- Primitive Conditional Probabilities, Subset Relations and Comparative Regularity.Joshua Thong - 2024 - Analysis.details
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Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Agreement and Equilibrium with Minimal Introspection.Harvey Lederman - 2014 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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A Rational Agent With Our Evidence.Dominik Kauss - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Probabilist antirealism.Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.details
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Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
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Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.details
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Non-classical probabilities invariant under symmetries.Alexander R. Pruss - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8507-8532.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501.details
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Probability Modals and Infinite Domains.Adam Marushak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1041-1055.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Literal self-deception.Maiya Jordan - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):248-256.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
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What Are the Odds that Everyone is Depraved?Scott Hill - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):299-308.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Modal science.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details
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Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.details
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Regularity reformulated.Weng Hong Tang - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):329-343.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Fair infinite lotteries.Sylvia Wenmackers & Leon Horsten - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):37-61.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The eternal Coin: A puzzle about self-locating conditional credence.Cian Dorr - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):189-205.details
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Knowledge-First Inferential Evidence: A Response to Dunn.Timothy Williamson - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):441-445.details
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Non-Propositionalism and The Suppositional Rule.Tom Beevers - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):639-60.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Minkish dispositions.Alan Hájek - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4795-4811.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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Is Strict Coherence Coherent?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):411-424.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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A Note on Comparative Probability.Nick Haverkamp & Moritz Schulz - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):395-402.details
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God, mind, and logical space: a revisionary approach to divinity.István Aranyosi - 2013 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity.István Aranyosi - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):489-517.details
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Zero Probability.Dan D. November - unknowndetails
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Correction to John D. Norton “How to build an infinite lottery machine”.John D. Norton & Alexander R. Pruss - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):143-144.details
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