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On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright)

San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner (1969)

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  1. Anscombe's Moral Epistemology and the Relevance of Wittgenstein's Anti-Scepticism.Michael Wee - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64:0081-100.
    Elizabeth Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibited actions, though she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Nonetheless, I contend in this paper that Anscombe is more concerned with the epistemology of absolute prohibitions, and that her thought on connatural moral knowledge - which resembles moral intuition - is key to understanding her thought on moral prohibitions. I shall identify key features of Anscombe's moral epistemology before turning to investigate its sources, examining the roots (...)
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  • Provocation on belief: Part 1.David Gorman - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):97-99.
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  • Unsafe reasoning: a survey.Paulo Faria - 2009 - Dois Pontos 6 (2):185-20.
    Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns(say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions mustin each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferentialpattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions aresatisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us thatsuch was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility betweencontent externalism (...)
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  • Keynes's Theory of Probability and Its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses.Allin Cottrell - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):25-51.
    One calls a lot of things propositions. If one sees this, then one can discard the idea Russell and Frege had that logic is a science of certain objects – propositions, functions, the logical constants – and that logic is like a natural science such as zoology and talks about these objects as zoology talks of animals. Like a natural science, it could supposedly discover certain relations. For example, Keynes claimed to discover a probability relation which was like implication, yet (...)
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  • Love: gloriously amoral and arational.Nick Zangwill - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):298 - 314.
    I argue that an evaluational conception of love collides with the way we value love. That way allows that love has causes, but not reasons, and it recognizes and celebrates a love that refuses to justify itself. Love has unjustified selectivity, due to its arbitrary causes. That imposes a non-tradability norm. A love for reasons, rational love or evaluational love would be propositional, and it therefore allows that the people we love are tradable commodities. A moralized conception of love is (...)
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  • (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics. Orlando: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one.
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  • Toward a Resolute Reading of Being and Time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Dilemma between Inconsistency and Ineffability.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):572-605.
    Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider the possibility of a philosophical inquiry of an absolutely universal scope—an inquiry into the being of all beings, in Heidegger’s case, and into the logical form of everything that can be meaningfully said, in Wittgenstein’s. Moreover, they both raise the worry that the theoretical language by means of which we speak of particular beings and assert particular facts is not suited to this task. And yet their own philosophical work seems to include many assertions of (...)
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  • Good Reasons and Natural Ends: Rosalind Hursthouse's Hermeneutical Naturalism.Sascha Settegast - 2020 - In Hähnel Martin (ed.), Aristotelian Naturalism: A Research Companion. Springer. pp. 195-207.
    My aims are exegetical rather than critical: I offer a systematic account of Hursthouse's ethical naturalism with an emphasis on the normative authority of the four ends, and try to correct some misconceptions found in the literature. Specifically, I argue that the four ends function akin to Wittgensteinian hinge-propositions for our practice of ethical reasoning and as such form part of a description of the logical grammar of said practice.
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  • John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...)
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  • How To Hang A Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism.Nicholas Smith - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):51-82.
    : In the epistemology of the late Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the notion of the hinge: an arational commitment that provides a foundation of some sort for the rest of our beliefs. Quasi-fideism is an approach to the epistemology of religion that argues that religious belief is on an epistemic par with other sorts of belief inasmuch as religious and non-religious beliefs all rely on hinges. I consider in this paper what it takes to find the appropriate (...)
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  • Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.
    What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you (...)
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  • Why Climate Breakdown Matters.Rupert Read - 2022 - London, UK & New York: Bloomsbury.
    Climate change and the destruction of the earth is the most urgent issue of our time. We are hurtling towards the end of civilisation as we know it. With an unflinching honest approach, Rupert Read asks us to face up to the fate of the planet. This is a book for anyone who wants their philosophy to deal with reality and their climate concern to be more than a displacement activity. -/- As people come together to mourn the loss of (...)
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  • Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!Moti Mizrahi - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):969-990.
    In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to (...)
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  • Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.
    This essay argues that the main lesson of Lewis Carroll's Regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional.
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  • I do not believe in Meigas, but there are such. A Meinongian Empirical Case Based on Galician ‘Meigas’.Olga Ramírez Calle - 2020 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 27 (1):4-20.
    This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case1; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with (...)
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  • A Graded Bayesian Coherence Notion.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):843-869.
    Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology. Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body of research on coherence measures. However, there has been surprisingly little interaction between the two bodies of literature. The reason is that the existing formal literature on coherence measure operates with a notion of belief system that is very different from—what we argue is—a natural Bayesian formalisation of the concept of belief system from traditional epistemology. Therefore, (...)
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  • Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom (introduction).Eric S. Nelson - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury.
    What did Heidegger learn and fail to learn from Laozi and Zhuangzi? This book reconstructs Heidegger's philosophy through its engagement with Daoist and Asian philosophy and offers a Daoist transformation of Heidegger on things, nothingness, and freedom.
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  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
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  • Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
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  • The Pragmatic Century: Conversations with Richard J. Bernstein.Sheila Greeve Davaney & Warren G. Frisina (eds.) - 2006 - State University of New York Press.
    Critically engages the work of American philosopher Richard J. Bernstein.
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  • Filling out the picture: Wittgenstein on differences and alternatives. Bowell - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):203-219.
    At several points in his later writings Wittgenstein discusses imaginary forms of life and ways of thinking that appear queer or alien from our point of view; concepts so different from ours that those who think from within them seem to be alternatives to us. In this paper I argue that reflection on the notions of difference and possibility in play here shows that imaginary cases of alien conceptual schemes or forms of life such as those considered by Wittgenstein are (...)
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  • Morton White’s philosophy of culture: Holistic pragmatism and interdisciplinary inquiry.Sami Pihlström - 2011 - Human Affairs 21 (2):140-156.
    This paper explicates and defends Morton White’s holistic pragmatism, the view that descriptive and normative statements form a “seamless web” which must be tested as a “unified whole”. This position, originally formulated as a methodological and epistemic principle, can be extended into a more general philosophy of culture, as White himself has shown in his book, A Philosophy of Culture (2002). On the basis of holistic pragmatism, the paper also offers a pragmatist conception of metaphilosophy and defends the need for (...)
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  • Fiction and Conversation.Anniken Greve - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 35 (3-4):238-259.
    Exploring Rhees's analogy between everyday conversation and literature, the paper suggests a conception of form that encourages us to see literary works as contributions to conversation in virtue of their concern. How we might read for the concern of a literary work is exemplified by readings of Ibsen's Ghosts and The Wild Duck. These readings suggest that Rhees's analogy not only throws light on the communicative powers of literature: viewing everyday talk in the light of works of literature also gives (...)
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  • A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8).
    Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if we grant the very insights (...)
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  • Naturalism, Quietism, and the Threat to Philosophy.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2021 - Basel: Schwabe Verlagsgruppe.
    Two opposed movements of thought threaten philosophy as an autonomous practice from the inside: scientific naturalism and quietism. Naturalism (qua methodological thesis) threatens to turn philosophy into a mere ancilla of the sciences, quietism understood as the prescription to remain silent in philosophy would not countenance any more "positive" philosophy. This book reconstructs naturalism and quietism such that it becomes clear naturalism does have the potential to end philosophy as an autonomous practice and that quietism, correctly understood, does not. To (...)
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  • The Dynamics of Belief Systems: A Wittgensteinian view.Henrik Bohlin - unknown
    In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of reference” and are “exempt from doubt,” and that this “river-bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation between cultures.
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  • Against Quasi-Fideism.Jeroen de Ridder - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):223-243.
    Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue (...)
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  • Criteria for indefeasible knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'epistemological disjunctivism'.Peter Dennis - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4099-4113.
    Duncan Pritchard has recently defended a view he calls ‘epistemological disjunctivism’, largely inspired by John McDowell. I argue that Pritchard is right to associate the view with McDowell, and that McDowell’s ‘inference-blocking’ argument against the sceptic succeeds only if epistemological disjunctivism is accepted. However, Pritchard also recognises that epistemological disjunctivism appears to conflict with our belief that genuine and illusory experiences are indistinguishable (the ‘distinguishability problem’). Since the indistinguishability of experiences is the antecedent in the inference McDowell intends to block, (...)
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  • How Morality Can Be Absent from Moral Arguments.Benjamin De Mesel - 2015 - Argumentation 30 (4):443-463.
    What is a moral argument? A straightforward answer is that a moral argument is an argument dealing with moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in certain circumstances. I call this the thin sense of ‘moral argument’. Arguments that we find in normative and applied ethics are almost invariably moral in this sense. However, they often fail to be moral in other respects. In this article, I discuss four ways in which morality can be absent from moral arguments in (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on pure and applied mathematics.Ryan Dawson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4131-4148.
    Some interpreters have ascribed to Wittgenstein the view that mathematical statements must have an application to extra-mathematical reality in order to have use and so any statements lacking extra-mathematical applicability are not meaningful (and hence not bona fide mathematical statements). Pure mathematics is then a mere signgame of questionable objectivity, undeserving of the name mathematics. These readings bring to light that, on Wittgenstein’s offered picture of mathematical statements as rules of description, it can be difficult to see the role of (...)
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  • On the need for a computational psychology and the hope for a naturalistic one.Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-78.
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  • Disagreement Over Vaccination Programmes: Deep Or Merely Complex and Why Does It Matter? [REVIEW]Tim Dare - 2013 - HEC Forum 26 (1):43-57.
    This paper argues that significant aspects of the vaccination debate are ‘deep’ in a sense described by Robert Fogelin and others. Some commentators have suggested that such disagreements warrant rather threatening responses. I argue that appreciating that a disagreement is deep might have positive implications, changing our moral assessment of individuals and their decisions, shedding light on the limits of the obligation to give and respond to arguments in cases of moral disagreement, and providing an incentive to seek alternative ways (...)
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  • Causes and representation.Robert Cummins - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-76.
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  • Naturalizing language: human appraisal and (quasi) technology.Stephen J. Cowley - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (4):443-453.
    Using contemporary science, the paper builds on Wittgenstein’s views of human language. Rather than ascribing reality to inscription-like entities, it links embodiment with distributed cognition. The verbal or (quasi) technological aspect of language is traced to not action, but human specific interactivity. This species-specific form of sense-making sustains, among other things, using texts, making/construing phonetic gestures and thinking. Human action is thus grounded in appraisals or sense-saturated coordination. To illustrate interactivity at work, the paper focuses on a case study. Over (...)
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  • Language and biosemiosis: Towards unity?Stephen J. Cowley - 2006 - Semiotica 2006 (162):417-443.
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  • Discourse and mind.Jeff Coulter - 1999 - Human Studies 22 (2-4):163-181.
    In recent years, various attempts have been made to advance a project sometimes characterized as "discursive psychology". Grounded in what its proponents term "social constructionism", the discursive approach to the elucidation of 'mental' phenomena is here contrasted to an ethnomethodological position informed by the later work of Wittgenstein. In particular, it is argued that discursive psychology still contains Cartesian residua, notwithstanding its professed objective of expurgating Cartesian thought from the behavioral sciences. One principal issue has been the confusion of "conceptual (...)
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  • Anatomy, metaphysics, and values: The ape brain debate reconsidered. [REVIEW]Christopher Cosans - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (2):129-165.
    Conventional wisdom teaches that Thomas Huxley discredited Richard Owen in their debate over ape and human brains. This paper reexamines the dispute and uses it as a test case for evaluating the metaphysical realist, internal realist, and social constructivist theories of scientific knowledge. Since Owen worked in the Kantian tradition, his anatomical research illustrates the implications of internal realism for scientific practice. As an avowed Cartesian, Huxley offered a well developed attack on Owen''s position from a metaphysical realist perspective. Adrian (...)
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  • Modern mythology: the case of 'Reactionary Modernism'.David E. Cooper - 1996 - History of the Human Sciences 9 (2):25-37.
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  • Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.
    The idea that there is a distinctively practical use of reason, and correspondingly a distinctively practical form of knowledge, unites many otherwise diverse voices in the history of practical philosophy: from Aristotle to Kant, from Rousseau to Marx, from Hegel to G.E.M. Anscombe, and many others. This volume gathers works by scholars who take inspiration from these and many other historical figures in order to deepen our systematic understanding of questions raised by their work that still are, or ought to (...)
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  • Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal (...)
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  • What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.
    Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both (...)
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  • The Proof of the Pudding: An Essay in Honor of Richard S. Robin.Vincent Colapietro - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):285-309.
    Among his other contributions to advancing our understanding of classical American pragmatism and, in particular, Charles S. Peirce, none is more worthy of our attention than Richard S. Robin's characteristically painstaking attempt to address the puzzle of Peirce's "Proof" of pragmaticism.1 In this as in so many other respects,2 he shows himself to be, in effect, the student of Max H. Fisch (see especially 1986, chapter 19).3 There are hermeneutical traditions as well as philosophical ones and often the former are (...)
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  • Replies.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):81-96.
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  • Introduction.Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):221-234.
    This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.
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  • G. E. Moore and Bad Faith.Anthony Coleman - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):347-365.
    Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.
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  • Some defects in Fodor' ‘computational’ theory.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):75-76.
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  • Defamiliarizing Technology, Habituation, and the Need for a Structuralist Approach.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2022 - Foundations of Science 27 (4):1415-1420.
    In response to my article “Earth, Technology, Language”, Christopher Müller asks whether use-oriented theory and Wittgensteinian language can capture the structural relations of power that shape habituation and argues that digital media do not provide opportunities for empowerment and democracy because there is no co-ownership. In my reply I argue that I have shown that this can be done with the broader conception of use I propose, that the grammar of technology should also be understood in terms of implicit knowledge, (...)
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  • The Power and Perils of Example.Lorraine Code - 2021 - In Heidi Elizabeth Grasswick & Nancy Arden McHugh (eds.), Making the Case: Feminist and Critical Race Philosophers Engage Case Studies. Albany: SUNY Press. pp. 101-125.
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  • To Trust or not to Trust? Children’s Social Epistemology.Fabrice Clément - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):531-549.
    Philosophers agree that an important part of our knowledge is acquired via testimony. One of the main objectives of social epistemology is therefore to specify the conditions under which a hearer is justified in accepting a proposition stated by a source. Non-reductionists, who think that testimony could be considered as an a priori source of knowledge, as well as reductionists, who think that another type of justification has to be added to testimony, share a common conception about children development. Non-reductionists (...)
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  • The epistemic regress problem.Andrew D. Cling - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.
    The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary (...)
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