- Rules for the Inquiring Mind: A Unified Framework of Norms of Inquiry.Luis Rosa - 2024 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality.Benjamin Lennertz - 2023 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1235-1255.details
|
|
Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Reasoning in attitudes.Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–31.details
|
|
Functionalism About Inference.Jared Warren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
|
|
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):416-442.details
|
|
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
|
|
Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
|
|
Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
|
|
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
|
|
Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
|
|
A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
|
|
Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.details
|
|
When Obstinacy is a Better Policy.Justin Dallmann - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
|
|
You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
|
|
Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
|
|
A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
|
|
Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
|
|
Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
|
|
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
|
|
The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
|
|
Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
|
|
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
|
|
Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
|
|
Attitudes in Active Reasoning.Julia Staffel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
|
|
Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
|
|
Inferential practical knowledge of meaning.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
|
|
A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
|
|
Review of Selene Arfini, Ignorant Cognition, Springer, 2019. [REVIEW]Matías Osta-Vélez - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 40 (2):231-236.details
|
|
A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan H.\'aje & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
|
|
Inference and the structure of concepts.Matías Osta Vélez - 2020 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
|
|
Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content.Rafael Ventura - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2803-2820.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Predicament of Choice.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 294-313.details
|
|