Suppose that T^∗ is an ω_1-Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. We introduce a forcing axiom PFA(T^∗) for proper forcings which preserve these properties of T^∗. We prove that PFA(T^∗) implies many of the strong consequences of PFA, such as the failure of very weak club guessing, that all of the cardinal characteristics of the continuum are greater than ω_1, and the P-ideal dichotomy. On the other hand, PFA(T^∗) implies some of the consequences of diamond principles, such as the existence (...) of Knaster forcings which are not stationarily Knaster. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

In this note we will discuss a new reflection principle which follows from the Proper Forcing Axiom. The immediate purpose will be to prove that the bounded form of the Proper Forcing Axiom implies both that 2ω = ω2 and that [Formula: see text] satisfies the Axiom of Choice. It will also be demonstrated that this reflection principle implies that □ fails for all regular κ > ω1.

It is shown that the boldface maximality principle for subcomplete forcing,, together with the assumption that the universe has only set many grounds, implies the existence of a well‐ordering of definable without parameters. The same conclusion follows from, assuming there is no inner model with an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Similarly, the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom, together with the assumption that does not exist, for some, implies the existence of a well‐ordering of which is Δ1‐definable without parameters, and ‐definable (...) using a subset of ω1 as a parameter. This well‐order is in. Enhanced versions of bounded forcing axioms are introduced that are strong enough to have the implications of mentioned above, and along the way, a bounded forcing axiom for countably closed forcing is proposed. (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical significance of the consequence relation defined in the $\Omega$-logic for set-theoretic languages. I argue that, as with second-order logic, the hyperintensional profile of validity in $\Omega$-Logic enables the property to be epistemically tractable. Because of the duality between coalgebras and algebras, Boolean-valued models of set theory can be interpreted as coalgebras. In Section \textbf{2}, I demonstrate how the hyperintensional profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic. Finally, in Section \textbf{3}, the philosophical (...) significance of the characterization of the hyperintensional profile of $\Omega$-logical validity for the philosophy of mathematics is examined. I argue (i) that $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely logical, and (ii) that it provides a hyperintensional account of formal grasp of the concept of `set'. Section \textbf{4} provides concluding remarks. (shrink)

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. David Elohim examines the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable (...) propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal and hyperintensional cognitivism and modal and hyperintensional expressivism. Elohim develops a novel, topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develops a novel, dynamic two-dimensional semantics grounded in two-dimensional hyperintensional Turing machines. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for two-dimensional (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between Elohim's hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Elohim countenances a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. Elohim suggests, too, that higher observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for two-dimensional hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between interpretational and objective modalities and the truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. Elohim invents a new mathematical trick in which first-order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals in the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Elohim provides a counter-example to epistemic closure for logical deduction. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. David Elohim examines the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable (...) propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal and hyperintensional cognitivism and modal and hyperintensional expressivism. Elohim develops a novel, topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develops a novel, dynamic two-dimensional semantics grounded in two-dimensional hyperintensional Turing machines. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for two-dimensional (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between Elohim's hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Elohim countenances a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. Elohim suggests, too, that higher observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for two-dimensional hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between interpretational and objective modalities and the truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. Elohim invents a new mathematical trick in which first-order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals in the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Elohim provides a counter-example to epistemic closure for logical deduction. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

In set theory, a maximality principle is a principle that asserts some maximality property of the universe of sets or some part thereof. Set theorists have formulated a variety of maximality principles in order to settle statements left undecided by current standard set theory. In addition, philosophers of mathematics have explored maximality principles whilst attempting to prove categoricity theorems for set theory or providing criteria for selecting foundational theories. This article reviews recent work concerned with the formulation, investigation and justification (...) of maximality principles. (shrink)

A pervasive thought in contemporary philosophy of mathematics is that in order to justify reflection principles, one must hold universism: the view that there is a single universe of pure sets. I challenge this kind of reasoning by contrasting universism with a Zermelian form of multiversism. I argue that if extant justifications of reflection principles using notions of richness are acceptable for the universist, then the Zermelian can use similar justifications. However, I note that for some forms of richness argument, (...) the status of reflection principles as axioms is left open for the Zermelian. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to prove the relative consistency of certain statements about open colorings with 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1. In particular both OCA and the statement that every 1–1 function of size ℵ1 is σ-monotonic are consistent with 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1. As a corollary we have that 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 does not admit a ℙ max variation.

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

We give an overview of a research line concentrated on finding to which extent compactness fails at the level of first uncountable cardinal and to which extent it could be recovered on some other perhaps not so large cardinal. While this is of great interest to set theorists, one of the main motivations behind this line of research is in its applicability to other areas of mathematics. We give some details about this and we expose some possible directions for further (...) research. (shrink)

The paper begins with an examination of Gödel's views on absolute undecidability and related topics in set theory. These views are sharpened and assessed in light of recent developments. It is argued that a convincing case can be made for axioms that settle many of the questions undecided by the standard axioms and that in a precise sense the program for large cardinals is a complete success “below” CH. It is also argued that there are reasonable scenarios for settling CH (...) and that there is not currently a convincing case to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. (shrink)

We present two ways in which the model L(R) is canonical assuming the existence of large cardinals. We show that the theory of this model, with ordinal parameters, cannot be changed by small forcing; we show further that a set of ordinals in V cannot be added to L(R) by small forcing. The large cardinal needed corresponds to the consistency strength of AD L (R); roughly ω Woodin cardinals.

I examine various claims to the effect that Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and other problems of higher set theory are ill-posed questions. The analysis takes into account the viability of the underlying philosophical views and recent mathematical developments.

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The categorical duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The hyperintensional profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal and hyperintensional profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely (...) logical. Second, the foregoing provides a hyperintensional account of the interpretation of mathematical and metamathematical vocabulary. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that one of the arguments usually put forward in defence of universism is in tension with current set theoretic practice. According to universism, there is only one set theoretic universe, V, and when applying the method of forcing we are not producing new universes, but only simulating them inside V. Since the usual interpretation of set generic forcing is used to produce a “simulation” of an extension of V from a countable set inside V itself, (...) the above argument is credited to be a strong defence of universism. However, I claim, such an argument does not take into account current mathematical practice. Indeed, it is possible to find theorems that are available to the multiversists but that the advocate of universism cannot prove. For example, it is possible to prove results on infinite games in non-well-founded set-theories plus the axiom of determinacy (such as ZF + AFA + PD) that are not available in ZFC + PD. These results, I contend, are philosophically problematic on a strict universist approach to forcing. I suggest that the best way to avoid the difficulty is to adopt a pluralist conception of set theory and embrace a set theoretic multiverse. Consequently, the current practice of set generic forcing better supports a multiverse conception of set theory. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the analysis of the nature of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality, and to the applications of the latter to absolute decidability. Rather than countenancing the interpretational type of mathematical modality as a primitive, I argue that the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a species of epistemic modality. I argue, then, that the framework of two-dimensional semantics ought to be applied to the mathematical setting. The framework permits of a formally precise account of the priority (...) and relation between epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality. The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in the two-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the difference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our knowledge thereof. I also advance a topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, if hyperintensional approaches are to be preferred to possible worlds semantics. I examine the relation between two-dimensional hyperintensional states and epistemic set theory, providing two-dimensional hyperintensional formalizations of the modal logic of ZFC, large cardinal axioms, $\Omega$-logic, and the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The categorical duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The hyperintensional profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal and hyperintensional profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely (...) logical. Second, the foregoing provides a hyperintensional account of the interpretation of mathematical and metamathematical vocabulary. (shrink)

We describe the inner models with representatives in all equivalence classes of thin equivalence relations in a given projective pointclass of even level assuming projective determinacy. The main result shows that these models are characterized by their correctness and the property that they correctly compute the tree from the appropriate scale. The main step towards this characterization shows that the tree from a scale can be reconstructed in a generic extension of an iterate of a mouse. We then construct models (...) with this property as generic extensions of iterates of mice under the assumption that the corresponding projective ordinal is below ω2ω2. On the way, we consider several related problems, including the question when forcing does not add equivalence classes to thin projective equivalence relations. For instance, we show that if every set has a sharp, then reasonable forcing does not add equivalence classes to thin provably View the MathML source Δ1/3 equivalence relations, and generalize this to all projective levels. (shrink)

We analyze the degree-structure induced by large reducibilities under the Axiom of Determinacy. This generalizes the analysis of Borel reducibilities given in Alessandro Andretta and Donald A. Martin [1], Luca Motto Ros [6] and Luca Motto Ros. [5] e.g. to the projective levels.

We prove, in ZFC alone, some new results on regularity and decomposability of ultrafilters; among them: If m ≥ 1 and the ultrafilter D is , equation imagem)-regular, then D is κ -decomposable for some κ with λ ≤ κ ≤ 2λ ). If λ is a strong limit cardinal and D is , equation imagem)-regular, then either D is -regular or there are arbitrarily large κ < λ for which D is κ -decomposable ). Suppose that λ is singular, (...) λ < κ, cf κ ≠ cf λ and D is -regular. Then: D is either -regular, or -regular for some λ' < λ . If κ is regular, then D is either -regular, or -regular for every κ' < κ . If either λ is a strong limit cardinal and λ<λ < 2κ, or λ<λ < κ, then D is either λ -decomposable, or -regular for some λ' < λ . If λ is singular, D is -regular and there are arbitrarily large ν < λ for which D is ν -decomposable, then D is κ -decomposable for some κ with λ ≤ κ ≤ λ<μ . D × D' is -regular if and only if there is a ν such that D is -regular and D' is -regular for all ν∼ < ν .We also list some problems, and furnish applications to topological spaces and to extended logics. (shrink)

Given a stationary subset T of $\omega_{1}$ , let $\tilde{T}$ be the set of ordinals in the interval $(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2})$ which are necessarily in the image of T by any embedding derived from the nonstationary ideal. We consider the question of the size of $\tilde{T}$ , givenT, and use Martin's Maximum and $\mathbb{P}_{max}$ to give some answers.

We show, using a variation of Woodin’s partial order ℙ max , that it is possible to destroy the saturation of the nonstationary ideal on ω 1 by forcing with a Suslin tree. On the other hand, Suslin trees typcially preserve saturation in extensions by ℙ max variations where one does not try to arrange it otherwise. In the last section, we show that it is possible to have a nonmeager set of reals of size ℵ1, saturation of the nonstationary (...) ideal, and no weakly Lusin sequences, answering a question of Shelah and Zapletal. (shrink)

The canonical function game is a game of length ω1 introduced by W. Hugh Woodin which falls inside a class of games known as Neeman games. Using large cardinals, we show that it is possible to force that the game is not determined. We also discuss the relationship between this result and Σ22 absoluteness, cardinality spectra and Π2 maximality for H(ω2) relative to the Continuum Hypothesis.

The forcing construction Pmax, invented by W. Hugh Woodin, produces a model whose collection of subsets of ω₁ is in some sense maximal. In this paper we study the Boolean algebra induced by the nonstationary ideal on ω₁ in this model. Among other things we show that the induced quotient does not have a simply definable form. We also prove several results about saturation properties of the ideal in this extension.

Artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia, w jakim sensie można stosować kategorię wyjaśnienia do interpretacji filozofii matematyki Kurta Gödla. Gödel – jako realista matematyczny – twierdzi bowiem, że w wypadku matematyki mamy do czynienia z niezależnymi od nas faktami. Jednym z owych faktów jest właśnie rozwiązywalność wszystkich dobrze postawionych problemów matematycznych – i ten fakt domaga się wyjaśnienia. Kluczem do zrozumienia stanowiska Gödla jest identyfikacja założeń, na których się opiera: metafizyczny realizm: istnieje uniwersum matematyczne, ma ono charakter obiektywny, niezależny od nas; optymizm epistemologiczny: (...) jesteśmy wyposażeni w wystarczająco dobre środki poznawcze, aby uzyskać wgląd w owo uniwersum. Pojęcie rozwiązania problemu matematycznego Gödel rozumie znacznie szerzej niż jako podanie matematycznego dowodu – chodzi raczej o znalezienie wiarogodnych aksjomatów, prowadzących do rozwiązania. Stawiany w artykule problem analizuję na przykładzie hipotezy kontinuum. (shrink)

The article deals with the question of in which sense the notion of explanation can be applied to Kurt Gödel’s philosophy of mathematics. Gödel, as a mathematical realist, claims that in mathematics we are dealing with facts that have an objective character. One of these facts is the solvability of all well-formulated mathematical problems—and this fact requires a clarification. The assumptions on which Gödel’s position is based are: metaphysical realism: there is a mathematical universe, it is objective and independent of (...) us; epistemological optimism: we are equipped with sufficient cognitive power to gain insight into the universe. Gödel’s concept of a solution to a mathematical problem is much broader than of a mathematical proof—it is rather about finding reliable axioms that lead to a solution of the problem. I analyse the problem presented in the article, taking as an example the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

The paper exposes the philosophical and mathematical flaws in an attempt to settle the continuum problem by a new class of axioms based on probabilistic reasoning. I also examine the larger proposal behind this approach, namely the introduction of new primitive notions that would supersede the set theoretic foundation of mathematics.

Reductivist programs in logicand philosophy, especially inthe philosophy of mathematics,are reviewed. The paper argues fora ``methodological realism'' towardsnumbers and sets, but still givesreductionism an important place,albeit in methodology/epistemologyrather than in ontology proper.

We show that the members of a certain class of semi-proper iterations do not add countable sets of ordinals. As a result, starting from suitable large cardinals one can obtain a model in which the Continuum Hypothesis holds and every function from ω1 to ω1 is bounded on a club by a canonical function for an ordinal less than ω2.

We show that strongly compact cardinals and MM are sensitive to $\lambda$-closed forcings for arbitrarily large $\lambda$. This is done by adding ‘regressive' $\lambda$-Kurepa trees in either case. We argue that the destruction of regressive Kurepa trees requires a non-standard application of MM. As a corollary, we find a consistent example of an $\omega_2$-closed poset that is not forcing equivalent to any $\omega_2$-directed-closed poset.

Fix a cardinal κ. We can ask the question: what kind of a logic L is needed to characterize all models of cardinality κ up to isomorphism by their L-theories? In other words: for which logics L it is true that if any models A and B of cardinality κ satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic?It is always possible to characterize models of cardinality κ by their Lκ+,κ+-theories, but we are interested in finding a “small” logic L, i.e., (...) the sentences of L are hereditarily of smaller cardinality than κ. For any cardinal κ it is independent of ZFC whether any such small definable logic L exists. If it exists it can be second order logic for κ=ω and fourth order logic or certain infinitary second order logic Lκ,ω source for uncountable κ. All models of cardinality κ can always be characterized by their theories in a small logic with generalized quantifiers, but the logic may be not definable in the language of set theory. Our work continues and extends the work of Ajtai [Miklos Ajtai, Isomorphism and higher order equivalence, Ann. Math. Logic 16 181–203]. (shrink)

We prove that the Weak Reflection Principle does not imply that every stationary set reflects to an internally approachable set. We show that several variants of internal approachability, namely, internally unbounded, internally stationary, and internally club, are not provably equivalent.

We prove that it is consistent that there exists a saturated tail club guessing ideal on ω1 which is not a restriction of the non-stationary ideal. Two proofs are presented. The first one uses a new forcing axiom whose consistency can be proved from a supercompact cardinal. The resulting model can satisfy either CH or 20=2. The second one is a direct proof from a Woodin cardinal, which gives a witnessing model with CH.

In his book on P max [7], Woodin presents a collection of partial orders whose extensions satisfy strong club guessing principles on ω | . In this paper we employ one of the techniques from this book to produce P max variations which separate various club guessing principles. The principle (+) and its variants are weak guessing principles which were first considered by the second author [4] while studying games of length ω | . It was shown in [1] that (...) the Continuum Hypothesis does not imply (+) and that (+) does not imply the existence of a club guessing sequence on ω | . In this paper we give an alternate proof of the second of these results, using Woodin's P max technology, showing that a strengthening of (+) does not imply a weakening of club guessing known as the Interval Hitting Principle. The main technique in this paper, in addition to the standard P m a x machinery, is the use of condensation principles to build suitable iterations. (shrink)

We show that under $\mathsf {BMM}$ and “there exists a Woodin cardinal, $"$ the nonstationary ideal on $\omega _1$ cannot be defined by a $\Pi _1$ formula with parameter $A \subset \omega _1$. We show that the same conclusion holds under the assumption of Woodin’s $(\ast )$ -axiom. We further show that there are universes where $\mathsf {BPFA}$ holds and $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is $\Pi _1(\{\omega _1\})$ -definable. Lastly we show that if the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal (...) $M_1$ exists, there is a generic extension of $M_1$ in which $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is saturated and $\Pi _1(\{ \omega _1\} )$ -definable, and $\mathsf {MA_{\omega _1}}$ holds. (shrink)

We use a reverse Easton forcing iteration to obtain a universe with a definable well-order, while preserving the GCH and proper classes of a variety of very large cardinals. This is achieved by coding using the principle ◊ $_{k^ - }^* $ at a proper class of cardinals k. By choosing the cardinals at which coding occurs sufficiently sparsely, we are able to lift the embeddings witnessing the large cardinal properties without having to meet any non-trivial master conditions.

Various theorems for the preservation of set-theoretic axioms under forcing are proved, regarding both forcing axioms and axioms true in the Lévy collapse. These show in particular that certain applications of forcing axioms require to add generic countable sequences high up in the set-theoretic hierarchy even before collapsing everything down to ‮א‬₁. Later we give applications, among them the consistency of MM with ‮א‬ω not being Jónsson which answers a question raised in the set theory meeting at Oberwolfach in 2005.

We consider sparseness, smoothness and the Glimm-Effros Dichotomy for the restriction of a Borel equivalence relation on a Polish space to definable subsets of that space.

Several situations are presented in which there is an ordinal γ such that ${\{ X \in [\gamma]^{\aleph_0} : X \cap \omega_1 \in S\,{\rm and}\, ot(X) \in T \}}$ is a stationary subset of ${[\gamma]^{\aleph_0}}$ for all stationary ${S, T\subseteq \omega_1}$ . A natural strengthening of the existence of an ordinal γ for which the above conclusion holds lies, in terms of consistency strength, between the existence of the sharp of ${H_{\omega_2}}$ and the existence of sharps for all reals. Also, an (...) optimal model separating Bounded Semiproper Forcing Axiom (BSPFA) and Bounded Martin’s Maximum (BMM) is produced and it is shown that a strong form of BMM involving only parameters from ${H_{\omega_2}}$ implies that every function from ω 1 into ω 1 is bounded on a club by a canonical function. (shrink)

There is a partial order ${\mathbb{P}}$ preserving stationary subsets of ω 1 and forcing that every partial order in the ground model V that collapses a sufficiently large ordinal to ω 1 over V also collapses ω 1 over ${V^{\mathbb{P}}}$ . The proof of this uses a coding of reals into ordinals by proper forcing discovered by Justin Moore and a symmetric extension of the universe in which the Axiom of Choice fails. Also, using one feature of the proof of (...) the above result together with an argument involving the stationary tower it is shown that sometimes, after adding one Cohen real c, there are, for every real a in V[c], sets A and B such that c is Cohen generic over both L[A] and L[B] but a is constructible from A together with B. (shrink)

This paper aims to vindicate the thesis that cognitive computational properties are abstract objects implemented in physical systems. I avail of the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type Theory, in order to specify an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. The homotopic abstraction principle for epistemic intensions provides an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of intensions as abstract objects. I examine, then, how intensional functions in Epistemic Modal Algebra are deployed as core models in the philosophy of mind, Bayesian perceptual psychology, (...) and the program of natural language semantics in linguistics, and I argue that this provides abductive support for the truth of homotopic abstraction. Epistemic modality can thus be shown to be both a compelling and a materially adequate candidate for the fundamental structure of mental representational states, comprising a fragment of the Language of Thought. (shrink)