- Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism?James R. Beebe - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 173-187.details
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Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?David Sackris & James R. Beebe - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 175-192.details
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The Object(s) of Phenomenology.Thomas Arnold - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (2):105-122.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge-First Theories of Justification.Paul Silva - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.details
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The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
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Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
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What's the Point of Understanding?Michael Hannon - 2019 - In What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532.details
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Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.details
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Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
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Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason.Geoffrey Hall - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):471-492.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):1-21.details
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Introduction to the special issue ‘knowledge and justification: new perspectives’.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1473-1480.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Angeles Eraña & Axel Barceló - 2016 - Tópicos 51 (51):9-35.details
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Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):1-23.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.details
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Rethinking Implicatures.Matheus Silva - manuscriptdetails
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think about Awfulness and Death.Jake Quilty-Dunn - manuscriptdetails
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Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.details
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(1 other version)How to Identify Moral Experts.Amber Riaz - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):123-136.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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Better virtuous than safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.details
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Are women adult human females?Alex Byrne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3783-3803.details
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Group understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.details
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On two formulations of the safety condition and epistemic risk.Francois-Igor Pris - 2019 - Al-Farabi 3 (67):15-24.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.details
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Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5515-5528.details
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(1 other version)Epistemologia Analítica, Vol .1: debates contemporâneos.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.) - 2019 - Editora Fi.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Collective ignorance: an information theoretic account.Christopher Ranalli & René van Woudenberg - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4731-4750.details
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
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Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.details
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No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
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Modal Fragmentalism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70:570-587.details
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