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How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.details
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Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognition.Jerome Dokic - 2012 - In Michael J. Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 302--321.details
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Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.details
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Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 270.details
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In defence of dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.details
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Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.details
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The significance of high-level content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.details
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Interventionist counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.details
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It Seems Like There Aren’t Any Seemings.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):771-782.details
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Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? Or: evidentialism's troubles, reliabilism's rescue package.Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 254-280.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
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What are seemings?Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):260-274.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.details
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Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.details
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Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2008 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108.details
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Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.details
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Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2).details
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The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.details
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A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Right and the Good. Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Philip Stratton-Lake.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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The structure of justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.details
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Making Counterfactual Assumptions.Frank Veltman - 2005 - Journal of Semantics 22 (2):159-180.details
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Causation and manipulability.James Woodward - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Explanatory generalizations, part I: A counterfactual account.James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):1–24.details
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Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.details
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(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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An internalist externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.details
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Color and similarity.Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.details
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The mystery of direct perceptual justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.details
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Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).details
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The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
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