Switch to: Citations

References in:

Full & Partial Belief

In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   257 citations  
  • Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
    I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   886 citations  
  • The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.
    Perry argues that certain sorts of indexicals are 'essential', in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions. This paper also introduces the influential idea that certain sorts of indexicals play a special role in thought, and have a special connection to action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   884 citations  
  • Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. In this book, Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For instance, your .4 credence that it is raining outside can constitute knowledge, in just the same way that your full beliefs can. In addition, you can know that it might be raining, and that if it is raining then it is probably cloudy, where this knowledge is not knowledge of propositions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • The web of belief.Willard Van Orman Quine & J. S. Ullian - 1970 - New York,: Random House. Edited by J. S. Ullian.
    A compact, coherent introduction to the study of rational belief, this text provides points of entry to such areas of philosophy as theory of knowledge, methodology of science, and philosophy of language. The book is accessible to all undergraduates and presupposes no philosophical training.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   336 citations  
  • Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   589 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   813 citations  
  • Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
    The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. Different versions of this theory generate different versions of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  • A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
    Degrees of belief; Dempster's rule of combination; Simple and separable support functions; The weights of evidence; Compatible frames of discernment; Support functions; The discernment of evidence; Quasi support functions; Consonance; Statistical evidence; The dual nature of probable reasoning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   253 citations  
  • (4 other versions)The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.
    “Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   300 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   854 citations  
  • (1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   574 citations  
  • Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemology.Richard Foley - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    In everyday life we either express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms or we resort to numerical probabilities: I believe it's going to rain or my chance of winning is one in a million. The Stability of Belief develops a theory of rational belief that allows us to reason with all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief simultaneously.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Wolfgang Spohn presents the first full account of the dynamic laws of belief, by means of ranking theory. This book is his long-awaited presentation of ranking theory and its ramifications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.
    This book is devoted to a different proposal--that the logical structure of the scientist's method should guarantee eventual arrival at the truth given the scientist's background assumptions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  • Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.
    In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
    Historical records show that there was no real concept of probability in Europe before the mid-seventeenth century, although the use of dice and other randomizing objects was commonplace. Ian Hacking presents a philosophical critique of early ideas about probability, induction, and statistical inference and the growth of this new family of ideas in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Hacking invokes a wide intellectual framework involving the growth of science, economics, and the theology of the period. He argues that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  • (1 other version)Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
    Kolmogorov''s axiomatization of probability includes the familiarratio formula for conditional probability: 0).$$ " align="middle" border="0">.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   329 citations  
  • Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
    There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   360 citations  
  • The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  • Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   328 citations  
  • (1 other version)Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Gärdenfors - 1988 - Studia Logica 49 (3):421-424.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   340 citations  
  • Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing.Bruno De Finetti - 1972 - New York: John Wiley.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  • How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.
    According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Theories of Probability.Terrence Fine - 1973 - Academic Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael D. Resnik - 1987 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • (1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   261 citations  
  • (1 other version)Pursuit of Truth.W. V. O. Quine - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (253):384-385.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   269 citations  
  • What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  • Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
    Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • (1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   177 citations  
  • The Right and the Good.David Ross - 1930 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Philip Stratton-Lake.
    The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   231 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.Wolfgang Spohn - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   218 citations  
  • Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):444-448.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   201 citations  
  • Conditionalization and observation.Paul Teller - 1973 - Synthese 26 (2):218-258.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   190 citations  
  • Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.
    Until recently, it seemed like no theory about the relationship between rational credence and rational outright belief could reconcile three independently plausible assumptions: that our beliefs should be logically consistent, that our degrees of belief should be probabilistic, and that a rational agent believes something just in case she is sufficiently confident in it. Recently a new formal framework has been proposed that can accommodate these three assumptions, which is known as “the stability theory of belief” or “high probability cores.” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  • Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
    Conditional probability is one of the central concepts in probability theory. Some notion of conditional probability is part of every interpretation of probability. The basic mathematical fact about conditional probability is that p(A |B) = p(A ∧B)/p(B) where this is defined. However, while it has been typical to take this as a definition or analysis of conditional probability, some (perhaps most prominently Hájek, 2003) have argued that conditional probability should instead be taken as the primitive notion, so that this formula (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.
    In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for the revision of qualitative beliefs. The first method is generated by a simplistic diachronic Lockean thesis requiring coherence with the agent’s posterior credences after conditionalization. The second method is the orthodox AGM approach to belief revision. Our primary aim is to determine when the two methods may disagree in their recommendations and when they must agree. We establish a number of novel results about their relative behavior. Our most notable finding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
    Is it possible to give an explicit definition of belief in terms of subjective probability, such that believed propositions are guaranteed to have a sufficiently high probability, and yet it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1? We prove the answer is ‘yes’, and that given some plausible logical postulates on belief that involve a contextual “cautiousness” threshold, there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations