- Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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A Modal Logic and Hyperintensional Semantics for Gödelian Intuition.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - unknown - In Filippo Ferrari, Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher & Florian Steinberger (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification by acquaintance.John M. DePoe - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7555-7573.details
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Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.details
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Criteria for indefeasible knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'epistemological disjunctivism'.Peter Dennis - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4099-4113.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Williamson On the Margins of Knowledge: A Criticism.Ciro De Florio & Vincenzo Fano - 2020 - Foundations of Science 28 (1):273-285.details
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Hazardous Conditions Persist.Daniel Deasy & Jonathan Tallant - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1635-1658.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention.Nilanjan Das - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):402-414.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes.Franca D’Agostini - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Review: The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.details
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Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks.Eleonora Cresto - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3955-3977.details
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Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.details
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A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.details
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Suppose Yalcin is wrong about epistemic modals.Joshua D. Crabill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.details
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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Avi Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.details
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On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.details
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Empirical justification and defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1771-1786.details
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Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):700-716.details
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The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11065-11080.details
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Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.details
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Strokes of Luck.E. J. Coffman - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):477-508.details
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Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.details
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Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro (eds.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor). Springer.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science.Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.details
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Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons.Claudio Almeida - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology?Ian M. Church - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:147-171.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
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Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived.Ian M. Church - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.details
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Intuitive knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.details
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What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.details
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