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The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
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How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.details
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The nature of epistemic space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.details
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Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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The value of hope.Luc Bovens - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):667-681.details
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Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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How We Hope: A Moral Psychology.Adrienne M. Martin - 2014 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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The nature of hope.Ariel Meirav - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):216-233.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Rational hope.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):127-141.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Epistemic Possibility.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):119-142.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.details
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Navigating Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):501-519.details
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Emotions and knowledge.Robert M. Gordon - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details
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Hope.R. S. Downie - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (2):248-251.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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Rationality redeemed?: further dialogues on an educational ideal.Harvey Siegel - 1997 - London: Routedge.details
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Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action.Andrew Chignell - 2014 - In Gordon E. Michalson (ed.), Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Rational Hope, Moral Order, and the Revolution of the Will.Andrew Chignell - 2013 - In Eric Watkins (ed.), Divine Order, Human Order, and the Order of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197-218.details
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Moral Anxiety and Moral Agency.Charlie Kurth - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5:171-195.details
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.details
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Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.details
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Hope.John Patrick Day - 1969 - American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):89-102.details
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