach acknowledges the (...)
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  • Complexity as a new framework for emotion theories.Giovanna Colombetti - 2003 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1).
    In this paper I suggest that several problems in the study of emotion depend on a lack of adequate analytical tools, in particular on the tendency of viewing the organism as a modular and hierarchical system whose activity is mainly constituted by strictly sequential causal events. I argue that theories and models based on this view are inadequate to account for the complex reciprocal influences of the many ingredients that constitute emotions. Cognitive processes, feelings and bodily states are so subtly (...)
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  • Dynamical systems hypothesis in cognitive science.Robert F. Port - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  • A rhythm recognition computer program to advocate interactivist perception.Jean-Christophe Buisson - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (1):75-88.
    This paper advocates the main ideas of the interactive model of representation of Mark Bickhard and the assimilation/accommodation framework of Jean Piaget, through a rhythm recognition demonstration program. Although completely unsupervised, the program progressively learns to recognize more and more complex rhythms struck on the user's keyboard. It does so without any recording of the input flow, and without any pattern matching in the usual sense. On the contrary, internal processes are dynamically constructed to follow and anticipate the user's actions. (...)
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  • Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools.Eric Hochstein - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):199-217.
    In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a (...)
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  • Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language.Andrea Schiavio - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):735-739.
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  • Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Stillwaggon Swan (ed.), Origins of mind. New York: Springer. pp. 259--269.
    According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this (...)
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  • Environmental Representation of the Body.Adrian Cussins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
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  • Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
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  • Giere's (In)Appropriation of Distributed Cognition.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (4):379 - 391.
    Ronald Giere embraces the perspective of distributed cognition to think about cognition in the sciences. I argue that his conception of distributed cognition is flawed in that it bears all the marks of its predecessor; namely, individual cognition. I show what a proper (i.e. non-individual) distributed framework looks like, and highlight what it can and cannot do for the philosophy of science.
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  • Mental Life: Conceptual models and synthetic methodologies for a post-cognitivist psychology.Xabier Barandiaran - 2007 - In B. Wallace, A. Ross, J. Davies & T. Anderson (eds.), The World, the Mind and the Body: Psychology after cognitivism. Imprint Academic. pp. 49-90.
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  • The Impact of the Paradigm of Complexity On the Foundational Frameworks of Biology and Cognitive Science.Alvaro Moreno - unknown
    According to the traditional nomological-deductive methodology of physics and chemistry [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948], explaining a phenomenon means subsuming it under a law. Logic becomes then the glue of explanation and laws the primary explainers. Thus, the scientific study of a system would consist in the development of a logically sound model of it, once the relevant observables (state variables) are identified and the general laws governing their change (expressed as differential equations, state transition rules, maximization/minimization principles,. . . ) (...)
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  • (2 other versions)What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity.Robert A. Wilson - 2008 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. pp. 407-425.
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...)
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  • Dynamic Systems and Paradise Regained, or How to avoid being a calculator. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 1999 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 11 (4):473-478.
    The new kid on the block in cognitive science these days is dynamic systems. This way of thinking about the mind is, as usual, radically opposed to computationalism - - the hypothesis that thinking is computing. The use of dynamic systems is just the latest in a series of attempts, from Searle's Chinese Room Argument, through the weirdnesses of postmodernism, to overthrown computationalism, which as we all know is a perfectly nice hypothesis about the mind that never hurt anyone.
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  • Rationality as Effective Organisation of Interaction and Its Naturalist Framework.Cliff Hooker - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (1):99-172.
    The point of this paper is to provide a principled framework for a naturalistic, interactivist-constructivist model of rational capacity and a sketch of the model itself, indicating its merits. Being naturalistic, it takes its orientation from scientific understanding. In particular, it adopts the developing interactivist-constructivist understanding of the functional capacities of biological organisms as a useful naturalistic platform for constructing such higher order capacities as reason and cognition. Further, both the framework and model are marked by the finitude and fallibility (...)
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  • Towards a General Theory of Antirepresentationalism.Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):259-292.
    This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation--the dynamic field approach (...)
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  • Open problems in the philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):554-582.
    The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis (...)
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  • Cognitive Ecology.Edwin Hutchins - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):705-715.
    Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context. In particular, it points to the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem. At least three fields were taking a deeply ecological approach to cognition 30 years ago: Gibson’s ecological psychology, Bateson’s ecology of mind, and Soviet cultural-historical activity theory. The ideas developed in those projects have now found a place in modern views of embodied, situated, distributed cognition. As cognitive theory continues to shift from units (...)
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  • Is Cognition Enough to Explain Cognitive Development?Linda B. Smith & Adam Sheya - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):725-735.
    Traditional views separate cognitive processes from sensory–motor processes, seeing cognition as amodal, propositional, and compositional, and thus fundamentally different from the processes that underlie perceiving and acting. These were the ideas on which cognitive science was founded 30 years ago. However, advancing discoveries in neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and psychology suggests that cognition may be inseparable from processes of perceiving and acting. From this perspective, this study considers the future of cognitive science with respect to the study of cognitive development.
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  • Embodied cognitive science: Gibbs in search of synthesis.Paweł Gładziejewski, Anna Karczmarczyk & Przemysław Nowakowski - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):215 – 225.
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  • Information processing, computation, and cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2011 - Journal of Biological Physics 37 (1):1-38.
    Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In (...)
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  • Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.
    The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...)
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  • Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.
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  • On the nature of minds, or: Truth and consequences.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 20:181-196.
    Are minds really dynamical or are they really symbolic? Because minds are bundles of computations, and because computation is always a matter of interpretation of one system by another, minds are necessarily symbolic. Because minds, along with everything else in the universe, are physical, and insofar as the laws of physics are dynamical, minds are necessarily dynamical systems. Thus, the short answer to the opening question is “yes.” It makes sense to ask further whether some of the computations that constitute (...)
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  • Relational learning re-examined.Chris Thornton & Andy Clark - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):83-83.
    We argue that existing learning algorithms are often poorly equipped to solve problems involving a certain type of important and widespread regularity that we call “type-2 regularity.” The solution in these cases is to trade achieved representation against computational search. We investigate several ways in which such a trade-off may be pursued including simple incremental learning, modular connectionism, and the developmental hypothesis of “representational redescription.”.
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  • Framing the debate between computational and dynamical approaches to cognitive science.Randall D. Beer - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):630-630.
    van Gelder argues that computational and dynamical systems are mathematically distinct kinds of systems. Although there are real experimental and theoretical differences between adopting a computational or dynamical perspective on cognition, and the dynamical approach has much to recommend it, the debate cannot be framed this rigorously. Instead, what is needed is careful study of concrete models to improve our intuitions.
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  • Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james–lange theory.Georg Northoff - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):501-527.
    The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct (...)
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  • How does the Bird build its nest? Instincts as embodied meaning.J. Keeping - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):171-195.
    The concept of instinct has fallen into disrepute, due to a number of problems with the way it had been conceived, mostly related to the concept of innateness. Yet the legacy of instincts survives in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, in the form of an emphasis on the genetic determinants of behavior. Through a consideration of the two main theories of instinct and the objections that have been raised against them, it becomes clear that existing theories of instinct founder because of (...)
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  • Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...)
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