- Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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Being More Blameworthy.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):233-246.details
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Selective hard compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press. pp. 149-73.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):55-78.details
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Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):167-189.details
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True to ourselves.Jan Bransen - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1):67 – 85.details
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Autonomy and the authority of personal commitments: From internal coherence to social normativity.Joel Anderson - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.details
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Cruel Jokes and Normative Competence.David Shoemaker - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):173-195.details
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
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Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1.Tamer Nawar - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):359-391.details
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Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.details
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Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.details
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Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
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Islamist Women's Agency and Relational Autonomy.Ranjoo Seodu Herr - 2018 - Hypatia 33 (2):195-215.details
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Agency in Social Context.John Lawless - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):471-498.details
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Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.details
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Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts.Chandra Sripada - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):781-815.details
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Ability and Volitional Incapacity.Nicholas Southwood & Pablo Gilabert - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (3):1-8.details
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Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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Die Religionskritik Freuds.Godehard Brüntrup - 2014 - In Eckhard Frick & Andreas Hamburger (eds.), Freuds Religionskritik und der "Spiritual Turn". Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. pp. 64-74.details
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Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Holding others responsible.Coleen Macnamara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):299-317.details
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Strategies for free will compatibilists.J. O'Leary-Hawthorne & P. Pettit - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):191-201.details
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The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy.Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-16.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Attribution of Responsibility to Self‐Deceivers.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):420-438.details
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(1 other version)Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Jules Holroyd - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):198-202.details
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The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.details
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Luck’s Mischief and the Prescriptive Burden.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (3):297-313.details
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Helping It.H. C. Steward - unknowndetails
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Hidden substance: mental disorder as a challenge to normatively neutral accounts of autonomy.Fabian Freyenhagen & Tom O'Shea - 2013 - International Journal of Law in Context 9 (1):53-70.details
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Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.details
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Regulation Enables: Corporate Agency and Practices of Responsibility.Garrath Williams - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):989-1002.details
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The Consequence argument and the Mind argument.Dana Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.details
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(1 other version)Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy.David Zimmerman - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):25-53.details
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Disputing Autonomy: Second-Order Desires and the Dynamics of Ascribing Autonomy.Joel Anderson - 2008 - SATS 9 (1):7-26.details
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