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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.David Hawkins - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (3):221-227.details
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Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.details
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On presumption.Edna Ullman-Margalit - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):143-163.details
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Conditionalization and observation.Paul Teller - 1973 - Synthese 26 (2):218-258.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2019 - Synthese:1-38.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael D. Resnik - 1987 - Univ of Minnesota Press.details
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Completeness for counter-doxa conditionals – using ranking semantics.Eric Raidl - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):861-891.details
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Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief.Eric Raidl & Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):577-609.details
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Two autonomous axiom systems for the calculus of probabilities.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (21):51-57.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Stability and justification in hume’s treatise.Louis Loeb - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):233-235.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
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What are centered worlds.Shen‐yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.details
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Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
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Subjunctives, dispositions and chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.details
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The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference.Henry E. Kyburg - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):109-125.details
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Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
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The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability.B. O. Koopman - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):153-154.details
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Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.details
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Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.details
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Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.details
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Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-23.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Conditioning using conditional expectations: the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox.Zalán Gyenis, Gabor Hofer-Szabo & Miklós Rédei - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2595-2630.details
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Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.details
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